


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## POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

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HENRY FROWDE, M.A.



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
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## POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS

AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

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IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

VOLUME III

TWO ESSAYS

BOOKS III, IV, AND V-TEXT AND NOTES

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#### PREFACE

#### TO THE THIRD AND FOURTH VOLUMES.

My first words must be words of regret. The lamented death of Professor Susemihl not many months ago, which no one deplores more than I do, leaves a great gap in the ranks of Aristotelian scholars. His learning, his industry and powers of work, his thoroughness, and his acuteness will long be missed. The students of Aristotle's writings have abundant cause to be grateful to him, and none more so than myself. Even when I have differed from him most, I have always found his views suggestive and instructive. It was from him that I first learnt what the close study of a work of Aristotle's meant.

Of the friends who gave me assistance in the revision of the proofs of my first two volumes three—Mr. Alfred Robinson, Mr. R. L. Nettleship, and Mr. Evelyn Abbott—are, to my deep regret, no more. I have especially often missed the valued help of Mr. Alfred Robinson, whose death several years ago was a great loss to many besides myself.

Owing to weak health, the Warden of Wadham, Mr. G. E. Thorley, has, unfortunately for me, been unable to give me the assistance which he kindly gave me in the revision of the proofs of the first two volumes. Professor Bywater's suggestions have been but few—far fewer than I could have wished—but, on the other hand, I have gained a new and very valuable ally in Mr. Herbert Richards, whose Greek scholarship needs no

commendation from me, and who has most kindly found time to peruse all the proofs of the explanatory notes contained in the third and fourth volumes and to give me the benefit of his comments on them, which have been, I need not say, of great use to me, though I am alone responsible for the views expressed in this work. The references in the General Index under the name of Mr. Richards will suffice to show how many valuable suggestions I owe to him. For emendations of the text and transpositions not explicitly attributed to him I am responsible.

In five or six of the Additions and Corrections to Vols. I, II, and III placed at the end of Vol. III I have profited by some remarks on my commentary on the first two Books kindly sent me by Prof. Robinson Ellis in 1888 shortly after its appearance.

To all who have assisted me with information or suggestions in the correction of the proofs, and among them to the readers of the Press, my best thanks are due.

To Mr. F. G. Kenyon I am greatly indebted for the collation of MS. Harl. 6874 which I publish in an Appendix to my third volume. Many students have had cause to testify to his unvarying kindness and readiness to assist, and I can add my emphatic testimony to theirs.


I have not carried my collation of the Politics in O<sup>1</sup> (MS. 112, Corpus Christi College, Oxford) beyond the first two Books, but I have completed my collation of MS. Phillipps 891 (z), a manuscript of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation which, as will be seen from my critical notes (see for instance those on 1306 a 24 and 1315 b 31), occasionally offers excellent readings, found in no other MS. of the Latin Translation hitherto collated. It is throughout akin to a, though it sometimes differs from a, but the original reading of a has often been erased by a corrector, and where this has happened, the original

reading of z commonly remains intact and furnishes a probable clue to the original reading of a. I have again to thank the owner of the Phillipps Library, Cheltenham, for giving me every facility for the collation of this MS.

A list of the symbols and abbreviations used in the work will be found at the end of the fourth volume.

In my third and fourth volumes I have been able to refer to the English translation by Messrs. Costelloe and Muirhead of the volume of Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen which relates to Aristotle, and to the English translation by Messrs. Brooks and Nicklin of the first volume of Gilbert's Handbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer. The first volume of Gerth's edition of the Syntax of Kühner's Greek Grammar did not appear till my revision of the proofs of the third volume was almost completed. My references to Dittenberger's Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum are for a similar reason mostly to the first edition. The references in the first two volumes to Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften are to the first edition of the work, those in the third and fourth to the second edition, published in 1888.

NOVEMBER, 1901.



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# ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS AND THE LATIN TRANS-LATION OF WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE. II.

THE following remarks are in continuation of those contained in vol. ii. p. xli sqq. My object in them has especially been to study the characteristics of the two families into which the MSS. of the Politics fall and the errors to which they are most liable, and also to throw light on the methods of translation adopted in the vetus versio, in the hope that these inquiries may help us to discover the true reading in the many cases in which the MSS. of the two families offer different readings.

It has long been observed (see vol. ii. p. lvii) that the Omissions MSS. of the first family ( $\Pi^1$ ) are prone to omit both sentences and words. These omissions occur less often in some Books than in others. They are less numerous in the Sixth (old Fourth), the Seventh (old Fifth), and the Eighth (old Sixth) than in the other Books. Very few omissions occur between 1326 b and 1330 a (inclusive of these columns), none in 1332 b and 1333 a, 1334 a, 1338 a, and 1340 a.

Sentences are omitted in  $\Pi^1$  owing to a similarity of ending in 1253 b 25, 1275 a 28, 1287 b 38, 1337 a 29, b 25, and 1299 a 8, owing to a similarity of the beginning in 1324 b 28 and 1311 b 37, and for no clear reason in 1275 a 11 and 1331 a 21.

Single words are still more often omitted in  $\Pi^1$ , and

especially small words, as I have pointed out in Class. Rev. 7. 305 (1893). Out of 184 omissions in  $\Pi^1$  117 are omissions of words of one syllable. 'If I do not err, καί is omitted in  $\Pi^1$  twenty-four times in the course of the Politics,  $\mu \dot{\epsilon} \nu$  eight and  $\delta \dot{\epsilon}$  nine times,  $\tau \iota s$  and its parts six times, είναι five times, αν five times, and εκ thrice. M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> omit the article thirty-five times, and  $\tau\epsilon$  eight times, and very possibly  $\Gamma$  did the like, though of this we cannot be sure, for the Vetus Interpres seldom renders  $\tau \epsilon$ , and, writing in Latin, of course seldom renders the article' (Class. Rev. ibid.).  $\Pi^1$  are particularly prone to omit  $\tilde{\eta}$ ,  $\kappa \alpha l$ , and the article, where these small words are repeated near together. See as to # 1268 a 6, 1282 a 17, 1324 b 30, 1298 b 32, and 1305 a 32 (it is in these passages only that  $\tilde{\eta}$  is omitted in  $\Pi^1$ ); as to  $\kappa a \ell$ 1253 a 1, 25, 1255 a 5, 1259 b 31, 1260 b 17, 1263 a 23, 1264 a 16, 1317 b 6; as to the article 1265 a 12, 1266 b 3, 1268 a 17, 1269 a 38, 1272 b 28, 1279 a 34, 1282 a 40, 1285 a 6, 1325 a 8, 1331 b 5, 8, 1332 a 22, 1316 a 36.

Nor is it only sentences and words that  $\Pi^1$  are apt to omit. These MSS, often omit syllables, mostly the first or last syllables of words—the first in 1262 a 30, 1273 a 10, 1283 a 11 (here, however, the αν- of ανισότητα is omitted because πâσαν precedes), 1285 b 36, 1342 b 32, and 1298 a 31; the last in 1268 b 16, 1276 b 20, 1278 b 40, 1283 b 20, 1287 b 19, 1335 b 35, and 1315 a 15. In 1336 b 20 and 1300 b 28 the first two syllables are omitted in II1. In 1335 b 4 and 1317 a 36 a syllable or more than a syllable is omitted from the middle of the word. The first letter of a word is clearly omitted in  $\Pi^1$  in 1324 b 30 and 1315 b 18, and probably in 1265 b 19, 1297 b 7, and 1320 a 29; the last letter often disappears, especially when it is a v or s (see 1255 a 30, 1265 b 21, 1267 b 40, 1337 b 41, 1297 a 17, 1300 a 32, 1308 b 25, and 1309 a 31). On the other hand, two or three words are repeated in  $\Pi^1$  in 1333 b 38 and 1297 a 24.

Omissions, Many omissions occur in  $\Pi^2$  also, and some of them are etc. in  $\Pi^2$ . omissions of a sentence or of more sentences than one.

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Such omissions occur in 1334 a 37, 1337 b 16-20, 34-35, 1298 a 6, 1301 a 30-31, 1307 b 32-34, but they are easily explained, for they are caused by a similarity of ending. In 1292 b 32, if  $\Pi^2$  are wrong in omitting the sentence omitted, they have not this excuse. In 1336 b 18 the words omitted by  $\Pi^2$  are probably rightly omitted. Omissions of two words occur in 1285 b 16 (αὶ πάτριοι), 1326 b 32 ( $\tau \delta \nu \delta \rho \delta \nu$ ), and 1335 a 37 ( $\delta \epsilon \hat{\imath} \chi \rho \hat{\eta} \sigma \theta \alpha \imath$ ): at least it seems likely that  $\Pi^2$  are wrong in omitting these words. Omissions of a single word occur in 1259 a 37 (μέρη), 1276 a 33  $(\xi\theta\nu\sigma)$ , 1288 b 16  $(\xi\rho\gamma\sigma\nu)$ , 27  $(\partial\gamma\alpha\theta\partial\nu)$ , 1306 a 6  $(\epsilon\partial\theta\nu)$ , and perhaps in 1304 b 6, where airíai may have dropped out after ai. Omissions of small words, and especially of καί and the article, are frequent in  $\Pi^2$ , though not nearly as frequent as in  $\Pi^1$ . Omissions of a syllable occur in  $\Pi^2$  in 1294 b 26 (ἄδηλος for διάδηλος), 1314 b 7 (δόξει for δόξειεν), and 1320 a 38 (συναθροίζων  $\Pi^1$ , αθροίζων  $\Pi^2$ ). It is not often that  $\Pi^2$ can clearly be shown to omit a letter.

We note in  $\Pi^2$  a certain tendency to substitute o for  $\omega$ (e. g. in 1269 a 23, 1274 b 13, 1286 a 37, 1294 b 38, 1302 b 6, and 1317 a 39), and these MSS. substitute ov for  $\omega$  in 1273 a 9 and 1314 a 18, and w for ov in 1301 a 38 and 1307 a 38.

In five passages  $\Pi^2$  have the agrist infinitive, while  $\Pi^1$ (or at any rate M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, for the reading of Γ is uncertain) have the present infinitive. These passages are 1260 b 36, 1267 a 35, 1284 a 5, 1332 b 1, and 1317 a 36.

Some errors in the MSS. go back to an early date; thus Errors of the errors of  $\phi\iota\Lambda$ ίτια for  $\phi\iota\Delta$ ίτια in  $\Pi^1$  (1271 a 27, 1272 a 2, transcription of b 34), of O $v\sigma\iota\hat{\omega}\nu$ , O $v\sigma\iota$ a $\iota$  for  $\Theta v\sigma\iota\hat{\omega}\nu$ ,  $\Theta v\sigma\iota$ a $\iota$  in  $\Pi^1$  (1285 b 10, early date or other-16), and of  $\Delta\epsilon\hat{\iota}$  for 'A $\epsilon$ l in  $\Pi$  (1296 b 7) no doubt originated wise. in days when uncials were in use.

Errors shared by all the MSS. and the Vetus Interpres must also have originated early. Under this head fall-

1274 b 7, ἐπίσκεψιν for ἐπίσκηψιν

1275 b 39, kai for kav

1276 b 9, λέγοιμεν for λέγομεν (or has αν been omitted?)

1278 a 34, αὐτῶν for ἀστῶν (αὐτῶν ΓΠ, but ἀστῶν Vat. Pal. and Codex Hamilton)

1280 b 4, αδικήσωσιν for αδικήσουσιν

1287 a 4, βασιλείας for πολιτείας (Julian seems to have read βασιλείας: see critical note)

1324 b 37, δεσπόζον for δεσποστόν

1327 a 21, πολεμίους for πολέμους

32, ὑπάρχον for ὑπάρχοντα

1337 a 1, кадос for какос

1296 a 9, πολιτειών for πολιτών

1300 a 2, η η μισθός for η μισθοῦ

1306 a 30, σάμον for σίμον

1317 b 41, ἐπὶ for ἔτι.

Errors which we find in all extant MSS., though they were probably not present in the Greek text used by the Vetus Interpres, will also be of early date. Under this head fall—

1260 b 41, ἰσότης for εἶς ὁ τῆς

1266 b 2, δή or δέ for δ' ήδη

1278 b 20, περί for παρά

1283 a 7, ύπερέχειν for ύπερέχει.

Confusions of letters.

The mistakes which have given rise to these erroneous readings are mistakes easily made, and they frequently recur in the MSS. of the Politics. We often note a confusion of  $\epsilon$  and  $\eta$  (as in 1274 b 7), of  $\iota$  and  $\epsilon\iota$  (as in 1260 b 41), of  $\omega$  and  $\omega$  (as in 1280 b 4), of  $\pi \alpha \rho \alpha$  and  $\pi \epsilon \rho i$  (as in 1278 b 201), of πόλις, πολίτης, and πολιτεία (as in 1296 a 9), of πολέμους and πολεμίους (as in 1327 a 21). For the interchange of kav and kai reference may be made to 1282 b 8 and 1290 a 1, for that of o and oi in 1276 b 9 to 1271 a 40 and to Vat. Pal. in 1275 b 10, and for that of καλώς and κακῶς to 1294 a 7, while the change of ἀστῶν into αὐτῶν, of Σίμον into Σάμον, and of ἔτι into ἐπί needs no explanation. The substitution of ὑπάρχον for ὑπάρχοντα is probably due to the omission of a  $\tau$  over the last syllable of  $\hat{v}\pi\hat{a}\rho\chi\sigma\nu$ . That of δεσπόζου for δεσποστόυ appears to point to a confusion of στ and ζ. The erroneous readings in the four

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This error may probably be due to the misreading of a contraction.

remaining passages (1287 a 4, 1300 a 2, 1266 b 2, 1283 a 7) are easily explainable.

Among other confusions of letters which are of frequent occurrence in the Politics may be mentioned those of a with at (1290 b 19, 1309 b 37, 1318 a 3, 1322 b 37), of at with or (1268 a 11, 1274 b 14, 1285 a 24, b 5, 1339 a 1, 1294 a 37, 1313 b 39), of av with ov (1274 a 4, 1280 a 29, 1338 a 31), of ois with ovs (1292 b 36, 1309 b 14) and perhaps with ων (1272 a 29, b 16, 1302 b 30), of a with εν, which occurs in 1288 a 15 not only in II2, but also in Vat. Pal., and of n with  $\epsilon_{\ell}$  and  $\rho$  with  $\omega$  and  $\rho v$ , which are too common to need illustration.

The variations of reading hitherto noticed have been due Errors in to errors of transcription, but many variations of reading in the MSS. arising the MSS, are evidently due not to this cause, but to the from the occasional use in the MSS. copied by the scribes, or perhaps biguous in the archetype, of ambiguous contractions or contractions contraceasily misread or misinterpreted. Just as in the first the like. of the four handwritings of the papyrus of the  $A\theta\eta\nu\alpha\iota\omega\nu$ Πολιτεία o written above the line stands indiscriminately for -oι -ov -ov -oιs and -ovs (see Sandys, 'Aθ. Πολ. p. xxxvi), so in the MSS. from which the existing MSS. of the Politics were copied the terminations of words, and especially of common words like the cases of αὐτός and οὖτος, were probably often represented by ambiguous contractions.

In 1337 a 28, where the true reading is αὐτὸν, Ms has ἀν with  $\tau$  added over it, and it is very likely that the Vetus Interpres found the same contraction in the Greek text used by him and took it to represent αὐτῶν, for his rendering is ipsorum. The next word in the same line is variously given by  $P^3 \Pi^3$  as  $\alpha \hat{v} \tau o \hat{v}$ , by  $M^s$  as  $\alpha \hat{v} \tau \hat{\omega}$ , and by  $\Gamma P^1$ as αὐτῶ, the fact probably being that the writers of all these MSS. had before them an ambiguous contraction (perhaps ai with τ over it). So in 1312 b 9 P2. 3 have ai with τ over it, and the other MSS. make more or less successful attempts to interpret this contraction, Γ P1 having αὐτη̂s rightly, M<sup>8</sup> αὐτῆς, P<sup>4</sup> Ald. αύτοῦ, and so forth. The same thing holds of  $o\tilde{v}\tau os$ . In 1297 a 1 M<sup>8</sup> has  $\tau o\tilde{v}$  with  $\tau$  over it,  $\Gamma P^1 \tau o\tilde{v}\tau \omega$ , and the rest rightly  $\tau o\tilde{v}\tau ovs$ , the ambiguous contraction reproduced in M<sup>8</sup> being interpreted with varying success by the rest.

In 1283 b 9 M8 has  $\hat{v}\pi\alpha\rho'$  with x added over  $\rho'$ , P1  $\hat{v}\pi\acute{a}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota$ , the rest rightly ὑπάρχη: in 1307 b 12 Ms has χειροτονησαν with τ over a and P1 χειροτονήσαντας, the true reading being χειροτονήσοντα: in 1335 a 27 Ms has  $\pi\lambda\eta$  with  $\theta'$  over  $\eta$ , which Vet. Int. perhaps interprets, though wrongly, by his rendering multum: in 1303 b 33 Ms has a symbol for the termination of the word which Vet. Int. renders Estiaeis: in 1309 b 28 P3 has ποιη with σ over η and M8 pr. P2 ποιήση, the true reading being ποιήσει. It is probably owing to the use of an ambiguous contraction for πάντας that many MSS. have πάνν in 1286 a 25, and we may explain in a similar way the frequent interchange in the MSS. of πόλις πολίτης and πολιτεία (see for instance Susemihl's apparatus criticus in 1326 b 5, 1304 a 17, and 1318 a 9), and the false reading  $\hat{\epsilon}\pi\alpha\iota\nu\circ\hat{\nu}\mu\epsilon\nu$  in place of  $\hat{\epsilon}\pi\alpha\iota\nu\circ\hat{\nu}\sigma\iota\nu$  which we find in  $\Pi^1$  in 1289 a 1 (cp. 1267 a 25, where M<sup>8</sup> has ἐπιθυμοῦ in place of επιθυμοῦσιν, the reading of P1, and επιθυμήσουσιν, the reading of  $\Gamma \Pi^2$ , and 1258 b 4, where  $\Pi^1$  have  $\epsilon \pi o \rho \iota \sigma \dot{\alpha} \mu \epsilon \theta a$  and  $\Pi^2$ ἐπορίσθη). The divergence of the MSS. in 1282 a 27, where P2. 3 etc. have μέγιστον, M8 μέγιστοι, P1. 4 μέγισται, and Γ μέγιστα, may also be thus explained. For other possible instances of the same thing see the passages referred to in vol. ii. p. l, note 2.

That errors may have arisen from this cause at a very early date is clear from the fact that the papyrus of the 'Aθηναίων Πολιτεία is full of contractions, though, according to Mr. Kenyon (Palaeography of Greek Papyri, p. 92), it is 'highly probable' that it was 'written not very far from the year 90'. If the writers of the MSS. of the Politics which have come down to us, or the writers of the MSS. they copied, have had to any large extent to expand contractions of the kind described above, skill will have been needed by them in the discharge of their function no less than fidelity. We must bear this in mind in reference to

the question of the comparative claims of the two families of MSS. There can be little doubt that they both descend from an archetype in which ambiguous contractions were occasionally, and perhaps frequently, used, and the question evidently arises, which set of copyists, those of the first or those of the second family, was the more successful in expanding these ambiguous contractions. This is a question which it is not easy to answer positively, but the presumption is in favour of the more careful copyists, and, if we may judge by a comparison of omissions, the copyists to whom we owe the MSS. of the second family did their work more carefully than those to whom we owe the MSS. of the first. It would be rash, however, to dogmatize as to the superiority of either of the two families of MSS. in passages which are likely to have been affected by this source of error.

So far we have been concerned with variations of reading Variations of a more or less minute kind. In not a few cases, however, of reading the readings offered by II1 diverge widely from those minute offered by  $\Pi^2$ . The following list comprises most of the more marked and less easily explicable of these divergences:-

```
\Pi^1
BOOK I.
```

1254 a 15, wv 1255 a 24, δλως (Π1 P6 Mb Tb L8) 32, έξ ἀρχῆς b 26, τούτων 1256 b 1, κομίζονται 1258 b 27, τέταρτον

 $\Pi^2$ 

πανταχοῦ τῶν τοιούτων πορίζονται τρίτον

 $\delta \epsilon$ 

ãμα

#### BOOK II.

1260 b 28, τίς (Γ?) 1261 b 2, τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τούς ίσους είκειν τὸ δ' (τόδ' Γ) ώς όμοίους είναι έξ άρχης 1264 b 31, dè

έν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τους ίσους είκειν (or οίκειν) όμοιους (οτ όμοιως) τοις έξ άρχης yàp

			-
ı		ľ	н
ı	п	ı	•

 $\Pi^2$ 

1265 a 4,	$\epsilon$ is ( $\Gamma$ ?)	πρὸς	
35,	έξιν	χρησιν	
1266 a 37,	ἀναγκαῖον added after εἶναι	ἀναγκαῖον omitted	
1267 b 26,	κόμης	κόσμω πολυτελεῖ	
1268 b 5,	δίκης	κρίσεως	
1269 b 21,	τοιοῦτος ἐστίν	φανερός έστι τοιοῦτος ών	
1271 b 28,	κρητες	λύκτιοι	
1272 a 35,	έκ τινων	ἐκ τῶν	
1273 a 41,	ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τε βε-	ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι βε-	
	βαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι	βαίως άριστοκρατικήν πολι-	
	την πολιτείαν	τείαν	

#### Book III.

1281 a 17,	$\delta \epsilon \hat{\iota} \ (\Gamma ?)$	$\chi \rho \dot{\eta}$
28,	σπουδαΐα	δίκαια
1282 a 32,	μειζόνων	μεγάλων
b 5,	διορίσαι	δηλῶσαι
1285 a 12,		$γοῦν (οὖν P^4)$
1286 a 25,	πάντας Π1 Ρ4	πάνυ
1287 a 31,	φθείρει or διαφθείρει	διαστρέφει

### BOOK IV (VII).

1326 a 21, μερών	μορίων
25, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ	άλλὰ μὴν
1328 a 14, νομίζουσι	ύπολαμβάνουσι
b 15, â (Г?)	$\delta \nu$
1329 a 20, μέρος	γένος
b 13, δέ	γὰρ
1330 b 14, ταύτην	τοιαύτην
2 Ι, οἰκείων	<b>ιδίων</b>
1332 b 40, του τοιοῦτον	τοῦτον τὸν
1335 b 4, παιδείας	παιδονομίας
28, δεῖ (Γ?)	χρή
39, καὶ	ή
1336 b 20, θετέον (θετητέον M8)	νομοθετητέον

### Book V (VIII).

1337 a	36,	διά	$\pi\epsilon\rho$ ì
b	22,	εἴρηται (Γ?)	$\epsilon \lambda \epsilon \chi \theta \eta$

#### $\Pi^1$

 $\Pi^2$ 

1339 b 21, γὰρ	γοῦν
1340 b 7, 8è	γὰρ
1341 b 1, ἵαμβοι	σαμβύκαι
1342 b 32, διάνοιαν	παιδείαν οἷον

#### BOOK VI (IV).

1289 a 5,	ή	τοῦ
8,	γὰρ οτ γὰρ δὴ	δè
1292 a 17,	ό δημος ούτος	ό τοιοῦτος δημος
1293 a 21,	ή οί	εὶ μὲν
24,	πολλῶν	ἄλλων
b 24,	ἀποδοθείσας	άρτι βηθείσας
1294 a 36,	å	ὧν
1298 b 13,	τρόπου	διορισμόν
1300 b 30,	παρόντι	παντὶ

#### BOOK VII (V).

1301 b 26, πανταχοῦ Π¹ P²	πάντων
1308 b 17, ούτω ρυθμίζειν	οΰτως ἄγειν
1310 b 17, αὶ τυραννίδες	τῶν τυραννίδων
1315 a 38, ἀφαίρεσιν (Γ?)	παραίρεσιν ΟΓ παραίνεσιν

#### BOOK VIII (VI).

1317 b	17,	τοιούτων	τούτων
1319 a	7,	τοις παλαιοις	τοίς πολλοίς
1320 a	4,	μηδ'	$\hat{\eta}$
b	9,	τὴν ταραντίνων Ρ1, τὴν τα-	τὰ ταραντίνων
		ραντίνων followed by a	
		lacuna M8, την ταραν-	
		τίνων ἀρχήν Γ?	
1321 a	5,	μάλιστα	κάλλιστα

Of the above sixty-two divergences twelve are due to Tendency a source of error which—and this has not, I think, been of the MSS., and espenither to pointed out—especially affects the first family of cially of  $\Pi^1$ , MSS. I refer to the tendency of these MSS. to introduce to repeat a word or a word into the text which they repeat from a neighbouring words from a contiline, often the preceding or following line, the word thus guous line.

repeated sometimes extruding another word from the text and sometimes not doing so. Thus in  $\Pi^1$ —

in 1255 a 24  $\ddot{a}\mu a$  is displaced by  $\ddot{a}\lambda \omega s$  probably repeated from 21; in 1255 a 32  $\pi a \nu \tau a \chi o \hat{v}$  is displaced by  $\dot{\epsilon} \dot{\xi} \dot{a} \rho \chi \hat{\eta} s$  repeated from 30 sq.;

in 1265 a 35  $\chi\rho\hat{\eta}\sigma\nu$  is displaced by  $\tilde{\epsilon}\xi\nu$  probably repeated from  $\tilde{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ ;

in 1266 a 37 ἀναγκαῖον is added after εἶναι, being repeated from ἀναγκαίων in the preceding line;

in 1272 a 35 ἐκ τῶν is displaced by ἔκ τινων repeated from the preceding line;

in 1326 a 21  $\mu \rho \rho i \omega \nu$  is displaced by  $\mu \epsilon \rho \hat{\omega} \nu$  probably repeated from  $\mu \epsilon \rho \sigma$  in the preceding line;

in 1328 a 14 ὑπολαμβάνουσι is displaced by νομίζουσι repeated from νομίζουσιν in the following line;

in 1329 a 20  $\gamma \acute{\epsilon} vos$  is displaced by  $\mu \acute{\epsilon} \rho os$  perhaps repeated from 23; in 1289 a 5  $\tau o\hat{v}$  is displaced by  $\hat{\eta}$  repeated from the preceding line;

in 1298 b 13 διορισμόν is displaced by τρόπον repeated from the preceding line;

in 1320 a 4 η ολιγαρχείσθαι is displaced by μηδ' ολιγαρχείσθαι repeated from μηδ' ολιγαρχικόν in 2.

In 1268 b 5  $\Pi^2$  appear to fall into a similar error,  $\delta i \kappa \eta s$  being displaced in these MSS. by  $\kappa \rho i \sigma \epsilon \omega s$  repeated from the preceding line.

Occasionally all the MSS., and not those of the first or second family only, may be reasonably suspected of this error. Thus in 7. (5). 7. 1306 b 39, where all the MSS. except  $\Gamma$  have  $\delta\hat{\eta}\lambda o\nu$   $\delta\hat{\epsilon}$   $\kappa a\lambda$  ( $\Gamma$  omits  $\kappa a\lambda$ )  $\tau o\hat{\nu}\tau o$   $\hat{\epsilon}\kappa$   $\tau\hat{\eta}s$   $\Gamma\nu\rho\tau alov$   $\pi o\iota\hat{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\omega s$   $\tau\hat{\eta}s$   $\kappa a\lambda o\nu\mu\hat{\epsilon}\nu\eta s$   $E\hat{\nu}\nu o\mu las$ , the words  $\kappa a\lambda$   $\tau o\hat{\nu}\tau o$  are probably repeated by mistake from the preceding line. So again it is possible that in 2. 5. 1263 a 13, where almost all the MSS. have  $\lambda a\mu\beta \dot{a}\nu o\nu\tau as$ , and in 2. 6. 1265 b 2, where all have  $\pi\epsilon\rho\lambda$   $\tau\hat{\alpha}s$   $\pi\delta\lambda\epsilon\iota s$ , they have suffered in a similar way,  $\lambda a\mu-\beta \dot{a}\nu o\nu\tau as$  being repeated from  $\lambda a\mu\beta \dot{a}\nu o\nu\sigma\iota$  in the following line and  $\pi\epsilon\rho\lambda$   $\tau\hat{\alpha}s$   $\pi\delta\lambda\epsilon\iota s$  from  $\pi\epsilon\rho\lambda$   $\tau\hat{\alpha}s$   $\pi\delta\lambda\epsilon\iota s$  in the preceding line. The same thing may have happened to all the MSS. in 2. 7. 1267 a 8, where  $\hat{\epsilon}\pi\iota\partial\nu\muo\hat{\epsilon}\epsilon\nu$  may have taken the place of  $\hat{a}\delta\iota\kappao\hat{\epsilon}\epsilon\nu$  through repetition from  $\hat{\epsilon}\pi\iota\partial\nu\mu\hat{a}\ell\nu$ , 6 (see explanatory note

on 1267 a 5), in 2. 8. 1268 b 1, where  $\gamma \epsilon \omega \rho \gamma \dot{\eta} \sigma \epsilon \iota$  may have displaced some other word owing to the presence of  $\gamma \epsilon \omega \rho - \gamma o \hat{\nu} \nu \tau a s$  in the preceding line, and in 4(7). 9. 1329 a 14, where  $\pi o \lambda \iota \tau \epsilon \dot{\iota} a \nu$  may be a repetition of  $\pi o \lambda \iota \tau \epsilon \dot{\iota} a \nu$  in 1329 a 12 and may have pushed out some other and more appropriate word (see explanatory note on 1329 a 13).

 $\Gamma$  Ms are sometimes affected by this cause of error when  $P^1$  escapes. Thus in 2. 6. 1265 b 11 ållas repeated from ållav in the preceding line has displaced  $\pi \lambda \epsilon l \sigma \tau a \iota s$  in  $\Gamma$  Ms, in 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 3  $\beta \epsilon \lambda \tau \iota \omega v$  from the preceding line has displaced  $\kappa \dot{a} \lambda \lambda \iota \omega v$  in Ms and probably  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. melius), and in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 25  $\tau \rho \dot{\omega} \pi \omega v$  from the preceding line has displaced  $\chi \rho \dot{\omega} \nu \omega v$  in  $\Gamma$  Ms.

The MSS. of the second family are not free from this kind of error, though they have suffered much less from it than those of the first. We have already seen that in 1268 b 5  $\kappa\rho\ell\sigma\epsilon\omega$ s repeated from the preceding line probably takes the place of  $\delta\ell\kappa\eta$ s in  $\Pi^2$ . So again in 2. 4. 1262 b 33  $\Pi^2$  prefix  $\epsilon\ell$ s to  $\tau\sigma\nu$ s ållovs  $\pi\sigma\lambda\ell\tau$ as because  $\epsilon\ell$ s  $\tau\sigma\nu$ s ållovs  $\pi\sigma\lambda\ell\tau$ as occurs in the preceding line, and in  $\delta$  (4). 14. 1298 b 35  $P^{2\cdot 3}$  add  $\tau\delta$   $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\sigma$ s after  $\delta\epsilon\ell$   $\pi\sigma\iota\epsilon\ell\nu$  because  $\delta\epsilon\ell$   $\pi\sigma\iota\epsilon\ell\nu$   $\tau\delta$   $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\sigma$ s occurs in the following line.

Twelve, then, of the sixty-two variations of reading which Other have been enumerated may be thus accounted for. Five causes to which variothers (1255 b 26, 1330 b 14, 1332 b 40, 1292 a 17, 1317 b ations of 17) are due to an interchange of  $0\bar{v}\tau os$  and  $\tau o\iota o\bar{v}\tau os$ , four the less minutekind (1264 b 31, 1329 b 13, 1340 b 7, 1289 a 8) to an interchange are due. of  $\delta\epsilon$  and  $\gamma\delta\rho$  (the contractions being somewhat similar), and the eleven following to an interchange of not very dissimilar words—

1256 b 1, κομίζονται and πορίζονται
1282 b 5, διορίσαι and δηλώσαι
1285 a 12)
1339 b 21)
1287 a 31, διαφθείρει and διαστρέφει
1341 b 1, ἴαμβοι and σαμβύκαι
1293 a 24, πολλών and ἄλλων

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1293 b 24, ἀποδοθείσας and ἄρτι ἡηθείσας 1300 b 30, παρόντι and παντὶ 1319 a 7, τοῖς παλαιοῖς and τοῖς πολλοῖς 1321 a 5, μάλιστα and κάλλιστα.

In two other passages (1271 b 28 and 1308 b 17) a gloss has probably displaced the true reading in  $\Pi^1$ , and in three (1335b 4, 1336b 20, and 1342b 32) one or more syllables have been omitted in  $\Pi^1$ . The variations of reading in 1267 b 26 and 1269 b 21 are probably due to the tendency of  $\Pi^1$  to omit words. In 1286 a 25 the substitution of πάνυ for πάντας, and in 1301 b 26 that of πάντων for πανταχοῦ, may well be due to ambiguous contractions. In 1258 b 27 the substitution of τέταρτον for τρίτον, though wrong, is natural enough, τρίτον having occurred in 25. In 1330 b 21 the substitution in  $\Pi^1$  of cikelwy for  $l\delta(wy)$  is explained in the critical note on the passage. In 1282 a 32 the interchange of μειζόνων and μεγάλων resembles that of πλείους and πολλούς in 1290 b 2, that of βέλτιστου and βέλτιον in 1333 b 7, and that of φανερωτάτη and φανερωτέρα in 1293 b 32. As to 1261 b 2 and 1273 a 41 something has already been said in vol. ii. pp. 234 sq. and lv. The following variations of reading remain, sixteen in number:-

$\Pi^1$	$\Pi^2$
1254 a 15, ŭv	$\delta\epsilon$
1260 b 28, τίς (Γ?)	η
1265 a 4, els (T?)	πρὸς
1281 a 17 1335 b 28 \ \delta\epsilon(\Gamma?)	$\chi_{ ho\grave{\eta}}$
1281 a 28, σπουδαία	δίκαια
1326 a 25, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ	ἀλλὰ μὴν
1328 b 15 1294 a 36	మ్
1335 b 39, каї	$\vec{\eta}$
1337 a 36, διà	περί
b 22, εἴρηται (Γ?)	$\epsilon \lambda \epsilon \chi \theta \eta$
1293 a 21, noi	εὶ μὲν
1310 b 17, αὶ τυραννίδες	τῶν τυραννίδων
1315 a 38, ἀφαίρεσιν (Γ?)	παραίρεσιν ΟΓ παραίνεσιν

 $\Pi^2$  $\Pi^1$ 

1320 b 9, την ταραντίνων P1, την τὰ ταραντίνων ταραντίνων followed by a lacuna Ms, την ταραντίνων άρχήν Γ?

In seven of these passages (1260 b 28, 1265 a 4, 1281 a 17, 1335 b 28, 1281 a 28, 1335 b 39, 1337 b 22) words not themselves similar, but of similar meaning are interchanged, and in an eighth (1315 a 38) the interchange of ἀφαίρεσιν and παραίρεσιν may well be the result of accident. The divergences in the remaining eight (1254 a 15, 1326 a 25, 1328 b 15, 1294 a 36, 1337 a 36, 1293 a 21, 1310 b 17, 1320 b 9) are less easily explained.

A certain number of variations of reading are probably Variations due, as has been said already in vol. ii. p. liii, to grammarian due to revisers of the text. Thus, while both families use the rian revisers nominative μόναρχος (1292 a 11, 15 and 1313 b 39), not of the text. μονάρχης,  $\Pi^2$  use the oblique cases of μόναρχος,  $\Pi^1$  almost always those of μονάρχης 1. So again Ms P1 and possibly Γ have  $\partial \psi \circ \pi \circ i \eta \tau i \kappa \dot{\eta}$  in 1255 b 26, while  $\Pi^2$  have  $\partial \psi \circ \pi \circ i \kappa \dot{\eta}$ , and in 1256 a 6 Ms P1 and possibly Γ have κερκιδοποιητική, while  $\Pi^2$  have κερκιδοποιική. In 1289 b 32, again,  $M^{s}$  P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ have ἄοπλον,  $\Pi^{2}$  ἄνοπλον. differences of reading seem to be due to intentional correction, but others which are at first sight of a similar nature are probably due to accidental causes. Thus  $\Pi^1$ inherit the form  $\phi_i \lambda i \tau_i a$  and  $\Pi^2$  the form  $\phi_i \delta i \tau_i a$ , the rival forms originating at the outset no doubt in the resemblance of  $\Lambda$  and  $\Delta$ . It is probably also owing to accident that in 1280 a 20 Π<sup>2</sup> have εἰσενέγκαντα and M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> (we cannot be certain as to  $\Gamma$ ) είσενεγκόντα, in 1283 b 14  $\Pi^2$  δόξαιεν and Μº P1 δόξειαν, in 1285 a 24 and b 5 Π2 πάτριαι and εκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι and M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> πάτριοι and ἐκούσιοί τε καὶ πάτριοι, in 1292 b 9 Π<sup>2</sup> εἴπαμεν and M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> εἴπομεν, in 1302 b 4 Π<sup>2</sup> διὰ μικρότητα and M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> διὰ σμικρότητα, in 1307 a 31 Π<sup>2</sup> ἐδύναντο

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In 1312 a 29, however,  $P^1$  has  $\tau o \hat{i} s$   $\mu o \nu \acute{a} \rho \chi o \iota s$  with  $\Pi^2$ , while  $\Gamma M^8$ have τοις μονάρχαις. See also Additions and Corrections.

and Ms P1 ηδύναντο, and in 1311 b 14 Π2 viεî and Ms P1 viω. It is easy to confuse  $\alpha \nu$  and  $\alpha \nu$ ,  $\alpha$  and  $\alpha$ ,  $\alpha$  and  $\alpha$ ,  $\epsilon$  and  $\eta$ . If in 1338 b 23 Ms P1 Ls Ald. have ληστρικά and Π2 (except L<sup>s</sup> Ald.)  $\lambda \eta \sigma \tau \iota \kappa \dot{\alpha}$ , we remember that  $\tau$  and  $\tau \rho$  are easily confused, and that in 1336 b 30  $\Pi^2$  have  $\theta \epsilon \alpha \tau \hat{\omega} \nu$  and  $\Pi^1$   $\theta \epsilon \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho \omega \nu$ .

When II1 ent readings,  $\Pi^2$  are probably to be followed than II1.

In cases in which the two families of MSS, offer different and H2 offer differ- readings I am still of opinion, as I have been from the first, that the MSS. of the second family deserve our confidence more often than those of the first. The comparative merits of the readings offered by the two families vary from Book more often to Book, and in no Book does the first family stand the comparison as well as in the Second, yet even there it seems to me that the second family has the advantage. My reasons for so thinking have been given in an article which appeared in the Classical Review in July, 1893 (7. 304 sqq.).

> Even where the readings of the first family receive the support of the Vatican Palimpsest, they are not always to be adopted. This will be evident on a reference to 1287 a 32, b 41, and 1288 a 13.

> It has been pointed out in vol. ii. p. lix that not much weight attaches to readings supported by Ms P1 against the consent of  $\Gamma \Pi^2$ , or to those supported by  $\Gamma M^8$  against the consent of  $P^1 \Pi^2$ . On the other hand (and this has not as yet, I think, been pointed out) readings supported by Γ P1 against the consent of M<sup>8</sup>  $\Pi^2$  are very often correct. This will be found to be the case in the following passages:—

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1261 a 14, διελείν \Gamma P^1, διελθείν the rest;
1270 a 13, αὐτῆς Γ P¹, αὐτὴν the rest;
1276 b 33, where P P1 add a sentence missing in the other MSS.
                except that in two it is added by correctors;
1282 a 32, ἄρχουσιν \Gamma P^1, ἄρχωσιν M^8, ἔχουσιν \Pi^2;
1285 b 22, ώρισμένοις Γ P1, ώρισμένων the rest;
        33, πλειόνων Γ P1, πλείονος the rest;
1327 b 34, om. καὶ Γ P1, not so the rest;
1334 a 37, \Gamma P<sup>1</sup> add a sentence missing in the rest;
1335 b 11, έλευθέρων Γ P1, έλευθερίων the rest;
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1340 b 14, ἔστι Γ, ἐστι P¹, ἔχει the rest;
1341 a 15, κοινῶ Γ P¹, κοινωνῶ the rest;
1289 a 17, ἐκάστοις Γ P¹, ἐκάστης the rest;
1290 a 1, δὴ Γ P¹, δεῖ the rest, except correctors in P². ⁴;
1294 b 29, τῶ Γ P¹, τῶν the rest;
1295 b 34, θέλω Γ P¹, θέλων the rest;
1314 a 25, μὲν οὖν Γ P¹, μὲν the rest;
1316 b 1, πολὺ Γ P¹, πολλοὶ the rest;
1320 a 8, φερομένων Γ P¹ (lege φερόμενον), φερόντων the rest;
b 3, ἀφιεμένους Γ P¹, ἐφιεμένους the rest.
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For passages in which the accentuation is corrected in Γ P<sup>1</sup> see critical note on 1293 a 28. It has already been remarked (vol. ii. p. xliii, note 3) that Demetrius Chalcondylas, the scribe of P1, was a learned scholar and that many of the good readings peculiar to P1 are probably emendations of his, and the question might be asked whether the good readings which P¹ shares with Γ were not suggested to Demetrius by a study of the vetus versio. How far it is likely that Demetrius would study the vetus versio, I am unable to say, but I doubt whether he owes these readings to it, for it is evident from passages like 1280 b 6, where the true reading is διασκοποῦσιν and P1 has διακοποῦσιν, while Γ M<sup>8</sup> have διακονοῦσιν, that P<sup>1</sup> has a good independent tradition of its own. In 1297 a 1 and (if Sus. 1 is right, for in Sus.2.3.4 the erroneous reading is ascribed to ΓMs) in 1261 b 27 \(\Gamma\) P1 agree in a false reading which P1 is not likely to have borrowed from the vetus versio.

In some passages of the Politics the true reading is The true preserved by one MS. only and in not a few by two or often prethree: thus it is preserved by  $\Gamma$  in 1260 b 41, 1266 b 2, served by 1283 a 7 etc., by  $\Gamma$  M<sup>8</sup> in 1299 a 1, by  $\Gamma$  P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>8</sup> in 1299 a 2, by one, two, one, two, or three  $\Gamma$  Ald. corr. P<sup>2</sup> in 1332 a 33, by P<sup>2. 3</sup> Vat. Pal. in 1278 b 30, MSS. only. by P<sup>3</sup> and a correction in P<sup>2</sup> in 1304 b 28, by P<sup>4</sup> Ald. in 1286 b 33. We sometimes owe the true reading to quite inferior MSS. (e. g. in 1275 b 39, 1284 b 40, 1295 a 28, 1296 b 31, 1308 b 15, 1317 a 12, 1318 b 17, 1320 a 16).

Not a few good readings are due to the Latin translation Emendaof Aretinus (Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo, who was born in Aretinus.

1369 and died in 1444). They are probably conjectural emendations of his. Among them the following may be mentioned :-

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1264 α 19, ύπομενοῦσι (Γ Π ὑπομένουσι);
1337 a 14, παιδεύεσθαι (Γ Π πολιτεύεσθαι);
1330 a 20, ὖπνω (Γ Π οἴνω);
1296 α 9, πολιτών (Γ Π πολιτειών);
1299 a 14 (with 'ut videtur, corr. P1,' says Sus., and corr. P1
                  means Demetrius Chalcondylas), πολιτείαις (Γ Π
                  πολιτείαι):
       b 36, avrai ai (avrai ai \Pi^2, ai avrai \Pi^1);
1300 b 4, \tau \delta \tau \epsilon (the rest \tau \delta \delta \epsilon or \tau \delta \tau \epsilon \delta \epsilon);
1311 a 10, \tau \delta \tau \delta (the rest \tau \hat{\omega} \tau \delta or \tau \hat{\omega});
1317 b 41, έτι (Γ Π έπί).
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That the Fifth (old Eighth) and the Eighth (old Sixth) Books are incomplete, we have seen already (vol. ii. p. xxix). It is probable that something is wanting at the end of the Seventh (old Fifth) Book also. The question, however, to what extent ordinary lacunae occur in the text of the Politics is one of a different kind. That a small lacuna exists in the best MSS. in 1285 a 19 has already been noticed (vol. ii. p. lxvi). A somewhat larger one appears to occur in Γ II in 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 4 after the word ἀρετῶν (see explanatory note on 1334 a 41). It seems likely that several omissions occur in the passage 1300 a 23-b 5. Words appear to have fallen out of the text in 1301 a 6, 1307 a 31, and 1320 b 35 also.

Displacement of passages.

In two instances the transposition of passages has seemed to me to be called for: I have suggested the transposition of 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 3, στασιάζουσι-7, ουτες to after στασιάζουσι in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39, and of 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 17, μάλιστα  $\delta = 20$ ,  $\epsilon \pi \iota \theta \epsilon \sigma \epsilon \iota s$  to after  $\mu \epsilon \theta \nu \delta \nu \tau \alpha$  in 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 6.

Occasional editor's

Traces of the handiwork of an editor piecing together traces of an disquisitions originally unconnected appear to be especially handiwork. visible in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (see explanatory notes on 1289 b 27 and 1290 b 21-24). Prof. W. Christ remarks in the preface to his edition of the Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. xviii), 'Philosophus iis quae chartae iam

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mandaverat haud contentus nova subinde in margine adiecit, quae qui post auctoris mortem eius libros divulgarunt parum circumspecte primariae orationi intexuisse videntur'. We may perhaps account in this way for the state in which we find the Third and Fourth Chapters of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (see vol. i. Appendix A and explanatory note on 1289 b 27).

A few remarks may be added to what has already been Remarks said with regard to the translation of the Vetus Interpres on the vetus in vol. ii. p. xli sqq. A further study of this translation has versio. confirmed my impression (see vol. ii. p. lxiv) that he often misread his Greek text; thus for example in 1285 b 7 he renders πορίσαι emerunt, probably misreading it as πρίασθαι, in 1286 a 35 he renders δργισθηναι impetu ferri, misreading it apparently as δρμηθηναι, in 1330 a 11 he appears to misread πάλιν as πᾶσιν, in 1341 b 31 τύπους as τρόπους, in 1291 a 11 κομψῶς as κούφως, in 1319 a 24 θυραυλεῖν as θηρεύειν. It would be easy to add many other instances.

It should be pointed out that the Vetus Interpres often uses two different Latin words to render the same Greek word when it is repeated close together; thus in 1338 b 28 he renders τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν eo solum quod ad eos qui non studuerant conabantur, in 1295 b 30 his equivalent for ἐπιθυμοῦσιν is desiderant and in 31 concupiscunt, in 1295 b 32 μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύειν is rendered neque insidias patiuntur neque fraudes moliuntur: see also his renderings in 1303 b 14, 15 (διάστασιν), 1304 a 19, 20, 25 (εὐδοκιμῆσαι), 1321 a 21, 22 (καθιστάναι), and several other passages. This is not always so: thus in 1299 b 13 he translates  $d\rho\chi ds$  and  $d\rho\chi \eta \nu$  occurring in the same line principatus and principatum. On the other hand, he often uses one Latin word in rendering two Greek words occurring close together; thus in 1303a 35, 36 he translates both εἰσδεξάμενοι and ὑποδεξάμενοι suscipientes, in 1304 a 21-24 he translates both συντονωτέραν and λσχυροτέραν fortiorem, in 1304 b 30, 33 both συστάντες and άθροισθέντες are represented by coadunati, in 1305 a 39, 40 praeses represents

προστάτης and praesidem του ἡγεμόνα, and in 1306 a 5, 6 conatus est represents ἐνεχείρησε and conantur ἐπιχειροῦσι.

In rendering Greek words he often selects, if he can, a Latin word connected in meaning with the Greek; thus his equivalent for δήμευσις is populatio in 1298 a 6, for συμμαχία compugnatio in 1298 a 4, 26, for ελαττουμένου minorata in 1319 a 3, for dotvy eltovas municipales vicinos in 1330a 17.

He sometimes retains the case of the Greek in his rendering, notwithstanding that in Latin it is wrong: so in 1299 b 33 we have populi praeconsiliari for τοῦ δήμου προβουλεύειν, in 1304 a 31 habebat politiae for είχετο της πολιτείας, and in 1304 b 11, 12 voluntariorum transmutant politiam and detinent involuntariorum for ξκόντων μεταβάλλουσι την πολιτείαν and κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων: but this he does not always do.

In addition to the inexactnesses in translation mentioned in vol. ii. p. lxiii it may be noted that the Vetus Interpres often renders a verb as passive where it should be rendered as middle 1, and often renders the present tense by the future 2 and a future participle by a present participle 3. He also sometimes renders the singular by the plural 4 and the plural by the singular<sup>6</sup>, the comparative by the positive<sup>6</sup>, the superlative by the positive or the comparative and the positive by the comparative 9 or the superlative 10.

<sup>1</sup> E.g. in 1332 a 27, 1288 b 31, 1289 a 14, 1290 b 4, 1297 b 8, 1298 b 27, 1305 a 16. E.g. in 1281 a 19, 1287 a 32,

1313 b 15, 16.

E. g. in 1291 a 7 and 1298 a 19. 4 E.g. in 1287 a 27 (dant for δίδωσιν), 1307 b 33 (parvae ex-pensae for τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα), 1321 a 40 (expensarum for της δαπάνης), 1322 a 19 (divisi sunt for διήρηται).

E. g. in 1338 b 11 (speciem for τὰ εἴδη), 1296 a 34, 35 (democratiam and oligarchiam for δημοκρατίας and odiyapxias), 1303 a 14 (verecundiam for tas epibeias), 1310 b 34 (beneficium for everyevias).

6 E.g. in 1283 a 35 (generosi for γενναιότεροι), 1287 b 9 (multos for πλείονας), 1331 a 30 (eminenter for έρυμνοτέρως), 1333 b 10 (super-gressivas for πλεονεκτικωτέρας), 1298 a 36 (mediocribus for µєτριωτέρων), 1299 b 12 (facile for

7 E.g. in 1276 a 19 (superficialis for έπιπολαιοτάτη).

8 E.g. in 1315 a 26 (ampliori

for πλείστης). 9 E.g. in 1330 a 41 (recentiores

for εὐχείμεροι), 1293 a 30 (plus for

10 E.g. in 1292 b 29 (necessariissimas for avaykaias).

Since I wrote in vol. ii. p. lvi that, as Vet. Int. has qui mutaverit in 1269 a 18, he may have found not  $\kappa\iota\nu\dot{\eta}\sigma as$ , but  $\delta$   $\kappa\iota\nu\dot{\eta}\sigma as$  in his Greek text, I have discovered that qui mutaverit there probably stands simply for  $\kappa\iota\nu\dot{\eta}\sigma as$  (see critical note on 1340 b 24).

It has already been pointed out (vol. ii. p. lxiv) that the Vetus Interpres sometimes seeks to mend defects in his Greek text by slight conjectural alterations: to the cases already noticed may be added 1284 a 19 (where, finding δοκοῦσι omitted in his Greek text, as in M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, and being consequently unable to make sense of the passage, he translates διώκειν as if it were διώκουσι) and 1329 a 17, where for a similar reason he adds videtur.

Here and there in the MSS. of the vetus versio, as in those of the Politics, words find their way into the text from an adjacent line: thus in Sus. p. 536. 3 quod is wrongly added after aristocratiae, being evidently derived from the following line (see also the readings of a in Sus. pp. 296. 5 and 300. 4). Sometimes two alternative equivalents for a word stand together in the text of the translation: thus in 1283 a 9 two equivalents for κρεῦττον, melior and valentior, both appear in the text; the same thing perhaps happens in 1285 a 10 also, where ἐν χειρὸς νόμφ is rendered promptus potens lege, the two words promptus and potens being probably alternative renderings of ἔγχειρος.

It is often difficult to decide whether false renderings in the vetus versio are due to error on the part of the translator—for instance, to a misreading or mistranslation of the Greek text—or to corruption in the MSS. of the vetus versio. That they are sometimes due to the latter cause will be seen from the critical note on 1338 a 28. Corruption of the text may be suspected in 1270 a 35, traiciebant (tradebant?) politiam (μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας), 1275 a 20, adiectionem (ἔγκλημα: obiectionem?), 1331 a 2, insultus (τὰς πολιορκίας), 1335 a 16, lexatur (ἐπιχωριάζεται), 1305 b 17, invalescens (ἐπιθέμενος), 1318 b 3, permittere (συμπεῖσαι: persuadere?) and elsewhere.

# ON THE CONTENTS OF THE THIRD, FOURTH (SEVENTH), AND FIFTH (EIGHTH) BOOKS.

The Third Book.

THE Third Book is addressed to a wider class than the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth). It is addressed to the framers of all States, the Fourth and Fifth only to the framers of the 'best State'. Aristotle's aim in the Third Book is to point out how the State should be organized if its constitution is to be just, in the Fourth and Fifth how it should be organized if it is to be happy and to live the most desirable life.

Cc. 1-5.

The first five chapters of the Third Book are introductory to the rest. They are designed to show, (1) what is the minimum amount of rights which a citizen must possess if he is to be a citizen at all, and what further rights he will possess if he is to be a citizen in the fullest sense (cp. c. 5. 1278 a 35, λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης δ μετέχων των τιμών); (2) that each constitution awards these rights to different persons, that a democracy, for instance, awards them to a wider class than an oligarchy or an aristocracy, so that, while a citizen in a democracy may be a day-labourer lacking the virtue of a citizen, or even a person of illegitimate or semi-alien birth, a citizen under the best constitution will possess, if a ruler, the full virtue not only of a good citizen, but also of a good man. Thus there are many kinds of citizen; the citizen varies with the constitution and rises and falls as it rises and falls. And as the citizen rises and falls, so the polis rises and falls, for the polis is an aggregate of citizens.

Thus these five chapters prepare the way for the study

of the best constitution, to which we pass in the last chapter of the Third Book. They would, however, have been in fuller harmony with the remainder of the Book, if in the account which they give of the citizen the fact had been kept in view that the polis may be ruled by a king or a few 'best men'. We hear nothing in these chapters of the citizen of a kingship or of an aristocracy in which a few 'best men' rule. They imply that a citizen shares both in ruling and in being ruled, but is this true of the citizen of a kingship or of an aristocracy of the kind just mentioned? We might have expected the study of the citizen which they contain to include not only a study of the citizen in a State consisting of men more or less alike and equal, but also a study of the citizen in a State ruled by a king or a few 'best men'. In this expectation we are disappointed.

At the beginning of the Sixth Chapter we pass from the Cc. 6-7. citizen and the polis to the constitution, the main subject of the Book, and indeed of the Politics. The question is now asked (1278 b 6) 'whether we are to hold that one constitution exists or more than one' (a question already answered by implication in c. 1. 1275 a 38 sqq. and c. 5. 1278 a 15), 'and, if more than one, what and how many there are and what differences exist between them'. In answer to this question we have first the division of constitutions into normal forms and deviation-forms, and then in c. 7. 1279 a 22 the question is again raised, 'how many constitutions there are and what they are', and we are told to study the normal constitutions first, for the deviation-forms will be manifest when these have been distinguished, the answer to the question how many constitutions there are coming in the shape of an enumeration of six constitutions.

Of this classification of constitutions something has already been said in vol. i. pp. 214-225. Reference may also be made to *Class. Rev.* 6. 289 sqq., where I have pointed out that, though Aristotle has before him Plato's classification of constitutions in Polit. 297, 301 sqq., there are important differences between the two classifications. The

six constitutions of the Politicus, if we omit the best, are marked off from each other by their observance or non-observance of law, whereas the six constitutions of the Politics are distinguished by a different test, their aim; the three good constitutions make their aim the common advantage of the citizens, while the three bad ones aim at the advantage of the ruling individual or class. Aristotle's classification implies that this difference of aim suffices to make one constitution different in kind from another.

It is open to objection on more grounds than one. the first place, it leaves out of sight the possibility that the One, Few, or Many, or two of them, may share supremacy (see note on 1279 a 27). Again, in 8 (6). I. 1316 b 39 sqq. we find that constitutions exist which are partly aristocratic, partly oligarchical, and others which are partly polities, These constitutions will be partly partly democracies. normal and partly deviation-forms; they do not, therefore, fall under any of the six heads. Thus the classification is not exhaustive. Again, we can conceive the existence of constitutions under which rule is exercised for the advantage of the rulers, but yet for the common advantage, or partly for the one end, partly for the other (see note on 1279 a 17). These also fall outside the classification. And then again we might ask whether a constitution which, while it aims at the common advantage, takes a low view of that common advantage, construing it for instance as the acquisition of wealth or empire, should not also be treated as a distinct constitution from one which seeks the common advantage and studies it in a nobler way. Aristotle would perhaps reply that a constitution of this kind does not really study the common advantage. Still it cannot be said to study the advantage of a section of the citizens only, and thus it appears to escape enumeration.

But in fact, as has been pointed out in vol. i. pp. 217-220, Aristotle tends on fuller consideration to rest the distinction between constitutions not on the number of rulers or the aim with which they rule, but rather on the attribute—virtue, wealth, free birth, etc.—which they raise to supremacy.

Even this basis of classification, however, proves hardly satisfactory, for the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy raise the same attribute—fully equipped virtue—to supremacy (6(4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.), and oligarchy and tyranny both do homage to wealth (7(5). 10. 1311 a 10). Yet Aristotle distinguishes between the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy, and also between oligarchy and tyranny.

Passing on to the Eighth Chapter, we are told in c. 8. C. 8. 1279 b 11 sq. that it is necessary to state at slightly greater length 'what each of these constitutions is', the constitutions referred to being apparently the three deviation-forms. Little is said of tyranny in what follows, but the nature of oligarchy and democracy is more fully explained, and we learn that the distinction between them is to be found not so much in the comparative number of those who rule in each as in the fact that the rich rule in the one and the poor (or the free-born) in the other.

The Ninth Chapter is closely connected with the Eighth. C. 9. It throws further light on the nature of oligarchy and democracy by examining the version of justice which underlies each of these constitutions and showing its inadequacy. The one claims more than its due for a superiority in wealth, and the other claims more than its due for an equality in free birth, neither wealth nor free birth being the end for which the polis is formed. The end for which the polis is formed is, in fact, good life, and those who contribute most to it have a better right to supreme power in the polis than the wealthy and free-born, if the two last-named classes are inferior in virtue. the Ninth Chapter is a natural sequel to the Eighth, carrying its investigation of the nature of oligarchy and democracy further and using the conclusions as to the nature of these two constitutions arrived at in the Eighth; it also, however, forms an introduction to the discussions which follow, preparing the way for the inquiries of cc. 10-13 on the subject, 'what ought to be the supreme authority of the polis'?

This question, the central question in any inquiry respect-Cc. 10-11. ing constitutions, for the main business of a constitution is to determine the supreme authority of the polis (c. 6. 1278 b 9 sq.), is discussed in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters. and the conclusion is arrived at in c. II. 1282 b I-I3 that the supreme authority in a polis should be rightly constituted laws, or in other words laws adjusted to the normal constitutions (for such laws will be just), the magistrate or magistrates being supreme only in respect of matters which the law owing to its generality cannot regulate aright. We might suppose that the question 'what ought to be the supreme authority of the polis' was now finally answered, Cc. 12-13. but two chapters follow, the Twelfth and Thirteenth, which upset or greatly modify the conclusion arrived at in c. II, for they decide that in a certain case the supreme authority should not be laws of any kind, but the will of an absolute king raised above law.

> There is much in these two chapters to suggest a doubt whether they were placed where they stand by Aristotle. They make an important modification in the conclusion arrived at in c. 11, and yet do not do this explicitly. Again, the transition from c. II to c. I2 is very abrupt. Then again, the two chapters are not heralded by any previous announcement, nor are they closed with any recapitulation of their results. This is suspicious, for previous announcements and recapitulations are often wanting in the Politics in the case of chapters or passages which look like subsequent additions or interpolations (e.g. I. II: 2. 12. 1274a 22-b 26: 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 34-b 35). On the other hand, there are arguments to be urged in their favour. Some of these have been noticed in vol. i. Appendix C. The following may be added. The conclusion in favour of law arrived at in c. 11, which is upset or seriously modified by cc. 12 and 13, can hardly represent Aristotle's final and matured opinion, for it conflicts as much with the contents of c. 17 as with those of cc. 12 and 13. In both places we find a full recognition of the legitimacy under certain circumstances of an absolute kingship uncontrolled by law. We need

not, therefore, be surprised that the conclusions of c. II are modified in cc. 12 and 13. Then again, the mode in which cc. 12 and 13 refute the claims to exclusive supremacy preferred by the rich, the free-born, the good, and the many closely resembles that in which similar claims are refuted in the preceding chapters. Aristotle's plan throughout the Third Book is to refute exclusive claims to supremacy by arraying superior claims in opposition to them; thus in the Ninth Chapter he refutes the claims of the rich and the free-born by setting up against them those of the good, and in the Eleventh he refutes those of the few best by setting up against them those of the many. In just the same way in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters he refutes the claims of the rich, the free-born, the good, and the many to exclusive supremacy by setting up against them those of a single individual of surpassing wealth, nobility, or virtue. Thus the method followed in these two chapters closely resembles that which has been followed in the chapters which precede them. As to the absence in them of a preliminary announcement and a recapitulation, the same thing is true of 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5-1334 a 10. We are not prepared by any preliminary announcement for the transition in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., nor indeed for that in 4 (7). II. 1330 a 34 sqq. On the whole I still incline to think that the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

Their teaching is important. We learn from them a lesson which we have not been taught before, and which Aristotle appears to have been the first to teach. This is that the same constitution is not in place under all circumstances. If the constitution is to be just, the supreme authority which it sets up ought not only to be one which will rule for the common advantage, but also that which justice requires to exist in the particular case, looking to the distribution among the members of the community of the attributes which contribute to the being or well-being of the *polis* (virtue, wealth, free birth, etc.). If the distribution of virtue and political capacity in a given

community is such as to call for an absolute kingship, an aristocracy or polity would be out of place in it, though both of these are normal constitutions, constitutions in which rule is exercised for the common advantage. And so again, if the distribution of virtue, wealth, free birth, etc., is such as to make a constitution just in which all classes share in rule, an absolute kingship would be out of place under those circumstances.

Another lesson which is especially insisted on in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters is that a bare superiority in one only of the attributes which contribute to the being or well-being of the polis does not confer a right to exclusive supremacy. Nothing but a transcendent superiority in virtue and political capacity does so. We remember that Aristotle has rested natural slavery in a similar way on a vast disparity between master and slave (1. 5. 1254 b 16 sqq.: cp. 4(7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq.). Where this great disparity does not exist, and the good, the rich, and the free-born coexist in a community, and the many taken as a whole are superior to the few, the constitution must allow a fair share of power to all these classes (3. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq.). Aristotle goes so far as to say (3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqg.) that a constitution which gives exclusive supremacy to those possessed of a bare superiority in one attribute only is a deviation-form, and this he would apparently say even if the one attribute were virtue 1. In the Seventh Chapter constitutions have been said to be deviation-forms in which the rulers rule with a view to their own advantage; now we are told that a constitution is a deviation-form in which the rulers claim exclusive supremacy on the strength of a bare superiority in one attribute only. Aristotle's account of a deviation-form in the Thirteenth Chapter is evidently not quite the same as that which he gives in the Seventh. According to the Thirteenth Chapter even an aristocracy may be a deviation-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Yet it is allowed in 7 (5). I. claim to be considered absolutely 1301 a 39 sqq. that those who excel in virtue have a plausible

form if the superiority in virtue to which it awards supremacy is a bare superiority only.

The discussion of kingship which follows in cc. 14-17 Cc. 14-17. contains a passage, 1288 a 6-15, which may be intrusive or a subsequent addition, but it seems to be otherwise in correct order. We might have expected that more would be said about kingship than is said, and that Aristotle would follow up his study of it with a study of aristocracy. The kinds of kingship have been clearly distinguished, and why should not those of aristocracy be similarly enumerated? This is not done; on the contrary, Aristotle passes C. 18. on to inquire in c. 18 which is the best of the normal constitutions, and he finds that the best is kingship or aristocracy, whence he infers that, as the citizen of the 'best State' is a good man, the citizen of a kingship or an aristocracy will be a good man, and a kingship or aristocracy will be brought into being by the education which produces good men. We expect him to proceed at once to inquire what education produces good men, but this, as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 293 sq., he does not do till the Thirteenth Chapter of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book. The drift of the Eighteenth Chapter of the Third Book evidently is that if we wish to study how a kingship or an aristocracy is to be brought into being, we shall best do so by studying how the best constitution is to be brought into being (cp. 6(4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7(5). 10. 1310 b 2 sq., 31 sqq.). The chapter is apparently intended to account for the absence of an inquiry how a kingship or an aristocracy is to be brought into being and for the substitution in its place of an inquiry how the best constitution is to be brought into being and instituted. It evidently prepares the way for a study of the 'best State', though possibly for a different study of it from that which we possess in the Fourth and Fifth Books (the old Seventh and Eighth).

Aristotle's main aim in the Third Book is to correct and Remarks broaden the conceptions of justice on which Greek consti- on the Third VOL. III. C

Book.

tutions were based, just as in the Fourth and Fifth (the old Seventh and Eighth) he seeks to correct and broaden Greek conceptions of happiness. He rises in the Third above the one-sidedness of oligarchy and democracy, just as in the Fourth and Fifth he rises above the one-sidedness of the Lacedaemonian State.

A marked characteristic of the Third Book is its union of tolerance for imperfect types of political organization with a clear recognition of what is best. Aristotle accepts the lower forms of the citizen and the constitution, but he also sets before us their higher forms. A defective citizen does not cease to be a citizen, nor a defective constitution to be a constitution. Any man is a citizen who possesses certain political rights, whether he is fit to have them or not, and any 'ordering of the supreme authority' is a constitution, even if it gives power to the wrong persons. Not only is the citizen not identical with the good man, but even the good citizen is not necessarily so. There are many grades of citizens and constitutions. As Aristotle holds that the polis exists to realize good life, we might have expected him to say that only those are citizens who are able and purposed to realize it, and only that a constitution which gives rule to those who will rule with a view to the realization of good life, but this he does not do. His wish evidently is not to deny the names of citizen and constitution to any type of citizen and constitution to which these names were given in the ordinary use of language, and yet to point to the type of citizen and constitution which best deserved the name.

The old Books should be placed ly after the Third, though they are not com-

The reasons why the old Seventh and Eighth Books and Eighth should be placed after the Third have been adequately stated by Zeller (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 504) and others. The object of the immediate- Second Book, as we are told in its opening sentences, is to prepare the way for the inquiry what constitution is the best, and though, as has been already pointed out (vol. i. p. 226), the Third Book addresses itself to a different and

wider question, the inquiry what each constitution is, it pletely in prepares the way for the study of the best constitution with it and (vol. i. p. 201), and its last chapter concludes with the the transiwords, 'we must now attempt to state with respect to the tion from the the Third best constitution, in what way it comes into being and how Book to it should be instituted', and with an unfinished fragment Seventh of the sentence with which the old Seventh Book begins. leaves something The inference is obvious that the old Seventh Book to be originally followed the Third in the MSS. It is not likely desired. that Aristotle, after reaching the threshold of the inquiry as to the best constitution, and indeed actually beginning it, drew back again, and postponed its treatment till he had dealt in three Books (the old Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) with the polity and the deviation-forms and with changes of constitution, thus parting this inquiry by a long interval from the Second and Third Books, with which it is so closely connected. The old Fourth Book, in fact, speaks of the inquiry into the best constitution as already over (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30 sqq.), and though the inquiry on the subject which we possess may not have been written at the time when these words were penned, there seems to me to be little doubt that Aristotle intended to take up and deal with the question of the best constitution immediately after the Third Book.

It has, indeed, been suggested that the old Seventh and Eighth Books are an independent treatise, not originally designed to form part of the Politics, but the links between the old Seventh Book and the Second and Third are too numerous to allow of this supposition (see Class. Rev. 6. 291 sq.). No doubt, as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 292 sqq., the Third and the old Seventh Books do not dovetail into each other with perfect exactness. The transition from the one to the other leaves something to be desired, and the old Seventh Book is not quite in all respects what the Third Book leads us to expect it to be. To the defects of harmony to which reference has been made in vol. i. p. 292 sqq. this may be added, that while the opening chapters of the Third Book define the citizen

as one who has access to deliberative and judicial office, the younger citizens of the State sketched in the old Seventh Book have no share in deliberative and judicial functions. A difference appears also to exist between the best constitution as sketched in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, which must evidently be an aristocracy, and the account of aristocracy given in the Third Book. For though both in the best constitution of the former Book and in the aristocracy of the latter the rulers are a comparatively small number of men of high virtue, the reason why their rule is willingly accepted by the ruled is different in the two cases. In the one case it is willingly accepted because the ruled are men fitted to be ruled by rulers of this type as freemen should be ruled (3. 17. 1288 a 9 sqq.), whereas in the other it is willingly accepted because the rulers are older men, and because the ruled will become rulers in their turn on attaining a certain age. We hear nothing in the Third Book of the plan by which rule falls to men of superior age and is acquired by the ruled on the attainment of a certain age, nothing of these precautions for securing the willing submission of the ruled. The Fourth (old Seventh) Book appears to be written with a closer regard to what is practicable than the Third. It is conceivable that, as has been suggested in vol. ii. p. xxxi, note 2, the sketch of the 'best State' contained in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book is a second edition of an earlier sketch which was more completely in harmony with the teaching of the Third Book. But perhaps it is more likely that, some interval of time having elapsed between the composition of the two Books, Aristotle saw, when he came to depict the 'best State' in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, that some things of which he had dreamed in the Third were but dreams. Thus the absolute kingship of which we hear so much in the Third is dismissed in the Fourth as no longer practicable, and the aristocracy described in the Third assumes a more practicable form in the Fourth 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See the late Prof. H. Sidgwick's remarks in Class. Rev. 6. 143, and my own in 6. 291 sq.

## THE TWO IDEAL STATES OF PLATO. xxxvii

In writing the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) In the Books Aristotle has three States especially before him, the Fourth and Fifth Books weak points of which he does his best to avoid. These Aristotle are the two ideal States sketched by Plato in his Republic States and Laws and the Lacedaemonian State. The main differ-especially ences between Aristotle's 'best State' and these three Plato's two States have already been pointed out in the first volume, ideal States and the and our recapitulation of them here need only be a brief Lacedaeand summary one.

monian State.

Aristotle's first objection to the State of the Republic His objecis that it does not realize happiness. None of its citizens to the State are truly happy. The most desirable life is not realized in sketched in it, the life of fully equipped virtuous activity, for though Plato's Republic. the first or ruling class has virtue, it has not the equipment which is needed for virtuous action. How can it practise liberality, for instance, if it has no property? Another weak point of Plato's State is that the members of the second and third classes, though called citizens, are not really so, for they have no share in ruling. The citizens of the 'best State', according to Aristotle, should be 'able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to the life in accordance with virtue', and this the second and third classes of Plato's State are not. The citizens of the 'best State', again, should be men of full virtue, and this cannot be said of the members of Plato's third class, even if it can be said of those of his second. Another weak point dwelt on by Aristotle is that the second class will be discontented with its position, as it is permanently excluded from rule. Aristotle further objects to the communism of the Republic. He wishes the land of his 'best State' to be owned by the men of full virtue who are its citizens, though they will freely share the use of it and of all their property with their fellow-citizens and with others. In these and in other points his 'best State' diverges from the State of the Republic.

It stands in marked contrast to the State of the Laws To the also. Its citizen-body and its territory are smaller. The sketched in life lived by its citizens is a more ideal life. It is not Plato's Laws.

simply 'temperate', but 'temperate and liberal', and its supreme end is not work, but leisure and contemplation, the diagogê which is the best employment of leisure. Its constitution differs from that of the State of the Laws. It is an aristocracy, not a polity inclining to oligarchy. It will not covertly favour the wealthier class in elections to offices. It will take stricter precautions against pauperism than the State of the Laws, placing a limit on the procreation of children, not merely on the number of the citizens.

To the Lacedaemonian State.

To the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle's 'best State' stands in a relation of far more decided contrast. Plato in the Republic and Laws had sought happiness in the right direction, though in Aristotle's opinion he had failed to secure it for his citizens. The Lacedaemonian State did not do so; it sought happiness in empire, and valued virtue not for its own sake, but only as a means to empire and external goods. This error led it into a further error; its laws and training developed only one kind of virtue, that through which empire is won, military virtue. A third error was that it failed to train its citizens to make a right use of leisure and to live for diagogê as well as work. these errors will be avoided in Aristotle's 'best State'. It will be a State living for the highest end, for leisure and diagogê more than for work, for peace more than for war, for things noble rather than for things necessary or useful. Its education will be a preparation for a life of this kind; it will develope the virtues of justice, temperance, and wisdom as well as military virtue, and it will develope military virtue better than the Lacedaemonian education did, for it will not brutalize the young by an over-laborious gymnastic training. The dependent classes of the State, unlike those of the Lacedaemonian State, will be organized aright. Its slave-system will be so constituted as to secure the efficiency and submissiveness of the slaves. Its women will not be uncontrolled and uneducated, nor will they be allowed to rule the men. Its citizens will be neither too few nor too many, their numbers being kept at the proper level by a wise regulation of marriage and the procreation of children and of the right to buy and sell, give and bequeath; there will be no extremes of wealth and poverty within their ranks, no undue love of honour or money; the State will be ruled by its best men, not by persons of no special excellence, and by statesmen who make peace rather than war their end, and who are not only men of action, but also men of philosophical aptitude, not by mere soldiers to whom war is the one thing worth living for. There will be no senate organized in a narrow oligarchical way, no ephorate with over-great powers. On minor contrasts we need not dwell.

Our knowledge of Aristotle's views on the subject of Aristotle's education is imperfect. Education, according to him, teaching on the subject should vary with the constitution (1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.: of educa-5 (8). I. 1337 a 14 sqq.), yet the only scheme of education he gives us is that which is intended for the 'best State', so that we know little or nothing as to the kind of education which he would recommend under other forms of constitution than the best. That he wishes the State to concern itself with education in all forms of constitution is clear from 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 12 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.), where we are told that if the êthos which is appropriate to each constitution is not developed in the citizens—that is, the êthos which tends to the maintenance of each—the constitution will not last. The 'best State' for which his scheme of education is designed is a State very unlike those of the present day, for under Aristotle's best constitution the citizens are withdrawn from 'necessary activities' -the activities of agriculture, trade, and industry-in a way in which the men of modern States are not, and then again, a far longer gymnastic training was required in youth with a view to military efficiency in the Greece of Aristotle's day than is required in modern times. Thus we must be prepared to find much in Aristotle's scheme of education which is unsuitable to the present day. Still the broad principles on which it rests are not without interest even for ourselves.

We notice that his scheme includes no arrangements for the education of women and girls, notwithstanding what is said in 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq., or for the education of the non-citizen classes, notwithstanding what is said in 2. 5. 1264 a 36 sqq. The due regulation of education involves, in Aristotle's opinion, the regulation of marriage and of the rearing of infant children during the years in which education in the strict sense of the word cannot be said to have begun, and this is fully kept in view by Aristotle, but when school-training has commenced for the child, Aristotle confines his attention to it, though we learn from Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. that there are many influences not included in school-training which then promote a child's growth in virtue. Aristotle does not attempt to direct or regulate these.

His scheme of education for the 'best State' represents to a large extent a reaction against prevailing notions of In his criticism of the actual education of Greece he distinguishes between the States which paid special attention to the education of the young and undertook the direction of it, and the majority of States, which left its direction to the parent and allowed the child to be taught what the parent pleased in the way he thought best.

Education in Greek States which did not undertake the education.

In the latter class of States, to which Athens belonged, education was little better than a chaos. The parent's caprice was to a certain extent controlled by the general acceptance of four subjects of education-reading and direction of writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing-but each parent was free to educate his children apart from the rest and to give a special prominence in their education to whichever of these subjects he preferred, so that there was no security for an identity of training, no enforcement of the principle that the citizen belongs to the State and not to himself, nor again was any care taken that the education given to children was in harmony with the constitution and favourable to its maintenance.

Marriage was left to a great extent unregulated, with the

result that children were often the offspring of over-young or over-old parents. The rearing of infancy was also left unregulated, nor were children's minds sufficiently protected from evil influences in the earlier years of life, the years in which, according to Aristotle, permanent tastes are formed. Not only were the games and nursery-tales of infancy often other than they should be, but children were allowed to be too much in the company of slaves 1 and were too much exposed to hearing indecent language and seeing indecent pictures and statues. Boys and youths were allowed freely to witness the performance of iambi and comedy. The subjects chosen for youthful study were studied with a wrong aim and in a wrong way. Reading, writing, and drawing were studied merely for their utility, and music for the pleasure it gave. Music was often studied in too technical a fashion with a view to the attainment of a skill in execution suitable rather to virtuosi than to citizens. The only subject studied with a view to virtue was gymnastic, which was thought to produce courage. We do not hear of any studies by which it was sought to develope other virtues. Education in these States was evidently too utilitarian 2 and too narrow in its aim; it needed to be made more capable of influencing the character as a whole and the reason.

The States, on the other hand, which paid special atten- Education tion to the education of the young and made it a matter of in the Lacepublic concern erred in a somewhat different way. The State.

<sup>1</sup> This would only be true of the children of the better-to-do citizens, for we gather from 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sq. that the poorer citizens had no slaves.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle's feeling as to utilitarianism in education may be gathered from his remark (4(7). 14. 1333 b 1 sqq.) that the aim in the education of the young should be to fit them to do both work which is necessary and useful and work which is noble, but the latter more than the former. He treats as vulgar (φορτικόν) the preference of 'virtues thought to be useful and more productive of gain' to

virtues of a higher kind (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9 sq.). In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 37 sqq. he hints, not without some quiet sarcasm, that reading and writing should not be studied with a merely utilitarian aim, but rather because studying them enables us to master other studies, and that drawing should not be studied to save us from being cheated in the purchase of household utensils, but because the study of it makes us scientific observers of physical beauty, adding that 'to seek what is useful everywhere does not at all befit great-souled and freespirited men'.

Lacedaemonian State was one of them. We do not learn from Aristotle whether more care was taken at Sparta than elsewhere to regulate marriage and the rearing of infants and to protect early childhood from corrupting influences, but we know that, at any rate after a certain age, the State took the education of the young into its own hands, withdrawing it from the control of the parent, and educating the boys together and in the same way and with a view to the welfare of the whole State, severing them to a great extent from home and from contact with slaves. So far it did well, but its gymnastic training was too severe and laborious, and here again, as elsewhere, the education given was too narrow, failing to train the whole man, and also too utilitarian, though it studied that which was useful to the State rather than that which was useful to the individual. Its aim was to develope the more utilitarian virtues (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9 sq.), the virtues which favour the acquisition of empire, not to develope all the virtues nor to develope virtue for its own sake. The Lacedaemonian training was not even the best training for war or the winning of empire; much less was it the best for the preservation of empire when won, for it did not develope justice or temperance or the intellectual excellence which enables men to use aright the leisure which follows the acquisition of empire, and saves them from degenerating under the influence of ease and plenty and peace. based on a systematic preference of that which is useful to that which is noble, of that which is lower to that which is higher, of that which is only a means to that which is the end. It taught men to prefer external goods and empire to virtue, the lower kinds of virtue to the higher, war to peace, and work to leisure.

Aristotle's conception of educa-

Aristotle's aim in education is to develope the whole man—the body, the appetites ( $\delta\rho\dot{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\iota s$ , including  $\theta\nu\mu\delta s$ ,  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\delta a$ , and  $\beta\sigma\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota s$ : see note on 1334 b 19), and the reason—in such a way as to harmonize the three elements in a willing co-operation for the best end, a life spent in the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, and

especially the highest of them, those connected with the right use of leisure. In Aristotle's view he is a truly educated man who has learnt from youth upwards to love virtue for its own sake, and virtue not of one kind only, but of all, whose youthful love of virtue has been crowned with reason, and in whom reason, fully developed both on its practical and on its contemplative side and working for the best end, is mated with appetites which take pleasure in obeying it and with a body well prepared for the service of both. Aristotle's conception of education agrees with his conception of the man of full virtue (σπουδαίος) as a man in whom many excellences are combined (3. 11. 1281 b 10 sqq.). He would not be satisfied with an education which merely brought the body and the lower appetites under the control of some higher appetite, such as the love of the good; the appetites must, indeed, be trained to love what is good, but that is not enough; they must be brought under the control of reason fully developed and directed to the best end 1.

As the body developes before the soul and the appetites of the soul before reason, the education of the body should come first, then that of the appetites, and then that of the reason, but the body must be so trained as to subserve the development of the soul, and the appetites so trained as to subserve the development of the reason. The body and the appetites are apparently conceived by Aristotle as trained by habituation (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.), or in other words by a repetition of acts resulting in a formed habit, whereas the reason is mainly trained by instruction (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 15 sq.: Pol. 4(7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq.). Thus training by habituation comes first, training by reason later (Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.). We have been already told in the Nicomachean Ethics (10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.) that training by habituation must precede training by

he lays stress on this as an element in happiness (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 22, 40 sqq.).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We miss in Aristotle's scheme of education any training specially designed to develope *activity* in accordance with virtue, though

teaching, but the cause assigned there for this is not that reason developes later than the body and the appetites, but that training by teaching will not be effectual in producing virtue if it is not preceded by a long course of habituation beginning in childhood.

The education of the body.

The education of the body must, in Aristotle's view, be such as to make it a fit instrument for the soul; its growth must not be stunted nor its beauty impaired (5(8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq.), it must not be subjected in early youth to toils so excessive as to enfeeble it for the work of afteryears (5(8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.) or to brutalize the character (5(8). 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), nor must hard work be imposed on the body and mind simultaneously (5(8). 4. 1339a 7 sqq.), nor again must the training of the body be such as to unfit it for subsequent studies or to produce  $\beta avavola$  (5(8). 6. 1341 a 6 sqq.).

The education of the appetites.

The education of the appetites—i.e. of θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, and βούλησις—must be such as to lead them to love the noble qualities of character which reason will later on give them additional reasons for loving, and thus to prepare them to render a willing obedience to reason when it developes. The appetites must, therefore, be habituated to take pleasure in the right things; the child must be watched and guided in its pleasures from infancy. A wellordered gymnastic training must follow, not too laborious in early youth, and, midway in this, three years devoted to the study of reading, writing, drawing, and music. The musical training of the young should be such as to lead them to love ennobling melodies and the reproductions of mildness, courage, temperance, and other virtues which melodies contain, and so eventually to love these virtues themselves. Music should be the ally and precursor of reason, preparing the way for her before she appears, and beginning the wholesome discipline of the likings which she will later on carry to completion. No attempt must be made to hasten the development of reason, but, on the other hand, there must be nothing in the musical training of youth which will not be favourable to it; the use of the pipe (avhós) in

education, for instance, is not favourable to it (5(8). 6. 1341 b 6), and therefore must be rejected.

So important a part of youthful education is the training of the appetites to feel pleasure in the right things represented by Aristotle to be, that we might be tempted to take it for the whole. But the training of the body and the reason are also essential parts of youthful education; indeed. Aristotle sometimes distinguishes παιδεία from habituation (e.g. in 3. 18. 1288 b 1 and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16), or in other words from the training of the appetites.

The direct education of the reason, which is to follow the The educaeducation of the appetites, is not dealt with in the Politics tion of the reason. as it has come down to us, though we may infer from 4(7). 14. 1333 a 24 sqg, that it will be directed to the development both of the practical and of the contemplative reason, and will make the development of the latter its supreme end.

Aristotle's conception of education commends itself to us Remarks more than the scheme by which he seeks to realize it. on the scheme by The amount of time which he devotes to gymnastic training which appears to us to be disproportionately large. He surrenders seeks to to it all the years from seven to twenty-one with the realize his exception of three. He does so partly because in ancient of educa-Greece, as we have seen, a long gymnastic training in tion. youth was essential to full military efficiency, partly because without a suitably developed body neither the appetites nor the reason can be all that they should be, and partly because, as hard mental and bodily work must not be required of the young simultaneously, and bodily exercise is indispensable in youth for the growth and development of the body, mental work in youth must necessarily be confined within narrow limits. He is thus led greatly to shorten the amount of time devoted in youth to the work to which he attaches so much importance—that of training the appetites to take pleasure in the right things. For this kind of training he relies mainly on the study of music, and yet he allots to this study only a very small part of the first twenty-one years of lifed

a fraction of the three years after puberty which he gives up to other studies than gymnastic. Does he not hope too much from this brief musical training? Can it do all that he expects it to do for the moral improvement of the boys who are to receive it? It may be doubted, indeed, whether it is by a study of particular subjects, such as music, that a love of what is noble is instilled into the young. Is it not rather by intercourse with a parent or teacher or friend whose example and influence win the heart to a love of goodness? Then again, does not Aristotle underrate the extent to which the reason is susceptible of cultivation in boyhood? He admits in 1. 13. 1260 a 13 sq. that boys possess the deliberative element of the soul, though in an imperfect form. Why then should not this element receive more cultivation in youth than Aristotle provides for it? Some kinds of mental work, again, fall well within the range of the boyish mind; yet Aristotle makes no provision for the training of those intellectual aptitudes which boys may well possess. Is it quite clear that even in the education of the body and the appetites training by habituation will suffice by itself without an admixture of training by reason? Another question may well be asked. Does Aristotle's scheme of education call for enough effort from the young? Is not their 'distaste for everything unsweetened' too much studied in it? Would not a training which gave them more difficulties to face and to conquer develope in them more force of will and be more really useful to them? Does not education largely consist in acquiring the power and the will to do that which is distasteful to us, when it ought to be done?

## ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ΄.

Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ 1274 b 32 ποία τις, σχεδον πρώτη σκέψις περί πόλεως ίδεῖν, τί ποτε έστιν ή πόλις νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες την πόλιν πεπραχέναι την πράξιν, οί δ' ού την πόλιν άλλά 35 την όλιγαρχίαν η τὸν τύραννον τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πασαν δρώμεν την πραγματείαν οδσαν περί πόλιν. 2 ή δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις. ἐπεὶ δ' ή πόλις των συγκειμένων, καθάπερ άλλο τι των όλων μεν συνεστώτων δ' έκ πολλών μορίων, δηλον ότι πρότερον 40 ό πολίτης ζητητέος ή γαρ πόλις πολιτών τι πληθός έστιν, ώστε τίνα χρη καλείν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης έστί, σκε- 1275 a πτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις οὐ γάρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην ἔστι γάρ τις δς έν δημοκρατία πολίτης ῶν έν ὀλιγαρχία πολλάκις 3 ούκ έστι πολίτης. τούς μεν οῦν άλλως πως τυγχάνοντας 5 ταύτης της προσηγορίας, οδον τούς ποιητούς πολίτας, άφετέον ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ 4 γὰρ μέτοικοι καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοι- 10 νωνοῦσιν' καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει' πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν ούδε τούτων τελέως οί μετοικοι μετέχουσιν, άλλα νέμειν 5 ανάγκη προστάτην, ώστε ατελώς πως μετέχουσι της τοιαύτης κοινωνίας), άλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παίδας τοὺς μήπω δι' ήλικίαν έγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους 15 VOL. III. B

φατέον είναι μέν πως πολίτας, ούχ άπλως δε λίαν άλλά προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ή τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει δηλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον) ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα 20 τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ λύειν, πολίτης δ' άπλως οὐδενὶ των άλλων ὁρίζεται μαλ-6 λον ή τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχής. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἰ μέν είσι διηρημέναι κατά χρόνον, ώστ' ένίας μεν όλως δίς 25 τον αύτον ούκ έξεστιν άρχειν, ή διά τινων ώρισμένων χρόνων ό δ' άόριστος, οξον ό δικαστής καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα 7 μεν οῦν ἄν φαίη τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους, οὐδε μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀρχῆς· καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτάτους άποστερείν άρχης. άλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδέν περὶ ὀνόματος 30 γάρ ὁ λόγος ἀνώνυμον γάρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ έκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὴ διορισμοῦ χάριν άόριστος άρχή. τίθεμεν δη πολίτας τους ούτω μετέ- 8 χοντας, δ μέν οθν μάλιστ' αν έφαρμόσας πολίτης έπὶ πάντας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδον τοιοῦτός έστιν δεῖ δὲ 35 μη λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἶς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἴδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ' έχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἢ τοιαθτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἡ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν 9 είδει διαφερούσας άλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ 1275 b προτέρας ούσας τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας άναγκαῖον ύστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας πῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἔσται φανερόν). ὥστε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἑκάστην πολι-5 τείαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία μάλιστ' ἐστὶ 10 πολίτης, έν δε ταις άλλαις ένδεχεται μέν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαιον. (ἐν) ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν άλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οξον έν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν

έφόρων άλλος άλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς, ἐτέρα 10 11 δ' ίσως άρχή τις έτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. άλλ' έχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός έν γὰρ ταις άλλαις πολιτείαις ούχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής έστι καὶ δικαστής, άλλὰ δ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡρισμένος 15 τούτων γάρ η πασιν η τισίν αποδέδοται το βουλεύεσθαι καί 12 δικάζειν ή περί πάντων ή περί τινών, τίς μεν οθν έστιν ό πολίτης, έκ τούτων φανερόν ω γαρ έξουσία κοινωνείν άρχης βουλευτικής ή κριτικής, πολίτην ήδη λέγομεν είναι ταύτης της πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πληθος ίκανὸν πρὸς 20 αὐτάρκειαν ζωης, ώς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ὁρίζονται δὲ πρὸς 2 την χρησιν πολίτην τον έξ άμφοτέρων πολιτών καὶ μη θατέρου μόνον, οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέον ζητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους. οὕτω δε δριζομένων πολιτικώς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσί τινες τὸν 25 2 τρίτον έκείνον ή τέταρτον, πως έσται πολίτης. Γοργίας μέν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος, έφη, καθάπερ όλμους είναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, ούτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πε-3 ποιημένους, είναι γάρ τινας Λαρισοποιούς έστι δ' άπλοῦν 30 εί γὰρ μετείχον κατὰ τὸν ἡηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας. ήσαν πολίται καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατὸν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ή έκ πολίτιδος έπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ή κτισάντων. άλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὅσοι μετέσχον μεταβολής γενομένης πολιτείας, οδον 'Αθήνησιν 35 έποίησε Κλεισθένης μετά την των τυράννων έκβολήν πολ-4 λούς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. τὸ δ' άμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους έστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, άλλὰ πότερον άδίκως ή δικαίως. καίτοι κάν τοῦτό τις ἔτι προσαπορήσειεν, άρ' εί μη δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ώς ταὐτὸ δυναμένου 1276 a 5 τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἄρχοντάς τινας άδίκως, ούς άρχειν μεν φήσομεν άλλ' ού δικαίως, δ

δέ πολίτης άρχη τινὶ διωρισμένος έστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν της 5 τοιᾶσδε άρχης πολίτης έστίν, ώς έφαμεν), δηλον ότι πολί-3 τας μεν είναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ή μη δικαίως συνάπτει πρός την είρημένην πρότερον άμφισβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε ούχ ή πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται 10 δημοκρατία. τότε γάρ ούτε τὰ συμβόλαια ένιοι βούλονται 2 διαλύειν, ώς οὐ τῆς πόλεως άλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος, ούτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κρατείν ούσας, άλλα ού δια το κοινή συμφέρον, είπερ οθν καὶ δημοκρατοῦνταί τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως 15 της πόλεως φατέον είναι ταύτης τὰς της πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος. ἔοικε δ' οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς 3 ποτέ χρη λέγειν την πόλιν είναι την αὐτην ή μη την αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἐτέραν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας 20 ζήτησις περί τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθηναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τοὺς μεν έτερον τούς δ' έτερον οἰκῆσαι τόπον, ταύτην μεν οὖν 4 πραστέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης έστί πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως) δμοίως 25 δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν είναι τὴν πόλιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν 5 είη γαρ αν Πελοποννήσω περιβαλείν εν τείχος. τοιαύτη δ' ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλών καὶ πᾶσα ἥτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν μαλλον έθνους ή πόλεως ής γε φασιν έαλωκυίας τρίτην 30 ήμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ 6

30 ημέραν ούκ αισθέσθαι τι μέρος της πολέως. αλλα πέρι θ μεν ταύτης της ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρον χρήσιμος ἡ σκέψις: περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους της πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος εν ἡ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολιτικόν: ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, 35 πότερον ἕως ἄν ἢ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν

35 ποτερον εως αν η το γενος ταυτο των κατοικουντων, την αὐτην είναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομέ-

νων των δε γινομένων, ώσπερ και ποταμούς είωθαμεν λέγειν τούς αὐτούς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ ἀεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγιγνομένου νάματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξιόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον είναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ 40 7 πόλιν έτέραν; είπερ γάρ έστι κοινωνία τις ή πόλις, έστι δὲ 1276 b κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γιγνομένης έτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφερούσης της πολιτείας αναγκαῖον είναι δόξειεν αν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ότε μεν κωμικόν ότε δε τραγικόν έτερον είναί φαμεν, των 5 8 αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν άλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν έτέραν, αν είδος έτερον ή της συνθέσεως, οδον άρμονίαν των αὐτων φθόγγων έτέραν εἶναι 9 λέγομεν, αν ότε μεν ή Δώριος ότε δε Φρύγιος. εί δη τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερὸν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν 10 αὐτὴν πόλιν είς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας ὄνομα δὲ καλείν έτερον ή ταύτον έξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἐτέρων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ή μη διαλύειν, όταν είς έτέραν μεταβάλη πολιτείαν ή πόλις, λόγος έτερος.

Τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι 4
πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου
σπουδαίου θετέον, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε τοῦτο
τυχεῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τινὶ πρῶτον
ληπτέον. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἶς τις τῶν κοινωνῶν ἐστίν, 20
2 οὕτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτήρων καίπερ
ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρέτης, ὁ δὲ
κυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ πρωρεύς, ὁ δ᾽ ἄλλην τιν᾽ ἔχων τοιαύτην
ἐπωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἑκάστου λόγος
ἴδιος ἔσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμόσει 25
πᾶσιν. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν
3 πάντων τούτου γὰρ ἕκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁμοίως
τοίνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία
τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία·

30 διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον είναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, είπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλείω πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ένδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν άρετὴν είναι τὴν τελείαν τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι την τελείαν, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον 4 35 μη κεκτησθαι την άρετην καθ' ην σπουδαίος άνήρ, φανερόν ού μην άλλα και κατ' άλλον τρόπον έστι διαπορούντας έπελθείν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ 5 άδύνατον έξ άπάντων σπουδαίων όντων είναι πόλιν, δεί δ' εκαστον τὸ καθ' αύτὸν εργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· 40 έπεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους είναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν 1277 α είη μία άρετη πολίτου καὶ άνδρὸς άγαθοῦ. την μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην άναγκαῖον είναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ άδύνατον, εί μη πάντας άναγκαῖον άγαθοὺς είναι τοὺς έν ς τη σπουδαία πόλει πολίτας. έτι έπεὶ έξ άνομοίων ή πόλις 6 ώσπερ ζώον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχὴ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτήσις έκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλις έξ άπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις έξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων 10 συνέστηκεν είδων, ανάγκη μὴ μίαν είναι τὴν των πολιτων πάντων άρετήν, ώσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου. διότι μεν τοίνυν άπλως ούχ ή αὐτή, φανερον 7 έκ τούτων άλλ' άρα έσται τινὸς ή αὐτή άρετή πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν 15 σπουδαίον άγαθὸν είναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν άναγκαῖον είναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς 8 έτέραν είναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οί τῶν βασιλέων υἱεῖς ἱππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ "μή μοι τὰ κόμψ', ἀλλ' ὧν πόλει 20 δεί," ώς οὖσάν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν, εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ 9 ἄρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἐστὶ καὶ

ό ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἂν εἴη πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός,

τινδς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς

- 10 οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖταί γε τὸ 25 δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου (δοκεῖ) ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς, εἰ οῦν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ
- 11 πολίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἕτερα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μαν- 30 θάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, τοὐντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις. ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τἀναγκαῖα λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. 35
- 12 λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις. δούλου δ' εἴδη πλείω λέγομεν' αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείους. ὧν εν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνῆτες' οὖτοι δ' εἰσίν, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοὔνομ' αὐτούς, οἱ ζῶντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἶς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. διὸ παρ' 1277 b ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν
- 13 δημον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχομένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν
  πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν μανθάνειν, εἰ μή ποτε χρείας χάριν 5
  αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν μὲν
  δεσπότην τὸν δὲ δοῦλον ἀλλ ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει
- 14 τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱππαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν 10 στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. διὸ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εῦ ἄρξαι μὴ
- 15 ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων 15 16 ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ

άμφω, καὶ εἰ έτερον είδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης άρχικης καὶ γὰρ άρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ, δηλον ὅτι οὐ μία αν είη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' είδη 20 έχουσα καθ' α άρξει καὶ άρξεται, ώσπερ άνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς έτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία (δόξαι γὰρ ἂν είναι 17 δειλὸς ἀνήρ, εἰ ούτως ἀνδρεῖος είη ώσπερ γυνη ἀνδρεία καὶ γυνη λάλος, εί ούτω κοσμία είη ώσπερ ὁ ἀνηρ ὁ ἀγαθός), έπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἐτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός (τοῦ μὲν 25 γὰρ κτᾶσθαι, τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν). ἡ δὲ φρόνησις άρχοντος ίδιος άρετη μόνη τὰς γὰρ άλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαΐον είναι κοινάς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, άρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα 18 άληθής ωσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων 30 αύλητης ο χρώμενος. πότερον μεν οθν ή αυτή άρετη άνδρος άγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἡ έτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἐτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.

5 Περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι λείπεταί τις τῶν ἀποριῶν. ώς άληθως γάρ πότερον πολίτης έστιν ώ κοινωνείν έξεστιν 35 άρχης, η καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οίς μη μέτεστιν άρχων, ούχ οίόν τε παντὸς είναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν (οῦτος γὰρ πολίτης): εί δε μηδείς των τοιούτων πολίτης, έν τίνι μέρει θετέος έκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἢ διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λό- 2 1278 α γον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ώς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις, έπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ παίδες ὡσαύτως πολίται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' 5 οί μεν άπλως οί δ' έξ ύποθέσεως πολίται μεν γάρ είσιν, άλλ' άτελείς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις 3 ην δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον η ξενικόν διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν' ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην. εί δὲ καὶ οῦτος πολίτης, άλλὰ πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἡν εἴπομεν 10 λεκτέον οὐ παντός, οὐδ' έλευθέρου μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅσοι τῶν ἔργων

4 είσιν άφειμένοι των άναγκαίων, των δ' άναγκαίων οἱ μέν ένὶ λειτουργούντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ κοινή βάναυσοι καὶ θητες. φανερον δ' έντεῦθεν μικρον έπισκεψαμένοις πως έχει περί αὐτων αὐτὸ γὰρ φανέν τὸ λεχθέν ποιεί 5 δηλον, έπει γαρ πλείους είσιν αι πολιτείαι, και είδη πο- 15 λίτου άναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου, ώστ' έν μέν τινι πολιτεία τὸν βάναυσον ἀναγκαῖον είναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας ἐν τισὶ δ' ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἴ τίς έστιν ην καλούσιν άριστοκρατικήν καὶ έν ή κατ' άρετην αί τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' άξίαν οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τ' ἐπιτηδεῦ- 20 6 σαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἢ θητικόν. ἐν δὲ ταις όλιγαρχίαις θήτα μεν ούκ ενδέχεται είναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθέξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναυσον δ' ένδέχεται πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν 7 τεχνιτών, έν Θήβαις δε νόμος ην τον δέκα έτων μη άπε- 25 σχημένον της άγορας μη μετέχειν άρχης. έν πολλαίς δέ πολιτείαις προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος ὁ γὰρ έκ πολίτιδος έν τισι δημοκρατίαις πολίτης έστίν τον αύτον 8 δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ μην άλλ' έπεὶ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται 30 πολίτας τους τοιούτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶνται τοίς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δ' ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται τους έκ δούλου πρώτον ή δούλης, είτα τους άπο γυναικών, 9 τέλος δε μόνον τους έξ άμφοιν άστων πολίτας ποιουσιν. ὅτι μεν οὖν εἴδη πλείω πολίτου, φανερον ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέ- 35 γεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ "Ομηρος έποίησεν " ώσεί τιν άτίμητον μετανάστην" ώσπερ μέτοικος γάρ έστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ' ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοι-10 κούντων έστίν. πότερον μεν οὖν έτέραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν θετέον 40 καθ' ην άνηρ άγαθός έστι καὶ πολίτης σπουδαίος, δηλον έκ 1278 b τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἔτερος.

κάκείνος οὐ πᾶς άλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνάμενος

είναι κύριος, ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν κοινῶν 5 ἐπιμελείας·

- 6 'Επεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους, κἂν εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα
- 10 τῆς κυρίας πάντων κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία λέγω 2 δ' οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τοὐναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις φαμὲν δὲ καὶ πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐροῦμεν
- 15 λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς. εἴρηται δὴ κατὰ 3 τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, ἐν οἶς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, καὶ ὅτι φύσει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν,
- 20 διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας [οὐκ ἔλαττον] ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν' οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστφ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ κοινῆ 4 πᾶσι καὶ χωρίς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ
- 25 καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν. δῆλον δ' ὡς 5 καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ
- 30 γλυκύτητος φυσικής. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς γε τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ράδιον διελεῖν καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ 6 δεσποτεία, καίπερ ὄντος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλω καὶ τῷ φύσει δεσπότη ταὐτοῦ συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἄρχει
- 35 πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἦττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου τοῦ

7 δούλου σώζεσθαι την δεσποτείαν, ή δε τέκνων άρχη καὶ γυναικός καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης, ἡν δὴ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικήν, ήτοι των άρχομένων χάριν έστιν ή κοινοῦ τινὸς άμφοῖν, καθ' αύτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας 40 τέχνας, οξον ζατρικήν και γυμναστικήν, κατά συμβεβηκός 1279 a δὲ κἂν αὐτῶν εἶεν οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην ἕνα τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνίοτ' είναι καὶ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερ-8 νήτης είς έστιν άει των πλωτήρων. ὁ μεν οθν παιδοτρίβης ή κυβερνήτης σκοπεί τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν ὅταν δὲ 5 τούτων είς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει της ώφελείας ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομέ-9 νων είς γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ών. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς άρχάς, όταν ή κατ' ισότητα των πολιτων συνεστηκυία καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μέν, 10 ή πέφυκεν, άξιοῦντες έν μέρει λειτουργείν, καὶ σκοπείν τινὰ πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκό-10 πει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ώφελείας τὰς άπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς άρχειν, οίον εί συνέβαινεν ύγιαίνειν άει τοις άρχουσι νοσα- 15 κεροίς οὖσιν καὶ γὰρ ἀν οὕτως ἴσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχάς. 11 φανερον τοίνυν ώς όσαι μεν πολιτείαι το κοινή συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὖται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ άπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων, ήμαρτημέναι καὶ πᾶσαι παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν 20 δεσποτικαὶ γάρ, ή δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν.

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας 7 ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσί, καὶ πρῶτον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἔσονται 2 φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ 25 πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν μὲν ὁ εῖς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι

30 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἡ τοῦ ένὸς ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων ή τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις ή γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον είναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἡ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος. καλείν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν 3 άποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν 25 πλειόνων δε ένδς άριστοκρατίαν, ή διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους άρχειν, ή διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῆ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς όταν δὲ τὸ πληθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλείται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία, συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως ένα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν 4 40 κατ' άρετην η ολίγους ένδεχεται, πλείους δ' ήδη χαλεπον 1279 b ήκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν αύτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίγνεται. διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτης οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα. παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη- 5 ς μένων τυραννίς μεν βασιλείας, όλιγαρχία δε άριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' όλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων' πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν 10 οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

8 Δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τίς ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν. ἔστι δὲ τυραννὶς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δεσπο- 2 τικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν ὧσι κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλὰ ἀποροι. 20 πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἶεν οἱ 3

20 πρώτη δ΄ ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἰεν οὶ β πλείους ὄντες εὔποροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν ἦ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἴ που † συμ-

βαίνη † τους ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν είναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείττους δ' όντας κυρίους είναι της πολιτείας, όπου δ' όλίγον κύριον πληθος, όλιγαρχίαν είναί φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν 25 4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἄν τις συνθεὶς τῆ μὲν εὐπορία τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῆ δ' ἀπορία τὸ πληθος ούτω προσαγορεύη τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ή τὰς άρχας έχουσιν οἱ εύποροι ὀλίγοι τὸ πληθος όντες, δημοκρατίαν δὲ ἐν ἢ οἱ ἄποροι πολλοὶ τὸ πληθος ὄντες, ἄλλην 30 5 ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι λεχθείσας πολιτείας, την έν ή πλείους εύποροι και έν ή έλάττους οί άποροι, κύριοι δ' έκάτεροι των πολιτειών, είπερ μηδεμία 6 άλλη πολιτεία παρά τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστίν; ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιείν δηλον ότι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ή πολλούς είναι κυ- 35 ρίους συμβεβηκός έστιν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς όλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς δ' είναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς 7 ρηθείσας αίτίας γίνεσθαι διαφοράς), ώ δε διαφέρουσιν ή τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτός 40 έστιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν 1280 a τ' έλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, είναι ταύτην όλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου 8 δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τούς μεν όλίγους είναι τούς δε πολλούς εύποροῦσι μεν γαρ ολίγοι, της δε έλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες δι' ας 5 αίτίας άμφισβητοῦσιν άμφότεροι της πολιτείας.

Αηπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας 9 καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἄπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως 10 δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ 2 οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις. οἱ δὲ τοῦτ ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἶς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δὰ αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις σχεδὸν δὰ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι 15

κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ 3 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἶς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα όμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἶς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, 20 μάλιστα μέν διὰ τὸ λεχθέν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περί αύτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς έκατέρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν άπλῶς. οἱ μὲν 4 γάρ αν κατά τι άνισοι ωσιν, οδον χρήμασιν, όλως οδονται άνισοι είναι, οἱ δ' αν κατά τι ἴσοι, οἱον ἐλευθερία, ὅλως 25 ίσοι, τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτη- 5 μάτων χάριν έκοινώνησαν καὶ συνηλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι της πόλεως ὅσονπερ καὶ της κτήσεως, ὥσθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειεν αν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν έκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενέγκαντα μίαν μνᾶν τῶ 30 δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινομένων) εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἔνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ 6 εὖ ζην (καὶ γὰρ ἀν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ην πόλις νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζην κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ένεκεν, ὅπως 35 ύπὸ μηδενὸς άδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς άλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρησιν την προς άλληλους και γάρ αν Τυρρηνοί και Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἶς ἐστὶ σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἄν πολίται πόλεως ἦσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθῆκαι 7 περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν 40 καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ 1280 b τούτοις κοιναὶ καθεστασιν, άλλ' έτεραι παρ' έκατέροις, οὔτε τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους, ούδ' όπως μηδείς άδικος έσται των ύπο τὰς συνθήκας μηδέ μοχθηρίαν έξει μηδεμίαν, άλλα μόνον όπως μηδεν άδική-5 σουσιν άλλήλους. περὶ δ' άρετης καὶ κακίας πολιτικης 8 διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ἢ καὶ φανερὸν ότι δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῆ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομα-

ζομένη πόλει, μη λόγου χάριν. γίνεται γαρ ή κοινωνία

συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπῳ διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καί, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυ- 10 κόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ'

- 9 ούχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ συναγάγοι τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἕν, ὥστε ἄπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς 15 ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς
- 10 πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων έστίν. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν χωρὶς μέν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄποθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς <sup>20</sup> ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων,
- 11 οἶον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ' οὕτω πω πόλις. διὰ τίνα δή ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἔκαστος 25 μέντοι χρῷτο τῆ ἰδία οἰκία ισπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ως ἐπιμαχίας οὕσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον, οὐδ' οὕτως ἀν εἶναι δόξειε πόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴπερ
- 12 όμοίως όμιλοῖεν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρίς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς 3° αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἀπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελέας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρ-
- 13 κους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα 35 κατοικούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαί τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν,
- 14 ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν 40 κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς 1281 a

φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν 15 τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις. ὅτι μὲν οῦν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου ο λέγουσι, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων'

10 "Εχει δ' ἀπορίαν, τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. η γάρ τοι τὸ πληθος, η τοὺς πλουσίους, η τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, η τὸν βέλτιστον ένα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα έχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; αν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ 15 πλείους είναι διανέμωνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικόν έστιν; έδοξε γὰρ νὴ Δία τῷ κυρίφ δικαίως. τὴν οὖν άδικίαν 2 τί χρη λέγειν την έσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, οί πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἂν διανέμωνται, φανερὸν ὅτι φθείρουσι την πόλιν. άλλα μην ούχ ή γ' άρετη φθείρει τὸ 20 έχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν ώστε δηλον ότι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον. ἔτι καὶ 3 τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἔπραξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας δικαίας. βιάζεται γὰρ ὢν κρείττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πληθος τοὺς πλουσίους, ἀλλ' ἆρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον 25 ἄρχειν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; αν οὖν κἀκείνοι ταὐτὰ ποιῶσι καὶ διαρπάζωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτ' έστὶ δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον άρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ὅτι πάντα 4 φαῦλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν άλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄρχειν δεί καὶ κυρίους είναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους 30 ἀτίμους είναι πάντας, μη τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαίς τιμάς γάρ λέγομεν είναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ' αίεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον είναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους, ἀλλ' 5 ένα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν βέλτιον; άλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο όλι-

γαρχικώτερον οι γαρ άτιμοι πλείους. άλλ' ίσως φαίη τις

αν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον είναι άλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον, 35 έχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. αν οὖν η νόμος μεν όλιγαρχικός δε ή δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περί τῶν ἡπορημένων; συμβήσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον, περί μεν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος 11 ότι δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πληθος ή τοὺς ἀρίστους 40 μεν όλίγους δε, δόξειεν αν λύεσθαι καί τιν έχειν απορίαν. 2 τάχα δὲ καν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαίος ἀνήρ, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελ- 1281 b τίους ἐκείνων, ούχ ώς ἕκαστον άλλ' ώς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ συμφορητά δείπνα των έκ μιας δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων πολλών γάρ όντων έκαστον μόριον έχειν άρετης καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ώσπερ ένα άνθρωπον 5 τὸ πληθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ' 3 αίσθήσεις, ούτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ήθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον πάντα δὲ 4 πάντες. άλλὰ τούτω διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν 10 έκάστου τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλούς φασι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνηχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρίς είς έν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον έχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὶ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλ-5 μόν, έτέρου δέ τινος έτερον μόριον. εί μεν οὖν περὶ πάντα 15 δημον καὶ περὶ πῶν πληθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφοράν των πολλων πρός τους όλίγους σπουδαίους, άδηλον, ίσως δὲ νη Δία δηλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς καν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσειε λόγος καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ένιοι των θηρίων ώς έπος είπειν;), άλλα περί τι 20 6 πληθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον είρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ την έχομένην αὐτης, τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς έλευθέρους καὶ τὸ πληθος τῶν πολιτῶν (τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν ὅσοι μήτε 7 πλούσιοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν) το μεν γαρ 25 VOL. III. C

μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἄν τὰ δ' άμαρτάνειν αὐτούς), τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν όταν γαρ άτιμοι πολλοί και πένητες ύπάρ-30 χωσι, πολεμίων άναγκαῖον είναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται δη τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. 8 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν έπί τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, άρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἐῶσιν πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι 9 35 συνελθόντες ίκανην αίσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοσι τὰς πόλεις ώφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφή μετά της καθαράς την πάσαν ποιεί χρησιμωτέραν της όλίγης · χωρίς δ' έκαστος άτελης περί τὸ κρίνειν έστίν. έχει 10 δ' ή τάξις αύτη της πολιτείας απορίαν πρώτην μεν ότι δόξειεν 40 αν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰάτρευκεν, οὖπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς νόσου της παρούσης ούτος δ' έστιν ιατρός, όμοίως δε τούτο καί 1282 α περί τὰς ἄλλας έμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοις όμοίοις, ιατρός δ' ό τε δημιουργός και ό άρχιτεκτονι- 11 κὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην εἰσὶ γάρ 5 τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ώς είπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δε τὸ κρίνειν οὐδεν ήττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ή τοίς είδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν αν 12 δόξειεν έχειν τρόπον καὶ γὰρ τὸ έλέσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδότων έργον έστίν, οξον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ 10 κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἔργων καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' οὔ τι τῶν είδότων γε μάλλον. ώστε κατά μέν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ 13 αν είη τὸ πληθος ποιητέον κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν οὔτε τῶν εὐθυνῶν, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς 14

15 διά τε τὸν πάλαι λόγον, ἄν ἢ τὸ πληθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες (ἔσται γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτὴς τῶν εἰδότων, ἄπαντες δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρους), καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων οὕτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὕτ' ἄριστ' ἂν κρίνειεν, ὅσων τᾶργα γιγνώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἶον οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γνῶναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλ-20 τιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῷ κρινεῖ (χρῆται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαιτυμὼν ἀλλ'

- 15 οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειέ τις ἂν οὕτω λύειν ἰκανῶς· ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς 25 φαύλους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δ' εὔθυναι καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰρέσεις εἰσὶ μέγιστον· ὰς ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς δήμοις ἀποδιδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων τῶν
- 16 τοιούτων έστίν. καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς 3° τυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχουσιν ἀπὸ μεγάλων. ὁμοίως δή τις ἂν λύσειε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν ἄσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτ'
- 17 όρθως, οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ' ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ 35
  ὁ δῆμος τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἕκαστος μόριόν ἐστι τούτων (λέγω
  δὲ μόριον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστὴν καὶ τὸν δικα-
- 18 στήν)· ώστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πληθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν ὁ δημος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλεῖον τὸ πάντων τούτων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' 40
- 19 ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φα- 1282 b νερὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἔτερον ὡς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἄν τε εἶς ἄν τε πλείους ὧσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορί- 5
- 20 σαι περὶ πάντων. ὁποίους μέντοι τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι μένει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη

- καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δικαίους ἢ το ἀδίκους. πλὴν τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν 21 κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας οὐ δικαίους.
- 12 'Επεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις 15 ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῆ κυριωτάτη πασῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, ἔστι δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον, δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι γὲ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οῖς
- 20 διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν (τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναί φασιν) ποίων δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ 2 ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν. ἴσως γὰρ ἄν φαίη τις κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμῆσθαι τὰς ἀρ-
- 25 χάς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὅντες· τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἔσται ³ καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέ-
- 30 χουσιν. ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν 4 ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέροις οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν. εἰ
- 35 δὲ μήπω δηλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν ἔσται φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν κατὰ 5
  τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολὺ δ΄ ἐλλείπων κατ΄ εὐγένειαν ἢ κάλλος,
  εἰ καὶ μεῖζον ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθόν ἐστι τῆς αὐλητικῆς
  (λέγω δὲ τήν τ΄ εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ
- 40 την ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλέον της αὐλητικης ἡ ἐκεῖνος κατὰ την αὐλητικήν, ὅμως τούτω δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας

των αὐλων δεί γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπε- 1283 a ροχήν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ' 6 οὐδέν, ἔτι κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν αν είη συμβλητόν, εί γαρ μαλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως αν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον είη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς 5 έλευθερίαν, ώστ' εἰ πλεῖον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ή όδὶ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος, είη αν συμβλητα πάντα τοσόνδε γαρ [μέγεθος] εί 7 κρείττον τοσούδε, τοσόνδε δήλον ώς ίσον. έπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ άδύνατον, δήλον ώς καὶ έπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ 10 πασαν ανισότητ' αμφισβητούσι των άρχων (εί γαρ οί μέν βραδείς οἱ δὲ ταχείς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλείον τους δ' έλαττον έχειν, άλλ' έν τοις γυμνικοίς άγωσιν ή 8 τούτων διαφορά λαμβάνει την τιμήν), άλλ' έξ ων πόλις συνέστηκεν, έν τούτοις άναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν άμφισβήτησιν, 15 διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ πλούσιοι, δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τ' εἶναι καὶ τίμημα φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἄν εἴη πόλις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ 9 οὐδ' ἐκ δούλων) ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ 20 τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν, πλην ἄνευ μεν των προτέρων άδύνατον είναι πόλιν, άνευ δε τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι καλώς. πρός μεν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν αν η πάντα 13 ή ένιά γε τούτων όρθως άμφισβητείν, προς μέντοι ζωήν άγαθην ή παιδεία καὶ ή άρετη μάλιστα δικαίως αν άμφισ- 25 βητοίησαν, καθάπερ είρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἕν τι μόνον ὄντας οὔτε άνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ' ἕν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς 2 τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. είρηται μεν οθν καὶ πρότερον ότι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες, 30 άπλως δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως, οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλεῖον μέτεστι της χώρας αὐτοῖς, ή δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοί μαλλον ώς έπι τὸ πλέον οι δ' έλεύ-

θεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων (πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον 35 οί γενναιότεροι των άγεννων, ή δ' εὐγένεια παρ' έκάστοις οίκοι τίμιος. έτι διότι βελτίους είκὸς τοὺς έκ βελτιόνων, 3 εὐγένεια γάρ έστιν άρετη γένους). ὁμοίως δη φήσομεν δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβητείν κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν είναι φαμεν την δικαιοσύνην, ή πάσας άναγκαιον άκολουθείν 40 τὰς ἄλλας. άλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους 4 καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους εἰσίν, ώς λαμβανομένων των πλειόνων πρός τους έλάττους. 1283 b εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾶ πόλει, λέγω δ' οἶον οἵ τ' ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πληθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, πότερον άμφισβήτησις έσται τίνας άρχειν δεί, ή ούκ έσται; καθ' εκάστην μεν οθν πολιτείαν των είρημενων 5 5 άναμφισβήτητος ή κρίσις τίνας άρχειν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν άλλήλων, οξον ή μεν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ή δε τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον) ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχη χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον. εἰ δὴ τὸν 6 10 άριθμον είεν ολίγοι πάμπαν οί την άρετην έχοντες, τίνα δεί διελείν τρόπον; η τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεί σκοπείν, εί δυνατοί διοικείν την πόλιν ή τοσούτοι τὸ πληθος ώστ' είναι πόλιν έξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἄπαντας τούς διαμφισβητούντας περί των πολιτικών τιμών. δόξαιεν 7 15 γὰρ (ἀν) οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιοῦντες άρχειν, όμοίως δε καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος. δηλον γὰρ ώς εἴ τις πάλιν είς πλουσιώτερος άπάντων έστί, δήλον ότι κατά τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἕνα ἀπάντων δεήσει, όμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεία διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητούν-20 των δι' έλευθερίαν. ταύτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἴσως συμβήσεται καὶ 8 περί τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἰ γάρ τις εἶς ἀμείνων άνηρ είη των άλλων των έν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων όντων, τοῦτον είναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταὐτὸ δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλήθος είναι γε δεί κύριον διότι κρείττους είσὶ τῶν

όλίγων, καν είς η πλείους μεν τοῦ ένος ἐλάττους δε τῶν 25 πολλῶν κρείττους ὧσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δέοι κυρίους 9 εἶναι μᾶλλον η τὸ πληθος. πάντα δη ταῦτ' ἔοικε φανερὸν ποιεῖν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθός ἐστι, καθ' ὸν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοὶ μεν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχε-

- 10 σθαι πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν 30 ἀξιοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἄν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν δλίγων καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὡς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς
- 11 άθρόους. διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἢν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλ- 35 λουσί τινες, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτη νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν συμβαίνη τὸ λεχθέν.
- 12 τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς 4° πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν πολίτης δὲ κοινῆ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρ- χεσθαί ἐστι, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν 1284 a ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν
- 13 πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. εἰ δέ τίς ἐστιν εἶς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἑνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ 5 συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ' εἶς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων, ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν ὥσπερ γὰρ 10
- 14 θεδν έν άνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ δυνάμει κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἄν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις πειρώμενος κατ' αὐτῶν λέγοιεν γὰρ ἄν ἴσως ἄπερ ἀντι- 15

σθένης έφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὀστρα- 15 κισμον αί δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις, διά την τοιαύτην αίτίαν. αθται γάρ δή δοκοῦσι διώκειν την ἰσότητα μάλιστα πάντων, 20 ώστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἡ πολυφιλίαν ή τινα άλλην πολιτικήν ἰσχὺν ώστράκιζον καὶ μεθίστασαν έκ της πόλεως χρόνους ώρισμένους. μυθολογείται 16 δε καὶ τοὺς 'Αργοναύτας τὸν 'Ηρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ τοιαύτην αίτίαν οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Άργὸ 25 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλω συμβουλίαν ούχ άπλως οίητέον όρθως έπιτιμαν (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περίανδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμ- 17 φθέντα κήρυκα περί της συμβουλίας, άφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς 30 ύπερέχοντας των σταχύων όμαλθναι την άρουραν όθεν άγνοοῦντος μεν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγγείλαντος δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι δεί τους ύπερέχοντας ἄνδρας άναιρείν). τοῦτο γάρ οὐ μόνον 18 συμφέρει τοις τυράννοις, οὐδε μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν. 35 άλλ' όμοίως έχει καὶ περὶ τὰς όλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας ό γαρ όστρακισμός την αύτην έχει δύναμιν τρόπον τινὰ τῷ κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οί 19 κύριοι της δυνάμεως, οξον 'Αθηναίοι μέν περί Σαμίους καί 40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θᾶττον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν άρχήν, έταπείνωσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας), ὁ δὲ Περ-1284 η σων βασιλεύς Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ των άλλων τούς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπέκοπτε πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας 20 έστὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβε-5 βηκυίαι πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν άλλὰ περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοπούσας τὸν αὐτὸν

έχει τρόπον. δηλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν 21

καὶ ἐπιστημῶν οὕτε γὰρ γραφεύς ἐάσειεν αν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα της συμμετρίας έχειν τὸ ζώον, οὐδ' εί διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὖτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων 10 τι μορίων των της νεώς, ούδε δη χοροδιδάσκαλος τον μείζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἐάσει συγ-22 χορεύειν. ωστε διὰ τοῦτο μεν οὐδεν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνείν ταίς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ώφελίμου ταις πόλεσιν ούσης τοῦτο δρωσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογου- 15 μένας ύπεροχάς έχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικον ο λόγος ο περί 23 τον οστρακισμόν. βέλτιον μεν οθν τον νομοθέτην έξ άρχης ούτω συστήσαι την πολιτείαν ώστε μη δείσθαι τοιαύτης ίατρείας δεύτερος δε πλούς αν συμβή, πειρασθαι τοιούτω τινί διορθώματι διορθοῦν. ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις 20 ού γὰρ ἔβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας συμφέρον, 24 άλλα στασιαστικώς έχρωντο τοίς όστρακισμοίς, έν μέν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυίαις πολιτείαις ὅτι μὲν ἰδία συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον ἐστι, φανερόν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν άλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας 25 έχει πολλην ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν την ύπεροχήν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, άλλ' 25 άν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' άρετήν, τί χρη ποιείν; οὐ γαρ δη φαίεν αν δείν έκβάλλειν και μεθιστάναι τον τοιουτον. άλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου παραπλήσιον 30 γάρ καν εί τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν άξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς άρχάς. λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτο πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας είναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους

"Ισως δε καλώς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους με- 14
ταβηναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας φαμεν γὰρ τῶν
ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτέον δε πότερον
συμφέρει τῆ μελλούση καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ
χώρα βασιλεύεσθαι, ἢ οὕ, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλ2 λον, ἢ τισὶ μεν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει. δεῖ δε 40

έν ταις πόλεσιν.

πρώτον διελέσθαι πότερον έν τὸ γένος έστιν αὐτης ή πλείους 1285 α έχει διαφοράς. ράδιον δη τοῦτό γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω τε γένη περιέχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἶς πασων, ή γὰρ ἐν τῆ Λακωνική πολιτεία δοκεί μὲν είναι 3 βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάν-5 των, άλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθη τὴν χώραν, ἡγεμών ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἶον στρατηγία τις 4 αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ ἀίδιός ἐστιν κτεῖναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλεία, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς το πολεμικαίς έξόδοις έν χειρός νόμφ. δηλοί δ' "Ομηρος ό γὰρ 'Αγαμέμνων κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἡνείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, έξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτείναι κύριος ην. λέγει γοῦν 5 " δν δέ κ' έγων ἀπάνευθε μάχης, ού οι ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ήδ' οἰωνούς πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος." ἐν μὲν 15 οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου, τούτων δ' αί μεν κατά γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἰρεταί παρὰ ταύτην δ' άλλο 6 μοναρχίας είδος, οίαι παρ' ένίοις είσὶ βασιλείαι των βαρβάρων, έχουσι δ' αθται την δύναμιν πασαι παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν, είσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί διὰ γὰρ 20 τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἤθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Έλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν ᾿Ασίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ύπομένουσι την δεσποτικήν άρχην ούδεν δυσχεραίνοντες. τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτόν εἰσιν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ 7 τὸ πάτριαι καὶ κατὰ νόμον είναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βα-25 σιλική καὶ οὐ τυραννική διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν οἱ γὰρ πολίται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλείς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενικόν οί μεν γάρ κατά νόμον καὶ έκόντων, οί δ' ἀκόντων ἄρχουσιν, ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακήν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα 8 30 μοναρχίας, έτερον δ' όπερ ην έν τοις άρχαίοις "Ελλησιν, οθς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἰρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ

- 9 νόμον άλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον, ἦρχον δ' οἱ μὲν διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὡρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οῗον εἵλοντό ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιττα- 35 κὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν 'Αντιμενίδης καὶ
- 10 'Αλκαίος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοί δ' 'Αλκαίος ὅτι τύραννον είλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἔν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν ἐπιτιμῷ γὰρ ὅτι "τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν πόλεως τᾶς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος 'Εστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαινέοντες ἀολ- 1285 b
- 11 λέες." αὖται μὲν οὖν εἰσί τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἰρεταὶ καὶ ἑκόντων βασιλικαί τέταρτον δ' εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους ἑκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι γιγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον 5
- 12 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγίγνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι. κύριοι δ' ἢσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαί, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις 10 τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίουν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὀμνύοντες, οἱ δ' ὀμνύοντες· ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἢν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις.
- 13 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἢρχον ὑστερον δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων 15 παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάτριοι θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον εἶχον.
- 14 Βασιλείας μεν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμόν, 20 μία μεν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους (αὕτη δ' ἢν ἐκόντων μέν, ἐπί τισι δ' ὡρισμένοις στρατηγὸς γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεύς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἢν αἰσυμνητείαν προσαγορεύουσιν 25 (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν αἰρετὴ τυραννίς), τετάρτη δ' ἡ Λακωνικὴ

τούτων (αΰτη δ' έστὶν ώς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς στρατηγία κατὰ γένος αίδιος) αθται μέν οθν τοθτον τον τρόπον διαφέρουσιν 15 άλλήλων, πέμπτον δ' είδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ἢ πάντων 30 κύριος είς ὤν, ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη τῶν κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομική βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία 15 πόλεως καὶ έθνους ένὸς ἡ πλειόνων οἰκονομία. σχεδὸν δἡ δύο έστιν ώς είπειν είδη βασιλείας περί ων σκεπτέον, αύτη 35 τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνική τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μεταξὺ τούτων εἰσίν, ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασιλείας, πλειόνων δ' είσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ώστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν 2 περί δυοίν έστίν, εν μεν πότερον συμφέρει ταίς πόλεσι στρατηγον αίδιον είναι, καὶ τοῦτον η κατὰ γένος η κατὰ μέρος, 1286 a ή οὐ συμφέρει ἐν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ή οὐ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπείν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον είδος ή πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), 5 ώστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασι- 3 λείας πολιτείας εἶδός ἐστιν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αύτη, πότερον συμφέρει μαλλον ύπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου άνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ή ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς 4 10 νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν, άλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν, ὥστ' ἐν όποιαοῦν τέχνη τὸ κατὰ γράμματ' ἄρχειν ἠλίθιον καὶ ἐν Αίγύπτω μετά την τετρήμερον κινείν έξεστι τοίς ιατροίς, έὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνφ. φανερὸν τοίνυν ώς 15 οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεῖνον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν 5 τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἄρχουσιν κρεῖττον δ' ὧ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ῷ συμφυές. τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμω τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' 20 έχειν πασαν. άλλ' ίσως αν φαίη τις ώς άντὶ τούτου βου6 λεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κεῖσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἕνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας; 25

7 καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὖται δ' αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον. καθ' ἕνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὁστισοῦν ἴσως χείρων ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἑστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον 30

8 ὄχλος πολλὰ ἡ εἶς ὁστισοῦν. ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολύ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον τοῦ δ' ἐνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἤ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἄμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. 35

9 ἔστω δὲ τὸ πληθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο μὴ ράδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἶς ἀδιαφθορώ-τερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ 40 δὲ πάντες; ἢ δῆλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάσουσιν, 1286 b

10 ὁ δὲ εἶς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἴσως ὅτι σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνος ὁ εἴς. εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς βασιλείαν, αἰρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς 5 πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς

11 δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀν ἢ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἢν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατ ἀρετήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. ἔτι δ' ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν 10 τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.

- έπεὶ δὲ χείρους γιγνόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, 12 15 ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εὔλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι
- 20 δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς 13 πόλεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἔτι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν. εἰ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἕξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὁποῖοί τινες
- 25 ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὧν τοῖς 14 τέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὐκέτι τοῦτο ράδιον πιστεῦσαι χαλεπὸν γάρ, καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτόν, ἢ δυνήσεται
- 30 βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μη- 15 δὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, ἢ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους. τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν 16
- 35 διορίσαι (δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν ἰσχὺν ὥστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, καθάπερ οἵ τ' ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς ἐδίδοσαν, ὅτε καθισταῖέν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτην ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίφ τις, ὅτ' ἤτει τοὺς φύλακας, 40 συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας).
- 1287 a. 16 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος ὅ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρ-5 χειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν ἀίδιον, οἶον ἐν δημοκρατία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως:

τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ 2 'Οποῦντα δὲ κατά τι μέρος ἔλαττον) περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, αύτη δ' έστὶ καθ' ην άρχει πάντα κατά την έαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς—δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οὐδὲ κατά 10 φύσιν είναι τὸ κύριον ένα πάντων είναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου συνέστηκεν έξ όμοίων ή πόλις τοις γαρ όμοίοις φύσει τὸ αύτὸ δίκαιον άναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν άξίαν κατὰ φύσιν είναι, ώστ' είπερ καὶ τὸ ίσην έχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφην η έσθητα βλαβερον τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς 15 3 τιμάς, δμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους διόπερ οὐδεν μαλλον ἄρχειν ἡ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοίνυν ώσαύτως. τοῦτο δ' ήδη νόμος ή γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν άρα νόμον ἄρχειν αίρετώτερον μαλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα 4 τινά, κατά τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τινας ἄρχειν 20 βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις άναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕνα τοῦτον είναι φασι δικαιον δμοίων γε όντων πάντων. άλλα μην όσα γε μη δοκεί δύνασθαι διορίζειν ο νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος 5 αν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. άλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος 25 έφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῆ δικαιοτάτη γνώμη κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τους άρχοντας. έτι δ' έπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὅ τι αν δόξη πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον είναι των κειμένων. ὁ μεν οῦν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεί κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον. ή τε 30 γαρ έπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τους αρίστους ανδρας. διόπερ ανευ ορέξεως νους ο νόμος έστίν. 6 τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὅτι τὸ κατά γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, άλλὰ καὶ αἰρετώτερον 7 χρησθαι τοις έχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οί μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φι- 35 λίαν παρά τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρνυνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς κάμνοντας ύγιάσαντες οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς πολλά πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τους ιατρούς όταν υποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοις έχθροις δια-

40 Φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν ζητήσαιεν αν μαλλον. άλλα μην είσαγονταί γ' έφ' έαυτους 8 1287 b οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ώς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον ότι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν ὁ γὰρ νόμος τὸ 5 μέσον. ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμ- 9 ματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος. άλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει άρα πλείονας είναι τούς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας, το ώστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο έξ άρχης εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν η τὸν ἕνα καταστήσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, δ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον 10 έστίν, είπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ένὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους τοῦτο γάρ έστι τὸ "σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω" καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Άγαμέμνονος, "τοιοῦ-15 τοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες." είσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἰ άρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος άδυνατεί διορίζειν, έπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ περὶ τούτων ώς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. άλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ 11 20 δε άδύνατα, ταῦτ' έστὶν ὰ ποιεί διαπορείν καὶ ζητείν πότερον τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αίρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄριστον περί ὧν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετησαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων έστίν. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄνθρωπον είναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ 25 ένα μόνον άλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ έκαστος ἄρχων πεπαι- 12 δευμένος ύπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπόν τ' ἴσως αν είναι δόξειεν εί βέλτιον ίδοι τις δυοίν όμμασι καὶ δυσίν άκοαίς κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ή πολλοὶ πολλοίς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν 30 αύτων καὶ ώτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας· τοὺς γὰρ τῷ ἀρχῷ καὶ

αύτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες 13

οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν εἰ δὲ φίλοι κάκείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ τούτους οἰεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται δείν όμοίως. ά μεν ούν οί διαμφισβητούντες πρός την βασι- 35 λείαν λέγουσι, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτ' ἐπὶ μέν 17 τινων έχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δέ τινων οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον τυραννικὸν δ' οὐκ ἔστι κατά φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὅσαι παρεκβάσεις εἰσίν 40 2 ταῦτα γὰρ γίγνεται παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερον ώς έν μεν τοις όμοίοις και ίσοις ούτε συμφέρον 1288 α έστὶν ούτε δίκαιον ένα κύριον είναι πάντων, ούτε μη νόμων όντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν άγαθων ούτε μη άγαθων μη άγαθόν, ούδ' αν κατ' άρετην 3 ἀμείνων ἢ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον 5 είρηται δέ πως ήδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν. 4 βασιλευτον μέν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πληθος ὁ πέφυκε φέρειν γένος ὑπερέχον κατ ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν, ἀριστοκρατικόν δὲ πλήθος ὁ πέφυκε φέρειν πλήθος ἄρχεσθαι 10 δυνάμενον την των έλευθέρων άρχην ύπο των κατ άρετην ήγεμονικών πρός πολιτικήν άρχήν, πολιτικόν δέ πλήθος έν ῷ πέφυκεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πληθος πολεμικόν, δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα 5 τοις εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. ὅταν οὖν ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν 15 άλλων ένα τινὰ συμβη διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' άρετην τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων 6 καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον, οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὁ προφέρειν εἰώθασιν 20 οί τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες, οί τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οί τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικάς (πάντη γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν),

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άλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ή 7 25 φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δή που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν, ούτ' άξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ύπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν έχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ 8 τοιούτω, καὶ κύριον είναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. 30 περί μέν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας έχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς, 18 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμὲν εἶναι τὰς όρθας πολιτείας, τούτων δ' άναγκαῖον άρίστην είναι τὴν ὑπὸ των αρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη δ' έστὶν έν ή συμβέβη-35 κεν η ένα τινα συμπάντων η γένος όλον η πληθος ύπερέχον είναι κατ' άρετήν, των μεν άρχεσθαι δυναμένων των δ' άρχειν προς την αίρετωτάτην ζωήν, έν δε τοίς πρώτοις έδείχθη λόγοις ότι την αύτην άναγκαῖον άνδρὸς άρετην είναι καὶ πολίτου της πόλεως της άρίστης, φανερον ότι τον αὐτον τρόπον καὶ 40 διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαίος καὶ πόλιν συστήσειεν άν τις άριστοκρατουμένην ή βασιλευομένην, ώστ έσται 1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ έθη ταὐτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον άνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν, διωρισμέ- 2 νων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς άρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς. 5 [άνάγκη δη τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτης ποιήσασθαι την προσήκουσαν σκέψιν]

## $\Delta'$ (H').

1288 b 5 'Ανάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν
1323 a 14 προσήκουσαν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα
15 ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη] διορίσασθαι
πρῶτον τίς αἰρετώτατος βίος, ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ
τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν' ἄριστα γὰρ
πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρ-

2 χόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μή τι γίγνηται παράλογον. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰρετώτατος βίος, μετὰ 20 δὲ τοῦτο πότερον κοινἢ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος. νομίσαντας οὖν ἰκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.

3 ώς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρός γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἂν ώς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν 25 τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῆ ψυχῆ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν

4 τοις μακαρίοις χρή, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηδὲν μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηδενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήση τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ 30 πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἕνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς φιλτάτους φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινό-

5 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἄν συγχωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς. 35 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὁποσονοῦν, πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάν-

6 των των τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ράδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων διαλαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ 40 φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις, καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετἢ 1323 b τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ ἦθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκεῖνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις 5 ἐλλείπουσιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις

7 εὐσύνοπτόν ἐστιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι πῶν δὲ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν, ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς ἔχουσιν τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῷ περ ἂν 10

ύπερβάλλη, τοσούτω μαλλον χρήσιμον είναι, εί δεί και τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν άλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον. όλως τε δηλον ώς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίσ-8 την έκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, 15 ήνπερ είληφε διάστασιν ων φαμέν αύτας είναι διαθέσεις ταύτας. ώστ' είπερ έστιν ή ψυχή και της κτήσεως και τοῦ σώματος τιμιώτερον καὶ άπλως καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν την άρίστην έκάστου άνάλογον τούτων έχειν. έτι δέ 9 της ψυχης ξνεκεν ταῦτα πέφυκεν αίρετα καὶ δεῖ πάντας 20 αίρεισθαι τους εὖ φρονοῦντας, άλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχήν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστω τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦ- 10 τον όσον περ άρετης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατά ταύτας, έστω συνωμολογημένον ήμιν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, δς εὐδαίμων μέν έστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν 25 έξωτερικών άγαθών άλλὰ δι' αύτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις είναι την φύσιν έπει και την εύτυχίαν της εύδαιμονίας διά ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν της ψυχης αίτιον ταὐτόματον καὶ ή τύχη, δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς ούδε σώφρων άπὸ τύχης ούδε διὰ τὴν τύχην έστίν) έχόμενον 11 30 δ' έστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα την αρίστην είναι και πράττουσαν καλώς. αδύνατον δε καλώς πράττειν τοίς μη τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον ούτ άνδρὸς ούτε πόλεως χωρίς άρετης καὶ φρονήσεως άνδρία 12 δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει 35 δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὧν μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων. άλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα 13 μεν έπι τοσούτον έστω πεφροιμιασμένα τῷ λόγφ (ούτε γὰρ μη θιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους έπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους έτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς 40 ταῦτα νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ χωρίς έκάστω καὶ κοινή ταίς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετὰ ἀρετής κεχο-1324 α ρηγημένης έπὶ τοσοῦτον ώστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πρά-

ξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν 14

μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὕστερον, εἴ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχάνει μὴ πειθόμενος)·

Πότερον δε την εὐδαιμονίαν την αὐτην είναι φατέον 2 ένός τε έκάστου των ανθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ή μη την αὐτήν, λοιπόν έστιν είπειν. φανερον δε και τοῦτο πάντες γάρ αν 2 όμολογήσειαν είναι την αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτω τὸ ζῆν εῦ τίθενται ἐφ' ἐνός, οῦτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐὰν ἢ πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν' όσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, 10 οῦτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην αν είναι φαίεν εί τε τις τον ενα δι άρετην άποδεχεται, 3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. άλλὰ ταῦτ' ήδη δύο έστιν α δείται σκέψεως, εν μεν πότερος αίρετώτερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως 15 ή μαλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος, έτι δε τίνα πολιτείαν θετέον καὶ ποίαν διάθεσιν πόλεως ἀρίστην, είτε πασιν όντος αίρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως 4 είτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικης διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περί 20 έκαστον αίρετόν, ήμεις δε ταύτην προηρήμεθα νθν την σκέψιν, έκείνο μεν γαρ πάρεργον αν είη τοῦτο δε έργον της μεθόδου 5 ταύτης ότι μεν οθν άναγκαῖον είναι πολιτείαν άρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἢν τάξιν καν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζώη μακαρίως, φανερόν έστιν άμφισβητείται δέ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν 25 όμολογούντων τὸν μετ' ἀρετης είναι βίον αίρετώτατον, πότερον ό πολιτικός καὶ πρακτικός βίος αίρετὸς ἡ μᾶλλον ό πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἶον θεωρητικός τις, δν 6 μόνον τινές φασιν είναι φιλόσοφον, σχεδον γάρ τούτους τους δύο βίους των ανθρώπων οι φιλοτιμότατοι προς αρετήν 30 φαίνονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν λέγω δὲ δύο τόν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρον ποτέρως έχει το άληθές άνάγκη γαρ τόν γε εθ φρονούντα πρός τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν 7 ανθρώπων έκαστον καὶ κοινη την πολιτείαν. νομίζουσι δ' οί 35

μέν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετ' άδικίας τινὸς είναι της μεγίστης, πολιτικώς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον ούκ έχειν, έμπόδιον δὲ έχειν τῆ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερία τούτων δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἕτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες, μόνον 40 γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν, ἐφ΄ έκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις 1324 b ή τοις τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευομένοις. οἱ μὲν οὖν 8 ούτως ύπολαμβάνουσιν, οί δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον της πολιτείας είναι μόνον εύδαίμονά φασιν. παρ' ένίοις δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὖτος ὅρος καὶ τῶν νόμων, ὅπως 5 δεσπόζωσι τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην 9 ώς είπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως εἴ πού τι πρὸς έν οι νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατείν στοχάζονται πάντες, ώσπερ έν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτη πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται σχεδὸν ή τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πληθος. ἔτι δ' ἐν 10 το τοις έθνεσι πασι τοις δυναμένοις πλεονεκτείν ή τοιαύτη τετίμηται δύναμις, οἷον έν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θραξὶ καὶ Κελτοις έν ένίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινές εἰσι παροξύνοντες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν ὅσας ἂν στρατεύσων-15 ται στρατείας ήν δέ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν 11 μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεζῶσθαι τὴν φορβειάν ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῆ τινὶ σκύφον περιφερόμενον τῷ μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότι πολέμιον ἐν δὲ τοῖς "Ιβηρσιν, "έθνει πολεμικώ, τοσούτους τον άριθμον όβελίσκους 20 καταπηγνύουσι περί τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρη τῶν πολεμίων καὶ έτερα δὴ παρ' έτέροις έστὶ τοιαῦτα πολλά 12 τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν, καίτοι δόξειεν αν άγαν άτοπον ίσως είναι τοις βουλομένοις έπισκοπείν, εί τουτ' έστιν έργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρείν ὅπως ἄρχη 25 καὶ δεσπόζη τῶν πλησίον καὶ βουλομένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. πως γαρ αν είη τοῦτο πολιτικον ή νομοθετικόν, ο γε μηδε 13 νόμιμόν έστιν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως άλλὰ

καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν' οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιά- 30 σασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆρας.

- 14 άλλ' ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἴεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὑτοῖς ἕκαστοι οὔ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὑτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς 35
- 15 δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστόν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυσοίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν ἔστι δὲ θη- 40
- 16 ρευτὸν ὁ ἀν ἄγριον ἢ έδεστὸν ζῷον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ' ἀν καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων, ἢ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι 1325 a καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαί που καθ' ἑαυτὴν νόμοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἢς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων
- 17 μηδέν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον. δηλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς 5 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνου χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς πῶς
- 18 μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας. διοίσει 10 μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἔνια νομίμων καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν ὕστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν 15 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον 3 αἰρετώτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμάζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τόν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου

- 20 βίον ἔτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἰρετώτατον, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηδὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ΄ εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτόν) ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων τοῦτο 2
- 25 γὰρ ἀληθές οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλω, ἢ δοῦλος, χρῆσθαι σεμνόν ἡ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δεσποτείαν οὐκ ὀρθόν οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ
- 30 φύσει δούλου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν 3 οὐκ ἀληθές ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. καίτοι τάχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισ-
- 35 μένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖ 4 τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μήθ' ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο
- 40 φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἰρετώτατον, τὸ δ' εὖ πράττειν ἄριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ ὑπάρ-
- 1325 b ξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὅντων αἰρετώτατον· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οἶόν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται 5
  τοῦτο ψεῦδος· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι
  τῶ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ
  - 5 τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων ὅστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐδὲν ἄν τηλικοῦτον κατορθώσειεν ὕστερον ὅσον ἤδη παρεκβέβηκε τῆς ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ (ἐν) μέρει, τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις 6 καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν
  - 10 παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κᾶν ἄλλος τις ἢ κρείττων κατ ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτω

7 καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτφ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἢν ἔσται πρακτικός. ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῆ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' 15

8 ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοή- 20 σεις ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν

9 πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ' αὑτὰς πόλεις ίδρυμένας καὶ ζῆν οὕτω προηρημένας ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο 25 συμβαίνειν πολλαὶ γὰρ κοινωνίαι πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέ-

10 ρεσι της πόλεως είσιν. όμοίως δε τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ένὸς ὁτουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σχολη γὰρ αν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἶς οὐκ είσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. ὅτι μεν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον 30 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον ἐκάστω τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινη ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φανερόν ἐστιν

'Επεὶ δὲ πεφροιμίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν, 4 καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑποθέ- 35 σεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως. 2 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμμέ-

τρου χορηγίας. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ

3 οἷον περί τε πλήθους πολιτών καὶ χώρας. ὅσπερ γὰρ καὶ 40 τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἷον ὑφάντη καὶ ναυπηγῷ, δεῖ τὴν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείαν οὖσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσῷ 1326 a γὰρ ἂν αὕτη τυγχάνη παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ

τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτη δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν 5 ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσαν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον 4 τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, ὅσην τε εἶναι καὶ ποίαν τινὰ ταύτην. οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλεῖστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν εὐδαίμονα πόλιν εἰ δὲ τοῦτ'

10 άληθές, άγνοοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ ποία μικρὰ πόλις. κατ 5 ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστ ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην, οἷον

15 'Ιπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φήσειεν ἄν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ 6 μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ δεῖ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο ποιητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν

20 καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλ' ὅσοι πόλεώς εἰσι μέρος καὶ ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μορίων ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ πλήθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, ἐξ ῆς δὲ βάναυσοι μὲν ἐξέρχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὁπλῖται δὲ ὀλίγοι, ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν μεγάλη τε

25 πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γε ἐκ τῶν 7 ἔργων φανερὸν ὅτι χαλεπόν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον, εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὖσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὅ τε γὰρ 8

30 νόμος τάξις τίς έστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν εἶναι, ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλις ἦς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς 9

35 δρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάν-

- 10 των, ζώων φυτῶν ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἕξει τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως, ὁτὲ δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἶον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται 40 πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοιν, εἰς δέ τι μέγεθος ἐλθὸν ὁτὲ μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσει τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὁτὲ δὲ 1326 b
- 11 διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἡ δὲ πόλις αὔταρκες), ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον ὑπάρχειν τίς γὰρ στρατη- 5 γὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλήθους, ἢ τίς κῆρυξ μὴ Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους ὁ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν
- 12 ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι μείζω πόλιν, το ἀλλὰ τοῦτ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀόριστον. τίς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ῥάδιον. εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων,
- 13 ἄρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ' 15 ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποῖοί τινές εἰσι, τοὺς πολίτας, ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, φαύλως ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις· περὶ ἀμφότερα γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν
- 14 τῆ πολυανθρωπία τῆ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερῶς. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις 20 καὶ μετοίκοις ράδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. δῆ-λον τοίνυν ὡς οὖτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος. περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον 25

Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ 5 μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παν-

τοφόρον τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς 30 αὔταρκες. πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ώστε δύνασθαι τούς οίκοῦντας ζην σχολάζοντας έλευθερίως άμα καὶ σωφρόνως. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὅρον εἰ καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς λέγομεν, 2 υστερον επισκεπτέον ακριβέστερον, όταν όλως περί κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνη ποιεῖσθαι 35 μνείαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτήν πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφισβητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἕλκοντας ἐφ' ἐκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν ύπερβολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλισχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν. τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν (δεῖ δ' ἔνια 3 40 πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐμπείροις), ὅτι χρὴ μεν τοις πολεμίοις είναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοις δ' εὐέξοδον. 1327 α έτι δ' ώσπερ τὸ πληθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον έφαμεν είναι δείν, ούτω καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εί χρη ποιείν κατ' εὐχήν, πρός τε την θάλατταν προσήκει 5 κείσθαι καλώς πρός τε την χώραν, είς μεν ό λεχθείς 4 όρος δεί γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοινὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων άπάντων ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν

παραπομπάς, ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, κἂν εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυγχάνοι κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, 10 εὐπαρακόμιστον.

6 Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον ἀφέλιμος ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ βλαβερά, πολλὰ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες τό τε γὰρ ἐπιξενοῦσθαί τινας ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένους νόμοις ἀσύμφορον εἶναί φασι πρὸς τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῷ θαλάσση διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ' εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ 2 πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέ-20 χειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδηλον.

3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ράον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους είναι δεί κατ άμφότερα τούς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατά γην καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους, εί μη κατ' ἄμφω δυνατόν, άλλα κατά θάτερον ὑπάρ-4 ξει μαλλον άμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. όσα τ' αν μη τυγχάνη 25 παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα τῶν γιγνομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν αὐτῆ γὰρ ἐμπορικήν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν. οί δὲ παρέχοντες σφας αὐτοὺς πασιν άγορὰν προσόδου χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν ἡν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης 30 μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ' έμπόριον δεῖ κεκτησθαι τοιοῦτον. 5 έπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ώστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν, άλλα κρατείσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις άλλοις έρύμασι, 35 φανερον ώς εί μεν άγαθόν τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι διά της κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῆ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ τι βλαβερόν, φυλάξασθαι ράδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμίσγεσθαι δεῖ 6 πρός άλλήλους. περί δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν 40 βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ μόνον αύτοις άλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίον τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβερούς 1327 b είναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθείν, ώσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ 7 θάλατταν) περί δὲ πλήθους ήδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως εἰ μὲν γὰρ ήγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύ- 5 την την δύναμιν υπάρχειν προς τας πράξεις σύμμετρον. την δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν την γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν γὰρ 8 αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων ἐστίν, δ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ 10 κρατεί της ναυτιλίας πλήθους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκων καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργούντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι

καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισίν, οἶον τῆ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι το τριήρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεων καὶ 9 θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἔστω διωρισμένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους, τίνα μὲν 7 όρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποίους δέ τινας τὴν 20 Φύσιν είναι δεί, νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοήσειεν ἄν τις τοῦτό γε, βλέψας ἐπί τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας των Ελλήνων καὶ πρὸς πάσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διείληπται τοις έθνεσιν τὰ μὲν γὰρ έν τοις ψυχροις τόποις έθνη 2 καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μέν ἐστι πλήρη, διανοίας 25 δε ενδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ελεύθερα μεν διατελεί μαλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ᾿Ασίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ την ψυχήν, άθυμα δέ, διόπερ άρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεί τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ώσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ 3 30 τούς τόπους, ούτως άμφοῖν μετέχει καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικόν έστιν διόπερ έλεύθερόν τε διατελεί καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. την αύτην δ' έχει διαφοράν καὶ τὰ 4 τῶν Ελλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ] πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει 35 την φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερον τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε είναι καὶ θυμοειδείς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτη πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὅπερ γάρ 5 φασί τινες δείν ὑπάρχειν τοίς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικούς μὲν 40 είναι των γνωρίμων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνωτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός έστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν αὕτη γάρ έστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς 1328 α δύναμις ή φιλουμεν. σημείον δέ προς γάρ τους συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, όλιγωρείσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Αρχίλοχος προσηκόντως 6

τοίς φίλοις έγκαλων διαλέγεται πρός τον θυμόν.

σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεο.

5 καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμός. 7 οὐ καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας. προς ούδένα γάρ είναι χρή τοιοῦτον, ούδε είσιν οί μεγαλόψυχοι τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας. τοῦτο δὲ 10 μαλλον έτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἴρηται 8 πρότερον, αν άδικείσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατά λόγον παρ' οίς γάρ όφείλεσθαι δείν την εύεργεσίαν ύπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι καὶ " οί τοι πέρα στέρξαντες, οίδε καὶ πέρα μισοῦσιν."

9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισται σχεδόν (οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διά τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν 20 γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως) ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων 8 τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως, ων άνευ τὸ όλον οὐκ αν είη, δηλον ως οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον όσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν,

2 ούδ' άλλης κοινωνίας ούδεμιας, έξ ής έν τι τὸ γένος. εν γάρ 25 τι καὶ κοινὸν είναι δεί καὶ ταὐτὸ τοίς κοινωνοίς, ἄν τε ἴσον άν τε άνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν, οίον είτε τροφή τοῦτό έστιν

3 εἴτε χώρας πληθος εἴτ άλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν ὅταν δ΄ η τὸ μὲν τούτου ἔνεκεν τὸ δ' οὖ ἕνεκεν, οὐδὲν ἔν γε τούτοις κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν λέγω δ' οἶον 30 όργάνω τε παντί πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοίς οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐδέν ἐστιν ὁ γίνεται κοινόν.

4 άλλ' έστι της οἰκίας χάριν ή των οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως μέν δεί ταίς πόλεσιν, οὐδεν δ' έστιν ή κτησις μέρος της πόλεως. πολλά δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεώς ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ 35 πόλις κοινωνία τίς έστι των ομοίων, ένεκεν δε ζωής της ένδε-5 χομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ

άρετης ένέργεια καὶ χρησίς τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δε ούτως ώστε τους μεν ενδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αυτης, τους δε μικρον ή 40 μηδέν, δηλον ώς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἴδη καὶ διαφοράς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους άλλον γάρ τρόπον καὶ δι' 1328 η άλλων εκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες τούς τε βίους ετέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτί ἐστιν 6 ων άνευ πόλις οὐκ αν είη καὶ γὰρ α λέγομεν είναι μέρη πόλεως, έν τούτοις αν είη (α) αναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον 5 τοίνυν τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν 7 γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὅπλα πρός τε τὴν άρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδικεῖν 10 έπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αύτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἡν καλοῦσιν ίερατείαν, έκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαιότατον κρίσιν περί των συμφερόντων καὶ των δικαίων των πρὸς 15 άλλήλους. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα 8 πόλις ώς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πληθός ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, άλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὔταρκες, ὡς φαμέν, ἐὰν δέ τι τυγχάνη τούτων ἐκλεῖπον, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν είναι ταύτην) άνάγκη τοίνυν κατά τὰς έργασίας 9 20 ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τ' εἶναι πληθος. οὶ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὔπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων

9 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι 25 κοινωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄπαντας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας) ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποθετέον, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάση δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, 2

ένδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνείν πάντων, καὶ μὴ πάντας 30 πάντων άλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας έτέρας έν μεν γάρ ταις δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι 3 πάντες πάντων, έν δὲ ταῖς όλιγαρχίαις τοὐναντίον, ἐπεὶ δέ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' έστὶ καθ' ην η πόλις αν είη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων, την δ' 35 εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται πρότερον, φανερον έκ τούτων ώς έν τῆ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένη πόλει καὶ τῆ κεκτημένη δικαίους ἄνδρας άπλῶς, άλλὰ μη προς την υπόθεσιν, ούτε βάναυσον βίον ούτ άγοραιον δεί ξην τους πολίτας (άγεννης γάρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς 40 4 άρετην ύπεναντίος), ούδε δη γεωργούς είναι τούς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι (δεί γὰρ σχολης καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν της ἀρετης 1329 a καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικον καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρίνον περί των δικαίων ένυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα όντα, πότερον έτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ή 5 5 τοις αὐτοις ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι τρόπον μέν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ ἐτέροις. ή μεν γὰρ έτέρας ἀκμης έκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μεν δείται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἐτέροις ή δὲ τῶν άδυνάτων έστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους 10 ύπομένειν άρχομένους άεί, ταύτη δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἱ γὰρ τῶν όπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. 6 λείπεται τοίνυν τοις αὐτοις μεν άμφοτέροις άποδιδόναι την πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἄμα δέ ἀλλ', ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, ἡ μέν δύναμις έν νεωτέροις, ή δε φρόνησις έν πρεσβυτέροις 15 έστίν, οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμησθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον 7 είναι έχει γάρ αΰτη ή διαίρεσις τὸ κατ άξίαν, άλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ (εἶναι) περὶ τούτους ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εύπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολίται δὲ οὖτοι, τὸ γὰρ βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν γένος δ 20 μη της άρετης δημιουργόν έστιν. τοῦτο δὲ δηλον έκ της

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ύποθέσεως τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέ-ψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας.

- 25 φανερον δε καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγ- 8 καῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἢ] περιοίκους. λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. φανερὰ δε καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε 9 βάναυσον ἱερέα καταστατέον ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει
- 30 τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ ἐστὶ τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει δὲ τήν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυστν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον. ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ 10
- 35 πόλις οὐ συνίσταται, καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται (γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν ἀεί, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος)·
- 10 "Εοικε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διῃρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη 1329 b τὴν πόλιν καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν· ἐν Αἰγύπτω τε γὰρ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἔτι καὶ νῦν, τά τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οῦν περὶ Αἰγυπτον Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ 5 περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ 2 τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγιοι τῶν ἐκεῖ κατοικούντων Ἰταλόν 3 τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφ' οῦ τό τε ὄνομα 10 μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοὺς ἀντ' Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τοὔνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὖσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ

Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὁδὸν ἡμι-

- 4 σείας ήμέρας. τοῦτον δη λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας τοὺς Οἰνωτροὺς ὄντας ποιῆσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους ἄλλους τε 15 αὐτοῖς θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστῆσαι πρῶτον. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις
- 5 καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ἄκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν 'Οπικοὶ καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν Αὔσονες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν 'Ιαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν 'Ιόνιον 20
  Χῶνες, τὴν καλουμένην Σιρῖτιν ἢσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες
- 6 Οίνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν γέγονε πρῶτον, ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους ἐξ Αἰγύπτου πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν
- 7 Μίνω βασιλείαν ή Σεσώστριος. σχεδον μεν οὖν καὶ τὰ 25 ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις' τὰ μεν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὔλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν' ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν 30
- 8 ἔχειν τρόπον ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτόν ἐστιν οὖτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιότατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασι καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἰρημένοις ἰκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν.
- 9 "Οτι μεν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρὴ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν περὶ δὲ τῆς διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ ποίους εἶναι χρή, 40 λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινήν φαμεν εἶναι δεῖν τὴν κτῆσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῆ χρήσει φιλικῶς 1330 α γινομένην κοινήν, οὔτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς.
- 10 περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν δι' ἢν δ' αἰτίαν συν-δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν 5

πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐ ράδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἐδίων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλ- λην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεώς ἐστιν. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἰς δύο μέρη 11

- το διηρησθαι την χώραν, καὶ την μὲν εἶναι κοινην την δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἐκατέραν διηρησθαι δίχα πάλιν, της μὲν κοινης τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἰς την τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, της δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατιάς,
- 15 έτερον δε το προς την πόλιν, ΐνα δύο κλήρων εκάστω νεμηθέντων άμφοτέρων των τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν τό τε γαρ ἴσον ούτως έχει και το δίκαιον και το προς τους άστυ-γείτονας πολέμους όμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γαρ μη τοῦτον 12 έχει τον τρόπον, οι μεν όλιγωροῦσι της προς τους ὁμόρους
- 20 ἔχθρας, οἱ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν. διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἴδιον οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς. τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν 13 ἀνάγκη διηρῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας
- 25 αἰτίας τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δεῖ κατ εὐχήν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρός τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶεν χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύσιν.
- 30 τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν [ἰδίους] ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι ἰδίους τῶν κε- 14 κτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῆ κοινῆ γῆ κοινούς. τίνα δὲ δεῖ τρόπον χρῆσθαι δούλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς δούλοις ἄθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.
- 11 Την δε πόλιν ὅτι μεν δεῖ κοινην εἶναι της ήπείρου τε 35 καὶ της θαλάσσης καὶ της χώρας ἀπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εἴρηται πρότερον αὐτης δε πρὸς αὐτην εἶναι τὴν θέσιν εὕχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δη βλέποντας, πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν (αἵ τε 2

γὰρ πρὸς ἔω τὴν ἔγκλισιν ἔχουσαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα τὰ πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγιεινότεραι δεύτερον δέ 40 κατά βορέαν εύχείμεροι γάρ αθται μάλλον) των δε λοιπων πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλως 1330 b 3 έχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον είναι χρή, τοίς δ' έναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον, ύδάτων τε καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πληθος οίκεῖον, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦτό γε εὕρηται διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν 5 ύποδοχας ομβρίοις ύδασιν άφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ώστε μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον 4 έπει δε δεί περι ύγιείας φροντίζειν των ένοικούντων, τοῦτο δ' έστιν έν τῶ κεῖσθαι τὸν τόπον έν τε τοιούτω καὶ πρὸς τοιούτον καλώς, δεύτερον δε ύδασιν ύγιεινοίς χρησθαι, καί 10 τούτου την έπιμέλειαν έχειν μη παρέργως. οίς γαρ πλείστοις χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ 5 πνεύματος δύναμις τοιαύτην έχει την φύσιν. διόπερ έν ταίς εὖ φρονούσαις δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ' 15 όμοια μήτ' άφθονία τοιούτων ή ναμάτων, χωρίς τά τε είς τροφήν ύδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμνῶν, οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταις πολιτείαις οίον ακρόπολις όλιγαρχικόν και μοναρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν δ' όμαλότης, άριστοκρατικόν δ' οὐδέτερον, 20 6 άλλα μαλλον ισχυροί τόποι πλείους. ή δε των ιδίων οικήσεων διάθεσις ήδίων μεν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἄν εὔτομος ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς άσφαλείας τούναντίον, ώς είχον κατά τὸν άρχαῖον χρόνον 25 δυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς 7 ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχεται γάρ, ἄν τις ούτω κατασκευάζη καθάπερ έν τοῖς γεωργοις ας καλουσί τινες των αμπέλων συστάδας) και την μέν

όλην μη ποιείν πόλιν εύτομον, κατά μέρη δε καὶ τόπους 30

ούτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον έξει καλῶς. περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρε-8 της ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργφ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλω-35 πισαμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ 9 πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σώζεσθαι διὰ της των τειχων έρυμνότητος έπει δε και συμβαίνει και ένδέχεται πλείω την ύπεροχην γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων καὶ της ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ της ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετης, εἰ δεῖ 40 σώζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέον εἶναι πολε-1331 α μικωτάτην, ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὐρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας. όμοιον γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξιοῦν 10 καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαιρεῖν τοὺς 5 όρεινοὺς τόπους, όμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ περιβάλλειν τοίχους ώς ἀνάνδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικούντων. άλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν 11 περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περί την πόλιν έξεστιν άμφοτέρως χρησθαι ταις πόλεσιν, και ώς έχούσαις τείχη και ώς μή το έχούσαις, ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον έχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχη τῆ πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τάς τε άλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιτι- 12 15 θεμένοις έπιμελές έστι δί ων τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν, ούτω τὰ μὲν εύρηται τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοὺς φυλαττομένους άρχην γαρ ούδ' έπιχειροῦσιν έπιτίθεσθαι τοίς εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις.

12 Έπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πληθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσι20 τίοις κατανενεμησθαι, τὰ δὲ τείχη διειληφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους, δηλον ὡς αὐτὰ
προκαλεῖται παρασκευάζειν ἔνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις

2 τοις φυλακτηρίοις. και ταθτα μεν δη τοθτον ἄν τις διακοσμήσειε τον τρόπον, τὰς δε τοις θείοις ἀποδεδομένας οἰκήσεις και τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια ἀρμόττει 25 τόπον ἐπιτήδειόν τε ἔχειν και τὸν αὐτόν, ὅσα μη τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἤ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρη-

3 στον. είη δ' αν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον 30 τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἵαν καὶ περὶ

4 Θετταλίαν ὀνομάζουσιν, ἣν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ἀνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε βάναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τοιοῦτον παρα-βάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων (εἴη δ' ἂν 35 εὕχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων

5 έχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διηρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἄρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ
τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρου- 40
σία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευ-

6 θέρων φόβον)· τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύ- 1331 b
της εἶναι καὶ χωρίς, ἔχουσαν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε
ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας
πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ †πλῆθος † διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς,
εἰς ἄρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια περὶ τὴν τῶν 5

7 ίερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἀρχείων ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περί τε γραφὰς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορᾳ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνόδῳ τινὶ κοινῷ κα- 10 τεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν ἐστι τόπος ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ 8 πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις. νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρη-

8 πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις. νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς

- 15 ἄρχουσιν, οὺς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλωροὺς οἱ δὲ ἀγρονόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμημένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβο- 9 λογουμένους καὶ λέγοντας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργόν ἐστιν.
- 20 οὐ γὰρ χαλεπόν ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμ-βῆναι τύχης. διὸ περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τό γε ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν,
- 13 Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποίων
  25 δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ
  πολιτεύσεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δύ ἐστὶν ἐν οῖς 2
  γίγνεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτοιν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν
  σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἐν δὲ τὰς
  πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὐρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
  30 ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν ἐνίστε γὰρ
  - 30 ταυτα και οιαφωνειν αλληλοις και συμφωνειν ενιοτε γαρ ό μεν σκοπός εκκειται καλως, εν δε τω πράττειν του τυ- χείν αὐτου διαμαρτάνουσιν, ότε δε των μεν πρός το τέλος πάντων επιτυγχάνουσιν, άλλα το τέλος έθεντο φαυλον, ότε δε εκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οιον περὶ ιατρικήν ούτε γαρ
  - 35 ποίόν τι δεί τὸ ὑγιαίνον εἶναι σῶμα κρίνουσιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς,
    οὕτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὅρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιητικῶν δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμφότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις)
    ὅτι μὲν οῦν τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται 3
- 40 πάντες, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν, τοῖς δὲ οὔ, διά τινα φύσιν ἢ τύχην (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χο-
- 1332 a ρηγίας τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῖς ἄμεινον διακειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χεῖρον), οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ 4 ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ' 5 ἐστὶ καθ' ἢν ἄριστ' ἄν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἄριστα δ' ἄν πολι
  - τεύοιτο καθ' ην εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται την πόλιν,

- 5 δηλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν. φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην
- 6 οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 10 τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς τὸ καλῶς οἶον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρετής μέν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν (αἰρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ 15
- 7 τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτερον κακοῦ τινὸς αἴρεσίς ἐστιν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις τοὐναντίον κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις. χρήσαιτο δ' ἄν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσω καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον 20 ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἡθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ῷ διὰ τὴν
- 8 ἀρετὴν τὰ ἀγαθά ἐστι τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἁπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἴτια 25 τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῷτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, τὰ
- 9 δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν, ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία κυρίαν γὰρ 30 ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν· τὸ δὲ σπουδαίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολίται
- 10 μετέχουσι της πολιτείας. τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γί- 35 νεται σπουδαίος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἰρετώτερον ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας. ἀλλὰ μὴν 11 ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ τρία δὲ

- 40 ταῦτά ἐστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον οἶον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῷων, οὕτω καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνιά τε οὐδὲν ὄφελος 1332 b φῦναι τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ ἔνια γάρ ἐστι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῷων μάλιστα μὲν 12 τῆ φύσει ζῆ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ 5 καὶ λόγῳ μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον. ὅστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον. τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἵους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλον- 13 τας εὐχειρώτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον, 10 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.
  - 14 Έπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτική κοινωνία συνέστηκεν έξ άρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἐτέρους εἶναι δεί τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ 15 βίου δηλον γὰρ ώς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον 2 διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ήρωας ήγούμεθα των άνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρώτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντας ὑπερβολήν, εἶτα κατὰ 20 την ψυχήν, ώστε άναμφισβήτητον είναι καὶ φανεράν την ύπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ έπει δε τοῦτ' οὐ ράδιον λαβείν οὐδε ἔστιν ώσπερ 3 έν Ίνδοις φησί Σκύλαξ είναι τούς βασιλέας τοσούτον δια-25 φέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας άναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ ἴσον ταὐτὸν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, καὶ χαλεπον μένειν την πολιτείαν την συνεστηκυΐαν παρά το δίκαιον. μετά γάρ των άρχομένων ύπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν 4

30 βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν τοσούτους τε εἶναι

τους έν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πληθος ώστ' είναι κρείττους πάντων τούτων, έν τι των άδυνάτων έστίν, άλλα μην ότι γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβήτητον, πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δεῖ σκέ-5 ψασθαι τὸν νομοθέτην, εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, 35 ή γαρ φύσις δέδωκε την διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτὸ τῷ γένει ταύτὸ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν τοῖς μὲν άρχεσθαι πρέπει, τοις δ' άρχειν άγανακτει δε ούδεις καθ' ήλικίαν άρχόμενος, ούδε νομίζει είναι κρείττων, άλλως τε καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον, ὅταν τύχη τῆς 40 6 ίκνουμένης ήλικίας. έστι μέν άρα ώς τους αυτούς άρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ώς ἐτέρους, ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν έστιν ώς την αὐτην άναγκαῖον, έστι δ' ώς έτέραν 1333 a είναι. τόν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθηναί φασι δείν πρώτον. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴρηται λόγοις, ή μεν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν, ή δε τοῦ ἀρχομένου. 7 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναί φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν έλευ- 5 θέρων. διαφέρει δ' ένια των έπιταττομένων οὐ τοῖς έργοις άλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκα, διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων διακονικών έργων καὶ τών νέων τοῖς έλευθέροις καλὸν διακονείν πρός γάρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν ούχ ούτω διαφέρουσιν αὶ πράξεις καθ' αὐτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ 10 8 τίνος ένεκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν άρετην είναι φαμεν και του άριστου άνδρός, τον δ' αὐτον άρχόμενόν τε δείν γίγνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ άρχοντα ύστερον. τοῦτ' αν είη τῷ νομοθέτη πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες άγαθοὶ γίγνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ 15 9 τέλος της ἀρίστης ζωης. διήρηται δε δύο μέρη της ψυχης. ων τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αύτό, λόγω δ' ύπακούειν δυνάμενον. ὧν φαμέν τὰς ἀρετὰς είναι καθ' ὰς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγεταί πως. τούτων δ' έν ποτέρω μαλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διαιροῦσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς 20 10 φαμέν ούκ άδηλον πως λεκτέον, αίει γάρ το χείρον τοῦ

βελτίονός έστιν ένεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερον ὁμοίως έν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον έχον διήρηταί τε διχή καθ' όνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαι-25 ρείν ό μεν γάρ πρακτικός έστι λόγος ό δε θεωρητικός. ώσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη διηρῆσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δηλονότι 11 καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίονος αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἰρε-30 τώτατον, οὖ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου. διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς 12 ό βίος είς ἀσχολίαν καὶ είς σχολην καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ είς τὰ καλά. περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν 13 αίρεσιν είναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξε-35 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἕνεκεν. πάντα μέν τοίνυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον, καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν 14 40 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων διαιρέσεις δεί μεν γάρ ἀσχολείν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-1333 b λεμείν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τάναγκαΐα καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ μαλλον. ώστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παῖδας ἔτι όντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται 5 παιδείας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν 15 Ελλήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς πολιτείας, ούτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὖτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς τούς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν

10 πρός τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας.
παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γραψάντων 16
ἀπεφήναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν' ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἄγανται τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι

πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν ἃ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις έξε- 15

- 17 λήλεγκται νῦν. ὅσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζηλοῦσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλὴ χορηγία γίγνεται τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται τὸν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν γραφόντων περὶ (τῆς) πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι 20
- 18 πρός τους κινδύνους πολλών ηρχον καίτοι δηλον ώς ἐπειδη νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, οὐδ ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρησθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζην κα- 25
- 19 λως. οὐκ ὀρθως δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἡν δεῖ τιμωντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικως ἄρχειν ἡ των ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μαλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομίξειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ 30 των πέλας ἄρχειν ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην.
- 20 δηλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῷ τοῦτο πειρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται της οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν·
  ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Παυσανίᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ, καίπερ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμήν. οὔτε δὴ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιού- 35
  των λόγων καὶ νόμων οὐδεὶς οὔτε ἀφέλιμος οὔτε ἀληθής ἐστιν.
- 21 ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινῆ, τόν (τε) νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τήν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν οὐ τούτου χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα καταδουλώσωνται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ' ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ 40 δουλεύσωσιν ἑτέροις, ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἀφελείας ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο- 1334 α
- 22 τείας· τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν ἕνεκεν τάξη καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς 5

λόγοις αί γὰρ πλεῖσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σώζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται. τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀφιᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες. αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχοιο λάζειν.

15 'Επεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῆ καὶ ἰδία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῆ ἀρίστη πολιτεία, φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπάρχειν τέλος γάρ,

15 ώσπερ είρηται πολλάκις, είρήνη μεν πολέμου, σχολή δ' άσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δε των άρετων είσι προς την σχολήν 2 και διαγωγήν, ων τε έν τη σχολη το έργον και ων έν τη άσχολία. δει γαρ πολλα των άναγκαίων υπάρχειν, υπως έξη σχολάζειν διο σωφρονα την πόλιν είναι προσήκει

20 καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικήν κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως δοῦλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 3 δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρό-

25 νοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ 4 πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ

30 πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἶον εἴ τινές εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταί φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις μάλιστα γὰρ οὖτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅσφ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονία τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ 5

35 σπουδαίαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέχειν, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι

άγαθούς, εἰρήνην δ' άγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας άνδραποδώ-6 δεις. διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρε- 40 την άσκείν, έκείνοι μεν γάρ ού ταύτη διαφέρουσι των άλλων, τῶ μὴ νομίζειν ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν 1334 b άγαθων, άλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διά τινος άρετης. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν την τούτων ή την των άρετων . . . καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, φανερὸν έκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον. 5 7 τυγχάνομεν δη διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ, τούτων δὲ ποίους μέν τινας εἶναι χρὴ τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπον δε θεωρησαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγω πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνείν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην: ἐνδέχε-10 ται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-8 θέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίων ἢχθαι. φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτό γε πρώτον μέν, καθάπερ έν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' άρχης έστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχης ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ δε λόγος ήμιν και ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ώστε πρὸς 15 τούτους την γένεσιν καὶ την τῶν ἐθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν 9 μελέτην, έπειτα ώσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύ' ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ λόγον έχον, καὶ τὰς έξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν, ων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σωμα 20 πρότερον τῆ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ 10 λόγον έχοντος. φανερον δε καὶ τοῦτο θυμος γάρ καὶ βούλησις, έτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν 25 άναγκαῖον είναι προτέραν η την της ψυχης, έπειτα την της δρέξεως, ένεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν της δρέξεως, τὴν δὲ

Εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως 16 βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν 30

τοῦ σώματος της ψυχης.

έπιμελητέον περί την σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τινας όντας χρη ποιείσθαι πρὸς άλλήλους την γαμικην όμιλίαν. δεί δ' 2 άποβλέποντα νομοθετείν ταύτην την κοινωνίαν προς αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλι-35 κίαις έπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ μεν έτι δυναμένου γενναν της δε μη δυναμένης, ή ταύτης μέν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μή (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρός άλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς). ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχήν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς 3 40 ήλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ή χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ή δὲ παρὰ τῶν 1335 α πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις), οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι (πολλην γαρ έχει δυσχέρειαν ή τε γαρ αίδως ηττον ύπάρχει τοις τοιούτοις ώσπερ ήλικιώταις, καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν έγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς) έτι δ', ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο 4 5 μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχη πρὸς την τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν, σχεδον δη πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει κατά μίαν έπιμέλειαν. έπεὶ γὰρ ὥρισται τέλος 5 της γεννήσεως ώς έπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ 10 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συν- 6 δυασμός φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζώοις άτελη τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ την μορφήν, ώστ' άναγκαῖον ταύτο τοῦτο συμβαίνειν καὶ 15 έπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτελείς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματά είσιν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις 7 αὶ νέαι πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν γενέσθαι τινές φασι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν 20 τοίς Τροιζηνίοις, ώς πολλών διαφθειρομένων διά τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κομιδήν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδό-8

σεις ποιείσθαι πρεσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξησιν, ἐὰν ἔτι τοῦ 25 σπέρματος αὐξανομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ γὰρ τούτου τις ὡρισμένος χρόνος, δν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύον ἔτι

- 9 (ἢ μικρόν). διὸ τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς δ' ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα [, ἢ μικρόν]· ἐν τοσούτῷ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις 30 ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται
- 10 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ 35 πότε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἴρηται, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι οῖς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται καλῶς καὶ νῦν, ὁρίσαντες χειμῶνος τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην.
- 11 δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν τά τε παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν 40 οἵ τε γὰρ ἰατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων ἱκανῶς λέγουσι, καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νοτίων 1335 b
- 12 ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δέ τινων τῶν σωμάτων ὑπαρχόντων μάλιστ' (ἄν) ὄφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας,
  τύπω δὲ ἰκανὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν 5
  χρήσιμος ἕξις πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν
  καὶ τεκνοποιίαν, οὔτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοπονητικὴ λίαν,
- 13 ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἔξιν, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίοις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἕνα μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἕξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν 10 ἐλευθέρων πράξεις, ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι
- 14 καὶ γυναιξίν. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ ῥαθυμούσας μηδ' ἀραιᾳ τροφῆ χρωμένας. τοῦτο δὲ ῥάδιον τῷ νομοθέτη ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθ'

15 ήμέραν τινὰ ποιείσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν τῶν είληχότων την περί της γενέσεως τιμήν. την μέντοι διάνοιαν τούναντίον των σωμάτων ραθυμοτέρως άρμόττει διάγειν' ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης ώσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ 15 20 τροφής των γιγνομένων, έστω νόμος μηδέν πεπηρωμένον τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πληθος τέκνων, ἐὰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύη, μηδεν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων ὡρίσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πληθος, ἐὰν δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἴσθησιν έγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν, 25 έμποιείσθαι δεί την άμβλωσιν το γαρ όσιον καὶ το μή διωρισμένον τη αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζην ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν 16 άρχη της ηλικίας άνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διώρισται, πότε άρχεσθαι χρη της συζεύξεως, και πόσον χρόνον λειτουργείν άρμόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ωρίσθω τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων 30 έκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελη γίνεται καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῆ.

σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῆ.
διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς 17
πλείστοις ἥνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες
ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντή35 κοντα ἐτῶν. ὥστε τέτταρσιν ἢ πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα

τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγιείας χάριν ἤ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ 18
τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλὸν

40 άπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσαγορευθῆ πόσις, περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας 1336 α ἐάν τις φαίνηται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμίᾳ ζημιούσθω πρεπούση πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

17 Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἴεσθαι μεγάλην εἶναι διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὁποία 5 τις ἂν ἢ. φαίνεταί τε διά τε τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐπισκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οῖς ἐπιμελές ἐστιν ἄγειν τὴν

πολεμικήν έξιν, ή τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφή μάλιστ' 2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀοινοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα, ἔτι δε καὶ κινήσεις όσας ενδέχεται ποιείσθαι τηλικούτων συμπρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλό- 10 τητα χρώνται καὶ νῦν ἔνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μηχανικοίς, α τὸ σῶμα ποιεί τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμφέρει δ' εὐθὺς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν παίδων τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς 3 πράξεις εύχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς έστὶ τῶν βαρ- 15 βάρων έθος τοῖς μεν είς ποταμον ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γιγνόμενα ψυχρόν, τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα μικρὸν ἀμπίσχειν, οἷον Κελτοίς. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν, εὐθὺς ἀρχομένων βέλτιον μεν εθίζειν, εκ προσαγωγής δ' εθίζειν. εύφυης δ' ή τῶν παίδων έξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν 20 4 ψυχρών ἄσκησιν. περί μέν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιείσθαι την έπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ την ταύτη παραπλησίαν την δ' έχομένην ταύτης ηλικίαν μέχρι πέντε έτων, ήν ούτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν ούτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αύξησιν ἐμποδί- 25 ζωσιν, δεί δὲ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ώστε διαφεύγειν την άργίαν των σωμάτων ην χρη παρασκευάζειν καὶ δί 5 ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδιᾶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιάς είναι μήτε άνελευθέρους μήτε έπιπόνους μήτε άνειμένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ 30 τούς τηλικούτους, έπιμελες έστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὺς καλοῦσι παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολ-6 λας μιμήσεις των ύστερον σπουδασομένων, τας δε διατάσεις τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οί 35 κωλύοντες έν τοις νόμοις συμφέρουσι γάρ πρός αὔξησιν γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεί την ἰσχὺν τοίς πονοῦσιν, δ 7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ

40 τοις παιδονόμοις την τούτων διαγωγην τήν τ' άλλην, καὶ όπως ότι ήκιστα μετά δούλων έσται. ταύτην γάρ την ήλι-1336 b κίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφην έχειν. εύλογον οθν απολαύειν από των ακουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως 8 μεν οῦν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ώσπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ 5 τον νομοθέτην έξορίζειν (έκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ότιοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς), μάλιστα μεν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μηδεν τοιοῦτον έὰν δέ τις φαίνηταί τι λέγων ή πράττων τῶν 9 άπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως 10 ήξιωμένον έν τοις συσσιτίοις άτιμίαις κολάζειν και πληγαίς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίαις άνελευθέροις άνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφας ή λόγους ασχήμονας. ἐπιμελες μεν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς 10 15 ἄρχουσι μηδὲν μήτε ἄγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εί μὴ παρά τισι θεοίς τοιούτοις οίς καὶ τὸν τωθασμον ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος προς δε τούτοις ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος Γτούς την ήλικίαν έχοντας έτι την ίκνουμένην] καὶ ύπερ αύτων καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικών τιμαλφείν τοὺς θεούς. 20 τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὔτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμωδίας θεατὰς νομοθε- 11 τητέον, πρίν ή την ήλικίαν λάβωσιν έν ή και κατακλίσεως ύπάρξει κοινωνείν ήδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γιγνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθείς ή παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας. νῦν μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν παραδρομῆ πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον 12 25 ύστερον δ' έπιστήσαντας δεί διορίσαι μάλλον, είτε μη δεί πρώτον είτε δεί διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πώς δεί κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ἴσως γὰρ οὐ 13 κακώς έλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγωδίας ὑποκριτής οὐδενὶ γὰρ πώποτε παρῆκεν ξαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, 30 οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειουμένων τῶν θεατῶν

ταίς πρώταις ἀκοαίς. συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς

τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων. 14 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς νέοις πάντα ποιείν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ὅσα έχει ή μοχθηρίαν ή δυσμένειαν. διελθόντων δὲ τῶν πέντε 35 έτων τὰ δύο μέχρι των έπτὰ δεῖ θεωρούς ήδη γίγνεσθαι 15 τῶν μαθήσεων, ὰς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτούς. δύο δ' εἰσὶν ήλικίαι πρὸς ας άναγκαῖον διηρησθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετά την άπὸ τῶν έπτὰ μέχρι ήβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ την ἀφ' ήβης μέχρι των ένδς καὶ είκοσιν έτων. οί γάρ ταῖς έβδο- 40 μάσι διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακώς, δεί δε τη διαιρέσει της φύσεως έπακολουθείν πάσα 1337 α γαρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύ-16 σεως άναπληροῦν. πρώτον μεν οῦν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον τάξιν τινὰ περὶ τοὺς παίδας, ἔπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῆ ποιείσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἴδιον τρόπον (δ 5 γίγνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ ποίαν τινά δεῖ ταύτην.

 $\mathbf{E}'$   $(\Theta')$ .

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον περὶ
τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειεν, καὶ γὰρ
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γιγνόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πο2 λιτείας (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι τὸ γὰρ ἢθος
τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν 15
πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἶον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀεὶ δὲ
τὸ βέλτιστον ἦθος βελτίονος αἴτιον πολιτείας), ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ὰ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι
καὶ προεθίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἑκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δῆλον 20
3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. ἐπεὶ δ' ὲν τὸ τέλος
τῆ πόλει πάση, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ
τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέ-

anyther tillier by due

Surprese Tough

λειαν είναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν, δυ τρόπου νῦν ἕκα-25 στος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἰδία τε καὶ μάθησινης ίδίαν, ην αν δόξη, διδάσκων. δεί δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινην ποιείσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν. ἄμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν 1 αὐτὸν αύτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια 30 πέφυκεν έκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῆ ταύτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην 2 κοινήν ποιητέον, φανερόν τίς δ' έστιν ή παιδεία, και πως 35 χρη παιδεύεσθαι, δεί μη λανθάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητείται περὶ τῶν ἔργων οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δείν μανθάνειν τους νέους ούτε προς άρετην ούτε προς τον βίον τὸν ἄριστον, οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μαλλον ή πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος. ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμ- 2 40 ποδών παιδείας ταραχώδης ή σκέψις, και δηλον οὐδεν πότερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κρι-1337 b τάς τινας)· περί τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶσιν, ώστ' εύλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν αὐτῆς). ότι μεν οῦν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, 3 5 οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων έργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν όσα των χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βάναυσον. βάναυσον δ' έργον είναι δεί τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ το τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. τάς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χείρον διακείσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικας έργασίας ἄσχολον γαρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα-

FLAREAU. έστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μέν 15 m à Cerdo πεινήν. τινος ένίων μετέχειν ούκ άνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν ις προς ακρίβειαν ένοχον ταις είρημέναις βλάβαις. έχει δε πολλήν διαφοράν καὶ τὸ τίνος Γένεκεν πράττει τις ή μανθάνει τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι ἀρετὴν οὐκ άνελεύθερον, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους 20 θητικόν καὶ δουλικόν δόξειεν αν πράττειν. αι μεν οθν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, έπαμφοτερίζουσιν έστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδον ὰ παιδεύειν εἰώ- ζημα ΙΑ θασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ένιοι γραφικήν, την μέν γραμματικήν και γραφικήν 25 ώς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικήν ώς συντείνουσαν πρός άνδρίαν την δε μουσικήν 2 ήδη διαπορήσειεν άν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οί πλείστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτης οἱ δ' έξ άρχης έταξαν έν παιδεία διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρη-30 ται, μη μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν 3 είπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ (Δο αἰρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῶς ἀστολίσειν Τὸς Κατολίσειν Τὸ αίρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον ο τι ποιοθντας δεί σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας τέλος 35 4 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδιὰν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο άδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις χρηστέον ταῖς παιδιαίς (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἡ δὲ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστιν· τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ παιδιὰς εἰσάγε- 40 σθαι καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρῆσιν, ώς προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν άνεσις γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάπαυσις τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔχειν 1338 αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως. τοῦτο δ' οὐ τοῖς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς σχολάζουσιν ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολῶν ἕνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ τέλους ώς ούχ ὑπάρχοντος, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἡν 5

οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς οἴονται πάντες εἶναι.
ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ καθ' έαυτοὺς ἕκαστος καὶ τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὑτῶν, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι 6

- 10 δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῆ διαγωγῆ σχολὴν μανθάνειν ἄττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύτας τὰς τὰς μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν 7 μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον 15 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ τὰ γράμ-
- 15 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ τὰ γράμματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλάς δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον οὐδ' αὖ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς
- 20 ύγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὁρῶμεν γιγνόμενον ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς). λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῆ σχολῆ 8 διαγωγήν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτήν ἢν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῆ τάττουσιν. διόπερ "Ομηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν
  - 25 ἀλλ' οἷον † μὲν † ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,
    καὶ οὕτω προειπὼν ἐτέρους τινάς, " οἱ καλέουσιν ἀοιδόν," φη- 9
    σιν, " ὅ κεν τέρπησιν ἄπαντας." καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν (ὁ)
    'Οδυσσεὺς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι διαγωγήν, ὅταν εὐφραινομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων " δαιτυμόνες δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκουάζων-
  - 30 ται ἀοιδοῦ ἥμενοι έξείης." ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶ παιδεία τις 10 ἢν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς υίεῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερόν ἐστιν' πότερον δὲ μία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὖται καὶ πῶς, ὕστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ 11
  - 35 ὁδοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχομέν τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων· ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,

to this well further

οἷον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰς

12 ἐνδέχεσθαι γίγνεσθαι δι αὐτῶν μαθήσεις ἐτέρας, ὁμοίως 40
δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνίοις μὴ διαμαρτάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ὦσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν
ὧνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἡ μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ 1338 b
περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευ
13 θέροις. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν πρότερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡ τῷ λόγῷ
παιδευτέον εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἡ τὴν διά- 5

παιδευτέον είναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τὴν διά- 5 νοιαν, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παῖδας γυμναστικῆ καὶ παιδοτριβικῆ· τούτων γὰρ ἡ μὲν ποιάν τινα ποιεῖ

την έξιν τοῦ σώματος, ή δὲ τὰ έργα.

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμε- 4 λείσθαι των παίδων αί μεν άθλητικην έξιν έμποιοῦσι, λω- 10 βώμεναι τά τε είδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ήμαρτον τὴν άμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν 2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ είρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε τον πρὸς μίαν ούτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον 15 την ἐπιμέλειαν εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκουσιν ούτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ούτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν όρωμεν την ανδρίαν ακολουθούσαν τοῖς αγριωτάτοις, αλλά 3 μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἤθεσιν. πολλὰ δ' έστὶ τῶν έθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρω- 20 ποφαγίαν εύχερως έχει, καθάπερ των περί τον Πόντον Άχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἕτερα, τὰ μὲν ὁμοίως τούτοις τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἃ ληστρικὰ μέν ἐστιν, 4 ἀνδρίας δ' οὐ μετειλήφασιν. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας ίσμεν, έως μεν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπε-25 ρέχοντας των άλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους έτέρων οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον μὴ 5 πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν, ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες

30 δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων
ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐδένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ
ἀγαθός. οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ 6
τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγώγους ποιήσαντες, βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατά γε τὸ ἀληθές, πρὸς ἕν τε μόνον ἔργον τῆ

35 πολιτική χρησίμους ποιήσαντες, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χείρον, ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος, ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων 7 κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν' ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῆ γυμναστικῆ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν

40 (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ήβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, αντικιίνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν' σημεῖον γὰρ οὐ 8

1339 α μικρον ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλυμπιονίκαις δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὕροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νενικηκότας
ἄνδρας τε καὶ παῖδας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκοῦντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων ὅταν δ' ἀφ' 9
5 ἥβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένωνται, τότε
ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν, ἄμα γὰρ τῆ τε διανοία
καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἑκάτερος
ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ὁ μὲν τοῦ
το σώματος πόνος τὴν διάνοιαν, ὁ δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα).

5 Περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῷ καὶ πρότερον, καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις οὺς ἄν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα 2

15 ἔχει δύναμιν ράδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἄμα παύει μέριμναν, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτῆν καὶ 3

20 χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνω καὶ μέθη καὶ μουσικῆς

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τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ή γυμναστική τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικήν τὸ ήθος ποιόν τι ποιείν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαί-4 ρειν ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς 25 φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων). ὅτι 100 1 600 - Cray μέν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ Sinyayy - he μάθησις. άλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγήν γε παισὶν άρμόττει μάθησις. ακκα μην συσε καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις οὐδενὶ γὰρ 30 μην Με (Ι) δων σπουδή παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθείσιν. άλλ' εί τοῦτ' έστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος αν ένεκα δέοι μανθάνειν αὐτούς, άλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ μανθανείν αυτους, ωπω μ... Μήδων βασιλείς, δι άλλων αὐτὸ ποιούντων μεταλαμβάνειν 35 his his 6 της ήδονης καὶ της μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον settles below άπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. εί δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν όψων πραγματείαν αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν άλλ' 40 , 7 ἄτοπον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἤθη βελτίω ποιείν ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' ούχ έτέρων ακούοντας όρθως τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, 1339 b ώσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκείνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ 8 χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν εἰ πρὸς εὐημερίαν καὶ διαγωγήν έλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῆ· τί δεῖ μαν- 5 θάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπείν δ' έξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἡν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν οὐ γαρ ο Ζεύς αύτος αείδει και κιθαρίζει τοις ποιηταις, άλλα καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ 9 ανδρός μη μεθύοντος η παίζοντος. αλλ' ίσως περί μέν 10 τούτων ύστερον έπισκεπτέον, ή δε πρώτη ζήτησίς έστι πότε-

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Par Lis Chim

ρον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγήν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ

- 15 φαίνεται μετέχειν. ή τε γάρ παιδιά χάριν άναπαύσεώς 10 έστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν)·
  - 20 την δε μουσικην πάντες είναι φαμεν των ήδιστων, καὶ ψι- 11 λην ουσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας (φησὶ γοῦν καὶ Μουσαιος είναι "βροτοις ήδιστον ἀείδειν" διὸ καὶ είς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτην ὡς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι παιδεύε-
- 25 σθαι δείν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ τῶν 12 ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀλλὰ καὶ
  - 30 διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ὰν εἴη διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ ταύτης ἡδοναῖς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι 13 τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων
    - 35 ἔχειν δμοίωμά τι' τό τε γὰρ τέλος οὐδενδς τῶν ἐσομένων χάριν αἰρετόν, καὶ αἱ τοιαθται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐδενός εἰσι τῶν ἐσομένων ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, οἶον πόνων καὶ λύ- πης. δι' ἢν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητοθσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίγνε- 14 σθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην ἄν τις εἰκότως ὑπο-
    - 40 λάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔοικεν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε 15
- 1340 a τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ΄ αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς

I this Chappiness shows but also as being aseful dos rela

Thursday Tank 38

· J ... ήδονης μετέχειν άπ' αὐτης, ης έχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν (έχει γάρ ή μουσική την ήδονην φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ήλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλής), ἀλλ' 5 όραν εί πη και πρὸς τὸ ήθος συντείνει και πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν.

- 16 τοῦτο δ' ἀν είη δηλον, εί ποιοί τινες τὰ ήθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. άλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα ποιοί τινες, φανερὸν διὰ, πολλών μεν καὶ ετέρων, ούχ ήκιστα δε καὶ διὰ τῶν 'Ολύμπου μελών ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς 10 ένθουσιαστικάς, δ δ' ένθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους
  - 17 πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθείς, καὶ χωρίς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν είναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων. την δ' άρετην περί το χαίρειν όρθως καὶ φιλείν καὶ μισείν, 15 δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηδὲν οὕτως ώς
  - τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθώς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ 18 ταις καλαις πράξεσιν, έστι δε δμοιώματα μάλιστα παρά
  - τας άληθινας φύσεις έν τοῖς ρυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν όργης καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων 20 τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι
  - 19 τοιούτων), δ δ' έν τοῖς δμοίοις έθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν έγγύς έστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον (οἶον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ 25 δί άλλην αἰτίαν άλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον τούτω καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν, οὖ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ.
    - 20 ήδείαν είναι), συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς άλλοις μηδεν υπάρχειν ομοίωμα τοις ήθεσιν, οίον έν τοις άπτοις καὶ τοις γευστοίς, άλλ' έν τοις δρατοίς ήρέμα 30 (σχήματα γάρ έστι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' έπὶ μικρόν, καὶ πάντες της τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα δμοιώματα τῶν ἡθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γιγνόμενα
    - 21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος έν τοῖς πάθεσιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ 35

Garage Pour June

- Dave

6.2 82.4

περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρείν τοὺς νέους, άλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἠθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι φανε- 22 40 ρόν εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας άλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως 1340 b καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οξον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἶον πρὸς τας ανειμένας, μέσως δε και καθεστηκότως μάλιστα προς έτέραν, οξον δοκεί ποιείν ή δωριστί μόνη των άρμονιων, ένθου-5 σιαστικούς δ' ή φρυγιστί· ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ 23 την παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες λαμβάνουσι γάρ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων έξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον έχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ρυθμούς οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος έχουσι στασιμώτερον οί δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οί μὲν 10 φορτικωτέρας έχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας. ἐκ 21 μεν οθν τούτων φανερον ότι δύναται ποιόν τι το της ψυχης ήθος ή μουσική παρασκευάζειν εί δε τοῦτο δύναται ποιείν, δηλον ότι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον έν αὐτη τούς νέους. έστι δε άρμόττουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην ή δι-25

15 δασκαλία της μουσικης δοί μεν γάρ νέοι διά την ήλικίαν ανήδυντον οὐδεν ὑπομένουσιν εκόντες, ἡ δε μουσική φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. καί τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς άρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι διὸ πολλοί φασι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μεν άρμονίαν είναι την ψυχήν, οί δ' έχειν άρμονίαν.

6 Πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἡ μή, καθάπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον. ούκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούς τινας, έάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνη τῶν ἔργων εν γάρ τι των άδυνάτων ή χαλεπων έστι μή κοινωνήσαντας 25 των έργων κριτάς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. άμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς 2 παίδας έχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Άρχύτου πλαταγὴν

the old membrale of busic, cooled (show

οἴεσθαι γενέσθαι καλώς, ἡν διδόασι τοῖς παιδίοις ὅπως γρώμενοι ταύτη μηδέν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν. οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τοῖς νηπίοις άρμόττουσα των παιδίων, ή δὲ παιδεία πλαταγή 30 3 τοις μείζοσι των νέων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν ούτως ώστε καὶ κοινωνείν των έργων, φανερον έκ των τοιούτων τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις οὐ χαλεπον διορίσαι, καὶ λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς φάσκοντας βάναυ-4 σον είναι την έπιμέλειαν. πρώτον μέν γάρ, έπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν 35 χάριν μετέχειν δεί των έργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους μὲν όντας χρησθαι τοις έργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δε γινομένους των μὲν ἔργων ἀφεῖσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ λ χαίρειν όρθως διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῷ νεότητι  $5 \pi \epsilon \rho i$  δ $\dot{\epsilon}$  τ $\dot{\eta}$ ς  $\dot{\epsilon}$ πιτιμήσ $\epsilon \omega$ ς ήν τιν $\epsilon$ ς  $\dot{\epsilon}$ πιτιμ $\hat{\omega}$ σιν  $\dot{\omega}$ ς ποιούσης 4 $\circ$ της μουσικης βαναύσους, οὐ χαλεπον λύσαι σκεψαμένους μέχρι τε πόσου τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν, καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ρυ- 1341 a θμών κοινωνητέον, έτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὀργάνοις τὴν μάθησιν 6 ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ λύσις έστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τρόπους τινὰς της μουσικης ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι 5 δεῖ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μήτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιείν βάναυσον καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρή-Levis 7 σεις ήδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὕστερον. συμβαίνοι δ' αν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνι- 10 κούς συντείνοντα διαπονοίεν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων, ὰ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν 8 άγώνων είς τὴν παιδείαν, άλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ αν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ρυθμοῖς, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ώσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλ- 15 λων ένια ζώων, έτι δὲ καὶ πληθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων. δηλον δε έκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρηστέον.

ούτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὕτ' ἄλλο τεχνικὸν 9 όργανον, οἷον κιθάραν κὰν εί τι τοιοῦτον έτερόν έστιν, άλλὰ 20 όσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τῆς μουσικῆς παιδείας η της άλλης έτι δε ούκ έστιν ο αύλος ήθικον άλλα μαλλον δργιαστικόν, ώστε πρός τους τοιούτους αυτώ καιρούς χρηστέον ἐν οἶς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μάθησιν. προσθώμεν δέ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς 10 25 παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγω χρησθαι τὴν αύλησιν. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπο- 11 ρίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, ἔτι τε πρότερον 30 καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, πάσης ήπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιζητοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ηὔλησε τῷ 12 χορώ, καὶ περὶ 'Αθήνας ούτως ἐπεχωρίασεν ώστε σχεδὸν οί 35 πολλοί τῶν ἐλευθέρων μετείχον αὐτῆς δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος δυ ἀνέθηκε Θράσιππος Ἐκφαντίδη χορηγήσας. ύστερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν συντείνον όμοίως δε καὶ πολλά τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἀρχαίων, 13 40 οξον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα τοίς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ 1341 b σαμβῦκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης. εύλόγως δ' έχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμυθολογημένον φασί γὰρ δὴ τὴν Αθηνᾶν εύροῦσαν ἀποβαλείν τοὺς αὐλούς. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ 14 5 την ασχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποιησαι δυσχεράνασαν τὴν θεόν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον είκὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως τῆ δὲ Ἀθηνῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργά-15

νων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὴν τεχνικὴν παι-

weiter

δείαν, τεχνικήν δε τίθεμεν την προς τους άγωνας (έν ταύτη 10 γάρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, άλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ 16 θητικωτέραν καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος ὁ γὰρ 15 θεατής φορτικός ών μεταβάλλειν είωθε την μουσικήν, ώστε καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτούς τε ποιούς τινας ποιεί καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις).

Σκεπτέον δ' έτι περί τε τὰς άρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ρυθμούς. 7 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] πότερον πάσαις χρηστέον ταῖς άρμονίαις 20 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ρυθμοῖς ἢ διαιρετέον, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοῦσι πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν θήσομεν ἢ † τρίτον δεῖ τινὰ ἔτερον, ἐπειδὴ † τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ρυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων δ' ἐκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τίνα έχει δύναμιν πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον 25 προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὔρυθμον. 2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν μουσικών ένίους καὶ τών έκ φιλοσοφίας όσοι τυγχάνουσιν έμπείρως έχοντες της περί την μουσικήν παιδείας την μέν καθ' έκαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητείν τοίς βουλο-30 μένοις παρ' ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους 3 μόνον είπόντες περί αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσί τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφία, τὰ μὲν ἡθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ τῶν άρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἔκαστα τούτων οἰκείαν 35 άλλην πρὸς άλλο μέρος τιθέασι, φαμέν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκεν ώφελείας τη μουσική χρησθαι δείν άλλα και πλειόνων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἔνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν την κάθαρσιν, νθν μέν άπλως, πάλιν δ' έν τοις περί ποιητικής έρουμεν σαφέστερον-τρίτον δε προς διαγωγήν, 40

φανερον ότι χρηστέον μεν πάσαις ταις άρμονίαις, οὐ τον 1342 a VOL. III.

προς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ προς την της συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν),

LES WA GENERAL

ablest Luterly " for y


Martin

αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταις ήθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. δ 4

- 5 γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἦττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οίον έλεος καὶ φόβος, έτι δ' ένθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης της κινήσεως κατακώχιμοί τινές είσιν έκ τῶν δ' ίερων μελων όρωμεν τούτους, όταν χρήσωνται τοις έξοργιά-
- 10 ζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ώσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν 5 καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς, τούς δ' άλλους καθ' όσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων έκάστω, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαί τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι
- 15 μεθ' ήδονης. όμοίως δε καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις 6 άρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι (χρησθαι) θετέον τοὺς την [θεατρικήν] μουσικήν μεταχειριζομένους άγωνιστάς (ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατής διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ
- 20 φορτικός έκ βαναύσων καὶ θητών καὶ άλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος, αποδοτέον αγώνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις προς ανάπαυσιν είσι δ' ώσπερ αύτων αί ψυχαί παρε-7 στραμμέναι της κατά φύσιν έξεως, ούτω καὶ τῶν άρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις είσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακε-
- 25 χρωσμένα, ποιεί δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οίκεῖον διόπερ ἀποδοτέον έξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιούτω τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικής) πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τῶν 8 μελών χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς άρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη
- 30 δ' ή δωριστί, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κάν τινα άλλην ήμιν δοκιμάζωσιν οί κοινωνοί της έν φιλοσοφία διατριβής και τής περί την μουσικήν παιδείας. δ 9 δ' έν τῆ πολιτεία Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μόνην καταλείπει μετά της δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας

τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν 1342 b ἡ φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν ἥνπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις.

- 10 ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά. δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίησις πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις
  μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν δ' ἀρμο- 5
  νιῶν ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον,
  οῖον ὁ διθύραμβος ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον.
- 11 καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν τῆ δωριστὶ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς Μυσοὺς οὐχ οἶός τ' ἦν, 10 ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν
- 12 προσήκουσαν άρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστ' ἦθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρεῖον. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην 15 ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἁρμονίας, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ
- 13 Δώρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποί, τό τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ γὰρ τὰ δυνατὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἑκάστοις ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὡρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς 20 ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον οὐ ῥάδιον ἄδειν τὰς συντόνους ἁρμονίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλικού-
- 14 τοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο (τῷ) Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας ἀποδοκιμάσειεν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς, 25 οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἥ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον) ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκυίας. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιού-
- 15 των άρμονιῶν ἄπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἔτι δ' εἴ τίς ἐστι τοιαύτη τῶν άρμονιῶν ἢ πρέπει τἢ τῶν παί- 30 δων ἡλικίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ἄμα καὶ παιδείαν, οἶον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπονθέναι μάλιστα τῶν άρμονιῶν . . . δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς ποιητέον εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον . . .



## CRITICAL NOTES.

## BOOK III.

1274 b 33. Vet. Int. renders ποτε by quidem, as in 1276 a 18 and 1286 a 1. 40. Vet. Int. has et for δε, as in 1291 b 40, βραχεων δε.

1275 a 11. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει om. Π<sup>1</sup>. 19. γὰρ ΓΠ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: de Ar. Conring, Sus. See explanatory note. 20. ἔγκλημα] Vet. Int. adiectionem (obiectionem ?). "Εγκλημα is rendered accusatio in 1264 a 27 and 1268 b 19, the two other passages of the Politics in which it occurs. δεόμενον Vet. Int. opportunam, as in 1323 b 30 and in Rhet. 1. 2. 1357 a 9 and 2. 7. 1385 a 20 (Dittmeyer, Quae ratio inter vetustam Aristotelis Rhetoricorum translationem et Graecos codices intercedat, p. 50). μέναι ΓΠ Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. divisi): διωρισμέναι Scaliger, Sus. explanatory note on 1275 a 23. 27. αν φαίη Γ P146 Vat. Pal., φαίη Ms, ἀντιφαίη P<sup>2 3</sup> etc. Göttling conj. αν ἀντιφαίη. But in Eth. Nic. 3. 8. 1117 a 14, where the MSS. have ἀντιπαθεῖν, Heylbut (Aspas. Comm. Praef. p. x) and Bywater accept αν παθείν from Aspasius. See also Stallbaum's critical note on Plato, Gorg. 481 D, where he restores âν φŷ from the best MSS. in place of the 28. καίτοι . . ἀρχη̂ς om.  $\Pi^1$ . 37.  $\hat{\eta}$  Vet. Int. secundum quod, which may represent  $\hat{\eta}$  (see critical note on 1280 a 24), though qua is a more usual equivalent for it in Vet. Int. (see e.g. 1279 a 11 and 1286 a 23).

1275 b 7. I follow Coray and Sus. in adding ἐν before ἐνίαις: cp. c. 11. 1282 a 27, ἀς ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις, where Ms P¹ and possibly Γ omit ἐν, and 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 27, ἡ κατασκενάσαντας ἀρχεῖον οἶον ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις ἐστίν, where Π² om. ἐν.

13. ἀλλὰ . . γὰρ] Vet. Int. sed, but this stands for ἀλλὰ γὰρ here, as in 1282 b 8 and 1323 b 36. Γὰρ om. P¹ Qb and over an erasure P⁴.

16. ἀποδέδοται Π: Vet. Int. attribuitur, as in 1299 a 26. In 1285 a 6 ἀποδέδοται is rendered attributa sunt, but it is doubtful whether Vet. Int. found

ἀποδίδοται in Γ in the passage before us and in 1299 a 26, for he renders  $\pi \epsilon \pi o \nu \theta \epsilon$  by patitur in 1204 b 17. 17. Ms P<sup>1</sup> omit the second περl, but see critical note on 1331 b 24 and explanatory note on 1284 a 35. 21. δε δη Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: all MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined but three (h k z) have etiam, which stands for δή in 1277 b 16 and 1292 b 10; h k z have autem. I follow Sus. in reading δέ. πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν Vet. Int. secundum usum: did he find karà in I? **25.**  $\delta \in \Pi^1$  P<sup>2</sup> Sus.:  $\delta n$  P<sup>3</sup>  $\Pi^3$  Bekk. 26. ἐκείνον \ Vet. Int. hunc (τοῦτον Γ?). 30. είναι γάρ τινας Λαρισοποιούς (είναι γάρ τινας λαρισσοποιούς ΓΠ Vat. Pal.) is bracketed by Ridgeway and Sus., and Camerarius (Interp. p. 112) would read Λαρισαιοποιούs in place of Λαρισοποιούs. See explanatory note on 32. ἦσαν Π¹ Ald. Vat. Pal. Sus. and over an erasure 1275 b 26. P4: ἦσαν ἄν P23 etc. Bekk. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ M8 P123 Vat. Pal. etc. Sus.4: καὶ γὰρ οὐ P4 etc. Bekk.: Vet. Int. neque enim, which perhaps represents καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ. 33.  $\epsilon \kappa$  om.  $P^1$  and perhaps  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. quod ex cive mare aut femina). 34. 'èreivo Victorius et vir doctus in marg. Aldinae Monacensis . . . ἐκείνην aut ἐκείνη Ms, ἐκείνην P2 etc. et pr. P1 (rasura super ει) et pr. P4 et corr. P3, ἐκείνοι pr. P3 (ut videtur) et editores inde a Victorio et Morelio posteaque exovoi eidem editores,' Sus.3, who reads exeivo and exei. Vet. Int. illi magis habent. 35. Richards would add obs after olov, a suggestion which well deserves to be recorded, though I am not sure that any change should be made in the text. 39. κᾶν Bekk.<sup>2</sup> Sus. : каї П Bekk. It is not easy to say what Vet. Int. found in his Greek text, for he has equidem et cum hoc adhuc aliquis dubitabit: perhaps καίτοι καὶ τούτω τις έτι προσαπορήσειεν. As to the omission of αν by Γ II see critical note on 1283 b 14. τοῦτό L8 Ald. pr. M8 Bekk. Sus., τούτω Γ P1234.

1276 a 4. της om. Ms P¹: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 5. ἔφαμεν P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: φαμέν Γ Ms. 14. καὶ δημοκρατοῦνταί τινες] Vet. Int. in democratiam versae fuerunt (or fuerint) quaedam, a rendering which it is hard to explain. We cannot be sure that καὶ was omitted in Γ, for Vet. Int. often fails to render καί: in may, however, stand for κατὰ installed in the place of καὶ. Does versae fuerunt stand for ἐτράποντο repeated from τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον?

21. Sus. brackets τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, but compare the similar repetition of τὴν χώραν in S (6). 4. 1319 a 33 (where Sus. brackets τὴν χώραν), and of τῶν ἡθῶν in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 33 sq. (where Sus. brackets the first τῶν ἡθῶν).

25. τὸν αὐτὸν]

τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον  $P^{46}$  Bekk. and possibly  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. eundem locum). As to additions of this kind in  $P^{46}$  see critical note on 1329 a 1. 33. ἔθνος om.  $\Pi^2$  and in a lacuna  $P^1$ .

1276 b 9. λέγομεν Albertus Magnus, Leonardus Aretinus, Morelius, Bekk., Sus.: λέγοιμεν Γ Π. Should αν be added after έτέραν and λέγοιμεν be retained? 14. μεταβάλη μεταβάλλη Π<sup>3</sup> Bekk. 30. διὸ P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus. : διόπερ Γ M<sup>8</sup>. 33. τὸν δ' αγαθον ανδρα φαμέν κατά μίαν αρετήν είναι την τελείαν is found only in Γ P<sup>1</sup> Ar., corr.<sup>3</sup> P<sup>2</sup> (in paler ink than the MS.), and marg. P<sup>4</sup>: την, however, is omitted in pr. P1 and supplied by the scribe in the same ink as the MS.; it is also written above the line in marg. P4: we cannot be sure that it was added in Γ. 36. ἀλλὰ om. M<sup>8</sup> Vat. Pal. pr. P<sup>1</sup>, but not Γ (as Sus. says), for Vet, Int. has quin immo, which represents οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ in 1278 b 21 and 1323 b 6. 39. αὐτὸν  $\Pi^2$  Bekk., αυτον Vat. Pal., αὐτὸν Γ (Vet. Int. ipsum): έαυτὸν Ms P1 Sus. 40. ἐπεὶ δὲ Π² Vat. Pal. Ar., ἐπεὶ δ' Bekk., έπειδή δὲ P¹, ἐπειδή Γ Ms Sylburg, Thurot, Sus.: Thurot and Sus., however, place  $\epsilon \pi \epsilon \iota \delta \dot{\eta} \ldots \pi \delta \lambda \iota \tau as$  before  $\delta \epsilon \hat{\iota}$ , 38.

1277 a 8. κτησις is bracketed by Bernays. See explanatory 12.  $\dot{\alpha}$ πλώς om.  $\Pi^1$ . 17.  $\ddot{\alpha}$ ρχοντος  $\Pi$  σον  $\ddot{\alpha}$ ρχοντος  $\Pi^3$  Bekk. note. φαίνονται παιδευόμενοι Vet. Int. videntur erudiri, which stands for φαίνονται παιδευόμενοι: cp. 1338 a 20 and 1339 a 2. Bekk.: δή Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. itaque). Vat. Pal. has ειδεαυτη. 24. ἴσως om. Π<sup>1</sup>. τυραννοί τυραννεί M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> pr. P<sup>2</sup> (corrected in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. has quando non tyrannizat, which probably represents ὅτε μὴ τυραννεῖ. 26. After or (with Bernays) before δοκίμου we should probably supply δοκεί: compare the omission of δοκούσι before διώκειν in Π1 in 3. 13. 1284 a 19. I prefer this change to Dr. Jackson's ingenious suggestion of dokei που in place of δοκίμου (adopted by Sus. 3a). 30. έτερα Coray: άμφότερα Γ Π: ἄμφω έτερα Bernays, who translates 'Beide müssten Verschiedenes (lernen). 'Αμφότερα from the next line, however, may perhaps have taken the place of ετερα. 32. τοὐντεῦθεν  $Π^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk., κάντεῦθεν Γ P¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. et hinc), κατένθεν Ms. 34. λέγομεν, å Lamb.: λεγόμενα Γ Π. Heylbut in his report of the readings of Vat. Pal. (Rhein. Mus. 42. 103) does not note any variation in 34 from the reading of Sus.3 (λέγομεν, â), but this may be an oversight. Sus. 3 a takes the reading of Vat. Pal. here to be that of Γ II, λεγόμενα. 39. αὐτούς See explanatory note on 1277 a 38.

1277 b 2. πρὶν δημον γενέσθαι Vet. Int. antequam fuisset demus. Γενέσθαι is rendered by fuisse in 1329 b 9 and by esse in 1288 a 16. just as eyévero is rendered by fuit in 1297 b 16, 1303 b 38, and 1304 a 5. 14. ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν Π² Bekk.: ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι II1 Sus. See critical note on 1288 a 13. The words are found in both orders (see e.g. 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2, 1277 a 26 sq., b 20). 20. ωσπερ ως γάρ Γ Ms pr. P1. 23. λάλος Π1 Bekk., άλλος P<sup>23</sup> etc., ἄλλως Ald., ἄλαλος P<sup>4</sup>. See explanatory note on 1277 b 22. κοσμία] z has ornata without any erasure (with c h k l m n and rec. a). which is probably right, for κοσμείν is rendered by ornare in Vet. Int. in 1323 b 3, 1314 b 37, and (in z) 1321 a 37: b g Sus. 29. ωσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ Π² Bekk.: ωσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς Π¹ Sus. Π² are probably right, for in 1278 a 37 Γ II have ώσπερ μέτοικος γάρ έστιν ό των τιμών μη μετέχων. A similar variation occurs in 1293 b 17, where  $\Pi^2$  have  $\epsilon ls$   $d\rho \epsilon \tau \dot{\eta} \nu$   $\tau \epsilon$  kal  $\delta \hat{\eta} \mu \rho \nu$  and  $M^{s}$   $P^{1}$  (Γ?) είς τε ἀρετήν καὶ δήμον, and in 1302 a 31, where  $\Pi^{2}$  have  $\pi$ ερὶ ὧν δέ, and  $M^s P^1(\Gamma?)$   $\pi$ ερὶ δὲ ὧν. See critical note on 1300 b 17 and cp. also 1326 b 4, where M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ have ἐν μὲν τοίς ἀναγκαίοις, and  $P^{2/3/4}$  ἐν τοίς μὲν ἀναγκαίοις.

1278 a 11. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων] See explanatory note. κοιν $\hat{\eta}$  Π<sup>1</sup> Sus.: κοινοὶ Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. 26. μη μετέχειν άρχης μη μετέχειν άρετης Γ Ms. Vet. Int. has non participare virtute, but in a z the words principatu fortes interpres are added after virtute. It has not been pointed out that the three words are probably a corruption of 'principatu fortasse' interpres, a suggestion by the translator that principatu should be read in place of virtute, in which he was undoubtedly right. 32. Vet. Int. does not translate δέ. Vat. Pal. has δοχλου with Π. παραιροῦνται Vet. Int. eligunt, which probably represents προαιρούνται (cp. 1325 b 25 and 1341 b 26). Vet. Int. may have found this reading in  $\Gamma$ ; it is more likely, however, that he misread his Greek text. 34. αστων Vat. Pal., αστῶν codex Hamilton collated by Dr. H. Rabe, confirming a conjecture of Perizonius (ad Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 10), αὐτῶν Γ Π. The two words are often confused in the MSS.: thus Π¹ have αὐτούς in place of dorrows in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 32, and in Oecon. 2. 1346 b 27 the MSS. have αὐτῶν in place of ἀστῶν. 36. Sus. 3a: 'ωσπερ... 38, μετέχων post 40, ἐστίν Vaticanum et pr. P1 et corr. P4, 37, ώσεί... 38, μετέχων ibidem Π2 Ar., 37, ώσπερ . . . μετέχων ibidem Γ M8, verum ordinem restituit corr.1 P1' (i. e. Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of P<sup>1</sup>, in the same ink as the MS.). 37. ωσεί Vet. Int. ac si,

just as he has ac si for  $&\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$  καν in 1312 a 26. 40. Schneider (followed by Sus.) may well be right in adding  $d\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta}\nu$  after  $\tau\dot{\eta}\nu$  avτ $\dot{\eta}\nu$  (cp. c. 4. 1277 a 20, where  $\Pi^1$  omit  $d\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta}$  after  $\dot{\eta}$  avτ $\dot{\eta}$ ), but  $d\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta}\nu$  is omitted in 1. 13. 1260 a 24 and 3. 13. 1283 a 40.

1278 b 1. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων om. Π¹, but Vat. Pal. agrees with Π² in adding the words. 3. κάκεινος Γ Ms Π2 Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. et ille): Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of P1, has first written κάκείνος and then corrected it to κάκείνης, adding, however, o above η (see Sus.1). Π1 Sus. add δ' after κάκείνος or κάκείνης. ή δυνάμενος είναι κύριοs is added by Π1 P2 Vat. Pal., but omitted by pr. P3 4 (add. 7. καν εί Π² Vat. Pal. (καν εί πλείους om. Ms): καὶ εί marg. P<sup>3 4</sup>). P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. et si plures), but et si appears to represent καν εί in 1326 a 17, 1340 a 37, and 1341 a 19. 12. δημοκρα-TIKAÎS Z has democratiis: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. democraticis. 14. τούτων] z has horum: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. eorum. 15.  $\delta \hat{\eta}$   $\delta \hat{\epsilon}$  pr. Qb Bekk. 17.  $\delta \hat{\eta}$   $\Pi^2$  (except  $P^4$ ), Bekk.:  $\delta \hat{\epsilon}$   $\Pi^1$   $P^4$ Sus. Vat. Pal. has δη. κατὰ καὶ κατὰ P¹ corr. P⁴ Bekk. οτι II Vat. Pal. Sus., οτι Bekk.: Vet. Int. fails to render καὶ, but this he often fails to do (see vol. ii. p. lxiii). δ is added before ἄνθρωπος in M<sup>s</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus. (Vet. Int. homo leaves the reading of Γ uncertain): om. Il Vat. Pal.: see critical note on 1253 a 2, and Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 619 Β, γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος. 20. παρ' ἀλλήλων παρ' άλλήλων Γ (Vet. Int. ab invicem):  $\pi \epsilon \rho i$  άλλήλων M<sup>8</sup>  $\Pi^2$  and pr.  $P^1$ , also Vat. Pal. βοηθείας πολιτείας Γ Ms Vat. Pal. Π1 Vat. Pal. omit οὐκ ἔλαττον and are probably right: see Heylbut in Rhein. Mus. 42. 108, who urges that the meaning intended to be expressed by our έλαττον here is always expressed by οὐχ ἦττον, οὐδὲν ἦττον, in Aristotle's writings (e.g. in 2. 6. 1265 a 26, 3. 11. 1282 a 6 etc.), while έλαττον on the contrary always means what is smaller in number, time, or space. 25. καὶ συνέχουσι την πολιτικήν κοινωνίαν These words are placed after αὐτοῦ by Π¹ Vat. Pal., but after μόριον by Π². Bekker's text is συνέρχονται δε καὶ τοῦ ζην ενεκεν αὐτοῦ (ἴσως γὰρ ενεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον) καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον κ.τ.λ. 27. ὑπερβάλλη M<sup>8</sup>: ὑπερβάλη P<sup>2 3</sup> etc. Vat. Pal.: ύπερβάλλει P14: it is uncertain what reading Vet. Int. found in his Greek text, for his rendering is excedatur. 30. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς άρχης γε] z adds et before principatus, thus giving an equivalent for kal, which the other MSS. of Vet. Int. do not.  $P^{23}$  Vat. Pal. 40. ωσπερ] ως  $M^8$   $P^1$  Sus. The reading of  $\Gamma$  is uncertain (Vet. Int. ut). Vat. Pal. has ωσπερ. Π1 often omit

small words, and these MSS. (or at any rate  $M^s$   $P^1$ ) omit  $\pi\epsilon\rho$  also in 1317 a 23.

1279 a 2. «va] elvat  $\Pi^1$ , but not Vat. Pal. 3.  $\epsilon_{i\nu ai}$  om.  $\Pi^1$ . 12. αύτοῦ P¹ Ald. Bekk, Sus.: the other MSS. but not Vat. Pal. 20. καὶ after πᾶσαι Π3 Bekk., but see explanatory and Γ αὐτοῦ. 25. τὸ πολίτευμα M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Vat. Pal. Sus.: Π<sup>2</sup> note on 1281 a 26. Bekk, omit  $\tau \delta$ : the reading of  $\Gamma$  is uncertain. 27. odívous z has paucos, but paucum, the reading of the other MSS. of Vet. Int., may perhaps be right, for Ms has ολίγον. 34. τῶν before ὀλίγων om. M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly  $\Gamma$ , but not Vat. Pal. 37. πολιτεύηται] Vet. Int. vivit (politice vivit?: cp. 1267 b 29, 1255 b 37).

1279 b 15.  $\tau \iota$  om.  $\Pi^1$ , but  $\Pi^1$  often omit  $\tau \iota s$  and its parts (see critical note on 1288 a 16). 22. † συμβαίνη † ] συμβαίνη Ms P23 etc.: συμβαίνηι Vat. Pal.: συμβαίνη Bekk.1: συμβαίνει P14 Bekk.2 Sus. (compare the reading of these two MSS. in 1278 b 27). Vet. Int. accidat, which might stand for either reading (see critical notes on 1253 a 22, b 26). See explanatory note on 1260 b 31. Meister (Das Colonialrecht von Naupaktos, p. 291 sqq.) defends the use of at with the subjunctive (at  $d\nu x o \rho \epsilon = at d\nu x \omega \rho \epsilon \eta$ ) in a Locrian inscription from Naupactus (Hicks, Manual, No. 63: Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr., ed. 2, No. 229), but the verb is there used, as he remarks, in a future sense, which is hardly the case here, and even if this were otherwise, the difference of dialect would have to 26. κάν τις P1 Π2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ἐάν τις be taken into account. Ms: Vet. Int. si quis, which may represent either έάν τις or κάν τις, for si stands for κάν in 1282 b 8, 1298 b 23, and 1309 b 9: κάν εί 28. προσαγορεύη Morelius Bekk.: προσαγορεύει Vat. Pal. Ob Tb Ald.: προσαγορεύοι Ms P123 etc. Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. appellet what was the reading of Γ. 32. Sylburg and Bekker add οἱ before εὖποροι. 38. Sus. adds διὰ after συμβαίνει and reads διαφοράs in place of διαφοράs in 39, but see explanatory 39. γίνεσθαι Π: γίγνεσθαι Vat. Pal.

1280 a 15. φαῦλοι κριταὶ  $\Pi^2$  Vat. Pal.: κριταὶ φαῦλοι  $\Pi^1$ . See explanatory note on 1275 a 32. For similar transpositions cp. 1277 a 1 (ἀρετὴ μία  $\Pi^1$ : μία ἀρετὴ  $\Pi^2$  Vat. Pal.), 1281 a 27 (φαῦλα πάντα  $\Pi^1$ : πάντα φαῦλα  $\Pi^2$  Vat. Pal.), 1323 b 19 (αἰρετὰ πέφυκε ταῦτα  $\Pi^1$ : ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἰρετὰ  $\Pi^2$ ), 1326 b 8 (ζῆν εὖ  $\Pi^1$ : εὖ ζῆν  $\Pi^2$ ), 1290 b 8 (μόρια πλείονα  $\Pi^1$ : πλείονα μόρια  $\Pi^2$  Vat. Pal.), 1294 a 22 (ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος  $\Pi^1$ : ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή  $\Pi^2$ ), 1320 a 23 (ἐκκλησίας ὀλίγας  $\Pi^1$ : ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας  $\Pi^2$ ). In 1322 a 31 it is  $\Pi^2$  that place the

substantive before the adjective (ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι Π²: ἐν μείζονι δὲ σχήματι Π1). See critical note on 1282 a 40, and cp. 1311 a 22, where II2 have τους ύπερέχουτας των πολιτών (except P4, which omits των), and Π1 των πολιτων τους υπερέχοντας. 24. έλευθερία έλευθερίη Ms, ελευθερία or ελευθερίη Γ (Vet. Int. secundum libertatem, and secundum pecunias in 1280 a 23 represents  $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\sigma\nu$ ,  $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\nu\theta\epsilon\rho\nu$   $\Pi^2$ ,  $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\nu$ θεριοι with the first ι above the line Vat. Pal., ελεύθεροι P1. Sus. ascribes the introduction of ἐλευθερία into the text to Vict., whose first edition appeared in 1552, but Sepulveda's translation, which appeared in 1548, already has the rendering ut libertate (p. 83 b). 28. "vov Vet. Int. aeguum, not aeguale: so ex aeguo stands for ¿ξ "Toov in 1318 a 8. 29. μνῶν Π Vat. Pal.: Vet. Int. talentis, though mnam for uvav and mnas or minas for uvas in 2. 8. 1268 b 13, 14. είσενέγκαντα Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: εισεναγκαντα Vat. Pal.: είσενεγκόντα M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. intulit what the reading of  $\Gamma$  was. 'In Attic inscriptions only the later form ἐνέγκας occurs, not ἐνεγκών' (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 147). (7) Vet, Int. ipsius vivere: for this rendering of the article cp. 1286 b 19, where ipsam multitudinem stands for τὸ πληθος, 1290 a 34, 1292 a 12, 1301 b 34, and many other passages. See critical note on 1258 a 2. μόνον ένεκεν II2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ένεκεν μόνον Γ M8 Sus.: «vekev om. pr. P1. 34. ενεκεν ενεκα M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ: 36. Τυρρηνοί ] τυρηννοι Vat. Pal., е́уєкеў П<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus. τυρηννοί P4, τύραννοι P23. So in 1329 b 18 Ms P2 34 have τυρηνίαν. The form Τυρρηνικός appears in an Attic inscription of B. C. 350-300 (Meisterhans, p. 76).

1280 b 2. τοῦ om. M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Vat. Pal. and perhaps Γ, possibly rightly: Vet. Int. neque quales quosdam esse oporteat alteros alteri 4. ἔξει Γέξειν P<sup>2 3</sup> etc.: ἔξει Π¹ P⁴ Vat. Pal. The mistake is a frequent one: see critical notes on 1283 a 7 and 1286 a 30. άδικήσουσιν Morelius, άδικήσωσιν Π Vat. Pal.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. iniuste agant what was the reading in r, for Vet. Int. has 5. πολιτικής om.  $\Pi^1$ . 6. διασκοποῦσιν  $\Pi^2$ : διακοhabeat for Exec. ποῦσιν pr. P1 (corrected in a paler ink than the MS.), διακονοῦσιν 8. γίνεται Π: γιγνεται Vat. Pal. 9. ἄποθεν] г Ms Vat. Pal. See critical note on 1262 a 29. In 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 22, l. 28 ἄπωθεν is 10. συμμάχων Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: συμμαχιών the form used. Conring, Sus. See explanatory note on 1280 b 8. 13. συναγάγοι] συνάγοι Π3 Bekk. So in 1317 a 36 M8 P1 and possibly Γ have  $\sigma v \nu \dot{\alpha} \gamma \epsilon i \nu$ ,  $\Pi^2 \sigma v \nu \dot{\alpha} \gamma \dot{\alpha} \gamma \dot{\epsilon} i \nu$ . 18.  $\ddot{\alpha} \pi o \theta \epsilon v$  See critical note on 1262 a 29, where, however, Vat. Pal. should have been stated to have  $a\pi\omega\theta\epsilon\nu$  here, not  $a\pi\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu$ . 19.  $\epsilon$ ίησαν P¹ Vat. Pal.:  $\epsilon$ ί ήσαν the other MSS. and  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. si essent). 23.  $\pi$ ον  $\Pi$  Vat. Pal. and probably  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. quidem, which represents  $\pi$ οτ $\epsilon$  in 1274 b 33 and  $\pi$ ωs in 1286 a 12):  $\pi$ ω Ar. Bekk. Sus. 30.  $\hat{\eta}$   $\pi$ όλις οὐκ  $\hat{\epsilon}$ στι  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.,  $\eta$   $\pi$ ολις ουκ  $\epsilon$ στιν Vat. Pal.: οὐκ  $\hat{\epsilon}$ στιν  $\hat{\eta}$   $\pi$ όλις  $\Pi^1$  Sus. 34.  $\tau$ ελέας  $\Pi^3$  P¹ Vat. Pal. Sus.:  $\tau$ ελέας  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.: the reading of  $\Gamma$  is uncertain. 35. καὶ  $\Gamma$   $\Pi$ :  $\eta$  Vat. Pal. 37.  $\phi$ ρατρίαι] See critical note on 1264 a 8. 40.  $\delta$ è  $\hat{\eta}$   $\Gamma$   $\Pi$  Vat. Pal.:  $\delta$  $\hat{\eta}$   $\hat{\eta}$  or  $\delta$  $\hat{\eta}$  Sus.

1281 a 3. χάριν Π<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. Bekk.: om. Γ Ms pr. P<sup>1</sup>. Sus. brackets it. 16. γὰρ P¹ Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: γὰρ ἄν Γ Ms (z omits utique representing  $\hat{a}\nu$ , but probably wrongly). 17.  $\chi\rho\dot{\eta}$   $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: δεί Ms P1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. oportet which reading he found in his Greek text, for in 1263 b 30 and 1289 a 1 oportet represents χρή and in 1342 b 15 oportere represents  $\chi \rho \hat{\eta} \nu a \iota$ , while oportet often elsewhere represents  $\delta \epsilon \hat{\iota}$  (e.g. in 1262 b 2-7). In 1335 b 28 again M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ have δεί and  $\Pi^2 \chi \rho \dot{\eta}$ .  $\lambda \eta \phi \theta \dot{\epsilon} \nu \tau \omega \nu \Gamma \Pi$  (Vet. Int. acceptis):  $\lambda \epsilon \iota \phi \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \omega \nu$  Vat. Pal. 21. τοῦτον Γ Π: τουτων Vat. Pal. 25. ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα Γ Π: Vat. Pal. does not give breathing or accent. Sus. ascribes the reading ταὐτὰ to Vict. and Lamb. followed by Montecatino, and it is true that Vict. and Lamb. have haec eadem and Montecatino (vol. iii. p. 138) eadem, but I find the rendering 'li medesimi danni' ('the same losses') in Bernardo Segni's Italian translation of the Politics (p. 147, ed. 1549), which was published before either of Victorius' editions or the translation by Lambinus ap-27. πάντα φαῦλα Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: φαῦλα πάντα Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1280 a 15. 28. díkaia II<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: σπουδαία II<sup>1</sup>. 36. ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν These words are placed after ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον in P<sup>1</sup> П<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. Bekk., but before these words in Г M<sup>8</sup>. Sus.<sup>3</sup> a (1894) places the words in the following order—αλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις αν το κύριον όλως ανθρωπον είναι φαύλον έχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον. But the order of P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. seems to me preferable. No doubt it interposes ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον between ἄνθρωπον and ἔχοντα, but as to that see explanatory 41. δόξειεν αν λύεσθαι κ.τ.λ. See explanatory note on 1276 a 28. note on 1281 a 40.

**1281** b **1.** οὐ Π<sup>1</sup> P<sup>4</sup>, ὁ P<sup>2 3</sup> etc. **5.** συνελθόντων Π<sup>1</sup> pr. P<sup>2 3</sup> Sus., συνελθόντας P<sup>4</sup> etc., corr. P<sup>2 3</sup> (same ink as MSS.), Bekk. **7.** τὰ

περὶ τὰ ἤθη Γ in place of περὶ τὰ ἤθη (Vet. Int. quae circa mores). περὶ is added before τὴν διάνοιαν by  $M^s$  and perhaps by Γ (Vet. Int. circa intellectum), but this is not certain, for Vet. Int. often repeats prepositions (see critical note on 1253 a 36).

8. κρίνονσιν] κρίης Γ  $M^s$ .

13. κεχωρισμένων] κεχωρισμένον Γ (Vet. Int. separatum), καὶ χωρισμένον  $M^s$ .

25. μηδέν μηδέ ἔν suggested by Sus. with a query, μηδὲ ἔν  $P^1$ , μὴ δὲ ἐν  $P^1$ , μὴ δὲ ἐν  $P^2$ , μηδένν  $P^2$ , μηδεὶν Ald.

30. πολεμίων] Vet. Int. seditionis.

42. δ is added before laτρόs in  $P^1$  followed by Sus.: the reading of  $\Gamma$  is uncertain (Vet. Int. iste autem est medicus).  $P^1$  are probably wrong: see explanatory note on 1253 b 11 and Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq., and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὖτη ἀρετὴ πολίτον, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32, αὖτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων.

1282 a 5. καί is placed not after but before τοιοῦτοι in Ms P1, followed by Sus.: Vet. Int. does not render it in either place. The authority of Ms P1 unsupported by T is small, and it is probably better to follow II2 and to place kai after τοιοῦτοι, taking it to mean 'in connexion with wellnigh all the arts, as well as in connexion with the medical art.' 7. kai om. II, but kai is very frequently omitted in Π¹. 10. εὶ γὰρ καὶ Vet. Int. et enim si, which probably stands for  $\epsilon i$  yap kai and not for kai yap  $\epsilon i$ , for et si stands for el kai in 1282 b 38 and 1322 b 8. ού τι see explanatory note on 1282 a 10. 17. II om. ή before βελτίους, but these MSS. are apt to omit ή when it is followed by a second  $\eta$ , as in the passage before us. This happens in 1268 a 6, 1324 b 30, 1298 b 32, and 1305 a 32, as well as here. The same thing holds also of kai. See also critical note on 1331 b 18. μόνον Π: μόνος Γ (Vet. Int. solus). Sus. 12 μόνος, Sus. 34 24. μόνον. I incline to retain μόνον: cp. c. 13. 1284 a 34, οὐδὲ μόνον οἰ **21**. κρινεί  $\Pi^1$ . **27**. μέγιστον  $P^{2\,3}$  etc. τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν. Bekk.: μέγιστοι Μ8, μέγισται P14, μέγιστα Γ Sus. (Vet. Int. maxima). èv om. M8 P1 and possibly I, though Vet. Int. has in quibusdam politiis (see critical note on 1275 b 7). ἄρχουσιν Γ P1, ἄρχωσιν Ms: ἔχουσιν Π2 (so in 41 Π2 have ἐχόντων for ἀρχόντων). μεγάλων Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk., μειζόνων Π<sup>1</sup> Sus. 40. τὸ before πάντων om. Ms P1, and probably also Γ, for Vet. Int. does not render it, though he renders τὸ before τῶν. πάντων τούτων Π² Bekk.: τούτων πάντων Π1 Sus. So in 1332 b 31 P1 Π2 have πάντων τούτων: Γ Με τούτων πάντων. πάντων τούτων is the more usual and less emphatic order (see Class. Rev. 10. 106), but II1 have a leaning

to inversions of this kind (see critical note on 1280 a 15). Ταῦτα πάντα ('every one of these things') is used when emphasis is called for (e.g. in 1268 b 3, 1281 a 13, 1291 a 16, 1309 a 39, 1321 b 38), which does not seem to be the case in the passage before us.

1282 b 5. διορίσαι  $\Pi^1$  Sus. (Vet. Int. determinare): δηλῶσαι  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.  $\Pi^1$  are probably right: cp. 1287 b 16 sq. 8. καὶ  $\Pi^2$  Bekk., καν  $M^s$   $P^1$  Sus.: Vet. Int. si (which however a b z Alb. omit) may perhaps stand for καν, as in 1279 b 26, 1298 b 23, and 1309 b 9. 15. δὲ  $\Pi^2$  Bekk., δὴ  $\Pi^1$  Sus. (Vet. Int. itaque).

1283 a 4. μᾶλλον See explanatory note. 7. ὑπερέχει corr. P1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. excedit): ὑπερέχειν the rest. But the addition of a final v is a common error of the MSS. (see critical notes on 1280 b 4 and 1286 a 30). 8. I follow Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος: see explanatory note on 1283 a 6. καὶ om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1282 a 7. 11. ἀνισότητ' Π², except P4 (which has ἀνισότητα), ἰσότητ' Ms, ἰσότητα pr. P1 (corrected in a paler ink), ισότητα or ισότητ' Γ (Vet. Int. aequalitatem).  $\tau'$  om. M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and probably  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. does not render  $\tau\epsilon$ , but then he seldom does so). 27. ἴσον Π¹, ἴσων P² ('ut videtur,' Sus.¹) 32. rà om. Ms P1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. ad conventiones what was the reading in T. 36. oikoi Vet. Int. 37. δή Π: of Susemihl's MSS. of the Vet. Int. only two (g k) have autem representing be, while five have etiam, which stands for δή in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1292 b 10: z has autem etiam. Sus. seems to go too far in assuming that  $\Gamma$  had  $\delta \hat{\epsilon}$ .

1283 b 2. τι om. Π¹, but Π¹ often omit τις and its parts (see critical note on 1288 a 16).

14. δόξαιεν γὰρ (ἄν)] δόξαιεν γὰρ Π², δόξειαν γὰρ Ρ¹, δόξειαν γὰρ Μδ. We cannot tell from Vet. Int. videbuntur enim whether Γ had δόξαιεν γὰρ οτ δόξειαν γὰρ. Δόξαιεν may be right, for δόξαι (opt. of δοκεῖν) occurs in 3. 4. 1277 b 21, and δόξαιεν in Eth. Nic. 10. 1181 a 1. ἄν om. Γ Π (as in 1275 b 39), add. Coray Bekk. Sus. Π¹ omit ἀν in 1267 a 40, 1297 a 41, and 1313 a 20; it is not therefore surprising that Γ Π should now and then omit it. See Bon. Ind. 41 b 4 sqq.

20. τοῦτο ἴσως οτ τοῦτ ἴσως Π², τούτοις Π¹, but here Π¹ omit the last syllable, as (e. g.) in 1276 b 20 (κοινῶν for κοινωνῶν) and 1335 b 35 (ώς for ὥστε).

1284 a 5.  $\pi a \rho a \sigma \chi \acute{\epsilon} \sigma \theta a \iota \Pi^2$  Bekk.,  $\pi a \rho \acute{\epsilon} \chi \acute{\epsilon} \sigma \theta a \iota M^s$  P<sup>1</sup> Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. exhiberi what was the reading in  $\Gamma$ . For other variations of a similar nature see Susemihl's apparatus criticus on 1260 b 36, 1267 a 35, 1332 b 1, and 1317 a 36.

γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν  $\Pi^2$ , αὖται γὰρ δὴ διώκειν  $M^s$ , and probably  $\Gamma$ , though Vet. Int. has hae enim utique persecuntur, ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ διώκειν  $P^1$ , where ταύτας and δεῖ are in all likelihood conjectural emendations of Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS., intended to remedy the flaw caused by the omission of δοκοῦσι in the archetype of  $\Pi^1$ . 37. τῶ  $P^{1 \ 2 \ 3}$ , τὸ the other MSS. and  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. scilicet prohibere). κολούειν  $P^1$  and marg.  $P^{2 \ 3}$ : κωλύειν the rest and  $\Gamma$ . 41. παρὰ  $\Pi^1$   $P^4$ , the rest  $\pi$ ερὶ.

1284 b 11.  $\tau \iota$  om.  $\Pi^1$ , but see critical note on 1288 a 16. 13. μονάρχους Π² Bekk., μονάρχας Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. monarchas). 20. έγίγνετο P<sup>234</sup>: έγίνετο Bekk, Sus. with the rest. 29. γὰρ δὴ Vet. Int. enim, as in 1328 a 5 and probably in 1303 a 11. 31. άξιοιεν P1 Π², ἀξιοίμεν Γ (Vet. Int. velimus), ἀξιοί μέν Ms. 32. ὅπερ ἔοικε] Vet. Int. adds et before videtur, his equivalent for éoike, but see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, and 1264 a 9. δὲ Π³ Bekk. Sus., δεῖ δὴ Γ Ms P123. 41. ἐν τὸ Π² Bekk., ἔν τι Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. unum aliquod genus). αὐτῆς Π¹ Bekk. Sus., αὐτῶν Π². 1285 a 6.  $\tau$ oùs om. Ms P1: the reading of  $\Gamma$  is uncertain.  $\Pi^1$  often omit the article. 8. αὐτοκρατόρων Π Bekk.1: the translation of Vet. Int. is ducatus quidam exercitus imperialis, and hence Vict. Schn. Bekk.<sup>2</sup> and Sus. read αὐτοκράτωρ, though it is just possible that imperialis is in the genitive in agreement with exercitus and represents αὐτοκρατόρων. See explanatory note on 1285 a 7. 9. ἔν τινι βασιλεία] Leonardus Aretinus does not translate these words. His rendering is (MS. Ball, 242), vitae enim necisque alicuius non habet potestatem, nisi dum bellum gerit, ut etiam apud antiquos fuisse videtur. Nor does Giph, translate έν τινι βασιλεία. Bekk.2 brackets the words. Sus. and Bernays bracket βασιλεία, and it is true that the word may easily have been repeated from βασιλεία two lines above, but on the whole I incline to retain it (see the explanatory note for my interpretation of the passage). Bywater would read ενεκα δειλίας in place of έν τινι βασιλεία, while Jackson would omit these words and transpose έν ταις πολεμικαις έξόδοις to take their place (Sus.4). 10. ἐν χειρὸς νόμω Vet. Int. promptus potens lege, but z and pr. a omit promptus, which is probably an alternative reading for potens, the equivalent for eyxeipos r. In just the same way in 1283 a 9 two alternative renderings of κρεῖττον (melior and valentior) have together found their way into the text of Vet. Int. δ γὰρ ἀγαμέμνων Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. Agamemnon enim which reading he found in r. The reading of

Π<sup>2</sup> is probably right, the Agamemnon of the epic being referred to: Bywater adds τοῦ before Εκτορος in Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 20. Cp. c. 16. 1287 b 14, where Π have τοῦ ᾿Αγαμέμνονος.
 12. γοῦν Π² Bekk. Sus. (except P4, which has οὖν), γὰρ Π1. So in 1339 b 21 Π2 have γοῦν 13. μάχης νοήσω pr. P1, μάχης νοήσω corr. P1 (in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. quem ego videro fugientem e proelio. Here  $\Gamma$  P<sup>1</sup> appear to complete the sense from a gloss. πλησίαν] παραπλησίως P46 etc. pr. P2. 19. τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατά Sus., τυραννίσι καὶ κατά Γ Ms, τυραννίσι κατά P1 and a corrector of P2 in paler ink than the MS., Tupavu and after a lacuna karà P3 pr. P2, τυραννικήν είσι δ' όμως κατά P4 6 L8 Q Mb Ub (as to these MSS. see critical note on 1253 a 12), τυραννική, είσι δ' όμως κατά Ald. Bekk. A short lacuna evidently existed in the archetype of the best MSS., and this has been filled up (perhaps conjecturally) in P46 L8 Q Mb 20.  $\eta\theta\eta$   $\xi\theta\nu\eta$   $\Pi^2$ . 24. πάτριαι Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: πάτριοι Ms P1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. patria which reading he found in Γ. See critical note on 1285 b 5. 25. την αὐτην Π: τοιαύτην οτ την τοιαύτην Γ (Vet. Int. talem). 35. μιτυληναίοι Π. The MSS. have μιτυλήνη, μιτυληναΐοι in almost every passage of Aristotle's writings in which these words occur: Rhet. 2. 23. 1308 b 12. however, is an exception, for there the best MSS. have μυτιληναίοι. Pr.  $P^3$  has μυτιλήνην in 1304 at 4. Πιττακόν  $\Pi^1$  and also in 38 and 39. In 1274 b 18 all MSS. have πιττακός. The form ФІТТАКОС appears on imperial coins of Mytilene (Head, Hist. Num. p. 488). Φ sometimes takes the place of Π in Attic inscriptions; thus in some of them we find the form  $\phi a \rho \theta \acute{\epsilon} vos$  in place of παρθένος (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 79). As to the same confusion in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies, 15. 299. 36. ovyádas The reading profugas in Vet. Int. is probably right, for a stands alone in reading profugos (z has profugas): cp. 1303 a 35. 39. τον κακοπάτριδα Πιττακον κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note.

1285 b 2. διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί] So Sus. after Sepulveda: διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικαὶ εἶναι δεσποτικαί ΓΠ. Sepulveda's note is (p. 99), 'herilia, quoniam tyrannica. Sic legitur in graecis exemplaribus quaecunque mihi videre contigit, sed lectio videtur esse transposita, quae commodius habitura videretur, si sic esset—tyrannica, quoniam herilia.' There is little doubt that he is right: compare the corresponding sentence 1285 a 23 sq. and also 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq.

5. ἐκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι Π² Bekk.: ἐκούσιοί τε

(Ms έκούσίοι τε) καὶ πάτριοι Ms P1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. voluntariae et patriae which reading he found in r. The fem. form έκοι σιος is more commonly used in Aristotle's writings than έκουσία (in 1313 a 5 all MSS. have ἐκούσιον ἀρχὴν), and this is the case in Greek literature generally (Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 1. 537), but Kb has ἐκούσιαι in Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 b 24, καὶ αί κακίαι έκούσιοι αν είεν, and the fem. έκουσίας occurs in Plato, Rep. 603 C, and έκουσία in Plato, Laws 925 A. The fem. form πατρία is also less often used in Aristotle's writings than πάτριος (in 1285 a 33 all MSS. have πάτριος), but in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 all MSS. have τη̂ς πατρίας δημοκρατίας. Plato uses the fem. πάτριαι in Laws 759 A. 7. πορίσαι Vet. Int. emerunt, which probably represents πρίασθαι, a misreading or mistake in Γ for πορίσαι. 10. θυσιῶν οὐσιῶν Π¹, and so in 16 ovoía II1 for ovoía, readings which indicate that the archetype of these MSS, was written in uncial characters (see Sus.1 p. xiv, and critical notes on 1271 a 27 and b 25). τασις P2 Ald. corr. P3, ἐπανάστασις M8 P14 pr. P3: we cannot be sure from Vet. Int. elevatio which reading he found in Γ, but perhaps he may have found ἐπανάτασις, for in 1302 b 33 he renders ἐπανάστασις 13. καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν See explanatory note. Ms adds ai πάτριαι and P1 ai πάτριοι before οὐσίαι, which wrongly takes the place of  $\theta v\sigma' i a in \Pi^1$ , and Vet. Int. has patriae substantiae: αὶ πάτριοι (or πάτριαι) is omitted in Π2 Bekk. That the ἄρχων βασιλεύς at Athens, who was more or less the representative of the ancient kings, had to do with πάτριοι θυσίαι, we see from 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 57: cp. Plato, Polit. 200 E. But whether these two words are rightly added by II before θυσίαι is doubtful. The language of Plutarch in Quaest. Rom. c. 63 makes rather in favour of their omissionέπει δ' οὐκ έμετρίαζον (οί βασιλείς) άλλ' ήσαν ύπερήφανοι και βαρείς, των μέν Ελλήνων οι πλείστοι την έξουσίαν αὐτῶν περιελόμενοι μόνον τὸ θύειν τοις θεοις απέλιπον—but Π<sup>2</sup> occasionally omit words or parts of words wrongly (these MSS., for instance, are undoubtedly wrong in omitting un in 1335 b 25 and in reading at for airia in 1304 b 6), and I incline on the whole to accept the reading of II1 here, though it is no doubt possible that ai πάτριοι is a gloss. 22. ωρισμένοις Γ P1, the rest ώρισμένων. τε is added after στρατηγός in M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>, and possibly was added in r also, but this is uncertain, for, as usual, Vet. Int. gives no rendering for it. 33. πλειόνων Γ P1 corr. P2 3 (i. e. corrections in P2 3 in the same ink as the MSS.): πλείονος M8 Π2. 36.  $\pi a \mu \beta a \sigma i \lambda \epsilon i a s$   $\beta a \sigma i \lambda \epsilon i a s$   $\Pi^1$ , but  $\Pi^1$  occasionally omit the first VOL. III. H

syllable of words, e.g. in 1342 b 32 (διάνοιαν for παιδείαν οἷον) and 1273 a 10 (τάξαντα for τὰ δόξαντα).

39. μέρος Π¹ P² β Bekk., αἵρεσιν P⁴ β Lβ Sus. 'Κατὰ μέρος fortasse corruptum in Pol. 3. 15. 1285 b 39' (Bon. Ind. 456 a 24).

1286 a 1.  $\pi o \tau \epsilon$  is added after  $\pi \acute{o} \tau \epsilon \rho o \nu$  in  $\Pi^1$  (Vet. Int. quidem, which represents ποτε, for πως ποτε is rendered qualiter quidem in 1276 a 17). It is probably a blundered dittography of πότερου. 9. δοκοῦσι the third Basle edition of Aristotle, followed by Bekker: δοκεί Γ II Sus., who prefers (with Göttling) to correct οἱ νόμοι, the reading of ΓΠ in the next line, to δ νόμος. Either change may be right: that of Bekker avoids the transition from νόμων, 9, to ὁ νόμος, 10, and then back to νόμους in 15, but it may be urged on the other hand that there is a similar transition from vóμοι to νόμος in 12. καὶ καὶ πως  $\Gamma$   $P^1$  Sus., καὶ πῶς  $M^s$ . Is not 1202 a 32 SQ.  $\pi \hat{\omega}_s$ ; a marginal query by some perplexed reader which has crept into the text? 13. τετρήμερον P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk., τριήμερον Γ M<sup>8</sup> Sus. In 1304 b 12 and 1305 b 27 Π1 wrongly substitute τριακοσίων and τριακοσίοις for τετρακοσίων and τετρακοσίοις, an error which occurs also in the MSS. of Lysias Or. 30. 8 and elsewhere. On the other hand, in 1258 b 27 Π1 have τέταρτον in place of τρίτον. In Hist. An. 5. 19. 553 a 10 all Bekker's MSS. have the form τετραήμερον. 14. αὐτοῦ Γ Sus. (Vet. Int. in suo periculo), αὐτῶ Ms, αὐτοῦ the rest 25. πάντας Π¹ P⁴: πάνυ P² 3 6. 30. κρίνει κρίνειν and Bekker. Ms П<sup>3</sup>. See critical notes on 1280 b 4 and 1283 a 7. δργισθηναι Vet. Int. impetu ferri. He may have misread δργισθηναι as δρμηθηναι (see Schn.). 38. εὶ δὲ δὴ Vet. Int. si autem, which may possibly stand for εί δὲ δή: cp. 1292 b 32 and 1295 a 34. τοῦτο μὴ Π² Bekk.: μὴ τοῦτο Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1280 a 15. 1286 b 1. δὲ πάντες δ' ἄνδρες Γ Ms. 7. δμοίους δμοίως Γ Π3 (Vet. Int. similiter). 10. οἰκοῦντας Vet. Int. habitabant, but Vet. Int. sometimes substitutes the indicative for the participle, e.g. in 1329 b 4, where he has lege statuit for νομοθετήσαντος, in 1333 a 18, where he has potest for δυνάμενον, and in 1305 a 24, where he has seditionem movit for στασιάσας. 14. γιγνόμενοι γενόμενοι Ms P1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. facti whether Γ had γενόμενοι or 15. Vet. Int. does not translate  $\pi \circ \theta \in \nu$ , but neither does he translate που in 1288 a 25. 17. μετέβαλλου Ms Π2 Vat. Pal. Bekk. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. transmutabantur): μετέβαλον P¹ Bekk.² Sus. 21. ἔτι] Vet. Int. iam (ἤδη Γ?). 24. ὁποῖοί r P1 Julian (ep. ad Themist. p. 261 A) and corr. P2, οποιοι Vat. Pal.,

όποιοι Ms, όποιόν P3 Ald. and pr. P2, όποιων P4 Ls Ob Tb. 29. αὐτόν the third Basle edition of Aristotle, αὐτόν om. Julian.  $\Gamma$  Π.  $\mathring{\eta}$   $\mathring{\eta}$   $\Gamma$   $P^{1/4}$ ,  $\eta$  Vat. Pal.,  $\mathring{\eta}$  the rest. 31. καὶ is added before κατὰ in Π², but omitted in Π¹ Vat. Pal. **32.** αύτοῦ Γ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. suam voluntatem), αὐτοῦ Π. 33. φυλάξει P4 Ald., φυλάξεται Ms P1, φυλάξαι P2 s etc. Vat. Pal.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. custodiet whether he found φυλάξει or φυλάξεται in Γ, for τους φυλαττομένους in 1331 a 16 is rendered custodientes by Vet. Int., while in 1285 a 26 φυλάττουσιν is rendered custodiunt. 36. έκάστου] Vet. Int. ea quae singulorum, where singulorum may possibly represent έκάστων, not έκάστου, for singularum represents έκάστων in 1337a 20 and singulis έκάστοις in 1295 a 38. Did Vet. Int. find την added before έκάστων (or έκάστου) in Γ? 40. συρακοσιοις Vat. Pal.: συρακουσίοις all other MSS. except P4, which has συρακουσίος. In Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 b 16 Ac has συρακοσίους (συρακουσίους Yb Zb, συρρακουσίους Q). In Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 38, however, all MSS. have συρακούσιοι, and in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8 the MSS. have συρακούσιοι, except pr. P<sup>3</sup>, which has συρακόσιοι. We know from inscriptions (Meisterhans, pp. 21, 75, ed. 2) and from coins that Συρακόσιοι is the correct form.

1287 a 4. πολιτείας Victorius and Camerarius (Interp. p. 138), followed by Bekker and Sus.: βασιλείας ΓΠ Vat. Pal. Julian (Ep. ad Themist. p. 261 A) appears to have read βασιλείας, for he says, έξης δε περί τοῦ κατά νόμον λεγομένου βασιλέως διεξελθών, δε έστιν υπηρέτης καὶ φύλαξ τῶν νόμων, καὶ τοῦτον οὐδὲ βασιλέα καλῶν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον είδος (SC. βασιλείας?) οιόμενος. 9. πάντα Π Vat. Pal.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. principatur omnibus whether he found πάντα or πάντων in Γ: πάντων Julian, Sus., πᾶν Cod. Voss. of Julian (according to 10. έαυτοῦ Π: αὐτοῦ Julian, αὑτοῦ Hertlein. See explanatory note. Vet. Int. adds dicendum after ὁ βασιλεύς from a gloss λεκτέον which appears in P2. δέ om. Julian. τὸ add. Julian after οὐδὲ. 11. τὸ κύριον ενα πάντων είναι τῶν πολιτῶν  $P^1 \Pi^2$ : τὸ κύριον είναι πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἔνα Γ M8. ὅπου—ἡ πόλις om. Julian. 13. καὶ—φύσιν om. 15. τà Sus. following the better MSS., τὸ Bekk. following P4 and others of the less good MSS. 16. τοίνυν om. Π1 but not Vat. Pal. οὐδέν Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: οὐδένα Bernays, Sus. 23. όμοίων Π1 Bekk. Sus.: όμοίως Π2. 25. αλλ' επίτηδες παιδεύσας ό νόμος εφίστησι] So Π2 Vat. Pal. (εφιστησιν Vat. Pal.): παιδεύσας om. M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>: Vet. Int. sed universale lex instituit, which probably stands for αλλα το καθόλου ο νόμος εφίστησι, though εφιστάναι is

not once rendered by Vet. Int. instituere in the Politics (it is rendered insistere in 1336 b 25). Τὸ καθόλου may probably have been a gloss in Γ (Sus.3); the words ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας were either wanting in I or left untranslated by Vet. Int. 27. Vet. Int. adds omnia before his equivalent for ἐπανορθοῦσθαι. He has dant for δίδωσιν and may have found διδόασιν in his Greek text, but he is not always faithful to the number which he finds in his Greek text (e.g. in 1338 b 11 and 1296 a 34, 35). 8 71 av 8687 Vet. Int. quodcunque videbitur, as in 1318 a 28. The more usual equivalent is quodcunque videatur. 28. II Vat. Pal. have & uèv οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους. Vet. Int. qui quidem intellectum iubet principari videtur iubere principari deum et leges (thus he fails to render ouv and seems to have found νοῦν in Γ in the place of νόμον). The Vossian MS. of Julian has ὁ μεν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους: thus it wrongly omits δοκεί κελεύειν ἄρχειν and has (no doubt rightly) τὸν νοῦν μόνους in place of τοὺς νόμους. 30. η τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. quando enim concupiscentia tale et furor principatum habuerit (or habuit), tandem et optimos viros interimet, representing possibly ὅτε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχον, τέλος καὶ τοὺς αρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθερεί (or διαφθείρει, for Vet. Int. sometimes renders the present by the future, e.g. in 1281 a 19). Ms has 6 τε in place of  $\eta$   $\tau\epsilon$ , as  $\Gamma$  apparently had  $\delta\tau\epsilon$ . See next note. ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθείρει M8 P1 (except that pr. P1 has  $\phi\theta\epsilon i\rho\epsilon\iota$ ) Sus. As to Vet. Int. see preceding note. In 1336 a 10 the correct reading διαστρέφεσθαι has been corrupted in II1 into διαφέρεσθαι, and διαστρέφει appears to have been corrupted in these MSS. here in a somewhat similar way. Julian has καὶ ὁ θυμὸς διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας, omitting ἄρχοντας, but otherwise agreeing with Π<sup>2</sup>. 32. νοῦς ὁ νόμος Π<sup>2</sup>: ὁ νοῦς νόμος Ms Vat. Pal. Julian pr. P1: we cannot be sure from Vet. Int. intellectus lex est which reading he found in r. 34. kai om. Vat. Pal. possibly rightly: it is bracketed by Sus. But see explanatory note. ἐπήρειαν Vet. Int. affectum. He does not understand the word. In Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 14, 18 and 2. 4. 1382 a 2 ἐπηρεασμός is rendered epireasmus, and in Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 17 δ έπηρεάζων qui epireazit. 39. πιστευθέντας Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.1: πεισθέντας Schn. Bekk.2 Sus. and perhaps Γ. Vet. Int. has persuasos ab inimicis for πιστευθέντας τοις έχθοοις, and this probably represents πεισθέντας τοις έχθροις, for

πιστευθέντες is represented elsewhere in the Politics by crediti (1305 a 22, 28) or credibiles facti (1310 b 16), and nowhere by persuasi, while πεισθώσιν is represented by persuadeantur in 1332 b 7.

1287 b 4. γὰρ Γ Π Vat. Pal.: δὲ Thurot, Sus. 6. ώστ' εἰ Π¹ Vat. Pal. (ωστε εί Ms), Eucken, Sus., ωστε Π2 Bekk. See Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 64. 8. πολλά om. Π<sup>3</sup> pr. P<sup>3</sup>. 14. ἐρχομένω P1 Π2 Bekk. Sus.: ἐρχομένων Γ Ms Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. simul duobus venientibus). 17.  $\gamma \epsilon$  is added in Ms P<sup>1</sup> Vat. Pal. and possibly was added in T, though Vet. Int. does not render it, for he seldom renders yε. δυνατός Vet. Int. potuit, but see above on 1286 b 10. 18. ως—κρίνειεν is placed in Π<sup>2</sup> wrongly before ἐπεὶ, 17. Π<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ἐπεὶ M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. quoniam which reading he found in Γ. 22. νομοθετήσαι II Vat. Pal. Bekk.: νενομοθετήσθαι Coray and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. lege statuta esse), but this is not certain, for Vet. Int. often renders the active by the passive. 26. τ' ἴσως Π¹ Vat. Pal. Sus.: δ' ἴσως Π² Bekk. 27. δυοίν See explanatory note. 29. μόναρχοι Π<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. Bekk.: μονάρχαι Π¹ Sus. 30. αὐτῶν Morelius, Bekk., Sus., and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. sibi): αὐτῶν Π. τῆ ἀρχῆ τῆς ἀρχῆς Casaubon, Richards, probably rightly (cp. 33). 31. αὐτοῦ Sus.3, αὐτοῦ Γ Π Bekk.<sup>1</sup>, avrois Bekk.<sup>2</sup> The Aldine edition of the Scholia Graeca in Aristophanem, in quoting ἄτοπον, 26—συνάρχους, 31, on Acharn. 92 (ed. Didot, p. 390), gives αὐτοῖς, but this quotation may have been interpolated by the editor of the Aldine, the Cretan Marcus Musurus, as to whose interpolations in these Scholia see Dindorf's preface in Didot's edition of them, p. iv. In that case this reading would no doubt be a conjectural emendation by Musurus. As to αύτοῦ, see explanatory note. 38. δεσποστὸν Sylburg, Bekk.: δεσποτὸν Π2 Vat. Pal.: δεσποτικὸν Π1 Sus. (two MSS. of the Vet. Int., however, a z, have despotum). Compare 1324 b 39, where P46 L6 have δεσποτικών and the other MSS. δεσποτών, the true reading being δεσποστών. καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτόν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: om. Π¹ (καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν Sus.). 39. Richards would add τοῦτο after 41. τὰ is added before παρὰ φύσιν in Π¹ Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. quae praeter naturam).

1288 a 6. ἤδη om.  $\Pi^1$ , but these MSS. occasionally omit ἤδη: see critical note on 1268 b 21. 9. z has aristocratica autem multitudo for ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος (with rec. b), whereas all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined have aristocratia. 10. Vict. and Bekk.² bracket πλῆθος ὁ πέφυκε φέρειν, but then the

rulers in an aristocracy cease to be a part of τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν πλήθος. Sus. prefers to bracket πληθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον, but this course is open to the same objection. In reality the ἀριστοκρατικὸν πληθος includes both rulers and ruled, as we see from c. 18. 1288 a 35 sqq. 12. ἡγεμονικῶν Vet. Int. praesidibus, which stands for ἡγεμόνων (see 1303 b 28, 1305 a 40, 1313 b 29, and 1316 b 18), but it is possible that Vet. Int. mistook the reading in Γ and that this was ήγεμονικών, 13. Π² add καὶ ἐν before ἐγγίνεσθαι, but Π¹ Vat. Pal. not ήγεμόνων. Sus. omit καὶ ἐν, Vat. Pal. reading ενγιγνεσθαι. Bekk. brackets καὶ έν, and Spengel and Bekk.2 bracket πληθος έν ῷ πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ἐγγίνεσθαι, but a  $\pi \lambda \hat{\eta} \theta_{os}$  which is a fit subject for Polity is not necessarily exclusively composed of πολεμικοί: it is rather under the sway of πολεμικοί (cp. c. 7. 1279 b 2, διόπερ κατά ταύτην την πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν). Καὶ ἐν (ἐν?) is probably an intimation that the copyist found ἐνγίνεσθαι in the text which he was copying in addition to έγγίνεσθαι. πολεμικόν Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Sus., πολιτικόν Π<sup>1</sup> Vat. Pal. Πολιτικόν probably comes from the preceding line. ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk., ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι Γ P¹ Sus., καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι Ms. See critical note on 1277 b 14. 15. εὐπόροις Π¹ Bekk. Sus., ἀπόροις Π<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. † γένος P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: † γένος Γ Ms: η γένος Sus. των άλλων should probably follow, not precede, ενα τινά: the two words may, however, have been placed where they stand in order to avoid the hiatus in ἡ καὶ ἔνα τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων, or they may be repeated (a common blunder) from των ἄλλων, 17. 16. τινà om. П¹, but see critical notes on 1273 b 27, 1279 b 15, 1283 b 2, 1284 b 22. πάντη Π¹, if Vet. Int. penitus stands for 11, and 1324 a 37. πάντη, παντηι Vat. Pal., πάντη Sus.: πάντες Π2 Bekk. 24. ἀλλὰ καὶ r Schn. Sus. (Vet. Int. immo, which represents ἀλλὰ καὶ in 1282 a 20 —a fact which has hitherto escaped notice): ἀλλὰ Ms P1 Π2 Vat. Pal. 27. την om, Ms P4 Qb Tb and possibly Γ, followed by Bekker. τοῦτον om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1257 b 24. 39. της πόλεως της ἀρίστης Π2 Vat. Pal.: της ἀρίστης πόλεως Ms P1 and probably Γ (Vet. Int. optimae civitatis). So in 1260 b 23 Π2 have της πολιτείας της αρίστης, while M8 P1 and probably Γ have της αρίστης πολιτείας, and in 1331 a 5 Π2 have ταις οἰκήσεσι ταις ιδίαις, while Ms P1 and probably Γ have ταις ιδίαις οἰκήσεσι. It should be noticed that in 1288 b 3 Π Vat. Pal, have περί της πολιτείας ήδη πειρατέον λέγειν της αρίστης. 40. διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν z has per eadem rightly (with g alone of the MSS. of Vet. Int. collated by Sus.): all the other MSS, have per eandem.

1288 b 3. δὲ Π, δὴ Vat. Pal. perhaps rightly: Conring had already conjectured δὴ. 5. ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν, which is evidently a slightly different version of the opening words of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, is added by ΓΠ Vat. Pal. at the end of the Third, except that P<sup>4 6</sup> Ls omit τὸν μέλλοντα and substitute γὰρ for δὴ. In one of the best MSS. of the Metaphysics, Ab, the closing words of one Book are often repeated in the opening words of the next: see Christ's preface to his edition of the Metaphysics, p. vii.

## BOOK IV (VII).

1288 b 5. See critical note at the close of the Third Book.

1323 a 16. πρώτον P1 Π2 Bekk.: πρότερον Γ M8 Sus. λογείσθαι Π: Vet. Int. confessum esse, but he may probably have found δμολογείσθαι, not ωμολογησθαι, in his Greek text (compare his renderings in 1262 b 6, where he has arbitratus est for oleral, and 27.  $\chi \rho \dot{\eta}$  om.  $\Pi^2$ . 29. παραπετομένας Vet. Int. volantes, but this may probably stand for παραπετομένας, not πετομένας, for he has dicens for προειπών in 1338 a 26, pascentes for ἐπινέμοντας in 1305 a 26, peccare for διαμαρτάνειν in 1338 a 41, 1288 b 37, and 1297 a 7, laborare for διαπονείν in 1339 a 8 and 1341 b 22, and labores for φιλοπονίαιs in 1338 b 25, to mention no other examples. 30. τοῦ is added after ἡ in M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. comedere vel bibere whether he found this  $\tau \circ \hat{v}$  in  $\Gamma$ . 32. όμοίως δέ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οῦτως ἄφρονα Vet. Int. similiter autem et quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant sic imprudentem, where Sus. thinks that the translator has rendered a gloss. 40. διαλαμβάνειν Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.<sup>1</sup>: διαβαίνειν Π<sup>1</sup> (Vet. Int. provenire should probably be pervenire, the reading of Sus., which no doubt stands for διαβαίνειν, though διαβέβηκεν in 1272 b 21 is rendered transivit): λαμβάνειν Lamb. Bekk. Sus. See explanatory note on 1323 a 39.

1323 b 6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Γ (Vet. Int. quin immo) Π²: οὐ μὴν Ms pr. P¹. 8. ὧν] Vet. Int. eorum, which perhaps should be eorum quorum, or simply quorum. 9. αὐτῶν om. Π¹. Αὐτοῦ is omitted by Π¹ in 1301 a 8. 15. εἴληφε Π² Bekk.¹: εἴληχε Π¹ Bekk.² Sus. 17. τιμιώτερον] Vet. Int. pretiosior: see critical note on 1267 b 1. 23. συνωμολογημένον] z has confessum with all the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, and this is probably the correct

reading: Sus. follows a, which has concessum. See critical note on 1323 a 20. 27. τοῦτ' Γ in place of ταῦτ', the reading of Π (Vet. Int. hoc). 41. ἐκάστω P² Bekk.: ἐκάστου the rest, except that P⁴ Vb Ald. and pr. P³ Sb omit καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστου (or ἐκάστω): ἐκάστου Sus.

1324 a 10. οσοι τε All the MSS. of Vet. Int. except z have quicunque: z quicunque autem. See critical notes on 1330 b 4, 1332 a 42, and 1336 a 5. 12. εἴ τέ τις Vet. Int. si etiam aliquis, where τε is rendered (it is not often rendered by Vet. Int.) and rendered by 14. πότερος ] πότερον Γ (Vet. Int. utrum): etiam, as in 1327 a 25. M<sup>8</sup> has a contraction which may represent πότερον (see Sus.<sup>1</sup>). 22. vào is omitted in  $\Gamma P^{46}$  L<sup>8</sup> Bekk. See critical note on 1272 b 31. λέγω δὲ δύο We expect λέγω δὲ τοὺς δύο (cp. 1307 a 10, λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δημον καὶ όλιγαρχίαν). The natural meaning of λέγω δὲ δύο surely is 'and I call the political and the philosophical lives two.' There was a question whether these lives were two or only one (cp. 28 sq. and Plato, Gorg. 500 D), but this can hardly be Aristotle's meaning here. Should rows be added before δώο? 33. ye Spengel Sus., τε M8 P1 Π2 Bekk. Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. 35. εκαστον and την πολιτείαν Π2 Bekk., εκάστω and τη πολιτεία 37. τινός om. II1, but see critical note on 1288 a 16.

1324 b 3. παρ' ένίοις κ.τ.λ.] Π<sup>2</sup> omit καὶ before τῶν νόμων, which I add with Congreve (P46 omit δρος also): παρ' ένίοις δ' οὖτος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας όρος Γ M8 Sus.: παρ' ένίοις δ' οὖτος καὶ τῆς 8. πολέμους Π2 Bekk. Sus.: πολεμίους πολιτείας όρος των νόμων P1. **16.** ἀπεκταγκότα and **18.** ἀπεκταγκότι In 16 P<sup>15</sup> have ἀπεκτονότα, pr. P3 (correxit margo recens) απεκτανκότα, P4 6 απεκτακότα, Ms ἐπταικότα, and in 18 Ms P1 4 6 have ἀπεκτακότι, pr. P3 (correxit recens) ἀπεκτανκότι, P5 ἀπεκτονότι: P2 has the forms given in the text (Sus.3). It is not absolutely certain that ἀπεκτακότα and ἀπεκτακότι should not be read, for we find ἀπεκτακότες in Polyb. 11. 18. 10 and ἀπεκτακώs in some MSS. in Polyb. 3. 86. 10, but the authority of P23 is in favour of απεκταγκότα and απεκταγκότι, and ἀπεκτάγκασι occurs in Menand. Μισούμενος, Fragm. 8 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 173) and ἀπεκταγκώς in some MSS. (followed by Hultsch) in Polyb. 3. 86. 10 (see Kühner, Ausf. gr. Gr., ed. Blass, 2. 468, and Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, p. 395). Cp. Moeris (ed. Bekk. p. 189), απέκτονεν 'Αττικοί, απέκταγκεν Ελληνες. 20. καταπηγυύουσι Vet. Int. commassant, which probably represents καταπυκνοῦσι: he may have misread καταπηγνύουσι. 28. ἀλλά... όρωμεν om. Π¹. 30. τὸ ἡ πείσαι ἡ βιάσασθαι Π², τὸ πείσαι ἡ τὸ λίσασθαι Ms P¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. suasisse aut sanasse); but see critical notes on 1282 a 17 and 1298 b 32. 37. δεσπόζον and οὐ δεσπόζον Γ Π Bekk. Giph. (p. 893) δεσποτόν and οὐ δεσποτόν: Stahr, Sus. δεσποστόν and οὐ δεσποστόν, probably rightly. 39. δεσποστῶν Lamb. (also a recent correction in P⁵, but this corrector probably reproduces the conjecture of Lamb.: cp. 1332 a 41): Sepulveda had already translated the words iis duntaxat qui tali imperio sunt idonei, and Segni, à chi è atto à servire: δεσποτικῶν P⁴ 6 L⁵, δεσποτῶν the rest (Vet. Int. despotibus).

1325 a 5. δηλον άρα ότι P4 Bekk. Sus.: δηλον ότι άρα P123 Sb Vb, δηλονότι "τρα Ms, and these MSS. may possibly be right; I would follow them if I was aware of any parallel to this use of δηλονότι. 8. τοῦ before σπουδαίου om. Ms P1 and possibly Γ. κιμάζουσι] z has reprobant, not reprobrant as Sus. (is this a misprint?). 25. τό P<sup>3</sup> Bekk. Sus., τῶ M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1 2 4</sup>, τῷ Ald. 28. δεσποτείαν δεσποτικήν P1 and possibly Γ, for a c have despoticam, z despoticiam, and b despociam: despotica, however, represents δεσποτεία in 1253 b 19. 29. αὐτὸ τὸ corr. P2 (i.e. the scribe of P2 in the same ink as the MS.), αὖ τὸ Γ P14, αὐτὸ Ms Ald., αὐτῶ P3 pr. P2. 36. ὥστε οὐ δεῖ Sus. reads e conj. deîv in place of deî, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the indirecta oratio is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is describing the views of others. 39. ὑπολογίζειν, the third Basle edition of Aristotle, followed by Sus. Sb, a MS. of very little authority, which Bekker follows, has ὑπολογεῖν: all the other MSS. ὑπολογιεῖν. The existence of the word ὑπολογεῖν is doubtful, for in Theopomp. Com., Inc. Fab. Fragm. 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 822: 5. cxx) the true reading is not ὑπολογεῖν but ὑπολέγειν. The active ὑπολοvicew is, however, extremely rare (see Liddell and Scott, s.v.). Richards doubts ὑπολογίζειν, especially with a genitive, and suggests that ὑπόλογον ἔχειν should be read in place of it.

1325 b 3. ψεῦδος is not rendered by Vet. Int. 7. ἐν is added before μέρει by Thurot and Sus. 20. αὐτῶν Vict. Bekk. Sus.: αὐτῶν ΓΠ. 22. καὶ before πράττειν om. Π¹ and Julian, Ep. ad Themist. p. 263 D, but Π¹ often omit καί, and other errors occur in Julian's quotation. 37. γενέσθαι] Vet. Int. fore, but this probably stands for γενέσθαι, as esse stands for γενέσθαι in 1288 a 16. συμμέτρου] Vet. Int. moderata: elsewhere σύμμετρος is rendered by commensuratus (1327 b 6, 1298 b 25). Συμμετρία is always rendered by commensuratio. Moderatus represents μέτριος in 1267 b 13, moderatius μετριώτερον in 1313 a 20, and moderate μετρίως in 1315 b 15, so that

moderata may stand for μετρίας here, though μέτριος is more usually rendered by mediocris. 38. προϋποτεθεῖσθαι] Vet. Int. praesupponi, just as he renders διηρῆσθαι by dividi in 1330 a 24, διωρίσθαι by distingui in 1330 b 15, and κατεσκευάσθαι by constitui in 1331 b 10.

1326 a 2. αὖτη Π¹ Sus. : αὐτὴ Π² Bekk. 6. πόσους τε Vet. Int. quos quot, but perhaps two alternative readings have here together found their way into the text. 7. Tony II Bekk. (Vet. Int. quantam may stand for either δσην or πόσην): πόσην Sylburg, Bekk.<sup>2</sup>, Sus.: see explanatory note on 1326 a 5. 10. ποία is added before μικρά in Γ M<sup>8</sup> Bekk. Sus.: om. P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>. 14. ολητέον om. Π1. ποιητέον Camerarius (Interp. p. 279), Bekk.2, Sus.: οἰητέον Γ Π. 21. μορίων Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: μερῶν M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. partibus which reading he found in Γ. Μερών in M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> may be repeated from  $\mu \epsilon \rho o s$  in the preceding line: this kind of error occurs not infrequently in Π<sup>1</sup>. 25. ἀλλὰ μὴν Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: οὐ μὴν  $\dot{a}$ λλ $\dot{a}$  II<sup>1</sup> Sus. (Vet. Int. non solum sed). 29.  $\tau \epsilon$  om. M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>: the reading in  $\Gamma$  is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom translates  $\tau \epsilon$ . 34. πόλις P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup>: πόλιν Γ M<sup>8</sup> Bekk. Sus. See explanatory note. 36. πόλεως Π1 Sus.: πόλεσι Π2 Bekk.

1326 b 4. ἐν τοῖς μὲν P<sup>2 3 4</sup> etc. Bekk.: ἐν μὲν τοῖς M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Ald. 12. ράδιον All MSS. of Vet. Int. but z have facile est, but z omits est. 19. ἐν τῆ πολυανθρωπία τῆ λίαν \ Vet. Int. in ea quae valde multorum hominum (ἐν τῆ πολυανθρώπω τῆ λίαν Γ?). I doubt, however, whether Vet. Int. found in his Greek text a different reading from that which we have in the MSS., for in 1302 b 28 he has eos qui sine ordine et sine principatu for της αταξίας και αναρχίας, and in 1310 b 21 he has conditores populi et prospectores for ràs δημιουργίας και τας θεωρίας. He seems now and then to allow himself a little laxity in his rendering of substantives in -ia. τον ορον om. P<sup>3 4</sup> pr. P<sup>2</sup>, but erroneous omissions occur occasionally in the MSS. of the second family (e.g. of  $\mu \dot{\eta}$  in 1335 b 25 and of έργον in 1288 b 16), though not so often as in those of the first family, and here τον ορον can hardly be spared, for it would be difficult to supply it from 23. 34. συμβαίνη z has accidit probably rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have accidet. αὐτήν] Richards suggests whether αὐτῆs should not be read, but perhaps αὐτήν is defensible: see explanatory note on 1326 b 35.

1327 a 5. μὲν οὖν Schn. Sus. See, however, explanatory note. 12. πολλὰ] πολλοὶ Camerarius (Interp. p. 283) and perhaps M<sup>8</sup> and pr. P<sup>1</sup> (see Sus.<sup>1</sup>), followed by Bekk.<sup>2</sup> Sus., πολλὰ Γ Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.<sup>1</sup>

20. τὴν χώραν] See explanatory note on 1327 a 19. 21. πολέμους Sylburg, Bekk., Sus.: πολεμίους Γ Π. 23. Susemihl (Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. (1894), p. 273) thinks that J. Argyriades in his Διορθώσεις εἰς τὰ ᾿Αριστοτέλους Πολιτικά Ι. (Athens, 1893) is right in bracketing πρὸς, but see explanatory note. 32. ἐπεὶ δὲ Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἐπειδὴ Π². ὑπάρχοντα καὶ Welldon, Sus.: ὑπάρχοντα Congreve, ὑπάρχον καὶ Γ Π Bekk.¹, ὑπάρχειν καὶ Schn. Bekk.² 34. τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ Μ⁵ P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.³ ⁴, except that P⁴ has αὐτὸν: νέμειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἄστυ Γ Sus.¹² (Vet. Int. ut neque occupetur ipsum municipium).

1327 b 11. της ναυτιλίας Vet. Int. navigium, though elsewhere he rightly translates the word navigatio. 13. καὶ before τοῦτο om. Π¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of καί. 14. Ἡρακλεωτῶν See explanatory note. 15. κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν έτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν ] Vet. Int. aedificata civitate magnitudine aliis contractiore (z artiore), which appears to represent κεκτισμένης πόλεως τῷ μεγέθει έτέρων ἐμμελεστέρας. πόλεων Γ Π Bekk.1: πόλεως Congreve, Sus. Bekk.2 brackets καὶ 17. διωρισμένα] διωρισμένον L8 P6 Ald. corr. P4, Bekk.2: for the reading of pr. P4 see Sus.1 and Sus.4: but these MSS. have little authority. For έστω διωρισμένα cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 39, έπεὶ δ' έστὶν ένίοις γεγραμμένα περί τούτων. 28. Π¹ add μέν after ἀρχόμενα, probably repeated from the preceding line. 31. βέλτιστα Π: Vet. 34. M<sup>8</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk, add καὶ before πρὸς ἄλληλα: Γ P<sup>1</sup> Int. maxime. omit it, probably rightly. Sus. brackets it. 35.  $\tau \in \Pi^2$ :  $\tau \in \text{Bekk}$ . om. Ms P¹ Bekk.2: Sus. brackets it: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom translates  $\tau \epsilon$ . But the authority of  $\Pi^1$  in omissions of  $\tau \epsilon$  is weak, for these MSS. often omit it. Te may be merely a blundered dittography of the first syllable of the next word κέκραται. It can hardly be accounted for here in the way in which Stallbaum accounts for its presence in Plato, Meno 72 E, Phaedo 63 C, and Hipp. Maj. 282 B.

1328 a 2. αἴρεται] z tollitur: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. attollitur. But I doubt whether z is right here. 5. σὸ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεο] So Bergk, probably rightly, though ΓΠ have οὸ in place of σὸ and all MSS. but Γ P⁵ have περὶ in place of παρὰ: ἀπάγχεο P² ³ 6 L⁵ Ald. Bekk., ἀπάγχετο P⁴, ἀπάγχεαι P¹ Sus., ἀπέγχεαι M⁵, a lanceis perforationes Vet. Int., whatever that may represent (z has alancenis perforationes with a dot under the second n of alancenis to expunge it). Vet. Int. has enim here for γὰρ δὴ, as in 1284 b 29.

13. δείν Π², δεί Ms, δέ pr. P¹: Vet. Int. does not render it. 14. ὑπολαμβάνουσι Π2 Bekk. Sus.: νομίζουσι M8 P1 and probably Γ (Vet. Int. putant, which is his equivalent for νομίζωσι in 1302 a 25): νομίζουσι has evidently slipped in here from the line below and displaced ὑπολαμβάνουσι. 15. χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν Π¹, Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 5. 480 D, Sus. (πολέμιοι in place of πόλεμοι Γ): χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφῶν Π2 Bekk. In 1338 a 25 Π1 give an unmetrical version, and in 1253 b 36 Γ Ms. 16. πέρα Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: πέραν M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. οίδε Gomperz, Sus.<sup>3a</sup>: οἱ δὲ ΓΠ Bekk. (except that P<sup>4</sup> omits δὲ). 18. όπόσην Με P¹ and possibly г, perhaps rightly (see critical note on 1326a 7): the rest πόσην. 22. ταῦτά ΓΠ² Bekk.² Sus., ταυτά M<sup>8</sup> P¹, ταὐτά Bekk.¹ 26. δεί Π1 P4, δή the rest. ταὐτὸ Π2 Bekk. Sus., τοῦτο Π1.  $\Pi^1$ , δ'  $\tilde{\jmath}$  Bekk. Sus., δή  $\Pi^2$ . 40. τοῦ  $\Pi^2$  Bekk., and probably  $\Gamma$ ; τω Ms P1, τω Sus.: Vet. Int. palam quod hoc causa quare fiant civitatis species, which probably represents δήλον ώς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ (not τῷ) γίνεσθαι πύλεως εἴδη (cp. 1305 a 10, where αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίνεσθαι is rendered causa autem quare tunc quidem fiebat).

1328 b 4. έν τούτοις αν είη (α) αναγκαίον υπάρχειν εν τούτοις αν είη αναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν Π² Bekk.: ἐν τούτοις αν εἴη, διὸ ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν Ms P1 Sus., who, however, marks a lacuna after διὸ: ἐν τούτοις αν είη διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has in his utique erunt, propterea quod necessarium existere. Cp. 1333 b 20, where propterea quod exercitati fuerunt represents διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι, 1282 b 5, 1338 a 39, 1339 b 34, 41, 1295 a 15, and many other passages. Vet. Int. renders διό by propter quod, not propterea quod. I supply à before ἀναγκαῖον, which might easily drop out: διὰ τὸ is of course impossible and διὸ seems to me unsatisfactory. 11. Schn. Bekk. Sus. add τàs before πολεμικάς, but see explanatory 21. παρασκευάσουσι P<sup>23</sup> Bekk. and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. qui praeparent): παρασκευάζουσι Ms P1 Π3 Sus. 22. ἀναγκαίων] See explanatory note on 1328 b 22. 29. ταὐτὸ Sus.: τοῦτο Γ Π 32. μέν om. Π¹, but these MSS. often omit μέν. τὴν ἀρετὴν  $M^8$   $P^1$  Sus. : ἀρετὴν  $\Pi^2$  Bekk. : the reading of  $\Gamma$  is uncertain. Ms P1 may be right, for in 1329 a 1 II have της ἀρετης. See critical note on 1332 a 22. οὐδὲ δὴ Π² Bekk.: οὐδὲ δεῖ Π¹ Sus. On οὐδὲ δή see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 45.

1329 a 1. P<sup>4</sup> L<sup>8</sup> Ald. add πολίτας after ἔσεσθαι, but these MSS. have little authority. For similar additions in them intended to complete the sense see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35,

1304 a 15, and 1332 a 30. 6.  $\delta \in \Pi^2$  Bekk. Sus. :  $\delta \eta \Pi^1$ . 11. τοῖς αὐτοῖς Bekk, Sus.: τοὺς αὐτούς Γ Π. Camerarius, commenting on τους αὐτούς, remarks (Interp. p. 295), 'ελλειπτικώς, scilicet είναι δεί. Eosdem esse oportet utrosque, id est quibus ambo munera mandentur. Καταλληλότερον esset, si scriberetur τοις αὐτοις, nimirum ἀποδοτέον, quod supra autor communiter posuerat. If τοὺς αὐτούς were retained, I should prefer to supply, not εἶναι δεῖ (with Camerarius), but θετέον τους προπολεμούντας και τους βουλευομένους και κρίνοντας 13. την πολιτείαν ταύτην | See explanatory note. ἐστίν Lamb. Bekk. would exchange the places of this ἐστίν and 17. είναι is transferred by Camerarius to after τούτους, 18, and by Sus. to after deî, 18. Vet. Int. adds videtur after his rendering for είναι, but it is not likely that he found δοκεί in his Greek text; he sometimes seeks to mend defects in it by conjectures (see vol. ii. p. lxiv): cp. also his addition of vivere in 1265 a 34. Welldon reads δίκαιόν ἐστιν, perhaps rightly. 18. δεῖ (εἶναι)] Vet. Int. oportet esse (δεί είναι Γ?): δεί without είναι Π. Bekker adds elvai. See explanatory note on 1329 a 17. **20**. γένος Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk., μέρος Π1 Sus. Μέρος may possibly come from 23, μέρος τι. before περιοίκουs is found in Γ Π, but Sus. is probably right in bracketing it: cp. c. 10. 1330 a 28 sq. 27. ἱερέων Γ Ls Ald., ίερῶν the rest: ἱερέων Bekk. Sus. 33. αὐτοὺς ] Sus. αὐτοὺς? There is something to be said for this suggestion (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, τιμάς απονέμοντες τοις θεοις και αυτοις αναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ήδονης), but on the whole I incline to retain αὐτούς. αν είη τας ιερωσύνας αποδοτέον] τούτους Γ Bekk.: τούτοις nearly all other MSS., so far as they have been examined. Ταις ίερωσύναις Γ Π Bekk. Bekker may be right in reading τούτους and ταις ίερωσύναις: cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 16, διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις άρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι θετέον τους την [θεατρικήν] μουσικήν μεταχειριζομένους αγωνιστάς, where, however, χρησθαι should probably be added before θετέον, and Isocr. Busir. § 15, τους μέν έπι τας ιερωσύνας κατέστησε. But as almost all MSS. have τούτοις, not τούτους, it seems better to substitute τὰς ἱερωσύνας for ταις ἱερωσύναις: ἀποδοτέον thus regains its usual meaning. 38. δή Γ Π Bekk., δè Schn. Sus.

1329 b 2. δὲ is added after ἔτι in Π¹. 4. νομοθετήσαντος] Vet. Int. lege statuit, but see critical note on 1286 b 10. 10. μετα-βαλόντας] Vet. Int. transsumentes, which represents μεταλαβόντας (cp. 1326 b 21, 1328 a 27, and 1339 a 35). 13. γὰρ Π² Bekk.: δὲ Π¹ Sus. 18. τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν] Vet. Int. quod quidem apud

Tyrreniam, which may possibly represent τὸ μὲν πρὸς τῆ Τυρρηνία, for apud represents πρός with the dative in 1331 b 10 and 1322 a 26. As to Τυρρηνίαν see critical note on 1280 a 36. 21. Χῶνες Π¹, Χάωνες P² ³⁴ etc. The name of the race is Χῶνες and the name of their country Χώνη in Strabo, p. 255: cp. Χώνων, Strabo, p. 264, and Χωνίαν, Strabo, p. 654, and Lycophron, Alex. 983. Σιρῖτιν Göttling, Bekk.², Sus.: σύρτιν Ms P¹ ²⁴ etc.: σύρτην pr. P³, Syrtem Vet. Int. 'It seems certain that we should read Σιρῖτιν for Σύρτιν: Lycophr. Alex. 983' (the late Sir E. H. Bunbury in Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, Art. Chones). 30. καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας] z has et qua (should be quae) circa politias: all Susemihl's MSS. of the Vet. Int. have et circa politias. 34. εἰρημένοις] See explanatory note on 1329 b 33.

1330 a 1. τη χρήσει z has usu, perhaps rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have usui. 2. γινομένην See explanatory note on 1330 a 1. 10. των ίδιωτων Vet. Int. propriam (ίδίαν Γ?). τὰς ἐσχατιάς \ Vet. Int. proprias necessitates. 20. διὸ παρ' Π² Bekk. Sus., διόπερ Ms P1, διὸ or διόπερ Γ (Vet. Int. propter quod). προς αὐτούς πολέμων Vet. Int. eorum quae ad ipsos proeliorum; πόλεμος is rendered by proelium in 1297 b 19 also. 28. δεύτερον δέ] z has secundo autem: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. et secundo autem. τούτων δε τούς μεν εν τοις ίδίοις είναι ίδίους P4 L8 probably rightly. Almost all other MSS. as well as Γ add ίδίους before έν τοῖς ίδίοις: Γ 36. αὐτης δὲ πρὸς αύτην είναι την θέσιν omits idious after civai. εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν See explanatory note. 37. πρὸς om, Π¹. δη om. Π² Bekk. 38. αι τε P¹ Ald. etc., ατε P² s etc., αι Ms P¹ and possibly r (Vet. Int. quae), but Vet. Int. rarely renders TE. Coray and Sus. add ai before κατὰ βορέαν, but see explanatory notes on 1330 a 40 and 1330 b 10. εὐχείμεροι Vet. Int. recentiores.

1330 b 2. μèν after αὐτοῖs om.  $\Pi^1$ . 4. τε] Vet. Int. autem (δὲ  $\Gamma$ ?). The same thing occurs in 1336 a 5 and 1332 a 42 (see also critical note on 1324 a 10). 6. ὀμβρίοιs  $P^5$  Sb and perhaps  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. per praeparationem susceptaculorum aquarum imbrium), ὀμβρίους  $M^8$   $P^{1 2 3 4}$  etc. ὕδασιν] ὕδατος  $P^2$ . 7. πόλεμον] Vet. Int. multitudinem: did he misread πόλεμον as πλήθος, or did he find πλήθος in  $\Gamma$ ? 12. χρώμεθα] Vet. Int. utuntur. 14. τοιαύτην  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.: ταύτην  $\Pi^1$  Sus. 16. μήτ  $\Pi$  Bekk. Sus., μηδ Coray. See critical notes on 1257 b 12 and 1293 a 9. τοιούτων  $\Pi^1$   $P^{4 6}$  Ls Bekk. Sus.: τούτων the rest, followed by Bekk. 18. τῶν om.  $M^8$   $P^1$ : the reading of  $\Gamma$  is of course uncertain. 21. ἰδίων] οἰκείων  $\Pi^1$  (Vet. Int. familiarium,

which no doubt represents οἰκείων, as in 1336 a 8 and 1312 b 13): οἰκείων, however, is probably a corruption of οἰκιῶν, an alternative reading for οἰκήσεων, which has displaced ἰδίων. 22. μέν om. Π¹, as often elsewhere. 23.  $\kappa a i$  om.  $\Pi^1$  Sus., but the authority of  $\Pi^1$ is very weak in omissions and especially in omissions of καί. ίπποδάμειον Ms P1 Bekk. Sus.: ίπποδάμιον Π2: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. domativum equorum which reading he found in Γ. II<sup>2</sup> have όρινούς wrongly for όρεινούς in 1331 a 5. 27. τούτων αμφοτέρων Π2 Bekk. (cp. c. 13. 1331 b 37 and 2. 7. 1266 a 33): ἀμφοτέρων τούτων Π¹ Sus. (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19). 28. γεωργοῖς] See explanatory 31. καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον Π2: Π1 add πρὸς before note. κόσμον, but wrongly in all probability: cp. Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 23, καὶ πρὸς ράστώνην καὶ διαγωγήν, and Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 22, καὶ εἰς τας συνουσίας και διαγωγάς, and 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 18, και ύπερ αύτων καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικών, and see explanatory note on 1284 a 35. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 451. 1. 32. τας της άρετης ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις z has virtuti contrafactas civitates: perhaps contrafactos (Sus.) is a misprint.

1331 a 2. πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας Vet. Int. ad insultus, yet in 1267 a 37 he translates της πολιορκίας correctly by obsidione. Insultus, if right, will therefore hardly represent πολιορκίας, but what it represents is doubtful. 5. δρεινούς Ms P1: δρινούς Π2: the reading of Γ is uncertain. ταις ολκήσεσι ταις ίδιαις Π2 Bekk.: ταις ίδιαις ολκήσεσι Ms P1 and probably Γ (Vet. Int. propriis habitationibus). See critical note on 1288 a 39. 10. ταις δε μή κεκτημέναις Γ Π Bekk.1: τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις Aretinus' translation, followed by Bekk.2 and Sus. But it is more natural to speak of cities as κεκτημέναι τείχη than of peoples: cp. 9, έχούσαις, and 1330 b 32 sq. 21. δήλον... φυλακτηρίοις om. Π¹. αὐτὰ Π² Bekk. (it forms part of the passage which Π¹ omit): αὐτὸ Bonitz, Sus. 24. θείοις ΓΠ (except P⁴, which has θεοῖs), Bekk.1: θεοῖs Bekk.2 Sus., who says however in Qu. Crit. p. 409 n. 'at forsitan θείοις servare liceat.' 25. ἀρχείων αρχων P46 L8 Ald., ἀρχαίων the rest, except P5, which has ἀρχείων. έρυμνοτέρως Vet. Int. eminenter, but Vet. Int. often renders the comparative by the positive (e.g. in 1283 a 35, 1287 b 9, 1333 b 10, and 1340 a 42). 32. ονομάζουσιν Γ Π Bekk.1: νομίζουσιν Lamb. Bekk.<sup>2</sup> Sus. and apparently Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51). See however explanatory note on 1331 a 31. 34. τοιοῦτον M<sup>8</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> etc. Bekk.: τῶν τοιούτων P1 and possibly Γ, for az have talium, though the seven other MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined have

talem. Sus. reads τῶν τοιούτων, against the weight of MS. authority, it would seem. See critical notes on 1336 b 8 and 1314 b 26. 39. τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους  $P^1$   $\Pi^2$ , τὰ δὲ πρεσβύτερα  $M^s$ , τὰς δὲ πρεσβυτέρας  $\Gamma$ ? (Vet. Int. matronas autem).

1331 b 4. † πληθος † Should προεστός be read? Cp. Plato, Rep. 428 Ε, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, and 564 D, τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς (i.e. της πόλεως), είς ίερεις, είς ἄρχοντας Schneider and Bekk.2, following others, add kai before the second eis, perhaps rightly (cp. c. 14. 1333 a 30). Welldon reads kai in place of the second eis. But, if  $\pi \lambda \hat{n} \theta os$  is retained, some further change would appear to be necessary—the substitution (with Sus.) of ὁπλίτας or στρατιώτας for the second εis, or the addition of καὶ ὁπλίτας (with Welldon) after καὶ ἄρχοντας. Perhaps, however, πληθος should be προευτός, and the classes referred to by Aristotle are those at the head of the State, which do not include the hoplites. 5. καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια Should  $\tau \dot{a}$  be added before  $\tau \hat{\omega} \nu$ ? See, however, explanatory note on 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις. τὴν om. Ms P1 and probably r, but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of the article. 8. την after ἄλλην om.  $M^s P^1$ : the reading of  $\Gamma$  is of course uncertain. 13. νενεμησθαι Π¹ corr. P² Bekk.¹ Sus., νενεμιμῆσθαι over an erasure P⁴, μεμιμῆσθαι P³ pr. P² etc. Bekk.² 16. ἀναγκαῖον z has necessarium: is necessariam in Sus. a misprint? 24. ἐκ before ποίων om. Π¹ Bekk.² Sus. So in 1275 b 17 Ms P1 have  $\eta$   $\pi\epsilon\rho$ i  $\pi$ aντων  $\eta$  τινών, where the rest have η περί πάντων η περί τινών, and in 1275 b 32 P1 and perhaps Γ have τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ή πολίτιδος, where the rest have τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ή ἐκ πολίτιδος: so again in 1271 a 17, διά φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διά φιλοχρηματίαν, Ms and perhaps Γ omit the second δια, in 1336 a 14, καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις, Ms P1 omit the second πρὸς, and in 1340 a 6, εί πη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ήθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, Ms P1 omit the second mpos. See also the readings in 1322 b 32, where  $\Pi^1$  omit  $\pi \epsilon \rho i$ . See critical note on 1282 a 17. The first family of MSS. have little authority in omissions, and especially in the omission 26. πολιτεύσεσθαι Coray Bekk.<sup>2</sup> Sus. probably of small words. rightly: πολιτεύεσθαι Π. Vet. Int. has civitatem quae debet esse beata et politizare bene, which leaves it uncertain what reading he found in r. The letter  $\sigma$  is easily added or omitted between two vowels in verbs (see critical notes on 1255 b 24, 1274 a 5, 1298 b 20), as well as at the end of words. See Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hellenic Studies, 15. 278, 281, 296, and 297. 27. ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος

τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶs] z has in eo quod est intentionem et finem actionum poni recte, which is probably correct: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. omit est. 31. ἔκκειται] z has iacet rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. latet. καλῶs Ms Π²: καλὸs Γ P¹ (Vet. Int. bona). Sus.³ ascribes the reading καλὸs to Γ Ms, but this is probably a misprint for Γ P¹ (see Sus.¹²²). 32. ὁτὲ Π, except P⁴, which has ὅτε, and P², which has ἐνίστε and is followed by Bekker. 34. γὰρ om. Π¹, but probably wrongly: see critical note on 1272 b 36, and compare the omission of γὰρ by Γ P⁴ 6 Ls in 1324 a 22. 41. τύχην ἢ φύσιν Π² and perhaps Ms, followed by Bekker: φύσιν ἢ τύχην Γ P¹ Sus., an order which suits δεῖται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. well, though on the other hand in Plato, Laws 747 C (which is probably present to Aristotle's memory here) we have εἴτε χαλεπὴ τύχη προσπεσοῦσα εἴτε καὶ φύσις ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη. For a similar interchange in the order of two words see critical notes on 1333 b 36 and 1318 b 4.

1332 a 4.  $\tau \dot{\eta} \nu$  om. M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly  $\Gamma$ , but omissions of the article in these MSS. have little weight. 8. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς Π² Bekk.: καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς Π¹ Sus., but see explanatory note on 1332 a 7. 13. καὶ is added before ἀναγκαῖαι in Γ Ms. αίρεσίς] See explanatory note on 1332 a 16. 22. την before άρετὴν om. Ms P1 and possibly Γ: contrast the reading of these MSS. in 1328 b 41. Their authority in omissions of the article is small. 23. τὰ before ἀγαθά is bracketed by Reiz and Sus., and omitted by Bekk.<sup>2</sup> Sus. places a full stop after ἀπλῶs ἀγαθά and reads δήλον δή in place of δήλον δ', but not, I think, rightly. Δήλον δέ . . . άπλωs is part of the paragraph introduced by καὶ γὰρ, 21. 29. κατ' εὐχὴν Γ Π Bekk., κατατυχείν Cor. Sus. 30. αὐτὴν is added after yap in P4 L8 Bekk., but see critical note on 1320 a 1. 32. Ms P1 add  $\tau \hat{\eta} s$  before  $\tau \hat{\nu} \chi \eta s$ : we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found τη̂s in Γ. See critical note on 1270 b 19. In 30 we have ή τύχη (as in c. 1. 1323 b 28 and Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 18), but in c. 12. 1331 b 21 sq. we have τύχης (ἔργον), not τῆς τύχης, and in 1273 b 21 II have άλλα τουτί έστι τύχης έργον, not της τύχης. It is unlikely therefore that Ms P1 are right. The best MSS. omit the before τύχης in 1258 b 36. Cp. also 1323 b 27-29. 33. Ms P1 are probably right in adding γε after σπουδαία: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. at vero whether he found ἀλλὰ μὴν or ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε in his Greek text, for he renders both the one and the other by at vero (see e. g. 1286 a 16 and 1287 a 41). τῶ Γ Ald. corr. 1 P2 (i. e. a correction in P2 in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int.

at vero studiosa civilas est in cives participantes politia studiosos esse: the rest  $\tau \delta$ .

41.  $\delta \tilde{\nu} \tau \omega \Gamma M^8 P^1 \Pi^2 Ar. pr. P^5$ :  $\epsilon \tilde{\iota} \tau a$  Lamb., followed by Bekk. and Sus. (also a recent correction in  $P^5$ , as to which see critical note on 1324 b 39).

42.  $\tau \epsilon \Pi$  Bekk.: Vet. Int. autem; hence Sus. reads  $\delta \epsilon$  in place of  $\tau \epsilon$ , but see critical notes on 1324 a 10, 1330 b 4, and 1336 a 5.

1332 b 1. μεταβαλείν Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: μεταβάλλειν M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus. and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. transmutari). See for similar variations critical note on 1284 a 5. 8. την μέν τοίνυν φύσιν την μέν φύσιν δη Ms pr. P1 and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has quod quidem utique natura, where utique represents δή. 10. ἐθιζόμενοι Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἐθιζόμενα  $\Pi^2$ . 13. δη Π² Bekk.: είναι altered into δη P¹: ήδη Γ M8 Sus. βουλόμενοι See explanatory note on 1332 b 29. 36. διαίρεσιν αίρεσιν Γ II Bekk.: διαίρεσιν Leonardus Aretinus, who translates natura enim ostendit quemadmodum haec distinguenda sint. Diaipeour (which Bonitz approves, Ind. 18 b 52) is probably right: cp. 16, την διαίρεσιν ταύτην, and c. 9. 1329 a 17, έχει γὰρ αὕτη ή διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' άξίαν (referring to the same matter), and c. 17. 1337 a 1, δεί δὲ τῆ διαιρέσει της φύσεως έπακολουθείν. ΔΙ might easily drop out before AI. αὐτὸ P<sup>2 8 4</sup> etc.: αὐτῶ M<sup>8</sup> and after τῷ Γ, om. P<sup>1</sup>: αὐτῷ Bekk. 37. ταὐτὸ Π² Sus.: ταὐτῶ Ms pr. and (between brackets) Sus. P¹, om. Γ: ταὐτὸν Bekk. Vet. Int. natura enim dedit electionem faciens eidem generi hoc quidem iunius, hoc autem senius. το μέν . . . τὸ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν . . . τοτὲ δὲ Με Ρ1. 40. τοῦτον τὸν Π² Bekk.: τὸν τοιοῦτον Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. talem). See critical note on 1292 a 17.

1333 a 18. δυνάμενον] Vet. Int. potest, but see above on 1286 b 10. 32. καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. 40. τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων διαιρέσεις] διαιρέσεις Γ Π Bekk. (δι' αἰρέσεις P¹), αἰρέσεις Coray. In 1318 a 16 Schn. Bekk.² and Sus. seem right in reading αἰρέσεων in place of διαιρέσεων (unless with Lamb. we should read ἀρχαιρεσιῶν), and Sus. follows Coray in reading αἰρέσεις here. The change is not without plausibility, especially if we compare Isocr. De Pace § 106, τὰς αἰρέσεις τῶν πραγμάτων, but both Bekk.² and Bonitz (Ind. 180 b 38) retain διαιρέσεις, and I incline on the whole to follow them, particularly looking to 30 sqq., διήρηται τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά. 41. Vet. Int. fails to render μὲν, but he fails to render μὲν in μὲν γὰρ in 1300 b 34 also.

1333 b 2. δε before πράττειν om. Π¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. in the omission of small words is weak.

7. βέλτιον

 $\Pi^2$  Bekk.: βέλτιστον  $\Pi^1$  Sus. 8. πάσας om.  $\Pi^1$ . 15. εὐέλεγκτα z has facile et redarguibilia: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. facile arguibilia. The addition of et in z is wrong, but redarguibilia may well be right, for έξελήλεγκται immediately after is rendered sunt redarguta and in 1330 b 34 eleganderes is rendered redargutas, though in 1308 a 1 έξελέγχεται is rendered arguuntur. om. Π¹. 17. ζηλοῦσι Γ Π: ζητοῦσι Camotius, Bekker (approved by Sus.), but see explanatory note. τὸ Π¹ P² s Sus., τῶν Π³ Bekk. 18. θίβρων Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: θίμβρων Π<sup>1</sup> Sus. 'Praestare videtur forma θιβρός, qua usus est Nicander, Alex. 568 . . . Eandem varietatem in scriptura nominis proprii Θίμβρων et Θίβρων deprehendas' (Meineke, Analecta Alexandrina, p. 128). See also Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 65, who finds only the form Θίβρων in Attic Inscriptions. For the frequent interchange of  $\beta \rho$  and  $\mu \beta \rho$ in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies 15. 275. 20. Schneider, Bekk.<sup>2</sup>, and Sus. are probably right in adding της 21. ἐπειδή νῦν γε Γ Π2 Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. quoniam before πολιτείας. nunc quidem): ἐπειδή γε νῦν Ms P¹. 30. τὸ Π Bekk.¹ Sus.: τῷ Scaliger, Bekk.<sup>2</sup> Γ probably had τὸ, for Vet. Int. translates ad principari super vicinos, whereas he commonly translates ἐπί with the dative 33. διώκειν z has persequi probably rightly, for this is the word by which Vet. Int. renders διώκειν: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have prosequi. 36. λόγων (om. P4) καὶ νόμων Π2 Bekk.: νόμων καὶ λόγων Π1 Sus. See critical note on 1331 b 41. ταὐτὰ P 23 etc. Bekk. Sus., ταῦτα Π1 P4 etc. τόν (τε) νομοθέτην I follow Thurot and Sus. in adding  $(\tau \epsilon)$  after  $\tau \delta \nu$ . **41**. ζητῶσι Vet. Int. zelent (ζηλῶσι Γ?).

1334 a 3. ὅπως . . . 4, σχολάζεω om. Γ Ms, and Vet. Int. seeks to heal the defect by rendering τάξη ordinis (see vol. ii. p. lxiv sq.).

8. ἀφιᾶσιν Π² Bekk. Sus., ἀνιᾶσιν Ms and also P¹, if Sus.¹² and the 1882 edition of Sus.³, confirmed by St. Hilaire in his edition of the Politics published in 1837 (vol. ii. p. 94), are to be trusted, though the 1894 reprint of Sus.³ ascribes the reading ἀνιᾶσιν to Γ Ms only. It is difficult to tell from Vet. Int. rubiginem contrahunt what reading he found in his Greek text; he may possibly have found ἐφιᾶσιν, for in 1278 a 27 προσεφέλκεται is rendered contrahitur. There is much to be said for ἀνιᾶσιν: cp. Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 14, ὁπηνίκα δὲ οὖτος οὐ προδίδωσι τὴν πενίαν, οὐδὲ ὡς βαφὴν ἀνίησι τὴν πάτριον πενίαν: Pollux 1. 44, ἔστι δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀνεῖται βαφῆς: and Theophr. Hist. Plant. 5. 5. 1, τὰ δὲ μοχθηρὰ σιδήρια δύναται τέμνειν τὰ σκληρὰ (sc.

τῶν ξύλων) μᾶλλον τῶν μαλακῶν, ἀνίησι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μαλακοῖς ισπερ ἐλέχθη περὶ τῆς φιλύρας, παρακονᾶ δὲ μάλιστα ταῦτα. But the weight of MS. authority appears to be on the side of ἀφιᾶσιν. 14. ὑπάρχειν Γ Π Bekk.: ὑπερέχειν Sus. not, I think, rightly. 19. σώφρονα is bracketed by Sus., and it is true that Aristotle adds no proof of the indispensability of σωφροσύνη in the acquisition of necessaries, as he does in regard to ἀνδρία and καρτερία, but that it is indispensable we have seen in the explanatory note on 1334 a 19 (cp. also 1334 a 24). 28. πολλῆς οὖν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. 30. ἀπολαύοντας] Vet. Int. frui (ἀπολαύειν Γ?). 36. τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς om. pr. P³: τοῖς ... 38, χρῆσθαι om. M³: ἔτι ... 38, χρῆσθαι om. Π². Γ P¹ omit nothing, but pr. P¹ has τῶ μὴ in 37 in place of τὸ μὴ. Bekker omits τὸ.

1334 b 2. γενέσθαι] See explanatory note on 1334 a 41 sub fin. 3. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note on 1334 a 41. τε] τὰ P1. Vet. Int. adds before haec, his equivalent for ταῦτα, the words quam quae belli, which represent ή τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and Ms has τὰ πολέμου in the same place, but here a gloss has crept into the text of Γ Ms, for P2 gives in red ink the gloss τὰ πολεμικά. om. Γ Ms pr. P1. δμοίων Γ Ms P234 pr. P1: δμοίως two or three inferior MSS. and marg. P1, followed by Bekk. Sus. 23. кай is added after  $\delta \hat{\epsilon}$  in M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus.: om.  $\Pi^2$  Bekk. and perhaps  $\Gamma$ , for z and almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. consulted by Sus. omit et. 27. τήν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς Π2 Bekk. Sus., τοῦ δὲ σώματος τῆς ψυχης P1, τοῦ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου της ψυχης M8: Vet. Int. huius autem eorum quae animae = τοῦ δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. 30. γένηται  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.: γίνηται Ms P1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. fiant which reading he found in his text, for fiunt stands for γένωνται in 1303 b 20. See critical note on 1339 a 13. 39. τῶν om. P<sup>2 3</sup>. λίαν om. Π<sup>1</sup>.

1335 a 2. γὰρ after τε om. Π¹. 5. μετέβημεν] Vet. Int. devenimus.

12. τὴν before τεκνοποιίαν om. Π³ P⁵ Bekk., but probably wrongly: cp. 31, 39, 1335 b 23, 41, 1265 a 40, b 7, 1270 a 40. The article is absent only in 1335 b 7, 29.

13. ἔκγονα Μ⁵ P¹ Bekk.² Sus.: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found ἔκγονα or ἔγγονα in his text: ἔγγονα Π² Bekk.¹, but in 1335 b 30 all MSS. have ἔκγονα, and the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the form ἔγγονος, though many of ἔκγονος, from the genuine writings of Aristotle. See Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 83, on the two forms: the form ἔκγονος is the more common in Attic inscriptions.

14. ταὐτὸ τοῦτο Π² Bekk.: αὐτὸ τοῦτο Μ⁵ P¹ Sus.,

τοῦτο αὐτὸ perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. hoc ipsum). 16. ἐπιχωριάζεται Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. probably rightly (see explanatory note), ἐπιχωριάζει Ms Sus. and after a lacuna pr. P1. Vet. Int. has lexatur (z et laxant: pr. a ālatur); possibly allocatur or allaudatur ('is allowed') is the true reading, representing ἐπιχωριάζεται. 18. αὶ νέαι Π² Bekk. Sus.: ένιαι Γ Ms pr. P1. πονοῦσί τε Π2 Bekk, Sus.: τε πονοῦσι Ms P1: the reading of r is uncertain, for, as usual, Vet. Int. does not translate 23. elva om. II1, but these MSS. occasionally omit elva. 25.  $\delta \hat{\epsilon}$  om.  $\Pi^1$ , but these MSS. often omit  $\delta \hat{\epsilon}$ . 26.  $\sigma \pi \hat{\epsilon} \rho \mu a r o s$ See explanatory note on 1335 a 24. 27. πληθύον ] Ms has a contraction which perhaps stands for  $\pi\lambda\hat{\eta}\theta_{0s}$ , and Vet. Int. has multum (=  $\pi o \lambda \dot{v}$ ). Göttling and Sus. are probably right in transposing  $\hat{\eta}$   $\mu$   $\kappa$  $\rho$  $\acute{o}\nu$ , 29, to after  $\acute{\epsilon}\tau$  $\iota$ , 27. **29**. As to [ή μικρόν] see 30. τοσούτω II P23, followed by Bekk. Sus.: τούτω the 32. τοις μέν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται της ἀκμης Ms P1 Π2 Sus.: Vet. Int. his quidem erit inchoante akmes, which probably stands for rois μεν ἀρχομένης ἔσται της ἀκμης, and this is Bekker's reading. believes ἀρχομένης to be right, though he leaves ἀρχομένοις in his text. 37. δεί χρησθαι οίς Π¹ Sus. (χρασθαι in place of χρησθαι Ms P¹): ως in place of δεί χρησθαι οίς Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. The reading of Π<sup>1</sup> may be no more than an explanatory gloss on ώs which has crept into the text and taken the place of is, a thing which sometimes happens to this family of MSS. (see critical note on 1255 b 12), but it is also true that  $\Pi^2$  occasionally omit, though less often than  $\Pi^1$ , and I incline on the whole to think that II2 are in fault here. **39.**  $\partial \hat{\epsilon} \Pi^1$  Sus.:  $\partial \hat{\iota}$  altered into  $\partial \hat{\eta} P^3$ ,  $\partial \hat{\eta}$  the rest followed by Bekker. 1335 b 3. μάλιστ' (ầν) μάλιστα ầν Ms (if Schoell, who collated Ms for Susemihl, is right): μάλιστα Γ P<sup>1</sup> Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.<sup>1</sup>: μάλιστ' αν Cor. Bekk.<sup>2</sup> Sus. 'In Graecis codicibus non raro scribitur vitiose ηκιστα, μάλιστα pro ἥκιστ' ἄν, μάλιστ' ἄν' (Madvig, Adversaria Critica, 1.41). δονομίας Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Sus.: παιδείας Γ M<sup>8</sup> pr. P<sup>1</sup>. 5. Sus. adds δεί before 6. οὐδὲ Coray, Bekk., Sus.: οὕτε Π. See explanatory note on 1272 b 38. 7. κακοπουητική κακοποιητική Ms pr. P1: Vet. Int. male habens (καχεκτική  $\Gamma$ ?). 10. τῶν ἐλευθέρων  $\Gamma$   $P^1$  Sus.: the rest, followed by Bekk., των έλευθερίων. 11. ταῦτα Π² Bekk.: ταὐτὸ Γ Ms Sus., ταυτό P1. καὶ is added before ἀνδράσι in Π1 Sus. 15. τῶν είληχότων την περί της γενέσεως τιμήν Vet. Int. his quae sortitae sunt eum qui de generatione honorem, but whether he found rais eidnxviais in his Greek text is doubtful. 18. τὰ γεννώμενα Π¹ Bekk.² Sus. (Vet. Int. quae generantur): τὰ γενόμενα Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. See critical note on

1256 b 13. 19. καὶ is added before τὰ φυόμενα in Π3 Bekk. γιγνομένων Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.<sup>1</sup>, γινομένων M<sup>8</sup> Bekk.<sup>2</sup>: γενομένων P<sup>1</sup> Sus. reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. genitorum). 21. έαν om. Π¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS, is small in omissions, and especially in omissions of small words.  $\tau \hat{\omega} \nu \vec{\epsilon} \theta \hat{\omega} \nu$  z alone of the MSS, of the Vet. Int. which have been examined has suetudinum: all the rest have gentium representing των έθνων, but probably a had suetudinum originally, for its present reading gentium is written over an erasure in a recent hand (see Sus.1). Schn. and Sus. take Leonardus Arctinus to have found  $\partial \theta \nu \hat{\omega} \nu$  in his Greek text in place of  $\partial \theta \hat{\omega} \nu$ , but his rendering, as it stands in MS. Ball. 242, is in aliis vero si mores institutaque civitatis prohibeant natos exponere, which seems to point to  $\partial \hat{\omega}$ , not  $\partial \hat{\omega}$ . 22. κωλύη  $\partial P^{24}$  etc. and a recent hand in P3 (Bekk, κωλύη), 'κωλύοι (ut videtur) pr. P3' (Sus.), κωλύει Π¹ Sus., but corr.¹ P¹ (i. e. a correction in P¹ in the same ink as the MS.) gives κωλύη. ωρίσθαι Γ, a correction in the margin of P1, and corr. P2 (i. e. a correction in P2 in the same ink as the MS.) Sus., Ερισθαι Ms, όρισθηναι pr. P1, Ερισται the rest followed by Bekker. 23. δεί Γ Ms pr. P13 Sus., δή the rest followed by Bekker. **24**. συνδυασθέντων Π: Vet. Int. combinatis, but it is doubtful whether Γ had συνδυασθείσιν, for in 1336 a 9 Vet. Int. renders τηλικούτων by tantillos. 25.  $\mu$ η om.  $\Pi^2$ . 28. χρη Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: δεί M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus. and possibly Γ (see however critical note on 1281a 17). 30. καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων Π: Vet. Int. sicut et iuniorum: Sus. is inclined therefore to read καθάπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, but see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, 1264 a 9, and 1284 b 32. 31. των γεγηρακότων Π2 Bekk. Sus.: των γηρασκόντων Ms pr. P1: Vet. Int. decrepitorum, which probably represents τῶν γεγηρακότων. 35. ωστε Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Sus.: ωs Π<sup>1</sup> (Vet. Int. ut... oportet), but a correction in P1 in the same ink as the MS. gives ώστε. 39. ή Π² Bekk.: καὶ Π¹ Sus.

1336 a 5. φαίνεται τε P¹ Π², φαίνεται τὲ Ms: Vet. Int. apparet autem (φαίνεται δὲ Γ?). But see critical notes on 1324 a 10, 1330 b 4, and 1332 a 42. 6. ἄγειν Ms P¹ and perhaps Γ, for Vet. Int. has inducere, and though ἄγειν is usually rendered by ducere and sometimes by adducere in Vet. Int., it is rendered by inducere in 1306 a 3. Vict. placed εἰσάγειν in his text, taking inducere in Vet. Int. to represent εἰσάγειν, which no doubt it sometimes does (e.g. in 1320 a 14), but it does not always do so. No MS. appears to have εἰσάγειν: P² ³ ⁴ etc. have ἀεὶ. "Αγειν may be right: cp.

Aristot. Fragm. 627. 1584 a 16, τον δε αρξάμενου της ώδης 'Αριστοτέλης 'Αρίωνά φησιν είναι, δε πρώτος τὸν κύκλιον ήγαγε χορόν. (Plato, Rep. 501 B) or Exew (Phaedr. 268 E), in addition to εἰσάγειν, would be possible alternatives for ἄγειν. 7. πλήθουσα II, but the word is not included in the Index Aristotelicus and does not appear to occur elsewhere in Aristotle's writings: πληθύουσα Vict. Bekk. and Sus. probably rightly (Sus., however, does not place it in his text). Πλήθειν occurs 'in Attic Prose only in the phrase ἀγορᾶς πληθούσης, ἐν ἀγορᾶ πληθούση etc.' (Liddell and Scott); it is a poetical word; still it may have been used by Aristotle, for πόσις also (1253 b 6 and 1335 b 41) and τιμαλφείν (1336 b 19) are poetical words. 9. τηλικούτων Ms P1 23 etc. Bekk. Sus.: τηλικούτω P46 Ls: Vet. Int. tantillos, but it is doubtful whether he found τηλικούτους in Γ (see critical note on 1335 b 24). 10. διαστρέφεσθαι  $\Pi^2$  Bekk. Sus., διαφέρεσθαι  $\Pi^1$  (for Vet. Int. has defluere, which perhaps should be diffluere), except that pr. P1 had διαφέρθαι. See critical note on 1287 a 31. 14. καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Sus.: Ms P<sup>1</sup> omit the second πρὸς (see critical note on 1331 b 24): about Γ we cannot be certain, for Vet. Int. commonly repeats the preposition in sentences of this kind, whether he finds it in the Greek or not (see critical note on 1253 a 36). 17. ψυχρόν is bracketed by Sus., who follows P1 corr. P4 in reading ψυχρου in place οf μικρον. ἀμπίσχειν Ms P1 4 Bekk. Sus., ἀμπισχείν P2 3. μένων Π<sup>13</sup> Sus.: ἀρχομένω P<sup>23</sup>, ἀρχομένω Bekk. 20. ẽξis is here represented by habitudo in Vet. Int., and not, I think, elsewhere in 23. ἡλικίαν \ Vet. Int. aetati (ἡλικίας Γ?). Vet. Int. in qua ( $\vec{\epsilon} \nu \ \hat{\eta} \ \Gamma$ ?: cp. 1336 b 21). 26.  $\delta \hat{\epsilon}$  om.  $\Pi^1 P^4$ 34. σπουδασομένων Cor. Sus.: σπουδασομένων or σπουδασ-Bekk. θησομένων Γ (Vet. Int. studendorum): σπουδαζομένων Π Bekk. 1328 b 21 some MSS. have παρασκευάζουσι and others παρασκευάσουσι, so that σπουδαζομένων might easily take the place of σπουδασομένων. διατάσεις Vet. Int. cohibitiones: cp. 39, where διατεινομένοις is rendered qui cohibentur. 35. kai II Bekk.: Vet. Int. in ploratibus. so that he probably found κατά in Γ, which Sus. reads instead of καὶ. τοὺs is added before κλαυθμοὺs in M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> Sus.: whether in Γ also, is uncertain. 38. τοις πονούσιν τοις πνεύμοσιν? Ridgeway (see the 1894 edition of Sus.3), a suggestion which I cannot follow Susemill in adopting. See for the force of rois movovouv explanatory note on 1336 a 37.

1336 b 2. ἀπολαύειν Ms P1 Sus., ἀπολαβείν Γ (Vet. Int. absumere),

απελαύνειν Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. 3. ανελευθερίαν των ανελευθέρων P<sup>6</sup> L<sup>8</sup> Ar. Ald. Bekk.<sup>2</sup> and pr. P<sup>4</sup>, των ανελευθερίαν corr. P<sup>4</sup>. Των ανελευθέρων is evidently a correction intended to suit the false reading ἀπελαύνειν. See critical note on 1340 b 14. For καὶ before τηλικούτους z has etiam probably rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. et.  $\dot{a}$ πηγορευμένων  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.:  $\dot{a}$ πηγορευμένον  $\Pi^1$  Sus. See critical notes on 1331 a 34 and 1314 b 26. 14. ἔστω P¹ Ar. Bekk. Sus., ἐστι 18. [τους την ήλικίαν έχοντας έτι την ίκνουμένην]. These words, which I have bracketed, are found in Ms P1 and are inserted by Sus. in his text: Vet. Int. has eos qui habent aetatem amplius provectam, which probably represents Bekker's reading, Tous Exoutas ήλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν, a reading found only in P5 and there probably adopted from the Vet. Int. ( $\pi\lambda\epsilon\omega$ ) over an erasure in P<sup>5</sup>): Π<sup>2</sup> omit the words, reading πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφείν τοὺς θεούς, and I incline to think that II2 are right, and that the words added in MsP1 and also those added in  $\Gamma$  P<sup>5</sup> are merely a gloss intended to complete the sense, which has crept from the margin into the text. The MSS. of the first family occasionally admit glosses into their text (see vol. ii. p. lvii). "Ett in the reading of Ms P1 I do not 19. καὶ γυναικών om. Γ Ms pr. P1. τιμαλφείν Π2 understand. Bekk. Sus.: τιμαλφαν M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ. 20. νομοθετητέον Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk., θετητέον Ms, θετέον Γ P<sup>1</sup> Sus. (Vet. Int. ponendum): είναι έατέον conj. Jackson. 24. τούτων τοῦτον P1 and after έν παραδρομή: τούτον before these words P4 Ald.: τούτων after έν παραδρομή Γ M8 Ar. Sus., before these words the rest followed by Bekker. "ίσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. 30. θεατῶν Π² corr. P1 Bekk.: θεάτρων Γ Ms pr. P1 Sus. See critical note on 1338 b 23. 35. ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμένειαν Vet. Int. infectionem aut inhaesionem, but probably these are two alternative readings, both of them incorrect, which have taken the place of infensionem, the true equivalent for δυσμένειαν, while malitiam, the true equivalent for  $\mu o \chi \theta \eta \rho i a \nu$ , has been omitted. The original rendering of Vet. Int. probably was aut malitiam aut infensionem. 36. ήδη om. Π¹. 38. την before παιδείαν om. Ms pr. P1 and possibly Γ. μετά] See explanatory note on 1336 b 37. 39. μέχρι ήβης Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: μέχρις ηβης Ms P1 Sus. and possibly r. In 1319 b 12, on the other hand,  $M^{s}$  P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ have μέχρι before a vowel:  $\Pi^{2}$  μέχρις. In Attic inscriptions μέχρι does not become μέχρις before a vowel (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 180). Phrynichus'

rule is μέχρις καὶ ἄχρις σὺν τῷ ς ἀδόκιμα μέχρι δὲ καὶ ἄχρι λέγε. In the 'Aθ. Πολ. this rule is observed, as will be seen from Dr. Sandys' Index. In Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1149 b 13, however, Kb and all the MSS. appear to have μέχρις ἐνταῦθα.

1337 a 1. κακῶς Muretus, Bekk.<sup>2</sup> Sus.: καλῶς Γ Π Bekk.<sup>1</sup> In 1294 a 7 Π<sup>1</sup> have καλῶς wrongly in place of κακῶς. 7. δεῖ] δεῖται Ms: Vet. Int. oportet esse (δεῖ εἶναι Γ?).

## BOOK V (VIII).

1337 a 14. δεί γὰρ Vet. Int. oportet autem (δεί δὲ Γ?). παιδεύεσθαι Ar. Sus. (Aretinus' translation being oportet enim ad singula gubernandi genera disciplinam accommodari): πολιτεύεσθαι Γ Π Bekk. In 1341 a 1 πολιτευομένοις is erroneously read in Γ Ms in place of παιδευομένοις, and the same mistake appears to occur here. βέλτιστον βέλτιον Ms Ar. Sus. Bekk.2: the rest βέλτιστον followed by Bekk. Bonitz (Ind. 403 a 15 sqq.) appears to accept βέλτιστον, comparing Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 29 sq. 27. αμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αύτοῦ τινὰ είναι τῶν πολιτῶν Vet. Int. simul autem neque oportet putare civium ipsorum aliquem sibi esse, so that I probably had αὐτῶν αὐτῶ in place of αὐτὸν αύτοῦ. Pl has αὐτὸν αὐτῶ: Ms an ambiguous contraction in place of αὐτὸν, followed by αὐτῶ: almost all 29. μόριον . . . πόλεως om. Π¹. the other MSS, have αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ. 34. κοινήν  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.: κοινή  $P^1$ , κοινή or κοινώς  $\Gamma$  Ar. (Vet. Int. communiter), κοινώς Ms (Sus. κοινή). **36.** περὶ Π² Bekk.: διὰ Γ M<sup>8</sup> pr. **40.** οὐδὲν P<sup>2 3</sup> etc. Bekk.: οὐδενὶ P<sup>1</sup> Sus. See explanatory note. П¹ Р⁴ Sus.

1337 b 5. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. ἐλευθέρων] Schneider conjectures ἐλευθερίων, and perhaps Γ had ἐλευθερίων, for Vet. Int. has liberalibus. 6. ἀνελευθέρων] ἀνελευθερίων P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. illiberalibus, but illiberalis commonly represents ἀνελεύθερος). 11. ἡ τὴν ψυχὴν is bracketed by Sus., who says in Qu. Crit. p. 418, 'si διάνοια pars animae est, expectas ἡθος pro ψυχὴν,' but for the use of ψυχή in the sense of ἡθος compare (with Bonitz, Ind. 866 a 3) c. 5. 1340 a 6; cp. also c. 7. 1342 a 22, εἰσὶ δ' ὧσπερ αὐτῶν (i. e. τῶν βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν) αὶ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως. An objection to the addition of these words not noticed by Sus. is that there is no reference to them in 11–15, as there is to τὸ σῶμα and τὴν διάνοιαν,

but for a similar inexactness of reference cp. 4 (7). I. 1323 b 33 sqg. 12.  $\tau \epsilon$  om. Ms P1 and possibly  $\Gamma$ , but  $\Pi^1$ and other passages. 16. 'τὸ δὲ . . . 20, ἀνελεύθερον om. P2 3 6 C4 Sb Tb often omit  $\tau \epsilon$ . L<sup>8</sup> Ald. pr. P<sup>4</sup> (suppl. marg. P<sup>4</sup>), Sus. το δε προσεδρεύειν M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. assiduare autem): om. pr. P<sup>5</sup> in a lacuna, προσεδρεύειν δε a recent correction in P5 followed by Bekker. But P<sup>5</sup> is a MS. of little or no authority and a recent correction in P<sup>5</sup> counts for even less than the MS. 17. πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> marg. P4 Sus.: the words fall within the passage omitted by II2: Vet. Int. ad perfectionem, which may perhaps represent προς ἀκρίβειαν (though Vict. and Bekk. take it to represent mpos to evtenes and adopt this reading), for Vet. Int. translates ελς ἀκρίβειαν by ad certitudinem in 1331 a 2, ἀκρίβειαν by certitudinem in 1328 a 20, and τη ἀκριβεία by diligentia in 1274 b 7, and he may well have used a third equivalent here. είρημέναις ρηθείσαις P5. 18. ένεκεν Ms P¹ Sus.: χάριν P⁵ Bekk.: Π² omit 16-20: Vet. Int. gratia may represent either ενεκεν or χάριν. 19. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ Mª P¹ Sus.: αύτοῦ μὲν γὰρ P<sup>5</sup> Bekk.: Vet. Int. ipsius quidem enim gratia may represent either reading.  $\tau \hat{\omega} \nu$  is added before  $\phi i \lambda \omega \nu$  in P<sup>5</sup>. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] ταὐτὸ τοῦτο Richards. πράττων Ms P1 Bekk. Sus.: πράσσων Π<sup>2</sup>: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους Π<sup>1</sup> Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note on 1255 b 2): II<sup>2</sup> Bekk. have δι' άλλους πολλάκις. 22. έλέχθη Π2 Bekk.: είρηται Ms P1 Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. dictum est). 25. την μέν ... γραφικήν om. г M<sup>8</sup> pr. P<sup>1</sup>. 34. της . . . 35, σχολάζειν om. Π<sup>2</sup>. τέλος Γ Π, except that P5 has τελευταΐον: ὅλως Vict. Bekk. See explanatory note on 36. avaykaîov See explanatory note on 1337 b 35. **41.** καιροφυλακοῦντας  $\Pi^2$ : καιροφυλακοῦντα  $\Pi^1$  Sus.: καιροφυλακτοῦντας P<sup>5</sup> Bekk. προσάγοντας Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: προσάγοντα Π<sup>1</sup> Sus.

1338 a 8. αὐτῶν Γ and Π² (except P⁴ Ald., which have αὐτῶν) Bekk. Sus.: αὐτὴν M⁵ pr. P¹, αὐτῶν a correction in P¹ in the ink of the MS.

10. τὴν ἐν τῷ διαγωγῷ σχολὴν] See explanatory note on 1338 a 9.

16. καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν is bracketed by Sus., 'nisi corruptum potius est μάθησιν' (Sus.).

25. Π¹ place καλεῦν after ἐπὶ δαῦτα. See critical note on 1328 a 15. Vet. Int. translates the line sed est quidem velut ad epulas vocari congaudere. Vocari may well represent καλεῦν (see vol. ii. p. lxiii, note 6), and congaudere probably stands for some corruption of θαλείην or else for a marginal gloss συνευφραίνεσθαι. As to †μὲν† see explanatory note on 1338 a 24. I propose to read μόνον in place of it.

26. οῖ κα-

λέουσιν] See explanatory note on 1338 a 24. 27. δ] ως  $\Pi^1$  (Vet. Int. tanquam delectantem omnes): σς  $\Pi^1$  I add δ before 'Οδυσσεύς because the Homeric Odysseus is referred to. 28. ὅταν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. quando gaudentibus hominibus 'congregati super tecta audiunt philomenam sedentes deinceps,' where congregati should perhaps be convivati, and philomenam philomelam. He appears either to have found ἀηδόνος in his Greek text in place of ἀοιδοῦ or to have misread ἀοιδοῦ as ἀηδόνος. 31. ἀναγκαίαν  $\Pi^1$  Bekk. Sus., ἀναγκαίον  $\Pi^2$ . 33. μία  $\Pi^2$  Bekk. Sus., μίαν  $\Pi^1$ . τὸν ἀριθμὸν  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.: τῷ ἀριθμῷ  $M^3$   $P^1$  and probably  $\Gamma$  (Vet. Int. numero), Sus.

1338 b 1. ή μαλλον αλλά μαλλον Reiz, Thurot, Sus.: μαλλον ή See explanatory note. θεωρητικών Π1 Bekk, Sus.: θεωρη-3. άρμόττει Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: άρμόζει M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ, Sus. M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ have άρμόζουσα in 1288 b 24, where Π<sup>2</sup> Vat. Pal. have άρμόττουσα, and the forms άρμόσει, άρμόσειε are of course used by all MSS., but I have not noticed any other passages in the Politics in which the form άρμόττειν is not used in all the MSS. 'In Attic inscriptions άρμόττω is the only form in use: άρμόζω is nowhere found' (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 141). έλευθέροις] See explanatory note. 4. πρότερον corr. P1 (i. e. a correction in P1 in the same ink as the MS. and therefore probably by the writer of it, Demetrius Chalcondylas): πότερον Γ Π. 5. elvai om. II1, but these MSS. often omit elvai, and here the omission of είναι suits the erroneous reading πότερον, 4. τε είδη Vet. Int. et speciem, but see critical note on 1287 a 27. 23. ληστρικά Ms P1 L8 Ald. (the reading of Γ is uncertain), ληστρικά Sus.: ληστικά P2, λήϊστικα pr. P3, ληστικα rec. P3, ληστικά Bekk. Ληστρικά may be right, for in 1256 b 1, 5 (the only other passages of Aristotle to which the Index Aristotelicus refers for either of these words) the form used is ληστρικός. Τ and τρ are easily confused; thus in 1336 b 30  $\Pi^2$  have  $\theta \epsilon a \tau \hat{\omega} \nu$  and  $\Pi^1$   $\theta \epsilon \acute{a} \tau \rho \omega \nu$ , and in 1274 a 39 we find  $\gamma \rho a \phi \dot{\eta} \nu$  in  $\Pi^2$  in place of  $\tau a \phi \dot{\eta} \nu$ . On the whole, therefore, I incline to follow Ms P1 and to read ληστρικά. Both forms, however, appear in the text of Thucydides—ληστικός in three passages and ληστρικός in two (see Von Essen's Index). τοις γυμνικοις αγώσι και τοις πολεμικοις Π1 Sus.: και τοις γυμνασίοις και τοις πολεμικοις αγώσι Π2 Bekk. 28. τῷ μόνον μόνον τῷ Reiz, Richards, but possibly μόνον is here displaced as οὐ μόνον sometimes is, e.g. in De An. 3. 6. 430 b 4 sq. (Bon. Ind. s. v. μόνος). 30. οὐδὲ γὰρ Π¹ Sus.: οὐ γὰρ Π² Bekk. It is more likely that οὐδὲ

has been changed into οὐ than that οὐ has been changed into οὐδὲ. Compare the readings in 1293 a 7 and see critical note on 1261 b 7. οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων Vet. Int. neque aliarum ferarum aliqua, but whether he found τι added in Γ after θηρίων may well be doubted. Vict. and Bekk. add it without necessity.

33. ἀπαιδαγώγους M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1345</sup> Sb Tb Ald. Sus.: ἀπαιδαγωγήτους P² Bekk. In Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 11 (the only other reference for either word given in the Index Aristotelicus) all MSS. have ἀπαιδαγώγητος.

1339 a 1. δύνανται Π1 L8 Ald. Sus.: δύναται P2 3 4 etc. Bekk. explanatory note. 5. γένωνται Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Sus.: γίνωνται M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. fiunt). 11. διηπορήκαμεν Ms P1 and probably Γ (Vet. Int. dubitavimus), Sus.: διηπορήσαμεν Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.  $\tau a \iota \Pi$ : the reading of  $\Gamma$  is of course uncertain (Vet. Int. fiat): γίνηται? Sus. But cp. 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 29 sq., where Π<sup>2</sup> and possibly Γ have ὅπως γένηται. 14. εἴπειεν P² Bekk. Sus. : εἴποιεν the rest: the reading of  $\Gamma$  is uncertain. 18. ούτε των σπουδαίων] z has neque studiosorum: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have neque studiosorum sunt. αμα παύει μέριμναν Π2 Bekk.1: αμα μέριμναν παύει Π1 Sus.: αναπαύει μέριμναν Göttling, Bekk.2 perhaps rightly (cp. Eurip. Bacch. 332 sqq. Bothe, quoted in explanatory note on 1339 a 17). ῦπνω Ar., Reiz, Bekk.2, Sus.: οἴνω Γ II Bekk.1. Οἶνος and ῦπνος are often interchanged in the MSS.: see Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. 22. τι om. Ms P1, but not Γ (Vet. Int. secundum Gr. p. 393. aliquid). 23. παρασκευάζει παρασκευάζειν Γ Με. 24. δύνασθαι om. I Ms. 25. καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν See explanatory note on 29.  $\gamma \epsilon \pi \alpha i \sigma i \nu P^1$ ,  $\tau \epsilon \pi \alpha i \sigma i \nu \Pi^2 \text{ Bekk.}^1$ ,  $\pi \alpha i \sigma i \nu M^s$ : the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom renders γε or τε (he has deductionem pueris here). I read γε παισίν with P1 Coray and Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 15): see explanatory note and Class. Rev. 7. 305, note 1. Bekk. reads [\tau\epsilon] \pianoiv. Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk.: οὐδὲν M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>: οὐδὲ Γ (Vet. Int. neque). Π<sup>1</sup> make the same mistake in 1255 a 39. 33. δέοι Π² Bekk. Sus.: δεῖ Γ Ms 35. δι' om. P² Bekk. pr. P1 (Vet. Int. oportet). 39. Richards may well be right in adding  $\tau \hat{a}$  before  $\pi \epsilon \rho \hat{i}$ . See explanatory note. 40. âν om. Π¹, but these MSS. occasionally omit ἄν.

1340 a 6. Ms P1 omit the second πρòs. See critical note on

1331 b 24. 12. Vet. Int. gives no equivalent for ἀκροώμενοι, a b m leaving a lacuna before the equivalent for των μιμήσεων: Γ probably omitted ἀκροώμενοι in a lacuna, for pr. Ms omits ροώμενοι in a lacuna. 13. pr. M<sup>8</sup> leaves a lacuna between χωρίς and ρυθμών in which των has disappeared, and there was probably a lacuna in the same place in T, for several MSS. of the Vet. Int. leave a lacuna between the equivalents for  $\chi\omega\rho$ is and  $\dot{\rho}\nu\theta\mu\hat{\omega}\nu$ , but whether  $\Gamma$  omitted  $\tau \hat{\omega} \nu$  it is impossible to tell from Vet. Int. 27. καὶ αὐτὴν Π² Bekk. Sus.: κατ' αὐτὴν Ms P¹, καθ' αὐτὴν Γ (Vet. Int. secundum se). As to αὐτὴν ἐκείνην see explanatory note. 31. See explanatory note. 34. ταῦτ' Π² Bekk.: τοῦτ' Π¹ Sus. ἐπὶ Π² Bekk.: ἀπὸ Π¹ Sus. Ἐπὶ appears to be right: see Plut. Sympos. 9. 15. 2, quoted in explanatory note on 1340 a 34. παύσωνος Π<sup>1</sup> Bekk. Sus., πάσωνος P<sup>2 3 5 6</sup> etc. and pr. P<sup>4</sup>. But in Poet. 2. 1448 a 6 Ac has παύσων and in Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 a 20, where some MSS. have πάσωνος or πάσσωνος, E has παύσωνος. The artist referred to in this passage of the Metaphysics was a sculptor, and Pauson was a painter, but he may have been a sculptor also. For the frequent interchange of a and av in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies, 15. 289. 37. καν εί Vet. Int. et si, but see critical note on 1278 b 7. 41. καὶ μὴ] z has et non: all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have sed non.

1340 b 6. παιδείαν Ar. Bekk, Sus., παιδιάν Γ Π. 7. δè Π¹ Sus.: 8.  $\tau \hat{\alpha}$  om.  $\Pi^3$  pr.  $P^1$ : Bekk.<sup>2</sup> brackets it. 10. γàρ Π² Bekk. έλευθεριωτέρας | Vet. Int. liberiores (έλευθερωτέρας Γ?). 11. ποιόν τι] z has qualem quendam in agreement with morem animae: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have qualem quandam. 14. ἔστι οτ ἐστι Γ, ἐστι P1: ἔχει the rest. άρμόττουσα] άρμοζόντως P4 L8 Ald. to suit the false reading exet. See critical note on 1336 b 3, where these MSS. similarly correct ἀνελευθερίαν. 16. z has natura rightly for φύσει: is naturae in Sus. a misprint? 17. As to ήδυσμένων see explanatory note on 1340 b 16. 20. Too's is wrongly added before autous in II1: z has eos for tous autous, but the other MSS. of Vet. Int. are probably right in reading eosdem. P<sup>1 2 3</sup>: δè the rest (Vet. Int. autem), followed by Bekk. and doubtfully by Sus. 24. μή κοινωνήσαντας Vet. Int. eos qui non communicaverunt, but this may well stand for μή κοινωνήσαντας: cp. 1281 a 30, where qui non honorantur stands for μή τιμωμένους, 1335 a 24, where quae usae fuerunt stands for χρησάμεναι, 1336 a 39, where pueris qui cohibentur stands for rois maidiois diateivous,

and 1322 a 4, where qui sustinent stands for ὑπομείναντες. See critical note on 1269 a 18, though I have now little doubt that qui mutaverit there stands not for ὁ κινήσας but for κινήσας. άρχύτου Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. and a correction in P<sup>1</sup> in the same ink as the MS.: ἀρχύτα Ms pr. P¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. Archytae which form he found in his text. It is doubtful whether Aristotle wrote 'Αρχύτα, for though in 1311 b 4 all MSS. but one or two have δέρδα, they have ἀμύντου in the preceding line, and we find ισμηνίου in Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 4 and εὐαγόρου in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 a 4. In Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 23, again, all MSS. have χαρώνδου, not χαρώνδα as in Strabo, p. 539. As to the usage in Attic inscriptions Meisterhans (Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 94) reports, 'Foreign personal names ending in -as in Athenian public documents of the fifth and fourth century B. c. form the genitive in -ου, not -a (Περδίκκου, 'Αμύντου, 'Αρύββου, and so forth). On the other hand -a occurs in a private inscription in the name of an Athenian (Χαιρεδήμου Φιλέα in an Attic inscription of the fifth century B. c.).' On the whole the chances are in favour of ἀρχύτου. In the nominative we have αντιμενίδης, not αντιμενίδας, in 3. 14. 1285 a 36, and ελλανοκράτης, not ελλανοκράτας, in 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 17, though the forms in -as are the local forms. 32. кай от. П<sup>1</sup>. 39. γενομένην Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Sus.: γινομένην M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup>: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. factam which reading he found in his Greek text, for in 1337 a 13 factum stands for γιγνόμενον.

1341 a 8. πρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note on 1341 a 7.

13. καὶ om. Π¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions and especially in omissions of καί.

15. κοινῶ Γ Ρ¹ rightly: the rest κοινωνῶ.

18. τι is added in Π¹ Sus. after ἄλλο.

19. ἔτερόν ἐστιν Π² (except corr. P⁴, ἄλλο ἔτερόν ἐστιν) and probably Γ (Vet. Int. alterum est), for Vet. Int. usually renders ἔτερος by alter and ἄλλος by alius: ἄλλο ἐστιν M³ P¹, ἄλλο ἔστιν Sus. Ἄλλο is probably repeated from the preceding line.

29. τὴν which Bekker omits before ἀρετήν is omitted only in a few MSS. of little authority.

33. αὐτὸς om. Π¹.

1341 b 1. σαμβῦκαι Göttling, Bekk., Sus.: σαμβύκαι Π²: ἴαμβοι Π¹.

2. εὐλόγως] z has rationabiliter rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have rationaliter.

3. δὴ om. Π¹.

4. Vet. Int. has enim for μὲν οὖν (or possibly μὲν, for pr. Ms omits οὖν in a lacuna), but see critical note on 1252 a 24.

11. αὖτοῦ Γ (Vet. Int. suimet) Bekk. Sus.: αὐτοῦ Π.

19–26. I retain δ' after σκεπτέον, thinking that its

presence in the text is due simply to the fact that owing to the long parenthesis, 10-18, Aristotle has forgotten that his protasis needs an apodosis. I bracket καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν, because, as Bonitz points out (Aristot. Stud. 2 and 3, p. 97 sq.), there is no such limitation in the solution of the problem given in 1342 a 1 sqq. Πρὸς παιδείαν has probably been repeated from the line below. In 22 sq., η τρίτον δεῖ τινὰ ετερον, there is much to be said for the emendation of Sus., ή τινα ετερον, τρίτον δε, but if we adopt this reading, it will be necessary, as Sus. sees, in order to obtain an apodosis, to translate kal, 25, 'also,' or else, which Sus. prefers, to expunge it. I feel inclined to suggest a greater change. Should not τρίτον δεί be bracketed and έτι δε be read in place of ἐπειδή? Τρίτον δὲ (altered into τρίτον δεῖ) may be nothing more than a marginal gloss which has crept into the text, just as πρῶτον μὲν has done in some MSS. in 1265 a 21. I have obelized τρίτον . . . ἐπειδή to indicate that the soundness of the text is doubtful. I thought better of the state of the text in 19-26 when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, than I do now. 23. z has quoniam autem for έπειδή (ἐπεὶ δὲ?): the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have quoniam. μέρος ΓΠ Bekk.: μέλος Tyrwhitt, Sus. possibly rightly. is added after vàp in P124. **40**. τρίτον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note.

1342 a 1. οὐ . . . χρηστέον om. Π¹. 8. ἐκ τῶν δ' Ms P¹²³ Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain: ἐκ δὲ τῶν P⁴ 6 Ls Ald. Bekk. 10. καθισταμένους P³ Π³ Bekk. Sus.: καθισταμένας Γ Ms P² pr. P¹ (Vet. Int. restitutas). 11. δὴ] Vet. Int. autem (δὲ Γ?). 15. καθαρτικὰ Γ Π Bekk.: πρακτικὰ Sauppe, Sus. See explanatory note. 17. χρῆσθαι θετέον Spengel, Sus.: θετέον Γ Ms P² pr. P¹ corr. P⁴: the rest θεατέον. 18. θεατρικὴν om. Γ Ms P¹ and pr. P² (it appears as a red-ink gloss in P²). Sus. brackets it. The Index Aristotelicus does not give any other instance of the use of the word θεατρικός. 24. παρακεχρωσμένα P³ Π³ Bekk. Sus.: παρακεχωρημένα Ms P² pr. P¹ and probably Γ: z has discretae perhaps rightly (see Sus.¹, p. 368), and this no doubt represents παρακεχωρημένα. 34. καταλείπει] Vet. Int. admittit.

1342 b 10. τοὺς μύθους Γ II: τοὺς Μυσοὺς Schn. Bekk.² Sus. probably rightly.

17. τοῖς νεωτέροις] See explanatory note on 1342 b 16.

17. εἰσὶ δὲ—34. τὸ πρέπον. See explanatory note.

19. ἐκάστοις P⁵, followed by Bekk. and Sus.: ἐκάστους the rest: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. quae decent singulos what reading he found in Γ.

21. χρόνον P³ δ Π³ and perhaps M³ (rightly, cp.

1329 a 33): the rest, including probably Г (Vet. Int. per tempus), have χρόνου. Bekk. reads χρόνου, Sus. χρόνου. 23. (τῶ) Σωκράτει] So J. C. Wilson followed by Sus.: σωκράτει Π. We expect τῶ Σωκράτει, as the Socrates of the Republic (398 E) is referred to. If in Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 30 we have δ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, in Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 8 (the same quotation) we have δ Σωκράτης. 26. As petulantia impetuosum is the equivalent for βακχευτικον in Vet. Int., the parenthesis in Sus. p. 371 which ends after magis should begin before petulantia, not before impetuosum. Schn. Cor. and Göttling place a colon, not a full stop, after τοιούτων, but see explanatory note. 33. ή is added after άρμονιῶν by P1 and corr. P2 (i.e. a correction in P2 in the same ink as the MS.), followed by Sus., who however places the mark of a lacuna after  $\hat{\eta}$ . Göttling reads  $\hat{\eta}$  in place of  $\hat{\eta}$ , comparing 2. 10. 1272 b 9. Schn. and Cor. omit ή and add οὖν after δηλον. 34. I follow Vet. Int., Sus., and others in indicating a lacuna after πρέπον: see vol. ii. p. xxix.

## NOTES.

## BOOK III.

32. Τω περί πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις. С. 1. Attention has already been called (above on 1274 b 26) to the 1274 b. absence of any connecting particle. Holitelas is probably not the acc. plur., as some take it to be, but the gen. sing. as in 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, ἡμιν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας, 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40, τοις περί πολιτείας φιλοσοφούσιν, 6 (4). I. 1288 b 35, των ἀποφαινομένων περί πολιτείας, and 2. 12. 1273 b 27, των δέ αποφηναμένων τι περί πολιτείας: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 14, καὶ όλως δή περί πολιτείας, and Pol. 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 8, έν οἷς περί βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν. From what has been said at the end of the First and the beginning of the Second Book we expect to be invited here to inquire into the nature of the best constitution, not into the nature of each constitution (see vol. i. p. 226), but the programme of the Politics given at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics contemplates an inquiry into the due structure of each constitution, and it is clear from Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 12, έν τοῖς περί τάς πολιτείας, that Aristotle intends to study all constitutions, not the best only.

τίς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις. This inquiry is taken up in the Sixth and following chapters. The question τίς καὶ ποία τις is characteristic of Science (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 29, καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἡ ποῖόν τι θεατὴς γὰρ τὰληθοῦς). The distinction between τίς and ποία τις recurs in Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 2 1 sqq. and 1. 3. 1253 b 7 sq. As to its nature, if we refer to Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 12, ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται δεῖ δὲ μἡ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις, we shall be tempted to take τίς in the passage before us as asking what is the genus, and ποία τις as asking what is the differentia, but it would seem that the answer to τίς is rather the definition, while the answer to ποία τις is given in further illustrative details, and that the sense

of the words is 'what is the nature of each and how each may be described.' Cp. Plato, Gorg. 448 E, ΠΩΛ. οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην, ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη; ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾳ, ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὅντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν: Aristot. Metaph. H. 3. 1043 b 23, ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ ᾿Αντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἡπόρουν ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν, οὔ, ὅτι δ' οἶον καττίτερος. Cp. also Plato, Symp. 201 E, Euthyphr. 11 A, Meno 71 B, Rep. 328 E, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 13, τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖόν τι (sc. ἡ ἡδονή), where Ramsauer thinks that ἡ ποῖόν τι is added because Aristotle feels that he fails in what follows to give a precise definition of pleasure. In Plato, Rep. 557 B sqq. in answer to the question ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη πολιτεία a description of a State democratically governed is given.

33.  $\pi \epsilon \rho \lambda$   $\pi \delta \lambda \epsilon \omega s$  is of course to be taken, not with  $\sigma \kappa \epsilon \psi \iota s$ , but with  $\partial \epsilon \hat{\iota} \nu$ .

34 sqq. Aristotle gives three reasons for inquiring into the nature of the πόλις before passing on to the πολιτεία:—I. The nature of the πόλιs is a disputed question. 2. The statesman and the lawgiver are concerned with the πόλις, hence an inquiry into its nature is not only needed but belongs to the province of the πολιτική ἐπιστήμη. 3. The constitution (which is the subject of his treatise) is an ordering of those who dwell in the  $\pi \delta \lambda \iota s$ . As to the first reason, see c. 3. 1276 a 6 sqq. and notes, and compare also (with Eaton) Thuc. 3. 62. 4 sq. As to the second reason, cp. Eth. Nic. Ι. Ι3. ΙΙΟ2 α 7 SQQ., δοκεί δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην (i. e. την ἀρετήν) μάλιστα πεπονησθαι, where a similar reason is given for the study of virtue. As to the third, we learn from c. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq., 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sqq. what kind of ordering a constitution is (Sus.2, note 432 b: Sus.4, 1. p. 354). Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of the πόλις and the citizen helps him to answer the question which he takes up later on, what a πολιτεία is, because it discloses that the πόλις is an aggregate of citizens, or in other words of men possessing access to office and therefore either actual or possible rulers, and thus leads on to the conclusion arrived at in c. 6, that the πολιτεία is an ordering of the offices of the πόλιs and especially of its supreme office (1278 b 8 sq.). The fact that the πόλις consists of actual or possible rulers also suggests the further conclusion that it is a κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων (c. 6. 1279 a 21), and that in the normal πολιτεία the kind of rule exercised is not the rule of a master over his slaves but rule for the common good. Thus the inquiry into the nature of the πόλις and the citizen is fruitful of important results. It also incidentally discloses the existence of a plurality of constitutions differing from one another. It will be observed that Aristotle conceives the statesman to be concerned only with the πόλις, not with the ἔθνος, an error into which he was possibly led in part by the use of the word πολιτικός to designate a statesman. The ἔθνος, whether in the form of an aggregate of cities or of villages, certainly deserved to be carefully studied by him. See as to the ἔθνος vol. i. p. 39 and note on 1326 b 3.

34. vûv, 'as it is,' without any special reference to the time at which Aristotle is writing.

36. τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν. Bonitz (Ind. 629 b 29) groups this passage with Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1105 a 10, ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῆ ἀρετῆ καὶ τῆ πολιτικῆ, and Metaph. K. 1. 1059 b 16 sqq.

τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου, often mentioned in the Politics in combination: see Bon. Ind. 488 b 11, where 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 4, 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 27, and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 35 are referred to. See also Plato, Polit. 309 C.

38. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ πόλις κ. τ. λ. The πόλις is a compound in the sense of being a whole composed of many parts. Not all compounds are wholes: see Metaph. Z. 17. 1041 b 11 sqq., which, following Grote (Aristotle 2. 348), we may thus paraphrase— 'Compounds are of two sorts—aggregates like a heap (mechanical) and aggregates like a syllable (organic or formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent elements, but something else besides. The syllable ba is something more than the letters b and a; flesh is something more than fire and earth, its constituent elements . . . This "something more" is the essence of each compound—the First Cause of existence to each.' A whole is a compound of the second kind; in it, as in a syllable, there is over and above the constituent elements an essence which is its First Cause. 'Voce ὅλον Aristoteles fere significat id quod per certam formam definitum ac consummatum est; cf. Metaph. I. 1052 a 22, τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἔχον τινὰ μορφήν καὶ είδος: Δ. 6. 1016 b 12. αν μή τι όλον ή, τοῦτο δὲ αν μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἔχη ἔν: Μ. 2. 1077 a 28:

M. 8. 1084 b 30' (Bonitz on Metaph. A. 1. 1069 a 18). A whole is in fact a kind of  $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$  (see the passages referred to in Bon. Ind. 223 a 25 sqq.), and thus, while the  $\pi\delta\lambda\iota$ s is termed a whole here and in 1. 2. 1253 a 20 and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., it is termed an  $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu$  in 2. 2. 1261 a 29. It is implied in the passage before us that there are wholes which are not composed of many parts, or perhaps of parts at all. A monad, a point, and a sound  $(\phi\theta\delta\gamma\gamma\rho\sigma)$  are given in Diog. Laert. 3. 107 as instances of things which are not compound. Are these wholes? As to the method of examining the parts in order to learn the nature of the whole, see above on 1252 a 17. The parts of the  $\pi\delta\lambda\iota$ s are here taken to be citizens: for other uses of the term see vol. i. pp. 98, 495, and Appendix A.

41. ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθός ἐστιν. Τι πλῆθος is explained in 1275 b 20 by πλῆθος iκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. On this account of the πόλις see vol. i. p. 226 sq., and for other accounts of it given in the Politics, vol. i. p. 283 sq. Compare with the passage before us Justin 2. 12. 14, Themistocles . . . persuadet omnibus patriam municipes esse, non moenia, civitatemque non in aedificiis, sed in civibus positam.

- 1275 a. 1. τίνα χρη καλείν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστί. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 448 E, ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτῷ ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὅντινα δέοι καλείν τὸν Γοργίαν.
  - 3. ἔστι γάρ τις κ.τ.λ. For instance the βάναυσος, who was not a citizen in the full sense in the Theban oligarchy (c. 5. 1278 a 25: 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 28) or probably in oligarchies based on birth, though he would often be so in oligarchies based simply on a property-qualification (c. 5. 1278 a 21 sqq.).
  - 5. τοὺς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Ἄλλως πως, 'in some other sense than the proper one,' opposed to κυρίως or οἰκείως: cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 23, ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 11, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων (i. e. τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ διωκομένων καὶ ἀγαπωμένων) ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. Ποιητοὶ πολῖται were excluded at Athens from the archonship and from priesthoods ([Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 92), and often did not reside within the State which made them citizens: thus Dion was a ποιητὸς πολίτης of the Lacedaemonian State (Plut. Dion, cc. 17, 49). See as to ποιητοὶ πολῦται Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 184 sqq.

7. οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που. See explanatory note on 1260 b 41. 'In the Athenian use of language a resident alien was described in contrast to a citizen, not as a demot, but as a dweller in a deme—e.g. in Corp. Inscr. Att. 1. 324 we read Τεῦκρος ἐν Κυδαθηναίω οἰκῶν' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 170=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 177). Whether the resident alien was termed μέτοικος, πάροικος, ἔνοικος, κάτοικος, σύνοικος, οτ ἔποικος (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 294. 1), his designation always expressed residence. Cp. Herondas 2. 94, ἄπασι τοῖς οἰκεῦσι τὴν πόλιν ξείνοις.

8. οὐδ' οἱ κ.τ.λ., 'nor are those citizens who, [as metoeci usually do,] share in political rights to the extent of undergoing trial and suing.' It would have been more regular if Aristotle had continued οὐδὲ τῷ τῶν δικαίων μετέχειν κ.τ.λ.

10. τοῦτο, i.e. τὸ τῶν δικαίων μετέχειν οῦτως ώστε κ.τ.λ.

τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν, who are obviously not citizens of the State in which they possess these rights. 'Από denotes the cause or origin of the association (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.).

11. ταῦτα, i.e. τὸ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι, and so τούτων, 12. The parenthetic remark, καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει, seems needless, but for equally needless parenthetic remarks see c. 11.1282 a 36 sqq. and c. 12.1282 b 39.

πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'nay in many places,' etc., so that in these places metoeci are still further removed from citizenship than in places in which they completely share in these rights. Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. It is here used in the sense of 'nay,' as in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399a 15, 23. 'To what exact extent the resident aliens at Athens were obliged to allow themselves to be represented by their προστάτης we have no means of saying, but it can be shown that they could plead their cause before a judicial tribunal themselves: this is proved by the speech of Demosthenes against Dionysodorus, where the speaker is a resident alien... In Herondas 2, again, the πορνοβοσκός, who pleads in person before a Coan court of justice, is obviously a μέτοικος, vv. 15, 40, 92 sqq.' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 170=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 177 sq.).

12. For νέμειν προστάτην, 'to take,' or 'choose,' 'a patron' (Liddell and Scott), cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 53, καὶ τοὺς μὲν μετοίκους τοιούτους εἶναι νομίζομεν, οἴους περ ἄν τοὺς προστάτας νέμωσιν, and Pollux 8. 35, τῶν οὐ νεμόντων προστάτην μετοίκων.

- 13. τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας, 'of the kind of association which has just been described,' i. e. of the association which goes no further than a right to sue and be sued.
- 14. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but [we may dismiss these from consideration], just as,' etc.
- 15. ἐγγεγραμμένους, i.e. at Athens in the ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, or list of citizens kept by the demarch, as to which see note on 1336 b 37. Boyhood is usually made to cease not, as here, on entry in this list, but at puberty (see note on 1333 b 3).

τους γέροντας τους άφειμένους. Cp. Plut. Tit. Flaminin., c. 21, ωσπερ ύπὸ γήρως ἀπτηνα καὶ κόλουρον ἀφειμένον ζην χειροήθη τὸν Αννίβαν άποκτείνας, and Plato, Rep. 498 C, ὅταν δὲ λήγη μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ήδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Ιτ would seem that after a certain age old citizens were excused attendance at the assembly and the dicasteries, unless we take Aristotle to refer merely to their exemption from military service, as to which see Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 40 and Diod. 14. 74. 1 sq. That attendance at the meetings of the assembly was to a certain extent compulsory at Athens, we see from Pollux 8. 104, though the rich seem often to have escaped attendance (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 8). Giphanius (p. 292) compares the 'senes depontani, seu de ponte deiiciendi, ut vocabant Romani,' who were excluded from the bridge which led to the Septa, the place where the comitia voted: see as to them Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht 3. 401. 3, and other passages referred to by Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 167. 9.

16. φατέον εἶναι μέν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ λίαν. Λίαν qualifies ἀπλῶς in the sense of 'very' or 'quite': cp. [Plato,] Ετγχ. 393 Ε, ὅπως ἃν βέλτιστα λίαν πράττοι τά τε αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ πράγματα καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων. Λίαν alone (without any ἀπλῶς) stands in contrast to πως in De Part. An. 3. 7. 669 b 36 sqq.

ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας κ.τ.λ. Supply φατέον εἶναι. For the case of προστιθέντας see Jelf, Gr. Grammar, § 613, Obs. 5, and cp. c. 3. 1276 b 10, 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 21 sqq., and 1324 a 2 sq. In 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 3, however, we have ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. 'The dative and the accusative of the agent are both allowed with the verbal in  $-\tau$ έον' (Goodwin, Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, ed. 2, § 926).

17. ἀτελεῖς. Cp. c. 5. 1278 a 4, where οἱ παῖδες are said to be πολίται ἀτελεῖς, and therefore πολῖται ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

- 19. ζητοῦμεν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'quaerimus enim hic civem simpliciter, et qui nullam quasi culpam in se contineat, quam oratione corrigere oporteat, ut factum est in superioribus generibus civium.' Έγκλημα must here mean, not 'accusation,' but 'culpa' ('defect': Sus. 'Mangel'), for if we construe 'accusation,' the accusation will be said to 'need correction,' which is not the sense required. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) marks off the use of ἔγκλημα in this passage from its ordinary use. 'Frohberger on Lys. 10. 23 quotes Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 34: Lys. 16. 10: Polyb. 2. 52. 4: Demosth. 1. 7, in all which passages ἔγκλημα seems practically to mean "offence" (Richards).  $\Gamma \acute{a}\rho$ , 19, probably refers not to what immediately precedes but to the general sense of the preceding passage (like  $\epsilon n \epsilon i \dots \gamma \epsilon$  in 2. 7.1267a 12, where see note), and especially to the clause suppressed in 14 ('we may dismiss these from consideration'). Οἱ ἄτιμοι καὶ φυγάδες are referred to as also being πως πολίται, being so far citizens that their disqualification was in the case of some aripor incomplete, and in the case of all ἄτιμοι and φυγάδες reversible (see Schömann, Antiq. Iur. Publ. Graec. pp. 199, 234). For τον άπλως πολίτην cp. Antiphanes, Τριταγωνιστής (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121), τὴν ἀληθῶς μουσικήν. Καὶ, 20, 'also,' not 'both.'
- 22. πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. 'Απλῶς is to be taken with πολίτης. For τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην, 19, followed by πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς here, see note on 1276 b 28. As to κρίσεως, see vol. i. p. 230, note 1. Κρίσις here seems to mean ἡ τῶν δικαίων κρίσις (Plato, Laws 766 D). A Greek hardly felt himself to be a citizen if he was excluded from all share in judicial functions (Plato, Laws 768 B, ὁ γὰρ ἀκοινώνητος τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἡγεῖται τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι). 'Αρχή is a wider term than κρίσις and is made in what follows to include κρίσις (e.g. in 1275 b 18 sq.).
- 23. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, 'now of magistracies some are severed in point of time,' i.e. their tenure is severed, they cannot be held continuously. So Bernays, 'ein Theil der Aemter freilich erleidet zeitliche Unterbrechung.' For the contrast of διηρημένος and συνεχής cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 29, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διηρημένων, and Phys. 4. 4. 211 a 29. Compare also ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ χρόνον in Metaph. M. 8. 1084 b 14 sqq. Mr. Welldon translates, 'some offices of State are determinate in point of time,' but can other passages be produced in which διαιρεῖσθαι bears this meaning? It would be easier to explain the passage thus if we read with Scaliger and Sus. διωρισμέναι in place of διηρημέναι.

24. ὅστ' ἐνίας μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 37 sq. Ἐνίας μέν should have been followed by ἐνίας δέ, but it is in fact followed by ἢ, 25: compare the way in which in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 24 ἡ μέν is followed by ἢ ὅταν, 28, and in Poet. 3. 1448 a 21, 23, ὁτὲ μέν is followed by ἢ. See also note on 1338 b 1. The Lacedaemonian admiralship could not be held twice by the same person (Xen. Hell. 2. 1. γ), and the same was the case with many offices at Athens (᾿Αθ. Πολ. c. 62 sub fin.). At Thurii at one time a repeated tenure of the office of stratêgus by the same individual was prohibited except after an interval of five years (γ (5). γ. 1307 b γ). See on this subject Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 206. 1 (=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 215. 4) and 2. 320. 1.

**26**. δ δ' ἀόριστος. We expect ai δ' ἀόριστοι, but see note on 1258 b 26.

τάχα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἀλλά, 29. Οὐδ΄ ἄρχοντας, 'not even magistrates, [to say nothing of their being magistrates unlimited in respect of time].' Philocleon in the Vespae of Aristophanes will not hear of the function of dicast not being a magistracy: see Vesp. 548–551 (Didot), 575,

άρ' οὐ μεγάλη τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καταχήνη;

and 619 sqq. Plato in the Laws (767 A: cp. 768 C) holds that if a dicast is not in strictness a magistrate, he is in a sense a magistrate, and an important one too, on the day on which he decides a lawsuit. Cp. Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 233, ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἐν πόλει δημοκρατουμένη νόμφ καὶ ψήφφ βασιλεύει. But dicasts and magistrates were no doubt commonly distinguished: Strabo, for instance (p. 665), speaks of δικασταί and ἄρχοντες, and Aristotle himself in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book distinguishes between ἀρχαί and τὸ δικαστικόν (6 (4). 14. 1297 b 41 sqq.). When he speaks otherwise in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 8 sq., he is referring to oligarchical constitutions in which the judge was really a magistrate. A member of the assembly, on the other hand, would be less likely to claim to be a magistrate. In c. 11. 1282 a 34 Aristotle says that dicasts and members of the Boulê and the assembly are not magistrates, but parts of a magistracy.

27. τους τοιούτους, 'the above-mentioned,' i.e. dicasts and members of the assembly.

28. διὰ ταῦτ, by reason of their being dicasts and members of the assembly.

τοὺς κυριωτάτους. Cp. c. 11. 1282 a 25 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 4 sqq., and see Philocleon's description in the Vespae of the greatness of his own position as dicast. The deliberative is described as 'supreme over the constitution' in 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1 and 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 31 sq. (cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 33 sq.).

- 29. περὶ ὀνόματος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the dispute is about a name, for the difficulty arises from the fact that there is no single word in use to designate that which a dicast and a member of the assembly have in common, [and to tell us] what we ought to call the functions of both.' Cp. Meteor. I. 4. 341 b 15, ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς καπνώδους διακρίσεως. Τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν is perhaps added because ἀνώνυμος has much of the sense of ἄδηλος, which is coupled with it in Metaph. Z. 7. 1033 a 13, ὧν δ' ἡ στέρησις ἄδηλος καὶ ἀνώνυμος. Compare, however, also such sentences as 6 (4). I. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5, ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει κ.τ.λ.
- 31. διορισμοῦ χάριν, 'distinctionis causa' (Bon. Ind. 200 a 60, where 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 and Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1195 a 27 are referred to).
- 32. ἀόριστος ἀρχή. When an adjective and substantive are without the article, the substantive is usually in the Politics placed first and the adjective second (cp. for instance 1275 b 18, ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἡ κριτικῆς, c. 4. 1276 b 17, ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου, and 1277 a 33, ἀρχὴ δεσποτική), but now and then we find the reverse order adopted, e.g. in the passage before us and in c. 11. 1281 b 35, ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν. When under these circumstances the adjective is placed first, it is usually intended to be emphasized. Πολύς and some other adjectives are exceptions to this rule; they commonly precede the substantive with which they agree (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 25: 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 27, 30), and are placed after it when they are emphatic (3. 16. 1287 b 29: Plato, Phaedr. 274 E, ἃ λόγος πολὺς ᾶν εἴη διελθεῖν: Demosth. in Lept. c. 162).

τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας, those who share as ἀόριστοι ἄρχοντες, in tacit contrast to 1275 a 8, οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι. Cp. c. 9. 1280 b 25, οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες.

33. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἃν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης κ.τ.λ. Πολίτης = διορισμὸς τοῦ πολίτου. We are told in fact later that the definition

of the citizen which rests on extraction fails to suit persons whom nevertheless all would hold to be citizens (1275 b 32). Ἐφαρμόττειν is a word often used by Aristotle, but it would seem to be rather a poetical than a prose word, and it does not appear to occur in Plato, Thucydides, or the Attic orators, nor indeed in Xenophon, unless the Agesilaus is his work.

34. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν...1275 b 5, πολιτείαν. See vol. i. p. 242 for an interpretation of this passage. The πολιτείαι are the ὑποκείμενα of the citizen because they are the 'res ad quas refertur' πολίτου 'notio et a quibus suspensa est' (Bon. Ind. 798 b 59, cp. 799 a 16). I follow the interpretation of Bonitz, as do also Prof. Jowett (Politics, 2. 106) and Prof. J. A. Stewart (Class. Rev. 9. 455 sq.).

35. τῶν πραγμάτων is probably a partitive genitive after οίς.

36. καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 a 19-23: Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1218 a 1 sqq.: Metaph. B. 3. 999 a 6 sqq.: and see Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 256, note 103 (esp. p. 259).

- 37. ἢ τοιαῦτα, i.e. in the case before us 'as citizens.' The citizen of the best constitution and the citizen of an extreme democracy may have much in common with each other as animals, but little or nothing as citizens.
- 1275 b. 1. τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 652 a 51 sqq.) groups with the passage before us Categ. 12. 14 b 4 sqq. (see Waitz on 14 a 26) and Metaph. B. 2. 997 a 12, where προτέρα is conjoined with κυριωτέρα. Cp. also Pol. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης (πολιτείας), and Plut. Sympos. 2. 3. 3, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ψύσει πρότερον εἶναι τὸ τέλειον, ὡς τοῦ πεπηρωμένου τὸ ὁλόκληρον καὶ τοῦ μέρους τὸ ὅλον.
  - 2. τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has, however, already used the term παρεκβάσεις (2. 11. 1273 a 3).
  - 5.  $\delta$   $\lambda \epsilon \chi \theta \epsilon i$ s. Cp. 1275 a 32. 'He who shares in the  $d \delta \rho \iota \sigma \tau o s$   $d \rho \chi \dot{\eta}$  of the dicast and the member of the assembly.'
    - ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία μάλιστα. These words are to be taken together.
  - 7. (ἐν) ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, sc. πολιτείαις. Δῆμος appears here to mean 'a people gathered in an assembly,' 'a body of ecclesiastae' (cp. c. 11. 1282 a 34 sqq., where ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής is said to be a μόριον of ὁ δῆμος), while ἐκκλησία means the institution itself, the assembly.
  - 8. συγκλήτους, such as, for instance, the 5000 at Athens, whom the 400 were to call together whenever they pleased (Thuc. 8.

67. 3). The contrast drawn implies that it was of the essence of an ἐκκλησία to meet at regular intervals, and not merely when the authorities of the State chose to convoke it. Compare the Pregadi at Venice. 'C'est le nom qu'on donnait aux sénateurs, parce que dans l'origine, alors qu'il n'existait pas de jour fixe pour leurs séances, on allait à domicile prier chaque membre de vouloir bien se rendre au Palais Ducal' (Yriarte, Vie d'un Patricien de Venise, p. 78). Schömann (Antigg. Iuris Publ. Graec. p. 82, note 6) refers to the ἐπίκλητοι instituted by Lysimachus at Ephesus (Strabo, p. 640, ην δε γερουσία καταγραφομένη, τούτοις δε συνήεσαν οι επίκλητοι καλούμενοι καὶ διώκουν πάντα), but the nature of these ἐπίκλητοι is obscure. Perhaps we should compare with them the ἐπείσκλητοι of 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 30. l. 21 sqq. (ed. Sandys). The members of the council of the Aetolian League were called ἀπόκλητοι (see as to them Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 28. 4). Σύγκλητοι would be officials, not ἀόριστοι ἄρχοντες.

κατὰ μέρος, 'by sections': cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 1, τοσοῦτοι δ' ἔτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος (τρόποι), opposed to τὸ πάντας κρίνειν. Lambinus adopts a different interpretation, 'et lites controversiasque alias alii cognoscunt ac disceptant,' and so Vict. and Bonitz ('aliam alius magistratus,' Ind. 455 b 7), but this rendering seems inconsistent with 11, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα, for this does not appear to have been the plan followed at Carthage.

- 9. οἶον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας. This is confirmed by Plut. Apophth. Lac. Eurycraticlas, διὰ τί περὶ τὰ τῶν συμβολαίων δίκαια ἐκάστης ἡμέρας κρίνουσιν οἱ ἔφοροι.
- 10. έτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχή τις έτέρας. E.g. the kings (Hdt. 6. 57, δικάζειν δε μούνους τοὺς βασιλέας τοσάδε μοῦνα' πατρούχου τε παρθένου πέρι, ε'ς τὸν ἱκνέεται ἔχειν, ἢν μή περ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὴν ε'γγυήση, καὶ ὁδῶν δημοσιέων πέρι).
  - 11. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. See note on 1273 a 19.
- 13. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'however [we need not give up] our definition of a citizen, as it admits of correction' (Mr. Welldon).
- 14. ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις, i.e. other than democracy, as in 6. Surely, however, an assembly and dicasteries will exist in a polity? An assembly, indeed, appears to have existed in some oligarchies also, though members of it were required to possess a high property-qualification (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.) or it was made harmless in some way (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq.), and not only an

assembly, but dicasteries of which the poor were at any rate nominally members (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 16 sqq.).

15. δ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡρισμένος, literally 'he who is limited [in point of time] in respect of his office,' i.e. the holder of office for a limited period. Cp. Plut. Pericl. c. 10, δ μὲν οὖν ἐξοστρακισμὸς ὡρισμένην εἶχε νόμφ δεκαετίαν τοῖς φεύγουσιν.

16. τούτων, i.e. των κατά την άρχην ωρισμένων.

τισίν, as at Carthage, so far at least as judicial authority is concerned, for a share of deliberative authority was accorded at Carthage to the popular assembly (2. 11. 1273 a 6 sqq.). In many oligarchies, probably, the power of deliberating about all matters and trying all suits was possessed by a part or the whole of the holders of office.

- 17. περί τινῶν. This would be characteristic of an aristocracy or a polity rather than an oligarchy (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq.).
- 18. ω γαρ έξουσία κ.τ.λ. Participation in either deliberative or judicial office is, it would seem, enough to constitute a citizen: thus if, as in some oligarchies, e.g. that of Heracleia on the Euxine (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 34), the dicasteries are recruited from those outside the ruling class, the members of them would be citizens. Aristotle's view that full citizenship is constituted by access to deliberative and judicial office is quite in harmony with his description of the deliberative and judiciary of a State as 'parts of the State in an especial sense' (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.). In c. 5. 1278 a 35, however, we are told that δ μετέχων των τιμών not simply ἀρχης βουλευτικης ή κριτικης—is ὁ μάλιστα πολίτης. Still it would seem that a man may be a full citizen without access to al ἀρχαί strictly so called, for at Malis οί ωπλιτευκότες were citizens, though they were not eligible for ai apxai (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 14). Whether the mere right to elect magistrates, which is distinguished from deliberative authority in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., would be sufficient in Aristotle's view to constitute citizenship, may be doubted. We gather from 3. 14. 1285 a 25 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 that there are citizens in States ruled by kings, but Aristotle nowhere explicitly takes account of such citizens, nor does he explain their position.
- 19. ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, 'of the State in which he possesses these rights': cp. c. 3. 1276 a 15 and c. 11. 1281 b 29 sqq.

- 20. πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς. So too in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 24, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16, πρὸς ζωὴν αὕταρκες, but in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 8 we have αὕταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν (cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 28 sqq. and Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 10 sq.), and this is the exacter statement.
- 21. ὁρίζονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. After giving his definition of a citizen C. 2. Aristotle now proceeds to point out the weakness of a rival definition. The citizen was commonly defined as descended from two citizen-parents. Those who defined citizenship thus could appeal to laws existing at Athens (vol. i. p. 227) and Byzantium ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 b 26 sqq.) and to the general feeling throughout Greece, that those descended from two citizen-parents were γνήσιοι πολίται (c. 5. 1278 a 30). Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 297. 2) traces this feeling at Oreus, Cos, Rhodes, and elsewhere. Not only citizenship but other things also were held to pass most surely by descent from both parents—e. g. virtue (Eurip. Fragm. 524,

ήγησάμην οὖν, εἰ παραζεύξειέ τις χρηστῷ πονηρὸν λέκτρον, οὐκ ἃν εὐτεκνεῖν, ἐσθλοῖν δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἐσθλὸν ἃν φῦναι γόνον),

nobility (1. 6. 1255 a 36 sqq.), and physical strength (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 4, νομίζων έξ ἀμφοτέρων ἰσχυρῶν καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἐρρωμενέστερα γίγνεσθαι).

πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν, in tacit opposition to πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν: cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 9 sq.

23. ofor is here explanatory (see above on 1255 b 38).

οί δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'while others even carry this requirement further, for instance to the extent of two, three, or more ancestors.' Cp. C. 13. 1283 a 33, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων' πολῖται γάρ μᾶλλον οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν. Liddell and Scott compare Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4. 47, δε οὐδὲ εἰς τρίτον πάππον ἀνενεγκεῖν ἔχει τὸ γένος: cp. also Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 4 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 229), ἀριθμοῦσίν τε τοὺς πάππους ὅσοι. It was usually in connexion with sacred offices that a pedigree of this kind was required (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 321.1: cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., No. 371), but civil offices were sometimes subject to a similar restriction—thus the Thesmothetae at Athens (Aristot. Fragm. 374. 1540 a 39 sqq.) and the τιμοῦχοι at Massalia (a senate of 600 life-members which ruled the State, Strabo, p. 179) were required to be διὰ τριγονίας ἐκ πολιτῶν γεγονότες—and we learn from the passage before us that some even denied the name of citizen to those who had not these advantages of descent. A still narrower

view prevailed at one time at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera, where the only persons regarded as ἐλεύθεροι were the descendants of the original settlers (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq.). Dio Chrysostom, on the other hand, sensibly remarks (Or. 41, 2. 181 R), τὸ γὰρ ἀπωτέρω δυοῖν βαθμοῖν ('further back than one's grandfather,' Liddell and Scott) ζητεῖν τὸ γένος οὐδαμῶς ἐπιεικές οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς εὐρεθήσεται πόλεως. In a similar spirit a slave of three generations (τρίδουλος, Soph. O. T. 1062 sq., cp. ἐπτάδουλος) was thought to be especially a slave. We read of ὁ ἐκ τρι[γο]νίας [ὧν] μυροπώλης in Hyperid. c. Athenogen. col. 9. 3.

25. πολιτικώς. Cp. Poet. 6. 1450 b 7 and Polyb. 5. 33. 5, οὐδ' ἐφ' ὅσον οἱ τὰ κατὰ καιροὺς ἐν ταῖς χρονογραφίαις ὑπομνηματιζόμενοι πολιτικώς εἰς τοὺς τοίχους, where Schweighäuser explains 'populari, vulgari, simplici ratione, nude, sine arte,' and [Xen.] Ages. 8. 7, ἀκουσάτω δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολιτικοῦ καννάθρου κατήει εἰς ᾿Αμύκλας ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ. 'Compare also the πολιτικὰ ὀνόματα of Isocr. Evag. § 10΄ (Richards).

ταχέως. Cp. Plut. Pericl. c. 13, ή γὰρ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν εὐχέρεια καὶ ταχύτης οὐκ ἐντίθησι βάρος ἔργφ μόνιμον οὐδὲ κάλλους ἀκρίβειαν.

ἀποροῦσί τινες τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τέταρτον, 'some raise a question as to that third or fourth ancestor.' The 'third ancestor' is apparently the great-grandfather. For this 'anticipatory accusative,' see Dr. Holden on Xen. Oecon. 18. 9, and other passages. Antisthenes may have been one of these τινες, for we know that his extraction was made a subject of reproach to him, and a rejoinder of this kind would be quite in his vein (compare his rejoinder in Diog. Laert. 6. 4). It is interesting to note that he was a disciple of Gorgias, of whose views we hear in 26 sqq.

26. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'Gorgias of Leontini, indeed, partly perhaps in a questioning way' (cp. ἀποροῦσι, 25), 'partly in a spirit of banter, said that as those are mortars which have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made by the handicraftsmen, for that there were certain Larissa-making handicraftsmen; but [there is nothing to raise any question about;] the matter is simple,' etc. Τῶν δημιουργῶν must be translated 'the handicraftsmen' and δημιουργούς must be supplied after Λαρισοποιούς, and then the added explanation, εἶναι γάρ τινας Λαρισοποιούς, which Ridgeway and Sus. would omit, is not otiose. The 'Larissa-making handicraftsmen' referred to are of course the magistrates (δημιουργοί) of Larissa, the word δημιουργός meaning both 'handi-

craftsman' and 'magistrate.' We expect Λαρισαιοποιούs in place of Λαρισοποιούς, and Camerarius reads Λαρισαιοποιούς, but since a city = its citizens, 'Larissa-makers'='makers of Larissaeans,' and Λαρισοποιούς, which (or rather Λαρισσοποιούς) is the reading of Γ II Vat. Pal., may be used in preference to Λαρισαιοποιούς, partly because it is nearer in form to δλμοποιούς, and partly to convey a hint that the making of Larissaeans had been on so large a scale that it virtually amounted to a making of Larissa. Gorgias said that every one was a citizen who was made a citizen by the duly empowered magistrates, and thus went to the length of acknowledging all those as citizens who were made citizens by the authorities of the State, whatever the rights conferred on them; Aristotle, on the contrary, looks not merely to the persons who confer citizenship, but also to the rights conferred; if these are the rights which constitute citizenship, the persons made citizens are citizens, but not otherwise. He probably objects to Gorgias' view because according to it ποιητοί πολίται would be citizens. But Gorgias' view was in his opinion so far correct that it did not base citizenship on extraction, but traced it to the action of the State. It was quite in the spirit of Gorgias' philosophical teaching to make out that citizens and the State were manufactured, artificial products. He himself was a Eévos at Larissa, and was no doubt not sorry to banter the Larissaean nobles on their pride of birth (compare Matt. iii. 9, 'And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father, for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham'). We have seen that the word δημιουργός meant 'handicraftsman' as well as 'magistrate.' A line of Leonidas of Tarentum (Anth. Pal. 6. 305),

τως Λαρισσαίως κυτογάστορας έψητηρας,

lends some colour to the view that a further équivoque lurks in the saying of Gorgias, and that Λαρισαίους may well have borne two meanings in the minds of his hearers, 'Larissaeans' and 'pots,' but as the late Dr. Thompson has pointed out (see Prof. Ridgeway, Camb. Philol. Trans. 2. 136), it is not clear that Λαρισαίος without a substantive could mean 'pot,' for it is linked with έψητήρ in the epigram, and indeed, if it could, we should expect Λαρισαιοποιούς in the clause which follows: Λαρισσοποιούς, however, as has been said, is the reading of all the MSS. and of Vet. Int. The saying loses little or nothing, if this additional subtlety is withdrawn from

it. Larissa was oligarchically governed, but it is perhaps hardly likely that even there the demiurgi of the State had the uncontrolled right of admitting citizens; more probably they acted under a commission empowering them to admit to citizenship persons who fulfilled certain conditions prescribed by the State. Szanto, Das griech. Bürgerrecht, p. 30 sq. Prof. Ridgeway (Journal of Philology, 15. p. 164) makes the not improbable suggestion that the addition to the citizen-roll of Larissa to which Gorgias' saying refers was necessitated by the blow which the city received in B. C. 404 from Lycophron of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 4). It would seem from 35 that it was not preceded by any change of constitution. Gorgias was well known for his irony (Rhet. 3. 7. 1408 b 19, ή δη ούτω δεί ή μετ' εἰρωνείας, ώσπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρω). We see from Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 31 that εἰρωνεία implies slight contempt. Whether Meineke, Fragm. Comicorum Anonymorum, 183 (Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 649),

τῶν πολιτῶν ἄνδρας ὑμῖν δημιουργούς ἀποφανῶ, has anything to do with Gorgias' saying, is more than I will under-

take to decide.

32. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατὸν κ.τ.λ., 'for it is not even possible [much less the fact | that the test of descent from a citizen-father or mother should apply in the case of those who were the first to dwell in the city or to found it,' and yet these would be citizens in an especial degree: compare 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 12 sq. and an inscription quoted by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 167. 3, in which a Halicarnassian named Nireus is honoured διά τε τὴν ἀπὸ [τ]ῶν κτιστῶν καὶ τυρα νν οκτόνων της πόλε ως καθ' έκα τ έρους τους γ ονείς αὐτοῦ εὐγενίαν: also Diod. 14. 98. 1, Εὐαγόρας ὁ Σαλαμίνιος, ος ην μεν εὐγενέστατος, των γὰρ κτισάντων τὴν πόλιν ἦν ἀπόγονος. Susemihl translates 'auf die ersten Ansiedler und Staatsgründer,' but "

appears to distinguish between being the first to dwell in a city and being the first to found it. In 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38, the only other passage in Aristotle's writings (except a fragment) to which the Index Aristotelicus gives a reference for the word κτίζειν, κ ίσαντες is used of kings who founded cities, and I am inclined to think (with Sepulv. Vict. Lamb. and Giph.) that it is used in a similar way in the passage before us of the κτίσται of cities, who, while they would no doubt be themselves among οί πρῶτοι οἰκήσαντες, would be marked off from them by being their chiefs and leaders. Kriζειν is especially used of these κτίσται or οἰκισταί, or else of the mothercity, though it is occasionally used of the whole body of original settlers, as for instance in Thuc. 5. 16. 3. For οὐδὲ δυνατόν, cp. c. 15. 1286 b 21, οὐδὲ ῥάδιον, and c. 16. 1287 a 10, οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν. I follow Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) in taking ἐφαρμόττειν here as intransitive, as in 1275 a 33, but it is quite possible that Sus., Liddell and Scott, and others are right in taking it as transitive.

34. ἀλλ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ., 'but perhaps this case lends itself more to debate, the case of those who acquired the rights of citizens after a change of constitution, such a creation of citizens, I mean, as that which Cleisthenes enacted at Athens, for he enrolled in the tribes many aliens and slave metoeci.' The question whether citizens who acquired citizenship after a change of constitution are citizens is a more difficult one than that just discussed, because the new citizens in this case are not made citizens by duly empowered magistrates of the old constitution, but by the introducer of the new one; besides, the citizens admitted by Cleisthenes were aliens and slave metoeci, and aliens and metoeci are the very opposite of citizens (c. 5. 1277 b 39). Euripides had made one of the characters of his Erechtheus say (Fragm. 362. 11 sqq.),

δστις δ' ἀπ' ἄλλης πόλεος οἰκίζει πόλιν, άρμὸς πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλφ παγείς, λόγφ πολίτης ἐστί, τοῖς δ' ἔργοισιν οὔ.

As to ἐκείνο see critical note. For ἔχει ἀπορίαν, cp. Phys. 8. 2. 253a 7, μάλιστα δ' αν δόξειε τὸ τρίτον έχειν ἀπορίαν, and 1. 3. 186 a 8, μαλλον δ' ὁ Μελίσσου (λόγος) φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ένὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τάλλα συμβαίνει τοῦτο δ' οὐδεν χαλεπόν: also Pol. 3. 11. 1281 a 41 and 3. 12. 1282 b 22. For οἷον 'Αθήνησιν ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 16, οἷον καὶ Σόλων ένομοθέτησεν, and for εποίησε, ' enacted,' 2. 12. 1274 b 7. Οἶον κ.τ.λ. explains μετέσχον. A suggestion, however, which well deserves notice, that ous should be added after olov, has been recorded in the critical note on 1275 b 35. For the plural in την των τυράννων έκβολήν, cp. Diod. 11. 55, μετὰ την κατάλυσιν των τυράννων των περί Πεισίστρατον, Thuc. 8. 68, έπειδή οί τύραννοι κατελύθησαν, Polyb. 3. 22. Ι, μετά την των βασιλέων κατάλυσιν, and the words μετὰ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτω βασιλέων (referring to the dethronement of the Ptolemies) in an inscription found at Philae and published in the Athenaeum for March 14, 1896. The displacement of the dynasty is expressed by the plural, as in 'pulsis regibus,' Tac. Hist. 3. 72. This is the sense which

the plural seems to bear in the passage before us, though οἱ τύραννοι is often loosely used where an act of only one of the tyrants is referred to (e.g. in 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 19. l. 13 and c. 20. l. 2, and in Demosth. c. Mid. c. 144). Ἐφυλέτευσε is stronger than πολίτας ἐποιήσατο would have been. As to δούλους μετοίκους see vol. i. p. 231 note. Cp. also [Plato,] Alcib. 1. 119 A, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων 'Αθηναίων ἡ τῶν ξένων δοῦλον ἡ ἐλεύθερον εἰπέ, ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι, where it is implied that the ξένοι include slaves, and Hecataeus, Fragm. 318 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 24). Bernays (Heraklit. Briefe, p. 155) takes ξένους and δούλους as both of them adjectives and μετοίκους as the substantive common to them, referring to Aristoph. Eq. 347 Didot,

εί που δικίδιον είπας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου,

which shows that the term ξένος μέτοικος was a recognized one, but on the other hand Eévoi and nétoikoi are often distinguished (e.g. in c. 5. 1277 b 39), and perhaps it is hardly likely that Cleisthenes confined himself to enfranchising resident aliens. His object was to strengthen his own party among the citizens, the democratic party, and this was most effectually done by enrolling aliens and slave metoeci, for they were sure to side with him against the γνώριμοι. At any rate they would not hold with the συνήθειαι at which he sought to strike a blow (8 (6), 4, 1319 b 26). Towards the close of the Peloponnesian War Athens enrolled not only metoeci but aliens also as citizens (Diod. 13. 97. 1). Not all aliens were absolute aliens; some were sons of a citizen-father by a mother not of citizen-birth, like the Eévoi mentioned in c. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. Those aliens and metoeci who had a touch of servile blood in their veins would be most unwelcome as citizens, for we learn in c. 5. 1278 a 33 that citizens of servile origin were the first to be extruded when the State could afford to get rid of them. How hateful the measure of Cleisthenes must have been to many, we see from Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 41, πολλών δέ καὶ δεινών κατά την πόλιν γινομένων καὶ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἢτυχηκότων, μάλιστ' ἄν τις ἤλγησε καὶ έδάκρυσεν έπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως συμφοραῖς ἡνίχ' ὁρᾶν ἦν τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τους μέν δούλους έλευθέρους, τους δε ξένους 'Αθηναίους, τους δ' ἀτίμους ἐντίμους' δς πρώτον ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτόχθων εἶναι καὶ ἐλεύθερος έσεμνύνετο. The 'happy city' of Lucian's Hermotimus, in which all are ἐπήλυδες καὶ ξένοι, αὐθιγενής δὲ οὐδὲ είς (c. 24), is in designed contrast to the generally accepted ideal. The making of slaves and aliens citizens was a measure often resorted to by tyrants (see

vol. i. p. 547, note 2: Diod. 11. 72. 3, 14. 7. 4) and by extreme democrats (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 48).

37. τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους. Cp. c. 16. 1287 b 35.

1. ἀρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, 'whether, if a man is not 1276 a. justly a citizen, he is not in fact no citizen at all.' This Aristotle will not admit: compare the line he takes in Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 17 sqq. Cicero, on the contrary, in De Legibus 2. 5. 11-2. 6. 14 denies that faulty laws are laws at all.

ώς ταὐτὸ δυναμένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. For the use of τε in sentences of this kind cp. c. 4. 1277 a 20 sq. and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 1. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19, ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.

4. ἀρχῆ τινί, i.e. ἀρχῆ βουλευτικῆ ἡ κριτικῆ (c. 1. 1275 b 18).

7. την είρημένην πρότερον αμφισβήτησιν, in c. 1. 1274 b 34 sq. C. 3. The question whether these citizens are justly citizens or not is connected with the question whether they were made citizens by the State or not, a question which some identify with the question whether the constitution under which they have become citizens is based merely on force or exists for the common advantage, and if we deny that the acts of a tyrant or an oligarchy are acts of the State on the ground that the tyranny or oligarchy is based merely on force and does not exist for the common good, we must say the same thing of the acts of any democracy which is in the same position, so that we shall deny that those who are created citizens by a democracy of this kind are justly citizens. Aristotle appears to hint that the democracy introduced by Cleisthenes was a democracy resting on force and not for the common good, and that on the principle laid down by the persons to whom he refers the aliens whom Cleisthenes made citizens were not justly citizens, but he does not adopt the view that the acts of a constitution not for the common good are not acts of the State.

10. τότε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for then some are not willing to discharge either (public) contracts on the plea that the tyrant, not the State, received the loan, or many other obligations of a similar kind, holding that some constitutions are based on superior force and are not for the common advantage, [and that the acts done by the authorities they constitute are consequently not acts of the State].' These persons probably regarded democracies as in an especial degree constitutions for the common advantage: compare Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, where it is argued that democracies, unlike

oligarchies, are governed by laws conceived in the interest of the Our own use of the words 'republic' and 'commonwealth' indicates the prevalence of a cognate view (see Sir J. R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 173). For an instance in which a public contract ran a risk of being thus repudiated, see vol. i, p. 231 sq. Οὔτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων perhaps refers to the quashing of acts and judicial decisions; this happened after the fall of the Thirty at Athens (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 39: Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 56: Andoc. De Myst. c. 87). Questions of a similar nature have found their way into modern English law-courts. 'Given a revolutionary government which has been recognized by foreign States as a government de facto, but which has since been superseded by a more legitimate régime, are its acts and contracts to be held valid or not by the courts of those foreign States, as far as concerns the subjects over which they have jurisdiction? This was the issue which Mr. Justice Kay had to decide yesterday in the case of "The Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus" (Times, Feb. 21, 1888, where a report of the case will be found). This case, it will be noticed, applies only to revolutionary governments recognized by foreign States.

- 12. τῷ κρατεῖν οὖσας. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 723 a 31, εἰ τοῦτο θήσομεν οὕτως ὅτι οὐ τῷ ἀπελθεῖν ἀπό τινος τὸ θῆλυ, and such expressions as φύσει εἶναι οτ τὰς βία πράξεις (Plato, Polit. 280 D).
- 14. δημοκρατοῦνται κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, i.e. τῷ κρατεῖν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον. Cp. Thuc. 8. 53. I, 'Αλκιβιάδην καταγαγοῦσι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις, and Plato, Polit. 29 I E, δημοκρατίας γε μήν, ἐάν τ' οὖν βιαίως ἐάν τε ἐκουσίως τῶν τὰς οὐσίας ἐχόντων τὸ πλῆθος ἄρχη, καὶ ἐάν τε τοὺς νόμους ἀκριβῶς φυλάττον ἐάν τε μή, πάντως τοὔνομα οὐδεὶς αὐτῆς εἴωθε μεταλλάττειν.

δμοίως κ.τ.λ., 'we must say that the acts of the authorities set up by this constitution are to just the same extent and no more acts of this State as those proceeding from the oligarchy and the tyranny.' For δμοίως καί cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 6, δμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους ('no better than'). Τῆς πόλεως ταύτης, i.e. the State of the τινες referred to: cp. c.11. 1281 b 29, ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην, and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 40. For τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας (πράξεις) see Liddell and Scott s.v. ἐκ iii. 3, and see note on 1302 a 4. Cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 6, τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν, and Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἀδικίαν.

17. ἔοικε δ' οἰκείος ὁ λόγος είναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but the inquiry [to which we have just referred] seems to be cognate to this question, on what principle we ought to say that,' etc. With Sepulveda, Bernays, and Welldon I take πωs ποτέ κ.τ.λ. to explain της ἀπορίας ταύτης, and not ὁ λόγος, as Sus. Looking to  $\tau \hat{\eta} s$  amopias, 19, this seems to be the more natural interpretation, though it is true that της ἀπορίας ταύτης might refer to ἀποροῦσι, 8. Aristotle means that the question whether the contracts of those who are in power under a constitution resting on force and not for the common advantage are acts of the State and should be fulfilled by those who are in power after a change of constitution is cognate to the question under what circumstances the State is to be regarded as the same or not the same. He decides (1276 b 10 sqq.) that after any change of constitution the State is not the same. but that the question as to the fulfilment of contracts is a separate one. As to πῶs ποτέ, see Liddell and Scott, who refer to Soph. O. T. 1210.

19 sqq. 'The mode of dealing with this problem which lies nearest to hand is in connexion with the site and its inhabitants, for the site and the inhabitants may be divided into two or more sections, and some of the inhabitants may dwell on one site, and some on another.' Mèv ov is taken up by mèv ov, 22, but it is difficult to say where the answering particle is to be found. For έπιπολαιοτάτη, cp. Rhet. 3. 10. 1410 b 21, διὸ οὔτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ένθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ ά μηδὲν δεί ζητήσαι) κ.τ.λ. The words ένδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθήναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους have been interpreted in two ways. Vict. explains them, 'contingit enim ut locus distinctus sit, hominesque eodem pacto separati, ita ut hi hanc, alii vero aliam sedem habeant.' Mr. Welldon, on the other hand, translates, 'it is possible that the inhabitants should be divorced from the site and should come to dwell in different sites.' Perhaps the former interpretation is to be preferred. As an instance of some inhabitants dwelling on one site and others on another, we may take the διοίκισις of Mantineia by the Lacedaemonians (Paus. 8. 8. 9, ως δε είλε την Μαντίνειαν ('Αγησίπολις), ολίγον μέν τι κατέλιπεν οἰκεῖσθαι, τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ εἰς ἔδαφος καταβαλών αὐτῆς κατὰ κώμας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διώκισε). The question then is will a change of this kind have destroyed the identity of the πόλις? Aristotle's somewhat curt answer is that the word  $\pi \delta \lambda \iota s$  is used in many different senses, and that it is easy to solve the question if

that is borne in mind. His meaning perhaps is that if we take  $\pi\delta\lambda\iota s$  in the sense of 'an aggregate of human beings or citizens,' the Mantineans after the  $\delta\iota oi\kappa\iota \sigma\iota s$  will still constitute the same State as before, but if we take it in the sense of 'an aggregate of human beings or citizens gathered on a given site,' they will no longer do so.

24.  $\delta\mu$ oíως  $\delta\epsilon$  κ.τ.λ., 'and similarly [one might raise the question] in the case also in which the inhabitants occupy one and the same site, when we ought to consider the  $\pi$ óλις to be one.' Are we to say that it is one, however large the site may be and however varied in race the inhabitants, provided only that it is enclosed within one and the same wall?

26. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν, 'for surely it is not one πόλις in virtue of its walls.' For γὰρ δή, cp. c. 9. 1280 b 24 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 32.

27. εἴη γὰρ ἄν Πελοποννήσω περιβαλεῖν εν τεῖχος. Aristotle probably remembers a famous taunt of the Athenians addressed to the Lacedaemonians, which is recorded in the Funeral Oration ascribed to Lysias, c. 44, ὕστερον δὲ Πελοποννησίων διατειχιζόντων τὸν Ἰσθμόν ... ὀργισθέντες ᾿Αθηναῖοι συνεβούλευον αὐτοῖς, εἶ ταύτην τὴν γνώμην εξουσιν, περὶ ἄπασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον τεῖχος περιβαλεῖν. A line in the Temenidae of Euripides (Fragm. 730) ran,

απασα Πελοπόννησος εὐτυχεῖ πόλις.

Polybius (2.37.9 sqq.) implies that in his day Peloponnesus was virtually one city, having the same magistrates, etc., the only want being a common wall.

τοιαύτη, 'like Peloponnesus with a wall round it.' Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 3 sqq.

28. καὶ Βαβυλών...30. πόλεως. As to Babylon, see note on 1326 b 3. The walls of Babylon according to Herodotus (1. 178) were 480 stadia in circumference, according to Ctesias (Diod. 2. 7) 360 stadia, and according to Cleitarchus (Diod. ibid.) 365 stadia. A still larger circuit of wall (1500 stadia) was to be found after Aristotle's time at Antiochia Margiana (the modern Merv), if we could trust Strabo (p. 516). Herodotus (1. 191) says that owing to the size of Babylon, when the outer part of it had been taken, the inhabitants of the centre were unaware of the fact and continued to celebrate a festival till they learnt it; he does not mention that the interval amounted to three days. Here, as in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sqq., 3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq., and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sq. (see notes on these passages), Aristotle mentions a circumstance also mentioned

by Herodotus, but mentions it with a slight variation. He may possibly quote Herodotus from memory. Megalopolis was taken by Cleomenes 'before the Megalopolitans were aware of the fact' (Plut. Cleom. c. 23), but then Megalopolis was 'a great desert' (Polyb. 2. 55. 2: 5. 93. 5). For the omission of πόλις after πᾶσα see note on 1266 b 1; its omission is facilitated by the occurrence of the word πόλεως in the next line. For the interposition of καὶ πᾶσα . . . πόλεως between ης and its antecedent Βαβυλών, cp. Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 3, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ηττον ἔστι τι ὁ περιέχει, καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἔκαστον, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον κ.τ.λ., where καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἔκαστον is interposed. Τινὸς μέντοι πολίτον is interposed in a somewhat similar way in Pol. 3. 4. 1277 a 22 sqq., and καὶ κεκαλλωπισμέναι in Aristoph. Lysistr. 43 Didot,

αὶ καθήμεθ' ἐξανθισμέναι, κροκωτὰ φοροῦσαι καὶ κεκαλλωπισμέναι καὶ Κιμβερίκ' ὀρθοστάδια καὶ περιβαρίδας.

31. εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος, cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 4, καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πουηροὶ εἰς τὰ πουηρά.

32. περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους . . . 34. πολιτικόν. Supply συμφέρει after τό τε πόσον. The question πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἢ πλείω συμφέρει is probably suggested by the mention of Peloponnesus, of which Herodotus says (8. 73), οἰκέει δὲ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἔθνεα ἐπτά. As to this question see vol. i. p. 295, note 1, where it has been pointed out that it is not dealt with in 4 (7). 4, though the proper size of the πόλις is discussed there. The πόλις consists ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν (1. 2. 1252 b 27), and a question might naturally be raised whether it should not also consist of more ἔθνη than one. The colony of Thurii had been recruited from a variety of sources (Diod. 12. 10. 4: 12. 11. 3), and Plato had seen advantages in a citizen-body derived from more quarters than one (Laws 708).

34. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. With the discussion of the question of the identity of the πόλις which commences here should be compared the remarks of Plutarch on the same subject in De Sera Numinis Vindicta, c. 15: Plutarch, however, does not seem to have had this passage of the Politics before him. The question of identity had long been raised in reference to the individual. The speculations of Heraclitus and his doctrine of the flux of all things had drawn attention to this question, and Epicharmus had made a character in one of his comedies point to the increase and decrease in size which takes place in human beings and ask how this increase and

decrease was compatible with personal identity, and how a man whose identity had changed could be called on to pay his debts. See Diog. Laert. 3. 10–11, and Bernays' essay on 'Epicharmos und der αὐξανόμενος λόγος' in his Gesammelte Abhandlungen 1. 109–117, and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 461. 1. Compare also the remarks of Diotima in Plato, Symp. 207 D. Aristotle is concerned in the passage before us not with the question of the identity of the individual, but with the question of the identity of the πόλις. In dealing with this question as with others, he steers a midway course. He agrees neither with Isocrates, who held that States are immortal (De Pace § 120), nor with those who held that change in the individuals composing them destroyed their identity; their identity is according to him destructible, but it is destroyed by a change of constitution, not by a change of individuals.

37. ὤσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς κ.τ.λ. Heraclitus had denied that they were the same (Fragm. 41 Bywater, ποταμοῖσι δὶς τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι οὐκ ἄν ἐμβαίης' ἔτερα γὰρ (καὶ ἔτερα) ἐπιρρέει ὕδατα, and Fragm. 81, ποταμοῖσι τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἶμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν). But Aristotle holds that the constant change of the watery particles of which a river is composed does not prevent its remaining the same. A river, however, is different from a πόλις. It is not an ὅλον οτ a σύνθεσις, like a πόλις οτ an ἀρμονία στ a χορός, the identity of which depends on the arrangement of the parts (Metaph. Δ. 26. 1024 a 6, ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὅσα ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἄν μὴ μεταφορᾶ). A river will remain the same so long as its particles consist of water, but a πόλις will not remain the same, so long as it consists of men of the same stock, if meanwhile a change should occur in its σύνθεσις οτ πολιτεία.

40. διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, i.e. διὰ τὸ εἶνὰι τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων.

την δὲ πόλιν ἐτέραν, 'but the State different [if there is a change of polity]' (Mr. Welldon, following Bernays).

1276 b. 2. κοινωνία πολιτών πολιτείας, 'a sharing of citizens in a constitution.' Bekker places a comma after πολιτών, but I follow Susemihl's punctuation: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 36, κοινωνούντων ἀπάντων μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. In c. 4. 1276 b 29 the πολιτεία, not the πόλις, is said to be a κοινωνία (see note on 1276 b 28).

γιγνομένης έτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφερούσης. We may have here a mere tautology, like those collected by Vahlen in his note on

Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, but perhaps it is more likely that διαφερούσης refers to changes less complete than a change of kind.

- 3. ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν κ.τ.λ. The πολιτεία represents the εἶδος τῆς συνθέσεως (7) in the case of the πόλις and thus constitutes its identity: compare the passages from the Topics which Bonitz (Ind. 729 a 51 sq.) groups with the passage before us—Top. 6. 13. 150 b 22, ἔτι εἶ μὴ εἴρηκε τὸν τρόπον τῆς συνθέσεως οὐ γὰρ αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ γνωρίσαι τὸ εἶπεῖν ἐκ τούτων οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὕτως ἐκ τούτων ἑκάστου τῶν συνθέτων ἡ οὐσία, καθάπερ ἐπ' οἰκίας οὐ γὰρ ἄν ὁπωσοῦν συντεθῆ ταῦτα, οἰκία ἐστίν, and 6. 14. 151 a 23, οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν συντεθέντων τούτων σὰρξ γίνεται, ἀλλ' οὐτωσὶ μὲν συντεθέντων σάρξ, οὐτωσὶ δ' ὀστοῦν. For the notion that a change of laws might affect the identity of a πόλις, compare Plato Com., Fragm. 42 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 692). According to Plut. De Śer. Num. Vind. c. 15 the identity of the πόλις remains μέχρις ἃν ἡ ποιοῦσα καὶ συνδέουσα ταῖς ἐπιπλοκαῖς κοινωνία τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττη.
- 4. ωσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν κ.τ.λ., 'as we say that a chorus also appearing at one time as a comic, and at another as a tragic, chorus is not the same.' 'The tragic chorus consisted of three files (στοῖχοι) of five men each and of five ranks (ζυγά) of three men each; the comic chorus of four files of six men each and of six ranks of four men each' (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 205, A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalt., where Pollux 4. 108-9 is referred to). Thus the εἶδος της συνθέσεως was different in the case of a tragic and comic chorus. The numbers of the two kinds of chorus were also different, and, as Mr. Richards points out, it is remarkable that Aristotle takes no notice of this. He implies that in a Dorian and a Phrygian 'harmony' the sounds may be the same, but that even then the είδος της συνθέσεως των φθόγγων will be different. It is not quite clear what this means. Does it mean that the sounds will be arranged in a different order? It is still less easy to say how a political constitution is an είδος της συνθέσεως of the elements of the πόλις. Does Aristotle mean that in each constitution the citizens of a πόλις are arranged in a different way—that in an aristocracy the best men are at the head and in an oligarchy or democracy the rich or the poor? Perhaps so: compare 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 25 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 17, in the latter of which passages he appears to imply that a constitution is a διάθεσις πόλεως.

- 5. τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων. We expect rather τῶν ἀνθρώπων than ἀνθρώπων, but cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 7, ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν: 1. 2. 1252 b 9, ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὅν: 1. 8. 1256 a 10, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομικὴ τῆ χρηματιστικῆ. Yet in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20 we have καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον.
- 6. πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν. Σύνθεσιν is the wider term. For πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν.
- 7. ἂν εἶδος ἔτερον ἢ τῆς συνθέσεως. Not τὸ εἶδος, for with ἔτερος, as with ὁ αὐτός (see above on 5), the subject of the sentence often is without the article: cp. c. 4. 1277 b 13, 17, 24, 30 sq., and c. 6. 1278 b 13 sq.
  - 9. λέγομεν. See below on 1277 a 37.
  - εὶ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον recurs in 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 10.
  - 10. For λεκτέον . . . βλέποντας, see note on 1275 a 16.
- 11. ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν κ.τ.λ. According to Thuc. 6. 4. 5 (see however Freeman, Sicily 2. 115 and 486 sqq.), Zancle received the name Messana from Anaxilas of Rhegium when he expelled the Samians and peopled the city afresh. On the other hand, Catana retained its name, when Dionysius the Elder replaced its citizens by Campanians (Diod. 14. 15), and so did the Trachinian Heracleia, though its inhabitants were changed by the Thebans in B.c. 395 (Diod. 14. 82. 6, 7). The name of Corinth was replaced by that of Argos in B.c. 393 during the supremacy of a faction, though the inhabitants were unchanged (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 6, ὁρῶντες δὲ τοὺς τυραννεύοντας, αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ ἀφανιζομένην τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ ὅρους ἀνεσπάσθαι καὶ Ἄργος ἀντὶ Κορίνθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζεσθαι).
- C. 4. 16 sqq. Aristotle passes on from defining the citizen to examine the nature of his virtue, just as after defining the slave he goes on in 1.13.1259 b 21 sqq. to ask what is the virtue of the slave. He has there found that the virtue of the woman, child, and slave is not τελεία ἀρετή, but relative to the head of the household, and now he asks in effect whether the virtue of the citizen is τελεία ἀρετή, and whether it is identical with the virtue of the good man. Thucydides (2. 42. 2-4) makes Pericles argue in his Funeral Oration that those who had fallen gloriously fighting for their country were eo ipso proved to be good men, for their service to the State outweighed and cast into the shade all private faults. It is not, however, so much in correction of views of this kind

as in correction of the teaching of Socrates that the Fourth Chapter is written. Socrates had taught the unity of virtue, claiming that virtue is one and the same in all who possess it. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that virtue varies with the work a person has to do, and that, as a citizen's work is relative to the constitution, his virtue varies with the constitution. To identify the virtue of the good citizen with that of the good man is therefore to ignore the difference between one constitution and another. It is also to ignore the difference between the ruling and ruled citizen in the best of constitutions. See vol. i. p. 234 sqq. as to the contents of the Fourth Chapter. Looking to the definition of a citizen which Aristotle has already given, we might expect him to say that the virtue of a citizen consists in the ability to deliberate and judge well, i.e. to rule well. But we learn in the Fourth Chapter that the work of a citizen consists not only in ruling but also in being ruled, and therefore that his virtue consists in knowing not only how to rule but also how to be ruled, with this limitation, however, that the only kind of rule which he needs to know is that which is exercised over freemen. To learn this he must be ruled first and rule afterwards—a principle which is not forgotten when Aristotle comes to construct his 'best State' (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sqq.). One remarkable conclusion, it should be noted, results from the Fourth Chapter. This is that the good man cannot be a good citizen (in the sense of contributing to the preservation of the constitution) in any constitution but the best without ceasing to be a good man in the strict sense of the words. The justice of Socrates, for instance, is not the imperfect kind of justice which tends to the preservation of a democracy (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.). But is Aristotle's account of good citizenship correct? Is not he a good citizen whose influence tends to the improvement of a constitution rather than he whose influence tends to its preservation? May not a man be all the better as a citizen because he is morally and intellectually somewhat in advance of the constitution under which he lives? Is a good citizen bound to do what contributes to the preservation of that constitution, even if it is a tyranny or an extreme democracy or oligarchy? See note on 1337 a 27.

18. ἀλλά μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly': see above on 1271 a 20.

19. For τύπω τινί, 'in some sort of outline,' cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 A, τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι σαφῶς ἡ καί τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, and 32 B,

and Laws 718 C and 802 D sq., and for τύπω τινὶ ληπτέον, Aristot. Τορ. 1. 7. 103 a 7, ώς τύπω λαβεῖν.

For πρῶτον in the sense of πρότερον, see below on 1323 a 16.

- 21. των πλωτήρων is in strictness in the gen. after έκάστου, 24.
- 22. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the relative rank of these personages cp. Aristoph. Eq. 541 Didot,

καὶ πρὸς τούτοισιν ἔφασκεν

ἐρέτην χρῆναι πρῶτα γενέσθαι, πρὶν πηδαλίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, κἆτ' ἐντεῦθεν πρωρατεῦσαι καὶ τοὺς ἀνέμους διαθρῆσαι, κἆτα κυβερνῶν αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ,

a passage already referred to by Camerarius (Interp. p. 114). As to the κυβερνήτης, cp. c. 6. 1279 a 3.

- 24. δῆλον ὡς κ.τ.λ. Translate, with Bernays (see also Sepulveda's note on 'perfectissima cuiusque ratio,' p. 77 b), 'it is clear that the most exact definition of the virtue of each will be special to the man.' As to λόγος, 'definition,' see Bon. Ind. 434 b 6 sqq., where it is pointed out that λόγος is sometimes used in a wider sense than ὁρισμός, and as to the contrast of ἴδιος and κοινὸς λόγος, see Bon. Ind. 339 a 55 and vol. i. p. 242 note.
- 25. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμόσει πᾶσιν. The phrase recurs in De An. 2. 3. 414 b 22, γένοιτο δ' αν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ος ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ' οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος. 'Ομοίως δέ, ' but equally.'
- 26. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 961 E, ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης ἄμα καὶ ναῦται τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῷ κυβερνητικῷ νῷ συγκερασάμενοι σώζουσιν αὐτούς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ναῦν; and Demosth. Phil. 3. c. 69, εως ἃν σώζηται τὸ σκάφος . . . τότε χρὴ καὶ ναύτην καὶ κυβερνήτην καὶ πάντ' ἄνδρα έξῆς προθύμους εἶναι, καὶ ὅπως μήθ' ἐκὼν μήτ' ἄκων μηδεὶς ἀνατρέψη, τοῦτο σκοπεῖσθαι. Giph. refers to Cic. Epist. Ad Fam. 12. 25. 5.
- 28. ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 19 sqq. 'The safeguarding of the association' seems hardly to answer to 'the safeguarding of the voyage'; we expect rather 'the safeguarding of the successful working of the State'; and though the πολιτικὴ κοινωνία is often, as here, identified with the πολιτεία (compare for instance 2. 1. 1260 b 27 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 35), the πόλις is more usually said to be the κοινωνία (e.g. in c. 3. 1276 b 1). For the structure of the sentence, in which (with Stahr, Bern., Sus., and others) I take κοινωνία to be the subject and ἡ πολιτεία the predicate, cp. c. 6. 1278 b 10,

κύριον μεν γάρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία: c. 7. 1279 a 25 sqq.: and c. 13. 1283 b 41, πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν' πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ. See also note on 1275 a 22.

33. τον δ' ἀγαθον ἄνδρα κ.τ.λ. Supply ἀγαθόν with εἶναι: cp. 35, τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἡν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ. Compare the line of an unknown elegiac poet quoted in Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 34,

έσθλοι μέν γὰρ άπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί,

and Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1237 a 30, δ δὲ σπουδαίος τέλειος: also Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3, τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν. Τελεία ἀρετή in the passage before us probably means ἀρετὴ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα. It turns out, indeed, on further investigation (1277 b 18 sqq.), that the virtue of the good man is not strictly one, but has two forms, the virtue of the ruler and the virtue of the ruled. As to φαμέν, see below on 1277 a 14.

**34.**  $\mu \hat{\epsilon} \nu$  oữ is answered by oữ  $\mu \hat{\eta} \nu$  å $\lambda \lambda \acute{a}$ , 36, as in 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 4 sqq. (Sus. Ind. Gramm. s. v.  $M \acute{\epsilon} \nu$ ), and also in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.

36. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., 'not but that it is possible in another way also to go over the same argument in reference to the best constitution by raising questions and debating them.' 'In another way,' because hitherto the best constitution has not been made the subject of the inquiry. For ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, cp. Phys. 8. 5. 256 a 21 (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 267 a 39), ἔτι δὲ καὶ δίδε του αὐτον τοῦτον λόγον ἔστιν ἐπελθεῖν. Lamb. translates, 'veruntamen etiam alio modo eandem rationem pertractare et persegui licet de optima reipublicae administrandae forma dubitantibus': thus he seems to take διαποροῦντας with περὶ της ἀρίστης πολιτείας (as do apparently Stahr and Bernays), but not, I think, rightly. Διαποροῦντας (here = διερχομένους τὰς ἀπορίας, Bon. Ind. 187 b 11) is added to indicate to us the mode of investigation which Aristotle is about to adopt. That Aristotle 'goes over the same argument' we shall see if we bear in mind that he has just shown that the good citizen will not necessarily be a good man under any and every constitution, and now goes on to show that this is true of the best constitution also. For κατ' άλλον τρόπου cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 10 and 2. 8. 1269 a 13, and (with Bonitz, Ind. 772 b 19) Meteor. 1. 3. 340a 15.

37. εὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if it is impossible that a State should consist of members all of whom are good, and yet each member

must discharge his function well, and this proceeds from virtue, [so that, though all will not be good, all will possess virtue, i.e. the virtue of the citizen, still, as it is impossible that all the citizens should be alike, there would not be one form of virtue belonging to the good citizen and to the good man; for the virtue of the good citizen ought to belong to all (for it is necessarily only in that way that the State will come to be the best State), but the virtue of the good man cannot possibly belong to all, unless all the citizens in the good State must necessarily be good, [which we have declared to be impossible].' It is implied that the citizens will not be alike if they all possess the virtue of a citizen, but that they will, if they possess in addition the virtue of a good man. The virtue of the good man is one, whereas the virtue of the good citizen varies with the function discharged. Compare 2. 2. 1261 a 24, οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις έξ δμοίων, a doctrine which may also be traced in 3. 12. 1283 a 18 sq. and 3. II. I281 b 34 sqq., and indeed in Fragm. 21 of the Aeolus of Euripides,

> δοκεῖτ' ἃν οἰκεῖν γαῖαν, εἰ πένης ἄπας λαὸς πολιτεύοιτο πλουσίων ἄτερ; οὐκ ἃν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά, ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ' ἔχειν καλῶς,

where Euripides perhaps has before him Heraclitus' doctrine of the harmony of contraries. But is it Aristotle's view that the citizens of the 'best State' cannot all be good men? This does not seem to be his view in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq., where we are told that all the citizens of the 'best State' will be good men (compare 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 9, where it appears to be implied that there may be States in which all the citizens are good men). Either we must admit a discrepancy between the passage before us and these passages and leave it unexplained, or we may seek to explain it by saying (with Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 209, note 2: see my first volume, p. 236, note 2) that the passage before us is merely aporetic, or by supposing that the word 'citizen' is used in the passage before us (as seems sometimes to be the case, see vol. i. Appendix B) in a wider sense than in 4 (7).

39. ἀπ' ἀρετῆs, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 12 and Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 22 sqq.

1277 a. 5. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. This is a further thrust. In 1276 b 37-1277 a 5 it has been argued that though all the citizens of the best State will

be good citizens, they will not all be good men, but now it is argued that they will not all be good citizens in the same way—one will be a good citizen in the way in which a ruler is a good citizen, and another a good citizen in the way in which a ruled person is a good citizen—and thus the virtue of all the citizens will not be the same, so that if the various forms of the virtue of the citizen are not identical with each other, they cannot all be identical with the virtue of the good man. This argument leads directly up to what follows in 1277 a 12 sqq., and I cannot agree with Susemihl that it ought to be bracketed as an interpolation. I did not see the relation in which 1277 a 5–12 stands to 1276 b 37–1277 a 5 so clearly when I wrote vol. i. p. 236 as I do now. See also Prof. J. A. Stewart's remarks in defence of the genuineness of 1277 a 5–12 in Class. Rev. 9. 456.

- 8. κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου. Bernays brackets κτῆσις, and I do not feel sure that he is wrong. If we retain the word, Aristotle's meaning will apparently be that ownership of property consists of master and slave, or in other words implies the existence of an owner and a slave. Surely, however, ownership implies the existence of things owned as well as of persons owned?
- 9. ἄλλων ἀνομοίων εἰδῶν, such as ruling and ruled citizens, and soldiers in contrast with deliberators and judges.
- 11. ἄσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου. As the tragic chorus marched into the theatre in its five ranks and three files (see above on 1276 b 4), its left-hand file was turned to the audience and its right-hand file to the stage; the left-hand file was consequently the most conspicuous of the three files. The κορυφαίος was third in this file, the two παραστάται second and fourth, and the two τριτοστάται (Metaph. Δ. 11. 1018 b 27) first and fifth. See on this subject C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 206 sq. (A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalt.). For the absence of the article before κορυφαίου see note on 1285 b 12.
- 12. διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἁπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, sc. ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου, for here the question raised in 1276 b 17 receives an answer.
- 13. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἔσται τινὸς κ.τ.λ., 'but will not the virtue of the good citizen and the good man be the same in a particular citizen?' By τινός is evidently meant ἄρχοντος, cp. 20 sqq. For the absence of the article before ἀρετή, see note on 1276 b 5.
  - 14. φαμέν δη κ.τ.λ., 'we say that a good ruler (of any kind) is

good and prudent, and the man who is capable of ruling a State (1278 b 3 sqq.) must necessarily be prudent.' To be ἀγαθός is not the same thing as to be φρόνιμος (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 a 14, δ μάλλον αν έλοιτο ὁ φρόνιμος η ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ), though one cannot be φρόνιμος without being ἀγαθός (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 36), or indeed really άγαθός without being φρόνιμος (1144 b 16, 31). Cp. c. 11. 1281 b 4, ἀρετης καὶ φρονήσεως. As to δή, see note on 1252 a 24. Φαμέν seems to be used by Aristotle when he recalls some well-known principle of his philosophy (as in 1. 2. 1253 a 9, οὐδὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ή φύσις ποιεί), or repeats what he has already said in the same treatise (as in 3. 18. 1288 a 32) or in another (as in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7, φαμέν δέ καὶ έν τοις ήθικοις), or gives utterance to some generally accepted view. Φαμέν may here possibly refer to 1.13. 1260 a 17, διό τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἢθικὴν ἀρετήν (i.e. μετά φρονήσεως, see note on this passage), where the head of a household is referred to, but the view was a commonly accepted one (Xen. Hipparch. 7. 1, παντί μέν οὖν προσήκει ἄρχοντι φρονίμω εἶναι, where the rule is applied to generals of cavalry: Plato, Rep. 433 C: Isocr. De Antid. § 71: Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 22). If every ruler needs to be φρόνιμος, the ruler of a State does so especially; indeed we are told in Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 23 that πολιτική and φρόνησις are the same habit. Cp. Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 22, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Βάττον . . . είς Διβύην έπεμψαν οἰκιστήν, ὅτι τραυλὸς μέν ἦν καὶ ἰσχνόφωνος, βασιλικός δέ καὶ πολιτικός καὶ Φρόνιμος.

16. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εἰθὺς κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed the very education of a ruler some make out to be different (from that of a ruled person),' i. e. not only his virtue, but the training by which it is imparted; or possibly not only the virtue of the fully-developed ruler, but his very education, which begins in childhood and is the first step in his development. Aristotle quite agrees that if the rulers are to be throughout life different from the ruled, their education will be different (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.), but the rulers of his best State, unless it takes the form of an Absolute Kingship, will be ruled first and rulers afterwards (1332 b 25 sqq.).

17. ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται κ.τ.λ., 'as in fact we see that the sons of kings are taught riding and the art of war.' For καὶ φαίνονται, see note on 1262 a 18. Compare Plut. De Adul. et Amic. c. 16, Καρνεάδης δὲ ἔλεγεν ὅτι πλουσίων καὶ βασιλέων παῖδες ἱππεύειν μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εὖ καὶ καλῶς μανθάνουσι: Strabo p. 730, μέμνηται δ' 'Ονησίκριτος καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ Δαρείου τάφω γράμμα τόδε, " φίλος ἦν τοῖς

φίλοις ἱππεὺς καὶ τοξότης ἄριστος ἐγενόμην κυνηγῶν ἐκράτουν πάντα ποιεῖν ἠδυνάμην": Plut. Pyrrh. c. 8, καὶ ὅλως τοῦτο (strategy) μελετῶν ἔοικε καὶ φιλοσοφῶν ἀεὶ διατελεῖν ὁ Πύρρος, ὡς μαθημάτων βασιλικώτατον κ.τ.λ. The sons of the great at Athens were trained in riding (Isocr. Areopag. § 45: Plato, Meno 93 D, 94 B), but not Greek boys in general, as would seem from the passage before us and from 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 23 sqq.; Persian boys, on the contrary, were taught to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth (Hdt. 1. 136).

19. καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ κ.τ.λ. Occasionally (here for instance and in 1. 13. 1260 a 29), but not always (see 1. 6. 1255 a 36), Aristotle ascribes to the dramatic poet himself a saying placed by him in the mouth of one of his characters. The fragment before us is from the Aeolus and is preserved in a completer form by Stobaeus, Floril. 45. 13 (Eurip. Fragm. 16 Nauck),

λαμπροί δ' ἐν αἰχμαῖς "Αρεος ἔν τε συλλόγοις μή μοι τὰ κομψὰ ποικίλοι γενοίατο, ἀλλ' ὧν πόλει δεῖ, μεγάλα βουλεύοιντ' ἀεί.

The lines are no doubt spoken by King Aeolus and relate to the princes his sons. Thus they are quite to the point. In τὰ κομψά Euripides probably has in view the varied subtleties which had been introduced into Greek education in the days which followed the repulse of the Persian invasion (5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), whether connected with musical art or with such subjects as geometry and astronomy (for in Xen. Mem. 4. 7 Socrates thinks it necessary to prescribe limits to these studies) and dialectic and philosophy. See note on 1337 a 39. Mr. Richards compares Thuc. 1. 84. 5, μὴ τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὅντες, τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγω καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργω ἐπεξιέναι. In ὧν πόλει δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Euripides is thinking partly of prowess in arms, cp. Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31 sqq.: Eurip. Suppl. 855 Bothe, 881 Dindorf,

ό δ' αὖ τρίτος τῶνδ' Ἱππομέδων τοιόσδ' ἔψυ παῖς ὧν ἐτόλμησ' εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὰς Μουσῶν τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μαλθακὸν βίου, ἀγροὺς δὲ ναίων, σκληρὰ τῆ φύσει διδοὺς ἔχαιρε πρὸς τἀνδρεῖον, εἴς τ' ἄγρας ἰὼν ἵπποις τε χαίρων, τόξα τ' ἐντείνων χεροῖν, πόλει παρασχεῖν σῶμα χρήσιμον θελων,

Eurip. Fragm. 284. 16 sqq., 362. 25 sqq., and a fragment of the Phaedo or Phaedrias of Alexis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 497),

μάχιμος γὰρ ἀνήρ, χρήσιμος δὲ τῆ πόλει.

Compare also Antiphon, Tetral. 2. 2. 3, ἐδόκουν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε ταῦτα παιδεύων τὸν υἱὸν ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα τὸ κοινὸν ἀφελεῖται, ἀμφοῖν τι ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν ἀποβήσεσθαι, where teaching boys how to hurl the dart is referred to. But Euripides probably has especially before him the teaching of Protagoras of Abdera, who claims in Plato, Protag. 318 D sqq. that he does not, like Hippias of Elis, carry boys back to the arts from which they have just escaped and make them study calculation, astronomy, geometry, and music, but teaches εὐβουλία περί τε τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἄν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἄν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Cp. Gorg. 491 A sq., where Callicles expresses similar views.

**20.** ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. Cp. 2. 11. 1273 a 31, ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου. ἀρετή, not ή ἀρετή, see note on 1276 b 5.

23. τινός μέντοι πολίτου. See note on 1276 a 28.

24. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. Διὰ τοῦτο, because the virtue of a citizen is different from that of a ruler, a citizen having, at any rate occasionally, to become a private man, a part which Jason did not know how to play. The first question which arises as to this saying of Jason's is as to the meaning of  $\delta \tau \epsilon \mu \dot{\eta}$  here.  $0 \tau \epsilon \mu \dot{\eta}$  is used with the optative in Hom. Il. 13. 319 and 14. 247 sq., etc. and Odyss. 16. 197 in the sense of 'unless,' or, according to Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 512. 4 b, 'except when,' and Bern. and Sus. render it 'unless' in the passage before us (Bern. 'er habe nichts zu essen, wenn er nicht Tyrann sei': Sus.4, 'he must starve if he were not on the throne'). But if  $\delta \tau \epsilon \mu \dot{\eta}$  meant 'unless' here, should we not have had πεινην αν rather than πεινην? I incline, therefore, to translate πεινην ὅτε μη τυραννοι either 'he was a starving man except when he was tyrant' or (as Mr. Welldon) 'he was a starving man whenever he was not tyrant' (cp. Thuc. 2. 15. 2, όπότε μή τι δείσειαν). The second of these two renderings is open to the objection that it implies that Jason was more than once tyrant of Pherae and that his tenure of the tyranny was not continuous, a fact which we do not learn elsewhere, and as the first is less open to this objection and also has the merit of giving the same meaning to  $\delta \tau \epsilon \mu \dot{\eta}$  in the passage before us as it bears in Homer, perhaps it is to be preferred. A further question is whether Jason meant by πεινην literal starvation (his ignorance of the art of being a private man making it impossible for him to maintain himself in that capacity), or starvation in a metaphorical sense (compare such expressions as 'auri sacra fames'). I incline to

the latter view. A man who does not possess the virtue of an ἀρχόμενος is not thereby incapacitated for earning a living as a ruled person; he is only incapacitated for τὸ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. As to Jason see vol. i. p. 237, note 1. Isocrates (Philip. § 65) describes Dionysius the Elder as 'desiring monarchy in an irrational and frenzied way.' 'The Venetian chronicler says of Giovanni Frangipane,' who had resigned the position of Count of Veglia and had retired to Venice, '"He was no more able to live in a free city than night can abide the rising of the sun"' (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 3. 135).

ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ. 'ὅΟτε μή is always found in the best authors with the optative' (Liddell and Scott s.v. ὅτε).

- 25. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖταί γε κ.τ.λ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. 'Επαινεῖται, 'id est, virtus est: habitus enim laudabiles virtutes vocamus, ut ipse ait in fine libri primi Ethicorum' (Sepulveda, who here refers to Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 9, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν). Compare also Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 1 and 2. 7. 1108 a 31, ἡ γὰρ αἰδῶς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. Thus the transition from ἐπαινεῖται, 25, to ἡ ἀρετή, 26, is an easy one. Agesilaus was praised for knowing both how to rule and how to be ruled (e.g. in Xen. Ages. 2. 16); Lysander, on the other hand, is described by Plutarch (Lysand. c. 20) as τὸν οἴκοι ζυγὸν οὐ φέρων οὐδ' ὑπομένων ἄρχεσθαι. Plato had said (Laws 942 C), τοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰρήνη μελετητέον εὐθὺς ἐκ τῶν παίδων, ἄρχειν τε ἄλλων ἄρχεσθαί θ' ὑφ' ἐτέρων.
- 26. καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου (δοκεῖ) ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Laws 643 E, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. Δόκιμος takes the place of τέλεος and καλῶς of μετὰ δίκης. As to the insertion of δοκεῖ see critical note.
- 28. τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἄμφω, i.e. τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς.
- 29. οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως. "Αμφω, the two aptitudes just referred to. Aristotle hints that the citizen must in fact possess two different kinds of virtue unequal in praiseworthiness (see vol. i. p. 237). He here anticipates the conclusion which he is slowly approaching. So Sepulveda, who has a note on 'Non eodem modo utrumque laudabitur,'—'non erit eadem virtus.'

έπει οὖν . . . 32. κατίδοι τις. 'Since then it is occasionally held that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things and not the same, and that the citizen [who is both ruler and ruled] should understand both and share in both, one may see at a glance the further course of the inquiry.' The next step in it is to point out that the citizen should not learn the work of all kinds of ruled persons. Armed with this principle, we are able to reconcile the two contradictory views. Aristotle here, as often elsewhere, sets two conflicting opinions side by side and brings them into collision, in order to show that each contains an element of truth. One view is that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things; the other is that the citizen, who is in part a ruler, should learn both how to rule and how to be ruled, or in other words should learn the same things as the ruled. Both of these views are partly true. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens, and therefore the citizen, should not learn the work of unfreely ruled persons. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn the same things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens should learn to be ruled as a freeman is ruled. Thus the truth lies midway, Aristotle thinks, between the two opinions. For τοὖντεῦθεν, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 13, έντεθθεν μικρόν έπισκεψαμένοις, and Plato, Symp. 217 E, μέχρι μέν οὖν δὴ δεῦρο τοῦ λόγου καλῶς αν ἔχοι καὶ πρὸς όντινοῦν λέγειν, τὸ δ' ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ. In Polit. 271 B, τὸ γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν, οἶμαι, χρή ξυννοείν εχόμενον γάρ εστι κ.τ.λ., it is explained by εχόμενον (as in Aristoph. Eq. 131 sq. Didot by μετὰ τοῦτον): cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 6. 1223 a I SQ.

31. ἀμφότερ' ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν. This reversal in the order of words (a kind of Chiasmus) is not uncommon in the Politics. Compare for instance c. 14. 1285 b 30, ἔκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη: 1. 1. 1252 a 4, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη: 3. 6. 1278 b 11, λέγω δ' οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τοὐναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις: 3. 11. 1281 b 11 sq.: 3. 17. 1288 a 3 sq.: 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 18, ὧσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὖρον: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19–21: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 22 sq. See Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολιτεία 'Αθηναίων des Aristoteles, p. 100, for similar instances from that work. The occasional occurrence in the Politics of this studied arrangement of words affords an argument

against the view that it is a pupil's hasty report of Aristotle's lectures.

33. ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τἀναγκαῖα λέγομεν, 'and by this we mean the kind of rule which obtains in connexion with necessary services.' Τἀναγκαῖα = τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἔργα, cp. τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν in 2. 9. 1269 a 35. Λέγομεν, in much the same sense as λέγω, 36, though perhaps the 'we' in λέγομεν is the 'we' of a teacher (cp. c. 1. 1275 b 3, 19). The term δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή is not always used by Aristotle in the sense of 'the rule which obtains in connexion with necessary services'; it is not, for instance, in 3. 14. 1285 a 22. It should be noticed that by explaining δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή as ἡ περὶ τἀναγκαῖα ἀρχή Aristotle is enabled to represent even freemen who do necessary work (e.g. βάναυσοι) as subject to δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή, and not merely absolute slaves.

34. ά ποιείν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαίον, ἀλλά χρησθαι μαλλον. In the case of δεσποτική ἀρχή the ruler does not need to know how to do the things that the ruled do, but only how to use their services. Hence in this form of rule he does not need to learn how to be ruled in order to learn how to rule; he does not need to be a slave first in order to be a good master. In the case of πολιτική ἀρχή, on the other hand, the ruler does need to know how to do what the ruled does, or in other words how to be ruled, for it is thus that he learns to be a good ruler. In δεσποτική ἀρχή all that the ruler needs to know is how to use the services of slaves, and even this he hardly needs to know, for this knowledge has nothing exalted about it (4 (7). 3. 1325.a 24 sqq.: 1. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.), and a master may dispense with it by employing a steward (1. 7. 1255 b 35 sqq.). But if in δεσποτική ἀρχή the ruler does not need to know how to do the things that slaves do, still less does he need to be able to do them for another. Doing them for another stands on a far lower level than merely doing them and is fit only for slaves (cp. 1277 b 5 and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.).

37. δούλου δ' εἴδη πλείω λέγομεν. Δούλου takes up ἀνδραποδῶδες, 35. Aristotle adds this in order to show that he regards as ἀνδραποδῶδες, not only the work of actual slaves, but also that of βάναυσοι τεχυῖται and χερνῆτες generally. Λέγομεν is probably here used in the same sense as in 34, not in that in which it is used in c. 3. 1276 b 9, where it seems to mean 'men commonly say.' The βάναυσος τεχνίτης and the θής are implied to be closely allied to

the slave in 1. 13. 1260a 40 sqq.: 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 21: 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 13.

38. ὧν κ.τ.λ. <sup>\*</sup>Ων refers to τῶν ἐργασιῶν according to Bonitz, Ind. 377 a 7. For ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν, he (ibid.) compares 6 (4). 8. 1294a 17 sqq. Χερνής is a rare, and apparently a poetical, word: χειροτέχνης is the equivalent word in Attic prose.

οὖτοι δ' εἰσὶν κ.τ.λ. Montecatino's conjecture of αὐτῶν or αὐτό for αὐτούs is a tempting one (Richards would read αὐτοῖs), and one or other of these emendations may well be right, but it is also possible that as εἰσίν immediately precedes, we are intended to supply εἶναι from it with αὐτούs, for Aristotle often omits εἶναι when it can readily be supplied from a neighbouring εἶναι, ἐστιν, or εἰσιν, e. g. in 2. 12. 1273 b 40, 3. 4. 1276 b 20 sq., 1277 b 26 sq., 3. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq., 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sq., and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sq.; indeed, he sometimes omits it where this is not the case (see notes on 1260 a 14 and 1327 a 34, and Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7). Bonitz (Ind. s.v. σημαίνειν) compares Phys. 4. 7. 213 b 30, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ποτέρως ἔχει δεῖ λαβεῖν τί σημαίνει τοὔνομα. As to the derivation of χερνής see Liddell and Scott s.v. To live by manual labour allied a man to the class of slaves (1. 11. 1258 b 38: 1. 5. 1254 b 17 sqq.: 1. 13. 1259 b 25).

1277 b. 1. ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. Cp. Solon, Fragm. 13. 49, ἄλλος ᾿Αθηναίης τε καὶ Ἡφαίστου πολυτέχνεω ἔργα δαεὶς χειροῖν συλλέγεται βίστον.

In the passage before us  $\beta \acute{a}\nu a\nu \sigma oi$   $\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \hat{i} \tau ai$  are included under  $\chi \epsilon \rho \nu \hat{\eta} \tau \epsilon s$ , whereas in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18–25  $\tau \acute{o}$   $\chi \epsilon \rho \nu \eta \tau \iota \kappa \acute{o}\nu$  is distinguished from  $\tau \acute{o}$   $\pi \epsilon \rho \grave{i}$   $\tau \acute{a}s$   $\tau \acute{\epsilon} \chi \nu as$ . Aristotle speaks of  $\acute{o}$   $\beta \acute{a}\nu a\nu \sigma os$   $\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \acute{i} \tau \eta s$ , not simply  $\acute{o}$   $\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \acute{i} \tau \eta s$ , because not all  $\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \hat{\iota} \tau a\iota$  are  $\chi \epsilon \rho \nu \hat{\eta} \tau \epsilon s$ . In Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 6 sqq. physicians and generals appear to be included under  $\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \hat{\iota} \tau a\iota$ . He sometimes, however, uses the word  $\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \acute{\iota} \tau \eta s$  'ad significandos opifices' (see Bon. Ind. s. v.  $\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \acute{\iota} \tau \eta s$ ).

διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. Διό, because they are slaves (cp. c. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq.). Kaissling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 72) remarks that the use of πρίν here with an infinitive after a negative principal clause is contrary to the general rule. In  $\pi a \rho$ ' ἐνίοις Aristotle probably refers especially to Athens. If so, it would seem that handicraftsmen were excluded from office at Athens not only in the early days when it was confined to Eupatridae (Plut. Thes. c. 25: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 8), but even down to the time when the

ultimate democracy' was introduced (the time of Pericles or later). According to the 'Aθ. Πολ., c. 13, however, the board of ten archons appointed in the year after the archonship of Damasias included two demiurgi. Was Aristotle aware of this? That the fourth and lowest of the property-classes, τὸ θητικόν, was excluded by Solon from office is well known (2. 12. 1274 a 21: Plut. Solon c. 18). Did handicraftsmen belong to this class under Solon's legislation, even if they owned land enough to place them in one or other of the three higher classes? At Ragusa the artisans 'had no voice at all in the government, and were not admissible to any office' (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 309).

- 3. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν here, as in 2. 9. 1270 b 17 and elsewhere, is answered by ἀλλά (7). Sus. brackets τὸν ἀγαθόν, and it is true that the question with which we have been concerned from 1277 a 29 onwards has been what the citizen and ruler should learn, not what the good man should learn. But the capability of rendering to another servile service has been said to be ἀνδραποδώδες in 1277 a 35, and as the opposite of δ ἀνδραποδώδης is ό ἐπιεικής (Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.: cp. 10. 6. 1177 a 6 sqq.), Aristotle's first thought is that this capability is not one which should be acquired by & ayabos, his next that it should not be acquired by δ πολιτικός (who is φρόνιμος, 1277 a 15, and therefore  $\dot{a}_{\gamma}a\theta \dot{b}_{s}$ ), and his next that it should not be acquired by the good citizen. Compare the story of the captive Spartan youth in Plut. Apophth. Lac. Obscur. Vir. § 35, 234 B, who replied Οὐ δουλεύσω, when a specially humiliating service was demanded of him.
- 5. εἰ μή ποτε κ.τ.λ., 'except occasionally to satisfy some need arising for him in relation to himself, for then it no longer happens that the one party (the party to whom the service is rendered) comes to be a master and the other (the party who renders the service) a slave.' A man who learns to do servile work for himself does not learn to do it for a master, and it is to the good man or good citizen learning to become a slave and to serve a master that Aristotle objects. 'Si quis usus sui gratia sordidum opificium discat, ut Alfonsus dux Ferrariensis, qui singulari industria et artificio aenea tormenta bellica conficere sciebat, is, quia sibi, non alteri, servit, non debet servus more artificum appellari' (Sepulveda). So Bern., 'ausser etwa für seinen persönlichen Bedarf, weil in diesem Falle das Herrn- und Sclavenverhältniss

nicht mehr stattfindet.' Vict., however, explains οὐ γὰρ—δοῦλον otherwise, 'si deberet qui regit haec discere, futurum esse ut distingui non possit servus ab ero,' and so Mr. Welldon, who translates, 'else the relation of master and slave ceases to exist,' and Mr. Richards, 'a citizen should not be thoroughly familiar with the zpya of a slave, for then the difference between a master and a slave vanishes.' I prefer the interpretation of Sepulveda and Bernays. Αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν (a phrase recurring in 7 (5). I. 1302 a 12 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 13) is to be taken with xpeias χάριν: cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 10, έτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως έχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς. For χρείας χάριν, cp. Thuc. 1. 136. 6, καὶ αμα αὐτὸς μεν ἐκείνω χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σῶμα σώζεσθαι ἐναντιωθηναι. For the thought, see note on 1337 b 19, and cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31, καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν έργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην έλευθέρου γαρ το μή προς άλλον ζην: also Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 15, ἀλλὰ βοηθεί μοι τὸ τοῦ ἀντισθένους μνημονευόμενον θαυμάσαντος γάρ τινος εὶ δι' ἀγορᾶς αὐτὸς φέρει τάριχον, Ἐμαυτῷ γε, εἶπεν εγω δ' ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς τοὺς εγκαλοῦντας εἰ κεράμω παρέστηκα διαμετρουμένω . . . Οὐκ ἐμαυτῷ γε φημὶ ταῦτ' οἰκονομεῖν, άλλα τη πατρίδι, where Plutarch makes a notable advance on the older view. It should be noticed that Aristotle's language in the passage before us is carefully guarded; the doing of menial work, even for one's own behoof, is only permitted if it is occasional, not habitual, and in satisfaction of a need.

7. ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ., 'but there is a kind of rule which men exercise over those like themselves in birth and free, for it is of this nature that we say the political rule (the rule which obtains between citizens) is, which [unlike the rule over slaves] the ruler ought to learn while being ruled.' "Αρχει, sc. δ ἄρχων. political rule is exercised over men free and equal, we see from 1. 7. 1255 b 20. Citizens are alike in birth, even though some of them are more nobly born than others, but kings are superior in birth to those over whom they rule (3. 13. 1284 a 11 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12), and the master of a slave is of course superior in birth to his slave. When Aristotle says in 1. 12. 1259 b 15 that the king is the same τῷ γένει as those over whom he rules, he probably means 'in race.' Pericles was already familiar with the contrast between rule over freemen and other kinds of rule (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 17, where we read that he said to himself, αναλαμβάνων την χλαμύδα, Πρόσεχε, Περίκλεις ελευθέρων άρχεις,

Έλλήνων ἄρχεις, πολιτῶν 'Αθηναίων), and Lysander also, who said, when the Spartan harmost Callibius raised his staff to strike the athlete Autolycus, that 'he knew not how to rule over freemen' (Plut. Lysand. c. 15).

- 10. στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. For the absence of καὶ before στρατηγεῖν see critical note on 1260 a 26, and cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 16, μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας. Καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα is added to show that one should not only have been under the command of a general before one becomes a general, for this might be said of a private soldier, but should have risen from the rank of a private to that of a lochagus, and from that rank to the rank of a taxiarch (compare the saying ascribed to the comic poet Crates by Aristophanes in Eq. 541 Didot, quoted above on 1276 b 22, and the principle underlying the ordo magistratuum at Rome). That the lochagus was subordinate to the taxiarch, we see from 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 1 sqq.: see also Liddell and Scott, s.v. ταξίαρχος.
- 11. διὸ λέγεται κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to a saying ascribed to Solon, ἄρχε πρῶτον μαθὼν ἄρχεσθαι (Diog. Laert. 1. 60), which Plato may have before him in Laws 762 E (quoted in vol. i. p. 238, note 1). Cp. also Cic. De Leg. 3. 2. 5 and M. Antonin. Comm. 11. 29. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' for Aristotle has already said that one should learn to rule freemen by being ruled, and now he goes further and says that it is not possible to rule them well without having been ruled. Alcibiades' experience of being ruled was probably far too short, for he figures as a leading statesman at Athens at a comparatively early age. Even good rulers have been thought to have lost somewhat through too rapid a rise in early life. Some traced Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's 'exceeding masterfulness' to this cause. 'He was pushed up the easiest possible incline to almost the top of the ladder of diplomatic rank before he was twenty-four' (S. Lane-Poole, Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 1. 80).
- 13. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα κ.τ.λ. Τούτων, i.e. τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀρχομένου τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχήν. Cp. 1. 13. 1259 b 32 sqq. Μέν, 'while,' as often elsewhere.
- 14. ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι. Δύνασθαι is a wider term than ἐπίστασθαι: knowledge is only one of the conditions of capability. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 2. 25, εἰσὶ δέ τινες τῶν Χαλδαίων οἱ ληζόμενοι ζῶσι

καὶ οὕτ' ἃν ἐπίσταιντο ἐργάζεσθαι οὕτ' ἃν δύναιντο, εἰθισμένοι ἀπὸ πολέμου Βιοτεύειν.

15. ἀρετή. For the absence of the article before  $d\rho$ ετή see note on 1253 b 11.

16. ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, 'on both sides,' i.e. both as ruler and as ruled: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 12.1143 a 35, και ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 18, ἐκοινώνουν δὲ οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῆς δόξης ἐπ' ἀμφότερα (i.e. both when their repute was bad and when it was good).

καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω, i.e. τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχήν. Thus Aristotle's 'best State,' which is composed of σπουδαῖοι (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.), is also composed of men who have learnt to rule well by being ruled (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 2) and who interchange ruling and being ruled (1332 b 25 sqq.). As to καὶ . . . δή see above on 1253 a 18.

17. καὶ εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'and if the temperance and justice appropriate to a ruler differ in kind [from the temperance and justice appropriate to a person ruled but free, for the temperance and justice of a person ruled but free are also different in kind [from those of a ruler, it is clear that the good man's virtue, for instance his justice, will be of two kinds,' [for the good man must have the virtue which fits him to rule and also the virtue which fits him to be ruled.] That the virtue of the ruler is different in kind from that of the ruled we have seen in 1. 13. 1259 b 32-1260 a 24, a passage with which that before us is nearly connected. For the suppression in 17 of 'from the temperance and justice appropriate to a person ruled but free, cp. 1277 a 16, καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς έτέραν είναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος, where 'from that of the ruled' is suppressed, and [Plut.] Consol. ad Apollonium, c. 23, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι ό ἄωρος θάνατος, ώς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει (SC. τοῦ ώραίου). For the ellipse in καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ see the examples collected by Bonitz, Ind. s.v. γάρ (146 a 50 sqq.), and especially Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 21, περί δὲ τὰς ίδίας τῶν ήδονῶν πολλοί καὶ πολλαχῶς άμαρτάνουσιν τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων (SC. πολλοὶ άμαρτάνουσιν) ή τῷ χαίρειν οἶς μὴ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. So here with καὶ γαρ αρχομένου μεν ελευθέρου δέ we must supply ετερόν έστιν είδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, or possibly, as Mr. Richards suggests, ἔστι σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη. For the absence of the article before άρετή in τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, see note on 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκήπτρου èπανάτασις. Aristotle had assumed for a moment in an aporetic

argument (1276 b 33) that the virtue of the good man is of one kind only, but he now arrives at a different conclusion. Plato had already so far distinguished the virtue of the ruler from that of the ruled as to say that poomous exists only in the ruler (Rep. 433 C), but neither he nor Protagoras had drawn any distinction between the temperance and justice of the ruler and the same qualities in the ruled, when they said (Plato, Rep. 431 E-432 B, 433 D: Protag. 324 D-325 A) that justice and temperance should be possessed by all classes in the State. Aristotle's principle is that ruling differs in kind from being ruled, and that therefore the virtue of the ruler differs in kind from the virtue of the ruled (1. 13. 1259 b 37 sq.). I do not remember any other passage in Aristotle's writings in which this view is expressed with equal distinctness. He appears in what follows to connect the difference between the courage and temperance of the man and the woman with the more active and arduous nature of the functions of the man in household management.

20. καθ' α, cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 13, δύναμιν καθ' ην ἔσται πρακτικός. ὅσπερ κ.τ.λ. This has been already said in 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sqq., where we are told that these virtues in the man are ἀρχικαί and in the woman ὑπηρετικαί. In Poet. 15. 1454 a 22 we read ἔστι γὰρ ἀνδρείον μὲν τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ άρμόττον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἡ δεινὴν εἶναι, but Ac has τῶι in place of the second τό with a blank space before it large enough for two letters, and Vahlen conjectures οῦτως. The article is absent before σωφροσύνη in γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἐτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία, just as it is often absent in similar sentences where ὁ αὐτός occurs: see above on 1276 b 5, 7, and 1277a 13, and cp. 24, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἐτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός.

22. καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός. Looking to δειλός, 22, which is the opposite of ἀνδρεῖος, we might expect to find ἀκόλαστος, the opposite of σώφρων, in place of λάλος, and Susemihl on the strength of 'inhonesta' in Leonardus Aretinus' translation places ἀκόλαστος in his text, but λάλος is probably right. Λάλος is often opposed to κόσμιος, e.g. in Philem. 'Αδελφοί, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 5),

οὐκ, ἄν λαλῆ τις μικρόν, ἐστὶ κόσμιος, οὐδ' ἄν πορεύηταί τις εἰς τὴν γῆν βλέπων ό δ' ἡλίκον μὲν ἡ φύσις φέρει λαλῶν, μηδὲν ποιῶν δ' ἄσχημον, οὖτος κόσμιος.

Λάλος, it is true, is found only in II1, but II2 (except P4, which has

ἄλαλος) have ἄλλος, which is frequently found in MSS. as a misreading for λάλος (see for instance Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 858: 3. 567). L. Schmidt has shown (Ethik der alten Griechen, 1. 313) how nearly akin κοσμιότης is to σωφροσύνη. Compare with the passage before us Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 364 (Nauck),

άλλος γυναικός κόσμος, άλλος άρσένων.

24. ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ. For the transition here from ἀρετή to οἰκονομία, compare what Meno says in Plato, Meno 71 E, εὶ δὲ βούλει γυναικός αρετήν, ου χαλεπόν διελθείν, ότι δεί αυτήν την οικίαν εθ οικείν, σώζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. Aristotle evidently has this passage before him, and probably also Xen. Oecon. 7, 25, έπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ Φυλάττειν τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα τῆ γυναικὶ προσέταξε, γιγνώσκων δ θεὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὸ φυλάττειν οὐ κάκιον ἐστι φοβερὰν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πλείον μέρος καὶ τοῦ φόβου έδάσατο τῆ γυναικὶ ἢ τῷ ἀνδρί. Compare also [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 26-1344 a 8. The account given there and in the passage before us of the household management of the man as being concerned with acquiring is, however, at issue with the usual teaching of Aristotle on the subject, which is that household management has to do with using: see above on 1256 a 11. To acquire is more difficult than to keep and demands a higher type of virtue (Demosth. Ol. 2. 26, πολύ γὰρ ράον ἔχοντας φυλάττειν ή κτήσασθαι πάντα πέφυκεν: Dio Cass. Hist. Rom. 52. 18. 5, καὶ μακρῷ τὸ φυλάξαι τι τοῦ κτήσασθαι ράον ἐστι' πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ τάλλότρια προσποιήσασθαι καὶ πόνων καὶ κινδύνων δεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα σῶσαι βραχεῖα Φροντὶς ἀρκεῖ).

25. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη, 'and moral prudence [is the only virtue which has not two kinds, for it] is the only virtue which is peculiar to the ruler.' This sentence is a continuation in a rough way of 18–21. The fem. form ἴδιος is used here, as in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 12 and De Part. An. 2. 7. 652 b 2, in all three cases before a word commencing with a vowel (see note on 1283 a 33). Bonitz (Ind. 472 b 44) gives a number of instances in which the word μόνος is placed at the end of a sentence, among them Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 20. As to the ruler's need of φρόνησις see above on 1277 a 14. It has been already said (above on 17) that Plato treats φρόνησις as peculiar to the ruler in Rep. 433 C, a passage which Aristotle also has before him when he ascribes δόξα ἀληθής to the ruled. Compare Timaeus 51 D sqq. and the contrast between ruler and ruled in Laws 734 E sq. Yet in Laws 632 C Plato speaks of instituting guardians of the laws, τοὺς μὲν διὰ

φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας, so that in the State of the Laws there were to be rulers without φρόνησις, armed only with true opinion (see as to this vol. i. pp. 437, 449). For the effect of 'true opinion respecting what is noble and just and good and the contrary' on the character of the members of a State, see Plato, Polit. 309 C sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 203 b 52) refers to Aristot. περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως Ι. 450 a 15, διὸ καὶ ἐτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζώων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἡ φρόνησιν, where the distinction reappears.

- 26. ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἶναι see notes on 1260 a 14 and 1277 a 38.
- 28. ἀρχομένου δέ γε κ.τ.λ., 'but as to a person ruled, his virtue is not moral prudence but true opinion, for the ruled person is like a flute-maker, while the ruler is a flute-player, who uses what the flute-maker makes.' The reason assigned seems at first sight to be no reason at all, till we recall 1.8. 1256 a 5 sqq. and 1. 10. 1258 a 21 sqq., where the art that makes is explained to be ministerial (ὑπηρετική) and subordinate to the art that uses. The ruled person is similarly ministerial to the ruler, and hence has a merely ministerial kind of virtue. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 13. 1246 b 11, ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ τῆ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρῆται. Compare also (with Sus.², Note 499) Plato, Rep. 601 D, οἶον αὐλητής που αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγγελεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν, οἶ ἄν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οῖους δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ ὑπηρετήσει, and (with Prof. Jowett) Cratyl. 388 sqq. (esp. 390 B sqq.). Γε in δέ γε qualifies ἀρχομένου: see Liddell and Scott s. ν. γε sub fin.
- 31. καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἐτέρα. The virtue of a good citizen has been shown to be the same as the virtue of the good man in the case of the citizen of the best State who is possessed of φρόνησις, or in other words who is capable of ruling. For πῶς, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 41 sqq.
- 34. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The question raised here is probably C. 5. suggested by the mention in c. 4. 1277 b 1 of the fact that in some States handicraftsmen had no share in office till the 'ultimate democracy' came into being. Cp. Polyb. 10. 17. 6, where οἱ πολιτικοί are distinguished from οἱ χειροτέχναι. But surely handicraftsmen even in those States shared in the ἀόριστος ἀρχή access to which, according to c. 1. 1275 a 30 sqq., suffices to make a man a citizen? Aristotle now seems to require that the citizen shall share not merely in ἀόριστος ἀρχή, but in ἀρχαί strictly so called

- (35 sqq.). He appears to hold that if a citizen does not do so, he cannot be said to possess the virtue of a citizen (36). Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of citizen-virtue results, in fact, in a change in his standard of citizenship; at any rate we are told in 1278 a 35 that  $\delta \mu \acute{a}\lambda \iota \sigma \tau a \pi o \lambda \acute{\iota} \tau \eta s$  is to be found in  $\delta \mu \epsilon \tau \acute{\epsilon} \chi \omega \nu \tau \acute{\omega} \nu \tau \iota \mu \acute{\omega} \nu$ .
- 37. τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν, 'the virtue which we have ascribed to the citizen' (cp. 1278 a 9, πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἡν εἴπομεν), i. e. the virtue which fits men both to rule and to be ruled.

οὖτος γὰρ πολίτης. Οὖτος, i.e. ὦ μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν. The addition of οὖτος γὰρ πολίτης seems unnecessary, but it is quite in Aristotle's manner: cp. c. 1. 1275 a 11, and the addition of οἱ μὲν γὰρ θορικὰ ἔχουσιν, οἱ δ' ὑστέρας in De Gen. An. 3. 5. 755 b 20 sqq., and see notes on 1282 a 36 and b 39.

- 38. ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέος ἔκαστος; 'in what class are we to place the individual handicraftsman?' For ἐν τίνι μέρει see Liddell and Scott s. v. μέρος. Compare Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 23, εἰ σκέψαισθ ἐν τίνι τάξει ποτ' ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ οὖ τὸ ψήφισμα εἴρηται, πότερα ξένος ἢ μέτοικος ἢ πολίτης ἐστίν.
- 39. διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, 'by reason of this statement at any rate,' i.e. the statement that βάναυσοι are not citizens nor metoeci nor aliens. Cp. Metaph. Λ. 10. 1075 a 25, ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι.
- 1278 a. 2. των εἰρημένων, i. e. citizens metoeci and aliens.

τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ. The preceding sentence has pointed to the conclusion that βάναυσοι are not citizens, and γάρ introduces a justification of this conclusion. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.

- 4. où oi maîdes, 'not even the children, [though they come nearer to being citizens than handicraftsmen do].' For what follows cp. c. 1. 1275 a 14 sqq. The sons of citizens are said to be citizens è  $\delta = 0$  in  $\delta = 0$  because they are citizens not absolutely but 'on an assumption'—the assumption, namely, that they will become citizens when they grow older.
- 8. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις κ.τ.λ. For the use of μὲν οὖν here see note on 1265 b 12. It is answered by δέ, 8. The sense is—'Nay, in ancient times the handicraftsmen were in some States slaves or aliens, but the best State will not go so far as to make them slaves, it will refuse to make them citizens' (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 33 sqq.). Handicraftsmen would be especially likely to be slaves in military States (Xen. Oecon. 4.3, and Plut. Lycurg. et

Num. inter se comp. c. 2, αὐστηρὰ δὲ ἡ Λυκούργειος (διάταξις) καὶ άριστοκρατική, τὰς μέν βαναύσους ἀποκαθαίρουσα τέχνας εἰς οἰκετῶν καὶ μετοίκων χείρας, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς πολίτας εἰς τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ τὸ δόρυ συνάγουσα). In maritime and commercial States like Corinth, where handicraftsmen were less despised, there would be less eagerness to keep them outside the citizen-body. When Solon offered citizenship at Athens to persons immigrating with their families for the practice of a handicraft (Plut. Solon c. 24), he bade farewell to the old-fashioned policy of keeping handicraftsmen slaves and aliens, and aided in the creation of that numerous body of handicraftsmen, the existence of which made it possible for Themistocles a century later to build and equip a fleet (Diod. 11. 43. 3). That handicraftsmen were often strangers in early days is implied in Hom. Odyss. 17. 382 sqq., and it appears that the first makers of the peplos of Athena were two aliens, Aceseus of Patara and Helicon of Carystus (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 22), but, according to Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 321), we do not read in Homer of slaves employed in handicrafts.

- 7. διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν. That handicraftsmen were often aliens in Plato's day is implied in Laws 848 A, τὸ δὲ τρίτον δημιουργοῖς τε καὶ πάντως τοῖς ξένοις. Cp. also Andoc. ap. Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1007, where we read about Hyperbolus ὡς δὲ ξένος ὡν καὶ βάρβαρος λυχνοποιεῖ, and Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 31, ἡμεῖς δ' ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ ταινίας πωλεῖν καὶ ζῆν οὐχ ὅντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα' καὶ εἴ σοί ἐστι τοῦτο σημεῖον, ὡ Εὐβουλίδη, τοῦ μὴ ᾿Αθηναίους εἶναι ἡμᾶς κ.τ.λ. Even at Athens most handicraftsmen may have been slaves or aliens as late as the time of Aristotle, though the Athenian citizenbody undoubtedly comprised a large number of βάνανσοι.
- 9. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὖτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. For this use of ἀλλά in the sense of 'at any rate' in an apodosis after a conditional clause introduced by εἰ or ἐάν, see Bon. Ind. 33 a 42 sqq., and cp. Phys. 8. 6. 258 b 32-259 a 4.
  - 10. λεκτέον οὐ παντὸς κ.τ.λ., sc. είναι: see above on 1277 a 38.
- 11. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων κ.τ.λ. The expression τῶν ἀναγκαίων presents much difficulty. It is possible that the word ἀναγκαίων has been repeated by a scribe's mistake from the preceding sentence and has displaced some other word (perhaps ἄλλων, which Bernays would read in place of it). Another possible view is Prof. Postgate's (Notes, p. 26), who construes τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων 'and with respect to necessary services,' but the sentence certainly reads as if τῶν

ἀναγκαίων were masculine. If we take it as masculine, we may translate 'the necessary people,' so termed in contradistinction to 'those who are quit of necessary services,' and compare 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 15, τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις βοσκήμασιν. It is thus that Lambinus appears to interpret τῶν ἀναγκαίων, for his rendering is 'eorum autem qui operibus et muneribus necessariis funguntur.' Τὰ τοιαῦτα=τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἔργα. In speaking of slaves as rendering services to an individual, Aristotle forgets the case of public slaves.

12. οί δὲ κοινῆ κ.τ.λ. Compare their name δημιουργοί.

13. ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις, 'starting from this point and carrying our investigation a little further.' So we have in Meteor.

1. 3. 340 b 14 δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν οὕτως καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρξαμένους. Ἐντεῦθεν should probably be taken, as Susemihl takes it, with μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις, and not with φανερόν, as Bernays, followed by Mr. Welldon, takes it.

14. αὐτῶν, i. e. βάναυσοι and θῆτες.

αὐτὸ γὰρ φανὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆλον, 'for that which has been said is enough by itself, when once made known, to render this manifest.' Aristotle probably refers in τὸ λεχθέν to what has been said in c. 1. 1275 a 38 sqq. For φανέν, cp. Plato, Gorg. 508 E, ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, and Soph. O. T. 848,

άλλ' ως φανέν γε τούπος ωδ' επίστασο,

and Trachin. 1. Aristotle evidently has in his mind a familiar proverb αὐτὸ δείξει: cp. Plato, Protag. 324 A, εἰ γὰρ ἐθελεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὧ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει, ὅτι οῖ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν: Critias 108 C, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οἶόν ἐστιν, αὐτό σοι τάχα δηλώσει: Hipp. Maj. 288 B: Eurip. Orest. 1101 Bothe, 1129 Dindorf,

εἶτ' αὐτὸ δηλοῖ τοὔργον, ἢ τείνειν χρεών:

Androm. 261 Bothe, 265 Dindorf (for other references to Euripides see Liddell and Scott s. v. σημαίνω 1. 2): Aristoph. Lysistr. 375 Didot: Cratin. Πυλαία, Fragm. 9 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 114). See also *Rhein. Mus.* 42. 400.

16. καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου. Cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 3 sq.

18. οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 25 sqq. <sup>°</sup>Ην καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικήν, for ἀριστοκρατία in the truest sense of the word implies something more than the

award of office according to virtue; it implies a constitution under which all the citizens, or at any rate all the citizens capable of rule, are men of full excellence (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 31, ås καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατίας.

20. κατ' ἀξίαν is here associated with κατ' ἀρετήν, but we must not identify the two expressions. 'Aξία, as Hildenbrand has already pointed out (Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie 1. 294), attaches not only to virtue, but to property and to every other attribute which gives its possessor a special importance in relation to the life of the State. Τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον is commonly contrasted with τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον (e.g. in 7 (5). I. 1301 b 29 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.), whence we infer that constitutions not based on τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον, for instance oligarchy, are based in a sense on τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον: indeed, democracy itself, though commonly represented as resting its claims on τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.), is sometimes implied to rest them on τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ίσον (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq.: cp. Pol. 3. 17. 1288 a 20 sqq.). Wealth, virtue, high birth, education, and even ἐλευθερία, confer ἀξία (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq.). That the wealthy, the well-born, and the free-born have a real, and not merely a fancied, claim on the score of ågía, results, I think, from Pol. 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq. Their claim, however, cannot compare with that of men superior in virtue (3. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq.), and hence κατ' ἀξίαν is especially and most truly used in the Politics, as it is in the passage before us, of agía conferred by virtue (see 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 15: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33).

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq.: also Xen. Oecon. 4. 3, καὶ ἀσχολίας δὲ μάλιστα ἔχουσι καὶ φίλων καὶ πόλεως συνεπιμελεῖσθαι αἱ βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι (τέχναι) ωστε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσι κακοὶ καὶ φίλοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ταῖς πατρίσιν ἀλεξητῆρες εἶναι.

- 22. μέν, 'while,' as often elsewhere.
- 23. ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν κ.τ.λ. Not so, however, surely in the first kind of Oligarchy (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39-b 2). For τιμη-μάτων μακρῶν cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 1 and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 4: also 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16 and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11.
- 24. πλουτοῦσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has in his mind Hom. Odyss. 17. 386, where δημιοεργοί are referred to,

οὖτοι γὰρ κλητοί γε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν, πτωχὸν δ' οὐκ ἄν τις καλέοι τρύξοντα ε̂ αὐτόν.

Still Plato (Rep. 406 C) contrasts οἱ δημιουργοί with οἱ πλούσιοἱ τε καὶ εὐδαίμονες δοκοῦντες εἶναι. Καί intensifies οἱ πολλοί, 'quite the majority.' See Stallbaum's notes on Plato, Rep. 562 C and Laws 630 A.

25. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but in Thebes,' etc. Bern. translates δέκα ἐτῶν ' seit zehn Jahren' ('since ten years previously'), Sus. 'zehn Jahre lang' ('for the space of ten years'). In support of Bernays' rendering Kühner, Ausführl, gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 418.8 b, may be referred to. In Aristoph. Lysistr. 280 the Latin translation contained in Didot's Aristophanes renders έξ ἐτῶν ἄλουτος 'inde a sex annis illotus.' But I should prefer Susemihl's rendering of δέκα ἐτῶν if parallel passages from Aristotle's writings can be adduced in support of it. It is conceivable, though perhaps hardly likely, that διά has dropped out before δέκα. 'Απεσχημένον της αγοράς appears to mean 'abstained from selling in the agora.' Aristotle no doubt refers to the time when Thebes was under an oligarchical constitution; he contrasts the oligarchy which existed at Thebes with other forms of oligarchy under which it was possible for a handicraftsman to find his way into office, and evidently prefers the strictness of the Theban oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26, την δε μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ήτοι . . τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις ή, καθάπερ Θηβαίοις, αποσχομένοις χρόνον τινα των βαναύσων ἔργων κ.τ.λ. (It would seem, if we compare this passage with that before us, that abstaining from the practice of a handicraft and abstaining from selling in the agora were much the same thing; handicraftsmen would appear to have both manufactured their goods and sold them in the agora, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26-30). Xenophon may perhaps refer to Thebes as well as to the Lacedaemonian State when he says in Oecon. 4. 3. καὶ ἐν ἐνίαις μὲν τῶν πόλεων, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν ταῖς εὐπολέμοις δοκούσαις εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔξεστι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ βαναυσικάς τέχνας ἐργάζεσθαι. oligarchies went further and enacted laws forbidding holders of offices to engage in any lucrative occupation (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 3 sqq.). Nόμος ην is probably emphatic, as in 2. 9. 1270 b 3; there was no concealment in the way in which Thebes excluded Bávavou from office, as there was in the methods followed by some States (1278 a 38 sqq.).

26. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ., 'but on the other hand in many constitutions,' etc. Here we pass from one extreme to another, from the extreme strictness of the Theban oligarchy to

the extreme laxity of other constitutions. Aristotle evidently holds, in full agreement with current opinion, that to make aliens citizens was worse than making handicraftsmen citizens. The constitutions to which he refers were no doubt extreme democracies (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6-19), and it is noticeable that Aristotle does not charge even them with commonly admitting absolute aliens to citizenship, whatever they might do at special crises (see note on 1275 b 34); he speaks in the passage before us of 'some of the class of aliens' (των ξένων, not τους ξένους), and refers in particular to 'persons born of a citizen-mother and an alien father,' i.e. half-aliens. distinguishes these half-aliens from νόθοι, he would seem to regard them as born in wedlock. These half-aliens would differ much among themselves; the alien parent would be in some cases a Greek, in others an European or Asiatic barbarian, and a barbarian of high or low position. Cimon was the son of a Greek father and a Thracian princess, Themistocles of a Greek father and a Thracian or Carian woman of less exalted position, and this would be much the commoner case. Many half-aliens would probably be the offspring of marriages between poor citizenwomen and rich metoeci (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 299. 1). Similar differences would exist in the ranks of the νόθοι. The term νόθος was used in strictness to designate those who were not born in wedlock, even if they were descended from citizen-parents (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 190). Thus a νόθος might be more purely Athenian than the half-aliens of whom we have been speaking, for he might be the offspring of an illicit connexion between Athenians of full citizen status. Far more frequently, however, he would be the offspring of an illicit connexion between an Athenian citizen and a slave-woman; occasionally he might be the offspring of an illicit connexion between an Athenian woman and a slave. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 299. 1) holds that in the passage before us Aristotle intends to identify the νόθοι with οί έκ δούλου ή δούλης (33), but perhaps we need not take him to assert that these constituted the whole class of νόθοι; they were no doubt the largest and least welcome portion of it. The distinction between ξένοι and νόθοι is not always maintained: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 297. 2, who refers to Pollux 3. 21, νόθος δὲ ό ἐκ ξένης ἡ παλλακίδος . . . τὸν δὲ νόθον καὶ ματρόξενον ἔνιοι καλοῦσιν. and to Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 213.

29. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. 'Επεί, 'as' or 'seeing that.' The

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passage implies that all States which made aliens and bastards citizens did so for want of genuine citizens, a statement which seems to conflict with 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq., where we are told that the founders of extreme democracies adopted measures of this kind, not because they could not help themselves, but with the view of making the demos strong. Aristotle leaves cases of this nature out of sight, for his object in the passage before us is to prove that States only make aliens and bastards citizens when they are forced by necessity to do so, and that, in fact, even the States which do this practically confess that some types of citizen are less authentic than others (vol. i. p. 241). Ποιοῦνται, 'make for themselves': contrast ποιήσει, 1278 a 8, and ποιούσιν, 34, and compare for a similar transition c. 16. 1287 b 29-31. Τούς τοιούτους, i. e. ξένους καὶ νόθους. It would seem from Oecon. 2. 1346 b 13-29 that at Byzantium the law requiring both parents to be citizens was relaxed at a time of merely financial pressure.

31. οὔτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις, 'they have laws of this nature' (literally, 'they have their laws thus'): cp. Aristot. Fragm. 155. 1504 a 25, πολλοὶ δὲ οὔτω χρῶνται τῶν βαρβάρων.

32. εὐποροῦντες δ' ὄχλου κ.τ.λ. The occurrence of δέ in the apodosis here after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί raises a very difficult question. There is no doubt that in the writings of Aristotle, as in those of other Greek authors, & not unfrequently occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by \(\epsilon\), when the apodosis or some part of it is opposed in sense to the protasis: see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 770. 1 a. We have instances of this in 3. 16. 1287 b 11 sqq.: Metaph. B. 4. 999 a 26 sqq.: Phys. 4. 8. 215 b 13 sqq. But the question is whether  $\delta \epsilon$  occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ¿πεί in the genuine writings of Aristotle. It occurs after a protasis introduced by is in the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics (1349 b 12, ώς δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔταξε, σφάζεσθαι ὅσα δεῖ τῆς ἡμέρας, οἱ δὲ πάλιν ἱερόθυτα ἐποίουν, referred to in Bon. Ind. 167 a 38), but Bonitz (Ind. 167 a 34 sqq.) and Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 31) hold that in the genuine writings of Aristotle δέ does not occur in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by  $\epsilon \pi \epsilon i$ , and Sus.<sup>3</sup> reads  $\delta \dot{\eta}$  in the place of  $\delta \dot{\epsilon}$  in the passage before us. Neither Bonitz nor Eucken, however, notice this passage: see Bonitz' discussion of the question in Aristot. Studien, 3. 124 sqq., and Eucken's in De Partic. Usu, pp. 26-31. When in 3. 12. 1282 b 14 sqq. a long string of sentences connected

by δέ and introduced by ἐπεί is followed, as it would seem, by an apodosis in 21 introduced by δέ, ποίων δ' ισότης έστι και ποίων ανισότης, δεί μη λανθάνειν, the presence of δέ in the apodosis may be accounted for by the anacoluthic character of the sentence. The same reason may be given for the occurrence of δέ in the apodosis after a string of sentences introduced by ἐπεί in Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 3-14, where the best MSS, have  $\delta \epsilon$  in 10, though the Vet. Int., supported by a few MSS. not of the best type, gives no equivalent for it. In the passage before us we make a nearer approach to the structure of the passages in which  $\delta \epsilon$  occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by el, for in this passage, as in those, there is an opposition in sense between the protasis and the apodosis, but here again the passage may be anacoluthic, the insertion of the parenthesis, διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὖτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις, serving to break the grammatical connexion and leading to the addition of δέ in εὐποροῦντες δ' ὅχλου. But whether we regard the passage as anacoluthic or as a real instance of the occurrence of δέ in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί, there is no need to follow William of Moerbeke in omitting & or to substitute δή for it.

κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται. Aristotle appears to be speaking of a gradual change in the law of citizenship, not of such purgations of the citizen-lists as occurred at Athens after the expulsion of the Peisistratidae ('Aθ. Πολ. с. 13) and in B.C. 444 (Plut. Pericl. c. 37) and 346 (Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 2. 289 sq.).

33. τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης. As to this class see above on 1278 a 26, and cp. Diod. 1. 80. 3, νόθον δ' οὐδένα τῶν γεννηθέντων νομίζονσιν, οὐδ' αν ἐξ ἀργυρωνήτου μητρὸς γεννηθῆ, where Diodorus is speaking of the Egyptians. If Antiochus' account of the Partheniae of the Lacedaemonian State (ap. Strab. p. 278) is true, and they were the sons of slaves, their enforced emigration to Tarentum would be an illustration of what Aristotle says here. The children of slaves were commonly thought to be morally below the mark (Eurip. Fragm. 966: Theogn. 537–8).

εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, i.e. sons of a citizen-mother by an alien, not a slave, father (Jowett). It will be noticed that sons of a citizen-father by an alien, not a slave, mother were usually the last to be excluded.

34. τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν. See above on 1275 b 21. For ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν see below on 1310 b 5 and critical note on 1301 b 35.

ότι μέν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μέν οὖν is not answered by ἀλλά, 38; it has, in fact, nothing answering to it, unless we take it to be eventually answered by δέ in 1278 b 6, ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται. In 1278 a 34-40 we have a summary of the results of the fifth chapter introduced by  $\mu \hat{\epsilon} \nu$  ov, and in 1278 a 40-b 5 a summary introduced by another uev ouv of the results of the fourth chapter, this second μέν οὖν finding an answer in 1278 b 6, ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται. No doubt the fourth and fifth chapters form to a certain extent a connected whole, for the fifth chapter is added by way of supplement to the fourth, it being necessary to explain that there are citizens in whose case the definition of the citizen's virtue given in c. 4 does not hold good, but still there is much awkwardness in the arrangement by which a summary of the results of the fourth chapter is added at the end of the fifth, all the more so as we have already had a brief mention (hardly a summary) of the results of the fourth chapter at the end of that chapter (1277 b 30 sqq.). It is doubtful whether the summary in 1278 a 40-b 5 is not an interpolation by some editor. It is not quite exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and note on 1285 b 27. As to είδη πλείω πολίτου, there are citizens who share in office and there are citizens who do not share in office except under certain constitutions.

- 36. ἄσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Καί, 'for instance,' as in 1. 12. 1259 b 8. The quotation is from Hom. Il. 9. 648 and 16. 59, where Achilles complains of Agamemnon's treatment of him. Aristotle quotes the words as if Achilles meant 'excluded from office' by ἀτίμητος. The transition was easy for Greeks from the idea of exclusion from office to that of being dishonoured (cp. c. 10. 1281 a 29 sqq. and Thuc. 6. 38. 5).
- 37. ὤσπερ μέτοικος γάρ κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. s. v. μέτοικος) refers to Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1233 a 28, διὸ καὶ οὐδεὶς ἄν εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις μέτοικος ὢν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἐαυτὸν ἀλλ' ὑπείκει, ἀλλ' εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὢν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 105 and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 6.
- 38. ἀλλ' ὅπου κ.τ.λ., 'but where exclusion from office is concealed, [there is a bad motive present, for] this concealment is practised by those who resort to it with a view to deceive those who dwell in the same State.' Aristotle uses the expression τῶν συνοικούντων, not τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, because those who are excluded from office can only be said κοινωνεῖν τῆς οἰκήσεως, like metoeci and slaves (c. 1. 1275 a 7). How hateful a thing it was

to deceive one's fellow-citizens appears from the remark of Solon to Peisistratus (Plut. Solon, c. 30), οὐ καλῶς, ὧ παῖ Ἱπποκράτους, ὑποκρίνη τὸν ὑρηρικὸν Ὀδυσσέα ταὐτὰ γὰρ ποιεῖς τοὺς πολίτας παρακρουόμενος, οἶς ἐκεῖνος τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξηπάτησεν αἰκισάμενος ἑαυτόν. At Athens to deceive the people was a crime (Hdt. 6. 136: Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 97). To wrong σύνοικοι is especially dangerous (Isocr. Panath. § 178). Most oligarchies openly excluded the many from office (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sqq.), but there may have been some oligarchies, and certainly there were aristocracies, in which an attempt was made to conceal their exclusion from them (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq.). To these aristocracies, as Susemihl has already remarked (Sus.², Note 518: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 379), Aristotle probably here refers.

- **40.** πότερον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. As to this summary see above on 34. For the omission of ἀρετήν, cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 24, and see vol. ii. p. li. note 4.
- 2. For the added explanation ὅτι κ.τ.λ. cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 6 sq. 1278 b. The sentence, if complete, would apparently run, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ σπουδαῖος πολίτης ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ κ.τ.λ.
- 3. κἀκεῖνος οὐ πᾶς, 'and not every citizen of the State in which the two are the same.'

ό πολιτικός. With the account given of the πολιτικός here compare Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 11, where the word πολιτικοί is conjoined with ἄρχειν ἱκανοί. Οἱ πολιτικοί are distinguished from οἱ δημοτικοί in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 24, from οἱ ἐργαστικοί in Polyb. 10. 16. 1, from οἱ χειροτέχναι in Polyb. 10. 17. 6, and from οἱ δημιουργοί and οἱ ρήτορες in Plato, Apol. 23 E (cp. Diog. Laert. 2. 39). In 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11, ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, Aristotle substitutes ἄρχοντος for πολιτικοῦ.

4. καθ' αὐτόν. Sus.² (Note 521: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 380) holds that Aristotle is thinking of ὁ βασιλικός, but we have been concerned in c. 4 with statesmen who understand both ruling and being ruled, and the reference probably is to magistracies held singly and not in conjunction with others: cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 109, ἀλλ' ἴσως καθ' αὐτὸν μὲν ἄρχων φαῦλος ἦν, μετὰ πλειόνων δ' ἐπιεικής. Cp. also c. 11. 1282 a 40, τῶν καθ' ἔνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων.

τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας. Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 8. 4, οι γε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστατεύοντες καὶ τῶν δημοσίων ἐπιμελόμενοι. In 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 7 we have ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια.

- C. 6. 'Επεὶ δὲ κ.τ. λ. The question raised in c. 1. 1275 a 1, τίνα χρή καλείν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστί, has now been answered, and in strictness (cp. 1274 b 38 sqq.) the next question is τί ποτε ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, but this has been answered already in c. 1. 1275 b 20, and Aristotle passes on at once to the question as to the nature of each constitution which he has marked out for consideration in the first sentence of the Third Book. The citizen has been defined by access to office, and as access to office is regulated by the constitution, the question whether there are more constitutions than one, and, if so, how many there are and what differences exist between them, is 'next' (τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα) dealt with. Aristotle prefixes to his discussion of these questions (see c. 7. 1279 a 22 sqq.) an inquiry into two preliminary ones, what is the true end for which the  $\pi \delta \lambda \iota s$  exists, and what is the true nature of political rule. At the close of this inquiry he no longer troubles to ask whether there are more constitutions than one (he has, indeed, already assumed this in c. 5. 1278 a 15), but asks at once (c. 7 init.) how many there are.
  - 7. κᾶν εἰ πλείους. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 61) remarks that κᾶν εἰ is often used just as καὶ εἰ might be. 'Id iam apud Platonem, Demosthenem, alios invenitur, sed apud nullum saepius quam apud Aristotelem . . . Inveniuntur loci, ubi nihil impedit, quominus ἄν ex verbo κᾶν ad apodosin referamus' (he refers among other passages to De An. 2. 10. 422 a 11 sq.), 'sed multo saepius omnino nulla apodosis est ad quam ἄν referri possit, maxime in Politicis, in quibus, ut exemplum afferam, saepe compluribus rebus enumeratis postremo loco verbis κᾶν εἰ aliquid additur quod magis generale est (cf. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 38) . . . Sed etiam aliis rationibus κᾶν εἰ eodem modo atque καὶ εἰ usurpatur' (Eucken cites the passage before us and 4 (γ). 4. 1326 a 16 sqq.). 'Simili modo κᾶν εἰ etiam in ceteris scriptis adhibetur, sed saepius praeter Politica in Metaphysicis tantum, rarius in ceteris, maxime in Rhetoricis, ubi semel (1. 1. 1354 a 25) usurpatur.'
  - 8. διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν, 'what are the differences between them': cp. Hist. An. 1. 1. 487 a 11, ai δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν ζώων εἰσὶ κατά τε τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This question is dealt with in c. 7, where the normal and the deviation-forms of constitution are distinguished, and also in c. 8. 1279 b 39 sqq. But it receives further consideration in the Sixth Book: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 31, ἔτι δὲ τίνες αὶ διαφοραὶ (τῶν πολιτειῶν) καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει.

ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Giphanius, Heinsius, and Bernays, fol-

lowed by Sus. and Mr. Welldon, are probably right in translating, 'now a constitution is an ordering of a State in respect both of its other magistracies and especially of the magistracy which is supreme over everything' (πάντων is probably neuter, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 26). Compare Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 27, τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ὅσαι γὰρ αὶ πολιτείαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύριά ἐστιν. See vol. i. p. 243, note 1, for other accounts in the Politics of the nature of a constitution. That implied in 3. 3. 1276 b 1 sqq., that it is the εἶδος τῆς συνθέσεως of the elements of the πόλις, should not be lost sight of. See note on 1276 b 4.

10. κύριον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ introduces a proof that the constitution is an ordering of the supreme magistracy. It is so because it is an ordering of the πολίτευμα and varies as this varies, and the πολίτευμα is the supreme authority of the State. Τὸ πολίτευμα, 'the supreme authority,' whether One Man or a Few or Many (cp. c. 7. 1279 a 25 sqq., and see vol. i. p. 243, note 2), usually not an individual, but a number of individuals, and thus we read of οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ πολιτεύματος in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 15 (cp. 24, τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας). It was, however, possible to be a member of the πολίτευμα and yet not to share in the greatest magistracies, as we see from 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 12, καταλύονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῷ ὀλιγαρχία ἐτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐμποιῶσιν' τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὅντος τῶν μεγίστων ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν οἱ ὀλίγοι πάντες.

11. πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία, 'and the supreme authority virtually is the constitution.' With Sepulv., Vict., Giph., Heinsius, and Stahr I take πολίτευμα to be the subject of the sentence (for the absence of the article before πολίτευμα see above on 1276 b 28). Lamb., however, translates, 'civitatis autem administrandae forma, quam politiam diximus a Graecis appellari, est administratio seu gubernatio civitatis'; thus he makes ή πολιτεία the subject of the sentence, and Bernays appears to do so too, for he translates, 'die regierende Klasse bestimmt sich nach der Regierungsform' ('the governing class is determined by the form of government'). This rendering suits well with 8-10, but not so well with what follows in 11 sqq., and I prefer the other interpretation. Aristotle proves that the constitution is especially an ordering of the supreme authority by showing that the nature of the supreme authority is decisive of the character of the constitution, from which it follows that the main business of the constitution is to fix the supreme authority. The two words πολιτεία and πολίτευμα are interchanged

- in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 6, καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, and in 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 14 sqq., where τῆς πολιτείας δι' ὀλίγων οὕσης answers to τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὄντος.
- 12. For the omission of πόλεσι after ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς see above on 1266 b 1. We rather expect ταῖς ὀλιγαρχικαῖς to follow.
- 13. φαμὲν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and we say that the constitution also (as well as the πολίτευμα) of these' (i.e. of those who live under the supremacy of the demos and those who live under the supremacy of the few) 'is different.' It is not quite clear whether in φαμέν Aristotle refers to himself and his school or (as Bernays thinks) to the common use of language (cp. c. 7. 1279 a 33, καλεῖν εἰώθαμεν). Perhaps ἐροῦμεν in the next line rather points to the former interpretation.
- 15. τῶν ἄλλων, 'the others' (in opposition to τούτων), i. e. those who live under the supremacy, not of the demos or the few, but of some other supreme authority. Or possibly 'the other constitutions.' Susemihl takes the words in the latter way, and he may be right.
- ύποθετέον δὴ κ.τ.λ. We must ascertain the end for which the State exists and the various kinds of rule exercised in relation to man as a member of society before we can say how many forms of constitution there are or discriminate the normal forms from the deviation-forms. For in the normal forms the true end is aimed at and the true kind of rule exercised, and in the deviation-forms neither is the case.
- 16. τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς. We are concerned here only with the kinds of rule exercised in relation to man (not in relation to the lower animals), and still further, only with such as have to do with human beings as associates in life, therefore with those kinds of rule only which are connected with the Household, Village, and State.
- 17. κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους. As to οἱ πρῶτοι λόγοι see vol. ii. p. xx sqq., and cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 71, where Isocrates, speaking of his own address to Nicocles, uses the words, ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ προοιμίῳ καὶ τοῦς πρώτοις λεγομένοις. The reference in the passage before us is to 1. 2. 1253 a 1 sqq.
- 19. καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'among other things this also, that' etc. The passage commencing here, together with c. 9. 1280 b 36 sqq. and perhaps 1. 2. 1252 b 12 sqq., seems to have been known to and used by an interpolator of Strabo, p. 419, where we read, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπίνοια αὖτη τῆς τε τῶν πόλεων κτίσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἱερῶν ἐκτιμήσεως καὶ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεις συνήεσαν καὶ κατὰ ἔθνος φυσικῶς κοινωνικοὶ ὄντες καὶ

ἄμα τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων χρείας χάριν, καὶ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ κοινὰ ἀπήντων διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας, ἐορτὰς καὶ πανηγύρεις συντελοῦντες φιλικὸν γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοτραπέζων ἀρξάμενον καὶ ὁμοσπόνδων καὶ ὁμωροφίων ὅσω δὲ πλεῖον καὶ ἐκ πλειόνων ἐπεδήμει, τοσῷδε μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ὄφελος ἐνομίζετο. Μέν ('while') is answered by οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, as in c. 13. 1284 b 4 sqq. and in the cases noted above on 1276 b 34. For the absence of the article before ἄνθρωπος see note on 1253 a 10 and critical note on 1253 a 2.

- 21. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., 'not but that the common advantage also brings them together, so far as a share in good life falls to the lot of each.' See above on 1252 b 27 sqq., and for the limiting clause, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 38, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς (i.e. εὐδαιμονίας), τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἡ μηδέν, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, ἐατέον ὅπως ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.
- 23. As to μεν οὖν see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. Τοῦτο, i.e. τὸ ζῆν καλῶς. For the thought cp. c. 9. 1280 a 31 sqq., where however it seems to be implied that men do not come together to form the State for the sake of life alone, which does not agree with 24 sqq.
- 24. συνέρχονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. Αὐτοῦ, 'alone' (see note on 1338 b 25). Contrast [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 1343 a 10, πόλις μὲν οὖν οἰκιῶν πληθός ἐστι καὶ χώρας καὶ χρημάτων αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζην φανερὸν δέ, ὅταν γὰρ μὴ δυνατοὶ ὧσι τούτου τυγχάνειν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ κοινωνία.
- 25. ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for perhaps there is an element of what is noble in life even if we take it by itself.' "Ενεστι is probably not to be taken with κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον as if κατά meant 'in'; it means rather 'in respect of,' and τῷ ζῆν should be supplied with ἔνεστι. In order to show that τὸ ζῆν may be the end with which the πόλις is formed and maintained, Aristotle shows that τὸ ζῆν has in it two characteristics of the end of human action, τὸ καλόν and pleasurableness: cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 17, καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν. Compare with the account of τὸ ζῆν in the passage before us Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 19, τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς τὰγαθοῦ ψύσεως, 1170 a 25 sqq., and b 1: Eth. Nic. 9. 7. 1168 a 5 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 25 sqq. Aristotle follows here in the track of Sappho, Fragm. 79,

έγὼ δὲ φίλημ' ἀβροσύναν, καί μοι τὸ λάμπρον ἔρος . . . ἀελίω καὶ τὸ κάλον λέλογχεν, where Clearchus of Soli, who has preserved the fragment (ap. Athen. Deipn. 687 a: Clearch. Sol. Fragm. 4 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 304), adds, φανερὸν ποιοῦσα πᾶσιν ὡς ἡ τοῦ ζῆν ἐπιθυμία τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶχεν αὐτῆ, and in ἇν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κ.τ.λ. in the track of Aeschylus, Fragm. 171,

τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίον, δε λύπας φέρει; (where we should read with Nauck ῷ βίος, or possibly δε βίος, or, with Richards, βίοτον, δε), and Soph. Aj. 473,

αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἄνδρα τοῦ μακροῦ χρήζειν βίου, κακοῖσιν ὅστις μηδὲν ἐξαλλάσσεται.

Cp. also Aesch. Fragm. 392, Soph. Fragm. 445, 867, and Bacchylides 1. 30 sqq. For τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον τι, cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, and 1. 11. 1258 b 28 sq. For τοῦς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον, cp. Rhet. 2. 17. 1391 a 32, τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθά.

27. δῆλον δ' ὡς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps designedly refers to οἱ πολλοί rather than to οἱ σοφοί, thinking that their views are a better guide to what is natural (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 2 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 15 sqq.), but he might have said the same thing of some σοφοί: see as to the last days of Antisthenes and Speusippus Diog. Laert. 6. 18 sq. and 4. 3. For οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 24.

30. ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly' (see above on 1271 a 20).

τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους, 'the forms of rule commonly spoken of.' Bonitz (Ind. 424 b 40) compares Categ. 12. 14 a 26, πρότερον ἐτέρου ἔτερον λέγεται τετραχῶς, and 14 b 9, οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τρόποι τοῦ προτέρου σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοἱ εἰσιν. He adds that Bernays translates the words otherwise ('die in Betracht kommenden Weisen der Herrschaft'), and refers to Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 53. Bonitz' translation seems to me to be the right one.

31. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις κ.τ.λ. Ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are literally 'external inquiries,' i. e. probably inquiries external to philosophy, cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 22, ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 114 sqq. (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 110 sqq.) for a full discussion of the meaning of the expression (also Grote, Aristotle, 1. 63 sqq., and Sus.4, 1. p. 561 sqq.). Zeller remarks (p. 119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4) that if we give an extended meaning to the 'we' of διοριζόμεθα in the passage before us, it is possible to take ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι here as referring to views advanced outside the

Aristotelian school in the intercourse of ordinary life, but that the use of the term in other passages makes it probable that Aristotle here also refers to writings of his own of a popular kind (possibly to the  $\pi \circ \lambda \iota \tau \iota \kappa \circ s$  and the  $\pi \in \lambda \iota \tau \iota \kappa \circ s$ ).

- 32. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 2. There is a striking resemblance between the passage before us and Dio Chrys. Or. 14. 439 R.
- 37. ἡ δὲ τέκνων ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. Οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή is here used in a sense exclusive of δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή, though undoubtedly the rule of the master over the slave is usually treated in the Politics as a part of οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή (cp. for instance 1. 3. 1253 b 1 sqq. and 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., and see Sus.², Note 529: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 383). We must bear in mind that Aristotle's use of the word χρηματιστική also varies (see note on 1256 a 1), and that the free members of the household are its members in an especial sense, so that in 1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq. the only members of the household mentioned are husband and wife, father and child. Thus in 1. 2. 1252 b 20 (cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.) the household is said βασιλεύεσθαι, though the rule of its head over his slaves is of course not a kingly rule. Cp. Hom. Odyss. 1. 397, where the οἶκοs is distinguished from the δμῶες,

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οἴκοιο ἄναξ ἔσομ' ἡμετέροιο καὶ δμώων οὕς μοι ληίσσατο δῖος 'Οδυσσεύς.

Younger brothers and sisters may be referred to in  $\tau \eta s$  οἰκίας πάσης ('the household as a whole,' see above on 1253 b 33, πᾶς δ ὑπηρέτης, and cp. also 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 34, πάντα τὸν δῆμον). In Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 8–17 (cp. 5. 15. 1138 b 7 sq.), τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον is distinguished from τὸ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον, but is explained as existing between husband and wife only, not between father and child also.

- 38.  $\hat{\eta}\nu$   $\delta\hat{\eta}$ .  $\Delta\hat{\eta}$  'vim relativi urguet,' and means 'just' or 'exactly' ('eben' or 'gerade,' Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 43).
  - 39. ἢ κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀμφοῖν, SC. ἀγαθοῦ.

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- 40. ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, sc. εἶναι.
- 2. καν αὐτῶν εἶεν, i.e. καν αὐτῶν χάριν εἶεν ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ἡ γυμναστική. 1279 a. See Schneider's note.
- οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 338 a 33) groups this passage with Metaph. Δ. 12. 1019 a 17, ἡ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὖσα ὑπάρχοι ἃν ἐν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἰατρευόμενος.
- 3. ωσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 341 C-D, which Aristotle here slightly corrects.
  - 4. ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης κ.τ.λ. takes up τοπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας

τέχνας, 1278 b 40: here as elsewhere (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq.) μὲν οὖν ' usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur.'

- 8. γίνεται, 'comes to be': see above on 1252 b 7 and 1264 a 14. παιδοτρίβης ων, 'though he is a training-master.'
- διὸ κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. because rule over a household and the rule which is exercised in the arts is essentially for the good of the ruled, and only accidentally and in certain cases for the common good of ruler and ruled) men imply by their acts that rule in a State also is essentially for the good of the ruled, inasmuch as they claim that all should hold office in turn, at any rate when the constitution rests on a basis of equality, thus treating office as a burden which should be borne in turn by all. No doubt this is not the case now-on the contrary, men seek to be perpetually in office, inasmuch as office brings great gains-but we must judge by what was the case formerly, when the state of things was natural. It may be asked how, if ruling is a burden to the ruler, perpetuity of rule, such as exists in a kingship, is fair to the ruler. Aristotle would perhaps reply that the perpetual ruler receives a quid pro quo in 'honour and reward' (see vol. i. p. 244, note 4). In τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς State-offices are referred to in contradistinction to such positions of command as those of the captain of a ship or a physician (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 37 and 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 19).
- 9. ὅταν ἢ κ.τ.λ. The suppressed nom. to ἢ is ἡ πόλις or ἡ πολιτεία, probably the latter, for συνεστηκυῖα points rather to it (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 25: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 33, b 16, etc.), though we have in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 36 περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως. For κατ' ἰσότητα συνεστηκυῖα, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἐκατέρα κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.
- 10. πρότερον μέν κ.τ.λ. Πρότερον, 'in former times.' As Susemihl has already pointed out (Sus.², Note 532 b: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 384), Aristotle has before him Isocrates' picture of Athens in the days when the Areopagus was strong (Areopag. § 24)—αἴτιον δ' ἢν τοῦ ταῦτα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν καὶ μὴ περιμαχήτους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅτι μεμαθηκότες ἢσαν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τῶν μὲν οἰκείων ἀμελεῖν τοῖς δ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπιβουλεύειν, μηδ' ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διοικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστοις ὑπαρχόντων, ὁπότε δεήσειε, τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπαρκεῖν, μηδ' ἀκριβέστερον εἰδέναι τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων προσόδους ἢ τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων γιγνομένας αὐτοῖς' οὖτω δ' ἀπείχοντο σφόδρα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ὥστε χαλεπώτερον ἢν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὐρεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἄρχειν ἢ νῦν τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους' οὐ γὰρ ἐμπορίαν ἀλλὰ λειτουργίαν (cp. 11, λειτουργεῖν)

ένόμιζον είναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν, οὐδ' ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας ἐσκόπουν ἐλθόντες εἴ τι λῆμμα παραλελοίπασιν οἱ πρότερον ἄρχοντες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 145, and De Antid. § 145: also Hdt. 1. 97. 2.

11. λειτουργείν. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 35 sqq. and Andoc. De Myst. c. 132. Λειτουργείν stands in contrast to ἄρχειν, 10.

12. πάλιν answers to πρότερον in ωσπερ πρότερον κ.τ.λ., as it answers (coupled with ἔπειτα) to πρώτον in 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 28 sq.

13. τὰς ἀφελείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς. This repeats Isocrates' phrases quoted above on 10 from Areopag. § 24, ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διοικεῖν and τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων προσόδους: cp. also De Antid. § 145, τῶν μὲν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἀφελιῶν τῶν ἐντεῦθεν γιγνομένων. Profits derived from office are distinguishable from those derived from public property, for they would often come in the shape of bribes from individuals. It would seem from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 20 sqq. that in an oligarchy, at all events, not all offices were lucrative.

14. βούλονται συνεχῶς ἄρχειν, as at Thurii (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 6 sqq.). Compare the reference to οἱ συνεχεῖς οῖδε in Demosth. Prooem. 55, p. 1461. The repeated tenure of the same office was no doubt often forbidden or discouraged in democracies, but even where that was the case, men might be perpetually in office, if they held different offices.

17. φανερον τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. For όσαι μέν . . . αδται μέν compare (with Sus. Ind. Gramm. s. v. Mév, p. 629 foot) 28-29 and I. 5. 1254 b 16-19: cp. also 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 454 a 23, where De Gen. et Corr. 1. 1. 314 a 8-9 is compared. Tò κοινή συμφέρον, i.e. των πολιτών (cp. 31 sq. and c. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq.). As to Aristotle's distinction of δρθαὶ πολιτείαι and παρεκβάσεις, see vol. i. p. 215 sq. Is it not, however, possible that in some cases the rule of the holder or holders of supreme power, though exercised exclusively in their own interest, may nevertheless be for the common advantage? Gibbon remarks (Decline and Fall, c. 5) that 'the true interest of an absolute monarch generally coincides with that of his people. Their numbers, their wealth, their order, and their security are the best and only foundations of his real greatness; and were he totally devoid of virtue, prudence might supply its place, and would dictate the same rule of conduct.' Is it not also possible that there are constitutions in which the rulers rule partly for their own and partly for the common advantage?

And are there not cases in which it is impossible to legislate for the advantage of all, the interest of one section of the population (for instance, producers or consumers) being entirely opposed to that of another? In 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq., again, we find constitutions mentioned which are partly aristocratic, partly oligarchical in their organization, and others which are partly organized as polities, partly as democracies. These constitutions then will be partly normal, partly deviation-forms.

- 18. κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, 'according to the standard of that which is absolutely just.' Τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον (cp. Soph. Fragm. 699, τὴν ἀπλῶς δίκην) is opposed to δίκαιόν τι in c. 9. 1280 a 22, and to τὸ ἰδία συμφέρον καὶ δίκαιον in c. 13. 1284 b 24 sq. Τὸ δίκαιον, by which is no doubt meant τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, is identified with τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον in c. 12. 1282 b 17. It is because the normal constitutions conform to the end for which the State came into being, and adjust their mode of rule to that which should prevail in communities of freemen, that they are pronounced normal according to the standard of absolute justice. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq.
  - 20. For the place of πασαι, see note on 1281 a 26.
- C.7. 23. πρῶτον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν. We find in fact that the normal constitutions are described first in 1279 a 25—b 10. On the other hand, in a later Book (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 31 sqq.) the study of the Polity, and indeed of the lower forms of Aristocracy, is designedly postponed till Democracy and Oligarchy have been studied.
  - 26. πολίτευμα δὲ κ.τ.λ. With all the translators and commentators, so far as I have observed, I take πολίτευμα to be the subject of the sentence. For the absence of the article, see above on 1276 b 28 and 1278 b 11.
  - 27. ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἔνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς. Aristotle leaves out of sight the possibility that the One, Few, and Many, or two of them, may share supremacy.
  - 28. τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον, as in 33 and 37, not τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον, as in 17 and 1278 b 21. Cp. Plut. Phocion c. 21, Arat. cc. 10, 24, where τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον occurs.
  - 30. τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 712 E and 832 B-D. Supply συμφέρον with τὸ ἴδιον.
  - 31.  $\mathring{\eta} \gamma \grave{\alpha} \rho \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$ , 'for [they deviate from the true standard, inasmuch as they do not admit all the citizens to a share of advantage,

and] either those who share in the constitution are not to be called citizens or they should share in the advantages derivable from it.'

33. καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν κ.τ.λ. Kingship exists for the protection of the ἐπιεικεῖς against the demos (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq.), but still it rules for the common advantage. Ideally Kings are guardians both of the rich and of the demos against wrong (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.). Polybius (6. 4. 2), on the other hand, rests the distinction between Kingship and Tyranny on the willingness or unwillingness of the subjects, but this criterion comes to much the same thing as that of Aristotle (see 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 19–23).

34. τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἀρχήν from μοναρχιῶν (cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 24 sq., where νόμος must be supplied from νομοθέτης).

**35**. τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν. Cp. c. 18. 1288 a 33 sqq.: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq., 40 sq.: Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 33 sqq.

36. ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῆ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς, i. e. τῆς πόλεως, cp. 4. (7). 2. 1324 a 15, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 19 we have τὸ γὰρ βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως. A definition of Aristocracy by its aim is most in harmony with the method of c. 7: thus Kingship (33), Polity (37), and the παρεκβάσεις (1279 b 6 sqq.) are all classified by their aim in c. 7. Perhaps another object with which this alternative definition of ἀριστοκρατία is added is to include such aristocracies as those described in Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 33 sqq. and 1366 a 5, where the ruling class is οἱ φαινόμενοι ἄριστοι (cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sqq.). The similarity of the language used here to that used in c. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq. should be noticed.

37. ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. The name πολιτεία was already used to designate democracy (Harpocr. s. v. πολιτεία. ἰδίως εἰώθασι τῷ ὀνόματι χρῆσθαι οἱ ῥήτορες ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τε ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν Φιλιππικοῖς, where the reference probably is to Isocr. Paneg. § 125 and Demosth. Phil. 2. c. 21).

39. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, i.e. 'it happens reasonably 'that it bears the common name of all constitutions. It seems likely that we should supply these words, but it is by no means easy to explain why Aristotle thinks that this happens reasonably. Giph. (p. 335) explains the matter thus—'cur autem huic reipublicae potius acciderit id quam aliis, ut suo vacans nomine dicatur communi, rationem reddit Aristoteles; quia vix accidat ut multi virtute praediti bonum

spectent publicum: facilius unus aut pauci reperiuntur tales, multi difficillime. Quare factum est ut regnum et aristocratia essent nota vocabula, multorum respublica vix esset nota et proinde nomine vacans,' and he refers in confirmation of this to 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 39 sqq., where we are told that the polity was of rare occurrence. (Mr. Mark Pattison takes a somewhat similar view in a note written in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics—' συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, viz. that this form should appropriate to itself κατ' έξοχήν the term which is common to all the forms, viz. πολιτεία, as it must be more rare than either of the other forms, in proportion as it is more difficult to find many virtuous than to find few or one.') I am myself inclined to suggest whether Aristotle's meaning is not rather this-it happens reasonably that the polity is called by the name common to all constitutions, and not by a special name indicative of exalted virtue in the rulers, such as Kingship (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 41 sq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq.) or Aristocracy, because the Many who rule in the polity will not be possessed of exalted virtue. I can hardly think that Bernays' view of the passage is right, but it deserves mention. He refers συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγωs to what follows, not what precedes, translating these words 'bei diesem Verfassungsstaat tritt nun naturgemäss folgendes Verhältniss hervor.' It would be more possible to refer συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως to what follows if we could suppose that the passage is anacoluthic, and that, when Aristotle began his sentence, he intended to write συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως κατὰ ταύτην την πολιτείαν κυριώτατον είναι τὸ προπολεμοῦν, but being led to interpose after συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως the parenthetic explanation ενα μεν γάρ—γίγνεται, prefixed διόπερ to the postponed completion of his sentence, thus making it anacoluthic. But this is hardly a likely supposition. The probability is that συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως refers to what precedes, not to what follows. Schmidt and Sus., on the other hand, transpose 1279 b 3, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα, to before συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, but not, I think, rightly. These words seem to me to be better placed where they stand in the MSS.

40. πλείους δ' ήδη κ.τ.λ., 'but when we come to a larger number of men, it is difficult that they,' etc. See as to ήδη note on 1268 b 21.

1279 b. 1. ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, 'to be perfected in respect of every kind of virtue.' Compare such phrases as τέλεος πρὸς ἀρετήν (Plato, Laws 678 B, 647 D), and cp. Plut. De Solertia Animalium

c. 4, τῶν θηρίων αἰτιᾶσθαι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν μηδ' ἀπηκριβωμένον πρὸς ἀρετήν: Plato, Laws 810 B, πρὸς τάχος ἡ κάλλος ἀπηκριβῶσθαι. For πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 5, τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα.

ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν. Obviously we are not intended to carry on χαλεπὸν ἢκριβῶσθαι πρός, as we might naturally do, for this would give a false sense: what we must carry on is ἐνδέχεται ἢκριβῶσθαι πρός. Compare Metaph. I. 7. 1057 a 37, τῶν δὲ πρός τι ὅσα μὴ ἐναντία, οὐκ ἔχει μεταξύ αἴτιον δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστίν τί γὰρ ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἐπιστητοῦ μεταξύ; ἀλλὰ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ (sc. ἐστὶ μεταξύ), and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 6, τοιγαροῦν οὐ συμβλητὸν κατὰ τοῦτο, οἷον πότερον κεχρωμάτισται μᾶλλον, μὴ κατά τι χρῶμα, ἀλλὶ ἢ χρῶμα ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λευκόν (sc. συμβλητόν ἐστιν).

- 2. αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίγνεται, 'for this kind of virtue arises in a mass of men.' See note on 1330 b 38.
- 3. μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1, 2. 6. 1265 b 28, and 3. 17. 1288 a 12 sq.
- 5. τυραννίς μέν βασιλείας. In 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sqq. tyranny is implied to be a παρέκβασις of the παμβασιλεία.
- 6. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 2 sqq. and Thuc. 1. 17. 'It is but justice to Meg Dods to state that though hers was a severe and almost despotic government, it could not be termed a tyranny, since it was exercised upon the whole for the good of the subject' (Sir Walter Scott, St. Ronan's Well, p. 13). The Scholiast on Aristophanes, speaking of the terms βασιλεύς and τύραννος, remarks (Acharn. 61), χρῶνται δὲ ἀδιαφόρως ἔνιοι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. Ἱέρωνα μὲν βασιλέα Πίνδαρος καλεῖ τὸν Συρακουσίων τύραννον, Εὔπολις δὲ ἐν Δήμοις εἰσάγει τὸν Πεισίστρατον βασιλέα.
- 7. ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία κ.τ.λ. We should naturally supply ἐστὶ μοναρχία, but of course ἐστί only must be supplied.
- 9. τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν, 'that which profits the whole body of citizens': cp. Plato, Rep. 442 C, τοῦ ξυμφέροντος ἐκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων. Cp. also Laws 715 B and 875 A–B.

11. τίς ἐκάστη τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν, i.e. apparently the C. 8. three deviation-forms (cp. 16–19), though tyranny soon drops out of view. For the question τίς ἐκάστη cp. c. 1. 1274 b 32.

12. τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Caelo 2. 5. 287 b 28 sqq. and Anal. Post. 2. 13. 96 b 35—97 a 6.

14. τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν. See note on 1281 a 26.

- 15. δηλοῦν, 'to make fully manifest': see note on 1253 a 10.
- 16. ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'now tyranny is, as has been said' (in c. 7. 1279 b 6 and c. 6. 1279 a 21) 'a form of monarchy ruling over the political association as a master rules over his slaves.' Τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας appears to be in the genitive after δεσποτική (see Liddell and Scott, s. v. δεσποτικός, who compare 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 19 and Xen. Oecon. 13. 5). In c. 6. 1279 a 21 the πόλις is said to be an association of freemen; hence tyranny is evidently wrong and receives no further consideration.
- 17. ὀλιγαρχία δὲ κ.τ.λ. This agrees with Plato, Rep. 550 C, except that Plato adds that the poor have no share in office.
- 18. κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 24, 33, 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1, and 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 32.

δημοκρατία δὲ κ.τ.λ. In the first form of democracy the law refuses to give supremacy either to rich or to poor, still, as the poor are in a majority, supremacy necessarily falls as a matter of fact to them (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 31-38).

- 19. οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πληθος οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι. This shows that the ἄποροι in the Politics are not altogether without property, but have not much property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, where οἱ ἄποροι are opposed to οἱ ἔχοντες τίμημα, and 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sqq. They must not be confused with οἱ λίαν ἄποροι and οἱ σφόδρα πένητες, of whom we read in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32 sqq., 2. 9. 1270 b 9, and 1271 a 30, but they do not appear commonly to have had any slaves (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sqq.), and unless they received pay from the State (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), they were obliged to work hard for the support of themselves and their families (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 4 sqq.). As to οἱ πένητες see note on 1297 b 6.
- 20. πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. Sepulv. 'est autem prima de definitione controversia,' and so Vict. Giph. Bern. and Sus. ('the first difficulty affects the definition'): Lamb., however, 'prima autem difficultas ac dubitatio ad superiorem distinctionem pertinens est haec.' The former interpretation is probably to be preferred. For the absence of the article with πρώτη ἀπορία, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30, δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. For πρός, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 13, ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἄπαντας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν, and Metaph. Z. 6. 1032 a 6, οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι πρὸς τὴν θέσιν ταύτην φανερὸν ὅτι τῆ αὐτῆ λύονται λύσει. The definition of oligarchy and democracy given in the foregoing (c. 7.

1279 b 6-c. 8. 1279 b 19) has represented the former as a constitution in which a few rich rule and the latter as a constitution in which many poor rule, and has failed to make it clear whether both characteristics (the fewness and the wealth of the rulers in the case of oligarchy, and their numbers and poverty in the case of democracy) are essential features of the two constitutions, or, if not, which of them is so. This question, however, requires an answer. A similar inquiry as to the nature of oligarchy and democracy occurs in 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 30 sqq. (where, however, no reference is made to the earlier discussion), but the inquiry contained in the chapter before us is far the more satisfactory of the two. See note on 1290 a 30. It should be noticed that though constitutions in which the rich, being a majority, rule on the ground of their wealth are here implied to be oligarchies, and constitutions in which the poor, being a minority, rule are implied to be democracies, no place is made for oligarchies and democracies of this type in the classification of forms of oligarchy and democracy contained in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.

22. †συμβαίνη†. See above on 1260 b 31, and critical note on 1279 b 22.

32. τὴν ἐν ἡ πλείους εὖποροι, 'that in which there is a majority of rich men.' For τὴν ἐν ἡ Bonitz (Ind. 495 a 14 sq.) compares Anal. Post. 1. 24. 85 b 36, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὅσα αἴτια οὕτως ὡς οῦ ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ.

38. διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. With τὰς ρηθείσας I supply αἰτίας (not πολιτείαs, as Bernays), and take these words to refer to πληθος and  $\delta \lambda_i \gamma_i \delta \tau \eta s$ , translating thus—'hence' (i. e. because  $\pi \lambda \hat{\eta} \theta_0 s$  and όλιγότης are accidents and not differentiae) 'it also does not happen that the causes we have mentioned'  $(\pi \lambda \hat{\eta} \theta_{os})$  and  $\partial \lambda_{ij} (\hat{\tau} \eta_{s})$ ' come to be causes of a difference between oligarchy and democracy.' Prof. Jowett (Politics 2.124) and Prof. J. A. Stewart (Class. Rev. 9. 456) have anticipated me in this view of the passage. One airias is made to serve for two, much as one μετέχεω is made to serve for two in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 35, έστι γάρ καὶ πάσιν έξειναι τοις άνυπευθύνοις κατά τὸ γένος (SC. μετέχειν), μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν. See also note on 1326 a 34. For airias diapopas cp. 1280 a 5 and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 33, τοῦτο μέν οὖν εἶδος εν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας. A definition of a thing must not be built on a distinguishing feature which is only an accident and not present in every case (Top. 6. 6. 144 2 23, σκοπείν δε καὶ εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει τῷ ὁριζομένω ἡ

διαφορά οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπαρχόντων ἐστί, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ γένος οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν).

1280 a. 1. μέν, answered by ἀλλά, 3, marks the antithesis between that which is necessary and τὸ συμβεβηκός: it is on the former that the real διαφορά between oligarchy and democracy rests.

διὰ πλοῦτον, cp. 5, δι' ås αἰτίας (i. e. εὐπορίαν καὶ ἐλευθερίαν) ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας, and Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1161 a 2, οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις.

- C. 9. 7. Ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ., 'we must first ascertain what distinguishing principles of oligarchy and democracy men put forward' [before we go on to examine their soundness], 'and what is the oligarchical and the democratic version of what is just.' Cp. c. 6. 1278 b 15, ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον, and 7 (5). 2. 1302 a 17, ληπτέον καθόλον πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. Liddell and Scott render ὅρος in passages like that before us as 'end' or 'aim,' comparing Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 2 sqq., but perhaps its meaning here is rather 'mark' or 'distinguishing principle' ('id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur,' Bon. Ind. 529 b 44): cp. Plato, Polit. 292 A.
  - 8. τὸ δίκαιον τό τε όλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. For the absence of the article before δημοκρατικόν, cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 37, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν.
  - 9. πάντες is explained by Sus. as here = ἀμφότεροι. See Sus. 4 on the passage before us and on 1273 a 8. So in 40 πᾶσιν means 'for both': for this use of πάντες, 'ubi de duobus tantum agitur,' see Bon. Ind. 571 b 50 sqq.

ἄπτονται δικαίου τινός. Bonitz (Ind. 89 b 56) compares Eth. Eud. 2. 10. 1227 a 1, εὶ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄπτονταί γέ πη τῆς ἀληθείας: De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7. 324 a 15, ἄπτεσθαι τῆς φύσεως. Cp. also Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 21, καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ λίαν ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅπη ψαύει τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ μυθῶδες. Δικαίου τινός, 'a just ground of claim,' 'a principle which is in a degree just.' Δίκαιόν τι is here contrasted with τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον, as in 22 with τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον.

- 10. μέχρι τινός, '[only] to a certain point': see note on 1282 a 36.
- 11. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. To show that the views of democrats and oligarchs as to what is just are only partially correct, Aristotle takes first a view prevalent among democrats and then (in

12) a view prevalent among oligarchs, and points out that neither is completely true. For οἶον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, cp. c. 12. 1282 b 18, Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 12, εἶ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513 Bothe (547 Dindorf),

σὺ δ' οὐκ ἀνέξει δωμάτων ἔχων ἴσον, καὶ τῷδ' ἀπονεμεῖς; κἆτα ποῦ 'στὶν ἡ δίκη;

άλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν άλλά τοις ἴσοις. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 11 sqq.

**12**. καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι. Cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 1, where see note.

14. ἀφαιροῦσι, 'take away,' 'strike off': ἀφαιρεῖν is here, as often elsewhere, opposed to προστιθέναι. It would seem, however, from 19, τὴν δὲ οἶς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, that the advocates of oligarchy and democracy did not ignore the fact that the determination of what is just involves a question of persons, but that they each gave a different answer to this question and, as it turns out, a wrong one.

15. σχεδὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. c. 16. 1287 b 2 sq. and Xen. Hell. 5. 3. 10, λεγόντων δὲ τῶν κατεληλυθότων, καὶ τίς αὕτη δίκη εἶη, ὅπου αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δικάζοιεν, οὐδὲν εἰσήκουον.

16. ωστ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, since what is just is relative to persons and is divided in the same way in respect of the things distributed and the persons who receive them' (i. e. since a just allotment of things to A and B will correspond with and follow the just claims of A and B respectively), 'as has been said before in the ethical discussions, they agree as to the equality of the thing, but differ as to the equality of the persons.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 14-24, and esp. 20, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς. For διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κ.τ.λ., cp. (with Jackson and Stewart) Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 b 3, έστι δέ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον έν τέτταρσιν έλαχίστοις. καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἶς τε καὶ ἄ (i.e. if the one person stands to the other in the proportion of two to one, a just distribution will make the things stand to each other in the same proportion). Both in this passage and in that before us we have the perfect, not the present—διήρηται, not διαιρείται: as to this use of the perfect see Vahlen on Poet. 5. 1449 b 9 (p. 114), quoted below on 1282 b 24. I have translated την μέν τοῦ πράγματος ισότητα όμολογοῦσι, την δὲ οἶς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, 'they agree as to the equality of the thing, but differ as to the equality of the persons,' but there is a further question what these words exactly mean. Perhaps 'they agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but differ as to what constitutes equality in the persons.' For την τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19, της ἰσότητος της πολιτείας.

- 20. διότι. 'Διότι non raro usurpatur pro verbo ὅτι, veluti . . . Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 20 (quamquam ibi causalem vim habere potest),' observes Bonitz, Ind. 200 b 43 (see his remarks in 45 sqq.). Bernays and Susemihl render διότι by 'because' in the passage before us, but I incline (with Bonitz and Mr. Welldon) to the rendering 'that': διότι may well be used in place of ὅτι because ἄρτι precedes.
- 22. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 28 sqq., which agrees with what is said here. Cp. also Plato, Protag. 331 E, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κᾶν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχη τὸ ὅμοιον.
- 24. ἐλευθερία. See vol. i. p. 248, note 1, as to the meaning of this word.
- 25. τὸ κυριώτατον evidently is the aim with which the πόλις was founded.
- εὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1131 b 29, καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα, and 8. 16. 1163 a 30 sqq.

τῶν κτημάτων. See above on 1258 a 33.

- 26. ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνῆλθον. Κοινωνία is possible without τὸ συνελθεῖν: cp. 1280 b 17 sqq., and esp. 1280 b 25.
- 27. ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος. Cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. Οὐ γὰρ εἶναι κ. τ. λ., sc. φασί, appears to explain ὁ λόγος.
- 30. οὖτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὖτε τῶν ἐπιγινομένων, 'neither of the original sum nor of the accruing profits,' for Bernays can hardly be right in rendering these words 'whether it be the first founders of the company or their successors' ('mögen es nun die ersten Begründer der Gesellschaft oder deren Rechtsnachfolger sein'). These words seem to be epexegetic of τῶν ἐκατὸν μνῶν, 29, and to be, like them, in the gen. after μετέχειν. Sharing in the hundred minae includes sharing not only in the sum originally contributed, but also in the profits accruing from it. The word ἐπιγένημα is often used in the Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus in the sense of 'surplus.' Cp. also ἐπέλαβεν in 1. 11. 1259 a 27 sq.
- 31. εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἔνεκεν κ.τ.λ. Yet in c. 6. 1278 b 24 we are told συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν αὐτοῦ, and in 1. 2. 1252 b 29 the πόλιs is said to come into existence for the sake of life, though it exists for the sake of good life. The protasis which

begins here expires in 36 sqq. without being succeeded by an apodosis. If an apodosis had followed, it would evidently have been to the effect of  $\delta\iota\delta\pi\epsilon\rho$   $\delta\sigma\sigma\iota$   $\kappa.\tau.\lambda$ , 1281 a 4 sqq.

32. καὶ γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. For τῶν ἄλλων ζώων see above on 1254 b 23, and cp. 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 57, line 31. Slaves do not share in εὐδαιμονία (compare—with Mr. Congreve—Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1177 a 8, εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδω μεταδίδωσιν, εὶ μὴ καὶ βίου), nor in life in accordance with προαίρεσις: in this they might share without sharing in εὐδαιμονία (they might live, for instance, in accordance with a vicious προαίρεσις, which would not bring them εὐδαιμονία). That slaves have not προαίρεσις, we see from Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 12 (cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 6, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὕτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὕτε θηρίον ούτε παιδίον οὐδεν ποιεί ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν). The citizen of the best State is ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος άρχεσθαι καὶ άρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν, and no citizen can act the part of a citizen without προαίρεσις. The notion of a 'city of slaves' is as old as Hecataeus (Fragm. 318: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 24), and there was a proverb ἐστὶ καὶ δούλων πόλις, έπὶ τῶν πονηρῶς πολιτευομένων (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 411) and a counter-proverb οὐκ ἔστι δούλων πόλις. διὰ τὸ σπάνιον εἴρηται (ibid. 1. 324, 433). Just as there were those who knew where to look for the mythical land 'where mice eat iron' (Herondas 3. 75: Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas, p. 73), so there were those who found a 'local habitation' for 'the city of slaves.' Hecataeus said that it was in Libya (Fragm. 318), and was followed by Ephorus (Paroem. Gr. 1. 433, note: cp. 2. 371); others placed it in Crete or Egypt; in a fragment of the Σερίφιοι of the elder Cratinus (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 133) we read

εἶτα Σάκας ἀφικνεῖ καὶ Σιδονίους καὶ Ἐρεμβούς, ἔς τε πόλιν δούλων, ἀνδρῶν νεοπλουτοπονήρων, αἰσχρῶν, ἀνδροκλέων, Διονυσιοκουροπυρώνων,

on which see Meineke's note, and cp. Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 506. On the other hand, Anaxandrides, who was a senior contemporary of Aristotle, placed in the mouth of one of the characters of his 'Αγχίσηs the lines (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 162),

οὐκ ἔστι δούλων, ὧ 'γάθ', οὐδαμοῦ πόλις, τύχη δὲ πάντα μεταφέρει τὰ σώματα,

and perhaps they are present to Aristotle's memory here. Meineke (Fr. Com. Gr. 5. xl) refers to Lehrs, Ep. Qu. p. 85 on the subject,

which I have not seen. Aristotle again dismisses the idea of a city composed wholly of slaves in c. 12. 1283 a 18 sq.: compare also c. 6. 1279 a 21.

34. μήτε συμμαχίας ένεκεν, όπως ύπο μηδενός άδικωνται. strictness the term for an engagement for mutual defence against attack was ἐπιμαχία, but συμμαχία was often used in this sense, as here (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 387, who refers to Thuc. 1. 44 and 5. 48). We have in the passage before us ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, but in 30 σύμβολα περί τοῦ μη άδικεῖν and in 1280 b 4 ὅπως μηδέν άδικήσουσιν άλλήλους. The two things are not the same. Το say that the molius is formed for protection against wrongs inflicted by all and sundry is not the same thing as to say that it is formed to protect its members against wrongs inflicted on them by each other. It is evident that Aristotle has the latter view of the origin of the πόλις before him in 39 and in 1280 b 4: hence it is not quite certain that he is thinking of the former in the passage before us, though his language is such as to admit of this interpretation. The view, however, that the πόλις was formed for protection against attacks from those outside it is a very tenable one, and deserved more consideration than it here receives. The rise of the πόλις out of a collection of scattered villages was probably often due to a wish for better protection against hostile attack than the village régime could offer. Thus the Athenian general Demosthenes was encouraged to invade Aetolia because the Aetolians lived in scattered and unwalled villages (Thuc. 3. 94. 4), and Megalopolis was founded to protect South-West Arcadia against Lacedaemonian attack (Paus. 8. 27. 1). Another and probably still more common origin of the πόλιs in early times was that described by Lucretius (5. 1108),

Condere coeperunt urbes arcemque locare Praesidium reges ipsi sibi perfugiumque.

To cases of this kind Aristotle makes no reference.

- 35. μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς κ.τ.λ. This is the origin which Plato imagines for the πόλις in Rep. 369 A sqq. (see vol. i. p. 36). Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 14 sqq., where Aristotle says that the buying and selling of necessaries is thought to be the original cause which brings men to group themselves under one constitution.
- 36. As to the relations of the Etruscans and Carthaginians see Meltzer, Geschichte der Karthager 1. 168 sqq. and Mommsen, History of Rome, Eng. Trans., 1. 153. The Phocaeans settled

about B.C. 560 at Alalia (Aleria) in Corsica, opposite to Caere, and about twenty-five years later (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 753-755) they were expelled by a combined fleet of Etruscans and Carthaginians—an evidence of the alliance of which Aristotle here speaks. According to E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterthums 2. 708, Aristotle refers to treaties concluded between Carthage and each of the Etruscan seacoast cities separately, not between Carthage and a central Etruscan authority; this may be so, but one would hardly have guessed it from Aristotle's language. His words appear to imply that States which were not connected by σύμβολα did not commonly trade with each other.

38. είσι γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι περί τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περί του μη άδικείν και γραφαί περί συμμαχίας. Not all συνθήκαι between States had to do with exports and imports, but when a State had surplus products to export or needed to import products, it made a συνθήκη with States willing to take exports from it or to supply it with imports, the object of the συνθήκη being to facilitate and regulate this trade. Compare Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 12, έτι δὲ περὶ τροφής, πόση δαπάνη ίκανη τη πόλει καὶ ποία ή αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ εἰσαγώγιμος, καὶ τίνων τ' εξαγωγής δέονται καὶ τίνων είσαγωγης, ΐνα πρὸς τούτους (i.e. those who will receive exports and send imports) καὶ συνθήκαι καὶ συμβολαὶ γίγνωνται πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν αναγκαίον ανεγκλήτους τούς πολίτας, πρός τε τούς κρείττους καί πρός τους είς ταυτα χρησίμους, and see for an example of such συνθηκαι Hicks, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 74 (p. 129). When States were linked together by a mutually advantageous commerce of this kind, it was important that provision should be made for the peaceful settlement of disagreements arising between individual citizens belonging to them, and hence σύμβολα were concluded between them in addition to the συνθηκαι. Σύμβολα may indeed have occasionally existed between States not linked together by συνθήκαι περί τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων. These σύμβολα established a form of legal process for the trial of offences committed by members of the one State against those of the other, in order that sufferers by those offences, or the State to which they belonged, might no longer be obliged, if they wished to obtain redress for them, to resort to forcible reprisals. The provisions of these σύμβολα were probably very various; a common one in those concluded by Athens was that offenders were to be proceeded against in the courts of the State to which they belonged, though the prosecutor

might appeal from their decision to a third State (ἔκκλητος πόλις). What the provisions of the σύμβολα between Etruria and Carthage were, we have no means of knowing. As to σύμβολα see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 1. 2. 432, ed. Thumser, and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 432 sqq., and Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 380 sqq. Γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας, for not all alliances were in writing (Polyb. 3. 25. 3).

- 40. ἀλλ' οὖτ' ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. Peloponnesus is regarded by Polybius (2. 37) as in his day all but one πόλις, inasmuch as it had the same laws, weights and measures, and coinage, and also the same magistrates, councillors, and dicasts, the only thing wanting being a common wall. Πᾶσιν, 'for both,' see above on 1280 a 9. 'Επὶ τούτοις is rendered by Sus. and Welldon 'to secure these objects' (cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 14), but Bonitz (Ind. 268 b 8) groups this passage with 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 22, τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τεταγμένας, and evidently interprets ἐπὶ τούτοις 'over these things,' 'charged with jurisdiction over these matters.' I incline on the whole to follow Bonitz. Cf. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 37, ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἰσίν.
- 1280 b. 1. For the construction, if τοῦ is omitted before ποίους (with Ms P¹ Vat. Pal. and perhaps Γ), cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1232 b 6, καὶ μᾶλλου ἀν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος τί δοκεῖ ἐνὶ σπουδαίφ ἡ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, but the construction with the genitive is far more usual. For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 29, τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιείται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. That members of the same State seek to make each other good had been pointed out in a famous passage of the discourse of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 327 A sq., where the speaker says, λυσιτελεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή.
  - 5. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. Πολιτικῆς, not συμμαχικῆς. The word is emphatic, and there can be little doubt that Γ Ms pr. P¹ are wrong in omitting it. These MSS. are prone to omit words; they also give the next word διασκοποῦσιν in a corrupt form. For ἀρετῆς πολιτικῆς cp. 1281 a 6, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, where, as in the passage before us, κατ' ἀρετήν follows in the next line, and 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 42, τοῦς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν (where see note). Cp. also Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐ κυκλίων χορῶν κριταὶ καθεστηκότες, ἀλλὰ νόμων καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, and Plato, Protag. 322 E. We expect οἱ μιᾶς πόλεως πολίται in place of ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας,

but Aristotle probably remembers that not all πόλεις cared for the promotion of virtue in their citizens. Hence he prefers to appeal here, as he does in 2. 5. 1263 a 31 sq. and Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 a 18 sqq., to the practice of those who care for εὐνομία, or in other words of those who are truly πολιτικοί, for εὐνομία is the end of the political science (see above on 1253 a 37, and Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 14, Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 b 18), and of any πόλις which deserves the name (6 sqq.). For διασκοπεῖν, 'to consider carefully,' cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 16, where it is contrasted with συντόμως εἶπεῖν, and Thuc. 7. 71. 6.

- 6. ἡ καὶ φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. For the construction περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι κ.τ.λ., Bonitz (Ind. 275 a 43 sq.) compares Hist. An. 3. 3. 513 a 14, εἴ τινι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελές, and Metaph. E. 2. 1026 b 4. Not all πόλεις are regarded by Aristotle as making the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.: Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς: 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32), but he evidently thinks that all πόλεις which deserve the name should do so. Still, even where the πόλις failed to do this, much was done for virtue by other agencies at work within it, as we see from the address of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. So that Aristotle's view that a πόλις omitting to make the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern becomes a mere 'alliance' does not seem to be altogether true.
- 8. γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise,' etc. Sus., following Conring, reads συμμαχιῶν in place of συμμάχων, which is the reading of Γ Π, but τῶν ἄποθεν συμμαχιῶν is an awkward phrase needing to be justified by parallel instances, and we should probably supply τῆς συμμαχίας before τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων. Cp. Plato, Rep. 375 A, οἴει οὖν τι ... διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς; We have perhaps in συμμάχων a similar irregularity to that which often occurs in comparisons (see note on 1267 a 5, μείζω ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, and cp. Meteor. 1. 4. 342 a 30, σημεῖον δ' ἡ φαινομένη αὐτῶν ταχυτὴς ὁμοία οὖσα τοῖς ὑφ' ἡμῶν ῥιπτουμένοις, and Xen. Cyrop. 5. 1. 4, καὶ τοίνυν ὁμοίαν ταῖς δούλαις εἶχε τὴν ἐσθῆτα). For τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων cp. Plut. Aquae et ignis comparatio, c. 11, τῶν ἔξωθεν συμμάχων.
- 10. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 389. As to the sophist Lycophron see above on 1255 a 32, and see Sus.<sup>2</sup>, Note 552 (Sus.<sup>4</sup>, 1. p. 393). In Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10 he is

spoken of as a writer. 'Ο σοφιστής is added to distinguish this Lycophron from others who bore the same name. This view of the object of law was inherited by Epicurus: see Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 462 sq., who refers to Diog. Laert. 10. 150, τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιὸν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι: Stob. Floril. 43. 139, οἱ νόμοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κεῖνται, οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶσιν, ἀλλ ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶνται: Lucr. 5. 1143 sqq. To Schopenhauer 'the State is in essence nothing more than an institution designed for protection against external attacks directed against the whole and against internal attacks made by individuals on each other ' (see the references in Frauenstädt's Schopenhauer-Lexikon 2. 343 sq.).

12. ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους. Καὶ δικαίους is added partly to explain ἀγαθούς, partly to sharpen the contrast with τῶν δικαίων in the preceding line. In much the same way we have ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἐκάστη πολιτεία τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36, where καὶ δικαιοσύνην is added because Aristotle is about to prove that ἀρετή relative to the constitution exists by proving the existence of δικαιοσύνη relative to the constitution. Another reason for adding καὶ δικαίους in the passage before us may be that bravery is often connoted by ἀγαθός more than anything else (see note on 1338 b 31). Cp. Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461, ἐξ ἰδίων σπουδαίων καὶ δικαίων ἀνδρῶν, Plato, Protag. 327 B, ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή, Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36, and Poet. 13. 1453 a 8.

ότι δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, i.e. that the πόλιs is not really a πόλιs, if it does not care for the promotion of virtue. Aristotle proves this by showing that nothing short of participation in good life constitutes a πόλιs, or at any rate what would be accepted as a πόλιs by close inquirers (οἱ ἀκριβῶs θεωροῦντες, 1280 b 28)—that unity of site is not enough, even if combined with intermarriage, nor nearness, or even unity, of site combined with the exchange of products and laws for the punishment of persons wronging each other in that exchange.

- 14. τοὺς τόπους, 'the sites of two cities.'
- 16. ἐπιγαμίας, plural, as in 36 and in Rhet. 1. 14. 1375 a 10, and these are the only passages in Aristotle's writings in which the Index Aristotelicus notes the occurrence of the word.

τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων, 'one of those acts of communion which are characteristic of States.' As to the right of intermarriage see Hdt. 5. 92 and Thuc. 8. 21, referred to by Eaton,

passages which show that it did not always exist between members of the same πόλις. See also Plut. Thes. c. 13, from which it would seem that it did not exist between the two Attic demes Pallene and Hagnus, whether permanently or not, we are not told. Nor was it exclusively possessed by members of the same πόλις, for it was often granted by Greek States to the citizens of States on friendly terms with themselves (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 378 sq.). The word κοινώνημα occurs occasionally in Plato's writings, but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in those of Aristotel.

- 19. ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'but they had laws for the sake of preventing the infliction of mutual wrongs.' For the 'genetivus causalis et finalis,' τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν, see Bon. Ind. 149 b 13 sqq. Cp. Oecon. 1. 4. 1344 a 8, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν νόμοι πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν' οὕτως γὰρ ᾶν οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀδικοῖτο.
- 20. οἷον εἰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has in his mind Plato's supposition in Rep. 369 A sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10 sqq. Καὶ τὸ πληθος εἶεν μύριοι is added, because he is not content with the four or eight members which Plato had implied were enough to constitute a πόλις, and wishes to place the αὐτάρκεια ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις of the imagined community beyond all question.
- 25. οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, i. e. κοινωνοῦντες ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας. Cp. c. 1. 1275 a 32, τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας.
- 26. καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ. We expect the optative of βοηθεῖν in place of βοηθοῦντες, but Aristotle continues the sentence as if χρώμενοι μέντοι ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ὧσπερ πόλεσιν had preceded, and not ἕκαστος μέντοι χρῷτο τῆ ἰδία οἰκία ὧσπερ πόλει.
- 28. τοις ἀκριβώς θεωρούσιν. Cp. Demosth. Olynth. 1. 21, ώς δοκεί καὶ φήσειέ τις ἂν μὴ σκοπῶν ἀκριβῶς.
- 30. τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν. Τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, like τῆς μεταδόσεως, is dependent on χάριν: it is not dependent on κοινωνία.
- 32. οὐ μὴν οὐδέ 'his tantum locis inveni, Pol. 1280 b 32, Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 a 13' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 10).
- 33. ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία κ.τ.λ. Supply (with Bernays and others) ἤδη πόλις ἐστίν. Aristotle often insists, as he does here, that the necessary conditions of a thing are not the thing (this is implied, for instance, in c. 5. 1278 a 2 sq. and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.). What is exactly meant by the phrase 'the communion of

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households and families in living well'? It stands in opposition to 25, ἔκαστος μέντοι χρῷτο τῷ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει, and means that the several households and families do not live well singly, each within itself, but that they, as it were, throw their 'living well' into a common stock so that all share in it, and live well as members of a larger whole, the πόλις. The dative καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι designates the sharers: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, and see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq. for instances of a similar dative. The πόλις is not an union of single individuals but of οἰκίαι and γένη (= κῶμαι): cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 27 sqq., 2. 5. 1264 a 5 sqq., and the closing sentences of the interpolation in Strabo, p. 419, quoted above on 1278 b 19.

35. τοῦτο, i.e. ή τοῦ εὖ ζην κοινωνία κ.τ.λ.

36. διὸ κ.τ.λ. 'Hence,' i. e. because ή τοῦ εὖ ζην κοινωνία cannot be realized without dwelling in the same place and intermarrying, or in other words without τὸ συζην, various forms of τὸ συζην came into being in States. Κηδείαι, φρατρίαι, θυσίαι, and διαγωγαί τοῦ συζην bring together the households and γένη of which the πόλις consists, and enable them to realize 'communion in good life.' The omission of any mention of the tribe is significant. It was probably too large, and at Athens too scattered, to be of much value as a means of There may well have been some who regarded to συζην as the end of the State (cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1234 b 22, της τε γάρ πολιτικής έργον είναι δοκεί μάλιστα ποιήσαι φιλίαν, και την άρετην διά τοῦτό φασιν είναι χρήσιμον οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι φίλους έαυτοῖς είναι τοὺς άδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλήλων): hence the pains which Aristotle takes to point out that it is only a means to that end. Compare his language in c. 6. 1278 b 20 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19, ένιαι δε των κοινωνιών δι' ήδονην δοκούσι γίγνεσθαι, θιασωτών καὶ έρανιστών αθται γάρ θυσίας ενεκα καὶ συνουσίας. πάσαι δ' αθται ύπο την πολιτικήν εοίκασιν είναι ου γάρ του παρόντος συμφέροντος ή πολιτική εφίεται, άλλ' είς απαντα τὸν βίον. There was a risk that the πόλις might be regarded as existing for the sake of pleasure like biaooi and Epavoi, or at any rate might be bracketed with marriage and the phratry as a means primarily to  $\tau \delta$   $\sigma v \xi \hat{\eta} \nu$ . Aristotle is all the more anxious to show that the end of the πόλις is not τὸ συζην but τὸ εὖ ζην, because he is thus enabled to draw the conclusion which he draws at the end of the chapter, that virtuous men have a claim to a larger share in the πόλις than the rich or the ἐλεύθεροι. Just as Plato had spoken of festivals in Laws 653 D as a means by which men correct

and complete their education (cp. 828 A, where he takes up the subject of festivals for treatment immediately after that of education), so Aristotle regards affinities and phratries and sacrifices and ways of passing time pleasantly together as aiding in the realization of a 'communion in good life.' Another use of social ties of this kind was that they served to protect the individual from wrong, as we see from Plato, Laws 729 E, ἔρημος γὰρ ὧν ὁ ξένος έταίρων τε καὶ ξυγγενών έλεεινότερος ανθρώποις καὶ θεοίς, but a reference to this would not be to the point here. Compare the enumeration of social ties in Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 23, ήμεις δέ, οις ίερα καὶ τάφοι προγόνων υπάρχουσιν έν τη πατρίδι και διατριβαί και συνήθειαι μεθ' ύμων έλευθέριοι καὶ γάμοι κατά τους νόμους καὶ κηδεσταὶ καὶ τέκνα κ.τ.λ: I take διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζην to mean 'modes of passing time belonging to social life': cp. (with Bonitz, Ind. 710 a 38) Eth. Nic. 4. 13. 1127 a 17, ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες είρηνται. Διαγωγαί τοῦ συζήν are tacitly contrasted with διαγωγαί not τοῦ συζην, such as, for instance, solitary contemplation. I prefer this interpretation to those of Stahr ('Vereine für den Zweck heiterer Geselligkeit') and Bernays ('Belustigungen zur Beförderung des Zusammenlebens'), in which τοῦ συζην is taken to mean 'for the purpose of social life.' Common sacrifices and festivals were all the more necessary to ancient City-States, because their citizens usually dwelt scattered over the territory, and not concentrated in the city, like those of many mediaeval City-States.

- 38. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον. The point of this remark, which is not at first sight evident, becomes so if we translate, 'but that which has just been mentioned' (i. e. τὸ  $\sigma v \xi \hat{\eta} \nu$ ) 'is the business of friendship, [not the end of the  $\pi \delta \lambda \iota s$ ].'
- **40.** κωμῶν is added in explanation of γενῶν (cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 16 sqq.).
  - 1. τοῦτο, i. e. ζωή τελεία καὶ αὐτάρκης.

1281 a.

- ώς φαμέν, cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 a 38, εἴη αν ή εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.
- 4. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. Compare 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq. Τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, i.e. τὴν τῶν καλῶν πράξεων χάριν συνεστηκυῖαν κοινωνίαν.
- 8. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Πάντες here means 'both,' as in 1280 a 9, and μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου, 'only a part of what is just.' For the suppression of 'only' see below on 1282 a 36.
- 11. Έχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. So far the question discussed has C.10. been who have the best claim to a superior share in the πόλις, but

now Aristotle asks what the supreme authority of the State should be, for we have been told in c. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq. that the nature of the constitution depends on the award made of supreme authority in the State. In the discussion which commences here Aristotle probably has before him Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq., where Pericles is compelled by Alcibiades to admit that a law imposed by force whether by a tyrant, the few, or the many, is not law but lawlessness. Compare also Plutarch, Ad Princ. Inerudit. c. 4, οἱ παλαιοὶ οὖτω λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσι καὶ διδάσκουσιν, ὡς ἄνευ δίκης ἄρχειν μηδὲ τοῦ Διὸς καλῶς δυναμένου.

12. For  $\tilde{\eta}$  yáp τοι Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 72) compares Phys. 8. 3. 254 a 18, adding that τοι appears to belong to  $\tilde{\eta}$ , not to  $\gamma \acute{a}\rho$ .

13. For the juxtaposition of ἔνα πάντων cp. c. 13. 1283 b 18, c. 14. 1285 a 2, c. 16. 1287 a 11, and 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 15.

ἢ τύραννον. If we hold that the Good should be supreme, then we shall have to allow that the One Best should be supreme, and so again, if we hold that the rich should be supreme, we shall have to allow that the One Richest, or in other words a tyrant, should be supreme: cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22, εἶ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἄν οἱ ὀλίγοι, τυραννίς (καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἶς ἔχη πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος).

άλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. Compare the very similar sentence in 2.8. 1268 b 3, ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν, where also we have the emphatic order ταῦτα πάντα ('every one of these things'). See critical note on 1282 a 40.

14. ἀν οἱ πένητες κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 24 sqq. and Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 43 sqq. Τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν; 'is this not unjust?' The answer to this question is given by a supporter of the supremacy of the Many—'No, for by Zeus it was justly decreed by the supreme authority'—to which Aristotle replies, 'Then what are we to say is the extreme of injustice, if not this?' Δικαίως, not 'with full legal validity' (as Sus. 'auf durchaus rechtsgültige Weise'), but 'justly,' for what the supreme authority decides is ipso facto just. Δικαίως is severed from ἔδοξε, the word which it qualifies, for the sake of emphasis: see notes on 1255 a 21, 1265 b 15, and 1323 a 36, and Holden on Xen. Oecon. 2. 8. Vict. and some others take τῷ κυρίφ δικαίως together ('summam potestatem habenti iuste'), but not, I think, rightly. Νὴ Δία occurs also in c. 11. 1281 b 18, but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other

instance from Aristotle's writings. In both these passages the expression is used asseveratively to introduce a statement which may be strongly affirmed.

- 17. πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, 'and again, taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty.' For πάντων ληφθέντων see above on 1254 b 15, and cp. λαμβανομένων, c. 13. 1283 a 42. Bernays, followed by Susemihl, translates these words 'nachdem [den Reichen] Alles genommen worden,' but I cannot think that they are right. Mr. Welldon translates rightly, 'take the whole body of citizens.' Aristotle here, in fact, turns to consider the case of the Many despoiling the Few of their property, whether those Few are rich or poor.
- 19. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ., 'but certainly it is not virtue that destroys the thing which possesses it,' so that the measures of spoliation just referred to cannot be the outcome of virtue. Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 15, ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὖ ἄν ἢ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 12 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 235),

μειράκιον, οὔ μοι κατανοείν δοκείς ὅτι ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἕκαστα κακίας σήπεται.

- 20. οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις. The just is the political good (c. 12. 1282 b 16), and 'the good of each thing preserves it' (2. 2. 1261 b 9: cp. Plato, Rep. 608 E sqq.).
- 21. καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον, i. e. the law by which supreme authority is given to the majority, no less than that by which supreme authority is given to the poor. So we read in c. 17. 1288 a 14, κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. Where a depreciatory meaning is intended to be conveyed, as perhaps here, οἶτος is often placed by Aristotle after its substantive—e. g. in 2. 3. 1262 a 13, 2. 6. 1265 b 16, 18, 1266 a 1, 2. 9. 1271 a 1, 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 28, and 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 23. But οὖτος is often placed after its substantive where this is not the case.

ἔτι καὶ τὰς πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This was the greatest of paradoxes, for a tyrant was commonly regarded as the incarnation of injustice (4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 344 A).

26. διαρπάζωσι. Bernays takes διαρπάζειν to be here used absolutely ('rauben'), but Susemihl supplies τὸ πληθος ('das Volk plündern'), and Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) τὰ κτήματα τοῦ πλήθους. I incline to follow Bonitz (see also Liddell and Scott), for Aristotle some-

times introduces a necessary word later than we expect: see for instance 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 31 and 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 1, where δύνασθαι comes in late; also 2. 6. 1264 b 35 (μετέχουσι), 3. 6. 1279 a 20 (πᾶσαι), 3. 8. 1279 b 15 (τι), and 1. 2. 1252 a 33 (φύσει).

28. τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, who will not plunder anybody. As to the danger arising from a mass of ἄτιμοι see note on 1281 b 28.

- 34. ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἄν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Plato, Laws 713 E sqq., where States are advised to place themselves under the rule of law, since a god is no longer forthcoming, as in the days of Cronus, εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος εἶς ἡ ὀλιγαρχία τις ἡ καὶ δημοκρατία ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀνηνύτω καὶ ἀπλήστω κακῷ νοσήματι ξυνεχομένην, ἄρξει δὴ πόλεως ἤ τινος ἰδιώτου καταπατήσας ὁ τοιοῦτος τοὺς νόμους . . . οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή. Cp. also c. 15. 1286 a 16 sqq. Long before Plato, however, Pittacus had declared in favour of the rule of law (Diod. 9. 27. 4: Diog. Laert. 1. 77). See below on 1286 a 7.
- 36. Åv οὖν κ.τ.λ. Plato had omitted to guard himself by explaining that the rule of law which he recommended must be the rule of good law. 'The Englishman in America will feel that this is slavery—that it is legal slavery, will be no compensation, either to his feelings or his understanding' (Burke, Speech on American Taxation: Works, ed. Bohn, 1. 433). Burke goes still further elsewhere when he says that 'bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.' Aristotle, however, finds in the Sixth Book (6 (4). cc. 4–5) and elsewhere a great difference between democracies or oligarchies in which law (i. e. democratic or oligarchical law) is supreme and those in which it is not.
- C. 11. 40. ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Λύεσθαι has been translated in many different ways. Vict. translates δόξειεν ᾶν λύεσθαι 'videretur solvi,' and Lamb. 'videatur esse expeditum ac solutum.' Bernays translates the words in what I take to be a similar way ('scheint sich befriedigend zu erledigen'). Bonitz appears to explain λύεσθαι here as 'to be refuted' (which is also the rendering of Mr. Welldon), for in Ind. 439 a 20 sqq. he groups the passage before us with passages (Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 b 6: Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 27 and 7. 13. 1153 a 29) in which the word bears this meaning, but, if we interpret λύεσθαι thus, it seems to be little in harmony with the words which follow immediately. Sus. translates 'gegen die angeregten Bedenken vertheidigen zu lassen' ('to be susceptible

of defence against the doubts raised about it'), but it is not easy to get this meaning out of the Greek, and he does not seem himself to be satisfied with his rendering, for he holds that the text is unsound in λύεσθαι—ἀλήθειαν. If we retain λύεσθαι, I should be disposed to follow Vict. in his rendering of the word and to translate, 'but [the apparent paradox] that the Many ought rather to be supreme than the Few Best would appear to receive a solution' (cp. Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 a 19, ἐπεὶ δ' οῦτω τ' ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οῦτως, ἐκ νυκτὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, λύοιτ' αν ταιτα, where Bonitz explains 'diremptae sunt hae quaestiones,' and Grote, Aristotle, 2. 377, 'we may consider the problem as solved'). But there is some strangeness in ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. followed by λύεσθαι in this sense, and I strongly suspect either that some word has dropped out before or after λύεσθαι, such as δείν, or that λύεσθαι is corrupt. Perhaps we should read λείπεσθαι ('to remain as a possible alternative') in place of it. The Few Best had found a panegyrist in Heraclitus (Fragm. 111 Bywater, τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ή φρήν; [δήμων] ἀοιδοῖσι ἔπονται καὶ διδασκάλω χρέωνται δμίλω, οὐκ είδότες ὅτι πολλοὶ κακοὶ ολίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί αίρεῦνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντία πάντων οί άριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα: cp. Eurip. Fragm. 358,

(ἐσθλοὺς ἐγὼ)

όλίγους ἐπαινῶ μᾶλλον ἡ πολλούς κακούς,

where ἐσθλοὺς ἐγώ is added e conj., but probably rightly, by Hense, and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16, οί γάρ πολλοί μάλλον δρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ή της τιμης). But it is especially because Plato in the Republic had placed his ideal State in the hands of the Few Best (see Rep. 503 A sqq.) that Aristotle takes pains both here and in c. 13. 1283 b 20-35 to show that if superior virtue gives a claim to political power, the Many have solid claims on that ground to such political power, at any rate, as they can exercise when gathered in an assembly and converted as it were into a single human being. We must not take him, however, to assert that a constitution in which the Few Best and a popular assembly of good type divide the powers of the State between them in this fashion is the best possible constitution; on the contrary, the best constitution is that in which all the citizens are men of complete excellence (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). His aim in the Eleventh Chapter, as in the Ninth, is in the main a negative and critical one—to overthrow the exclusive claims of the Few Best, just as in

the Ninth he overthrows the exclusive claims of the rich and the  $\epsilon \lambda \epsilon i \theta \epsilon \rho o i$ .

41. καί τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν. See above on 1275 b 34.

42. καν. 'Ipsum καν non sequente  $\epsilon i$  ita usurpatur ut a simplice καί vix distinguatur' (Bon. Ind. 41 a 36, where instances of this are given).

τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here probably remembers Hom. Il. 13. 237,

ξυμφερτή δ' άρετή πέλει άνδρων και μάλα λυγρων.

1281 b. 1. σπουδαίος ἀνήρ. See vol. i. p. 293.

δμως stands in opposition to ων εκαστός έστιν οὐ σπουδαίος ἀνήρ. Compare its use in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς, and in De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 7 sqq., in both which passages the opposition is of a similarly indirect character.

2. ἐκείνων, 'the Few Best.'

ούχ ως έκαστον. Ср. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 12.

οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 15. 1286 a 29, ὥσπερ έστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἁπλῆς: Hesiod, Op. et Dies 722 sq.: St. Jerome, Epist. 26, c. 4.

4. πολλων γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ., 'for each of them, numerous as they are, may have a share of virtue and prudence, and the Many, when they have come together, just as they become one man with many feet and many hands and many senses, may likewise become one man with many excellences of character and intelligence.' Supply ένδέχεται from I with έχειν, 4. 'Αρετής καὶ φρονήσεως is taken up by τὰ ήθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, 7. For συνελθόντων, where συνελθόντας might have been used (it is the reading of some of the less good MSS.), see notes on 13 and 1335 b 19, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 6. 744 a 15 sqq. and De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 319 b 10 sqq. As to the gain of having many eyes, ears, hands, and feet, see c. 16. 1287 b 26 sqg. The Lacedaemonians dedicated a statue of Apollo with four hands and four ears, as he had appeared to the combatants in a battle near Amyclae (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 22: 2. 264); the Erinnys is conceived by Sophocles (Electr. 488) as having many hands and feet; we read of beings like Geryon (see vol. i. p. 256, note 5, and Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 795 C); and Aristotle imagines the same multiplicity extended to moral and intellectual gifts. He perhaps remembers in the passage before us Aristoph. Ran. 675 Didot,

Μοῦσα, χορῶν ἱερῶν ἐπίβηθι καὶ ἔλθ' ἐπὶ τέρψιν ἀοιδᾶς ἐμᾶς, τὸν πολὺν ὀψομένη λαῶν ὅχλον, οῦ σοφίαι μυρίαι κάθηνται.

Compare also Eurip. Bacch. 359 Bothe (427 Dindorf), σοφὰν δ' ἀπέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε περισσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν τὸ πληθος ὅ τι τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόμισε χρηταί τε, τόδε τοι λέγοιμ' ἄν,

and Xen. Cyrop. 4. 3. 21, where Chrysantas says that the mounted horseman gets the advantage of his horse's ears and eyes as well as his own, and thus comes to be something better than a centaur, for a centaur has only two eyes and two ears. The thought that the Many gathered in an assembly become, as it were, one man recurs in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 11 sqq. Plato had already (Rep. 403 A sqq.) compared the Many under these circumstances to a θρέμμα μέγα καὶ ἰσχυρόν, but had regarded the opinions of this great creature, whether on questions of drawing, or music, or politics (493 D), as the reverse of wise, and the Sausage-seller in the Equites of Aristophanes (752 sqq. Didot) finds the Athenian Demos far cleverer at home than in the Pnyx (cp. Demosth. Prooem. 14. p. 1427). On the other hand, bodies of men acting as a whole have sometimes been credited by good observers with a superiority to the individuals composing them taken singly. Thus 'Canning used to say that the House of Commons as a body had better taste than the man of best taste in it, and I am very much inclined to think that Canning was right' (Letter of Lord Macaulay, Feb. 1831: Life and Letters, 1. 174). 'The quick and correct feeling of the House of Commons as a body is very striking' (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in 1820: Life by S. Lane-Poole, 1, 204). The House of Commons, it is true, is a more or less picked assembly. Compare, however, also Plin. Epist. 7. 17. 10, opinor, quia in numero ipso est quoddam magnum conlatumque consilium. quibusque singulis iudicii parum, omnibus plurimum.

7. τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. For the distinction between τὰ ἤθη and ἡ διάνοια, which evidently repeats ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, 4, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 38 sq.

διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i. e. because they possess as a Whole these manifold excellences of character and intelligence) 'the Many [not only are better than the Few, but] also judge better both works of music and works of the poets.' Socrates was of a different opinion (Diog. Laert. 2. 42: 3. 5), and Plato also (Rep.

493 A sqq.: Laws 670 B, γελοίος γὰρ ο γε πολὺς ὅχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γιγνώσκειν τό τε εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὔρυθμον καὶ μή, and 700 A-701 B). Aristotle here (speaking to some extent aporetically) echoes the compliments which it was the fashion for comic poets to shower on their audiences (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 51: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 192),

χαίρ', & μέγ' ἀχρειόγελως ὅμιλε, ταῖς ἐπίβδαις, τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτὴς ἄριστε πάντων.

- 10. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ., 'but it is just in this that men of complete excellence differ from each individual of the Many.' I follow Vict. Giph. Bern. and Sus. in my rendering of διαφέρουσιν. Sepulv. Lamb. and Welldon render it 'are superior to,' but the former rendering suits 16 sq. and 19 sq. better. Plato had claimed (Rep. 484 sqq.: compare the picture drawn of Theaetetus in Theaet. 144 A sq.) that there was an union of many great qualities in the philosophic nature, and Aristotle says the same thing of the σπουδαίος. For οἱ σπουδαίος τῶν ἀνδρῶν cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 316, τοῦς καλοῦς κὰγαθοῦς τῶν ἀνδρῶν.
- 11. ωσπερ κ.τ.λ., 'as indeed men say that beautiful persons differ from those who are not beautiful and pictures done by art from the original objects.' For other instances of the chiasmus which we note in  $\omega \sigma \pi \epsilon \rho$ ,  $11 - a \lambda \eta \theta \iota \nu \hat{\omega} \nu$ , 12, see note on 1277 a 31. For τῶν ἀληθινῶν, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 19, τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις. Sus.2 (Note 566: Sus.4, 1. p. 399) has already referred to the remark addressed by Socrates to Parrhasius in Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 2, and Vict. and Giph., followed by many others, to the mode in which Zeuxis obtained the ideal of womanly beauty which he depicted in his Helen. See Brunn, Geschichte der griech. Künstler 2. 80, 88 (referred to by Vahlen and Sus.), and Overbeck, Antiken Schriftquellen Nos. 1667-9, where Cic. De Invent. 2. 1. 3 is quoted, tum Crotoniatae publico de consilio virgines unum in locum conduxerunt et pictori, quam vellet, eligendi potestatem dederunt. Ille autem quinque delegit . . . Neque enim putavit omnia quae quaereret ad venustatem in corpore uno se reperire posse ideo quod nihil simplici in genere omnibus ex partibus perfectum natura expolivit.
- 13. ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε, 'since if we conceive them' (i. e. τὰ συνηγμένα εἰς ε̈ν) 'to be separated from each other.' Here, as often elsewhere (see above on 1254 b 34), ἐπεὶ . . . γε 'justifies what precedes by pointing out what would result if the contrary were

the case.' As to the genitive absolute κεχωρισμένων, see Bonitz on Metaph. A. 9. 990 b 14, νοείν τι φθαρέντος. 'Omissi in genitivis absolutis subiecti exempla ex Aristotele congessit Waitz ad Hermen. 10. 10 b 37, ex aliis scriptoribus Krüger, Gr. & 47. 4, 3. Usurpantur autem genitivi absoluti, cum per leges grammaticas videatur participium ad nomen quoddam ipsius enunciati primarii referendum fuisse (νοείν τι φθαρέντος idem quod νοείν τι φθαρέν), quo maiore vi participium, seiunctum illud ab enunciatione primaria, pronuncietur, cf. Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 561, Krüger l. l. § 47. 4, 2. Aristotelica contulit Waitz ad An. Pr. 2. 4. 57 a 33.' Thus in the passage before us κεχωρισμένον might well have taken the place of κεχωρισμένων, and this reading is actually given by Γ and in a blundered form by Ms, but κεχωρισμένων is certainly right. Waitz on De Interp. 10. 19 b 37 compares among other passages Probl. 35. 4. 965 a I, τὰ σώματα θιγγανόντων ψυχεινότερά ἐστι τοῦ θέρους ἢ τοῦ χειμῶνος: see also Bon. Ind. 149 b 37 sqq.

15. εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν here introduces a slight qualification of what has been said (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. and 1253 a 10): it is answered by ἀλλά, 20. For περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12, ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, and other passages in which the two words are used in much the same sense, e. g. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24 sq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sq. The almost tautological repetition is for the sake of emphasis (see notes on 1323 b 29 and 1325 b 10). Aristotle probably remembers a remark of Socrates recorded in Diog. Laert. 2. 34, πρὸς τὸ οὖκ ἀξιόλογον πλῆθος ἔφασκε (Σωκράτης) ὅμοιον εἴ τις τετράδραχμον εν ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωρὸν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδέχοιτο, and see vol. i. p. 256, note 1.

18. For νη Δία see above on 1281 a 14. 
ἐνίων, sc. δήμων, and so ἔνιοι, 20.

δ γὰρ αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ., 'for [if we claimed that every kind of demos possesses this superiority over the Few Good,] the same argument would hold in the case of brutes also, [which is absurd:] and yet what difference is there, so to speak, between some kinds of demos and brutes?' Aristotle refers in ἔνιοι especially to cases in which the demos is composed of βάναυσοι ἀγοραῖοι and θῆτες, and is therefore of a servile type (cp. 1282 a 15, ἄν ἢ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες, and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24 sqq.). The βάναυσος and the θής have been ranked with slaves in c. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq., and the slave comes very near to the brute (1. 5. 1254 b 24 sqq.). The Many had been compared to brutes by Heraclitus (Fragm. 111, quoted above on

1281 a 40), by Plato (Rep. 496 C sq.), and by Aristotle himself (Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 19 sq.).

21. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τούτων κ.τ.λ. The question referred to is that raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, τί δεί τὸ κύριον είναι της πόλεως. Isocrates had already declared for a similar solution of the question (Areopag. § 26, ως δε συντόμως είπειν, εκείνοι διεγνωκότες ήσαν ότι δεί τον μεν δήμον ώσπερ τύραννον καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περί των αμφισβητουμένων, τούς δέ σχολήν άγειν δυναμένους και βίον ίκανὸν κεκτημένους ἐπιμελείσθαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ οἰκέτας . . . καίτοι πῶς άν τις εύροι ταύτης βεβαιοτέραν ή δικαιοτέραν δημοκρατίαν, της τους μέν δυνατωτάτους ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις καθιστάσης, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὸν δῆμον κύριον ποιούσης;). Half the interest of the chapter before us lies in this, that in it Aristotle supports the views of Isocrates against those of his master Plato. There are no doubt some expressions in the passage just quoted of which Aristotle would not approve; he would also, it would seem, wish the magistracies to be in the hands of the Few Best rather than of οί σχολην άγειν δυνάμενοι καὶ βίον ίκανὸν κεκτημένοι, though this is not quite clear, for in 1282 a 31 sq. he connects the ἐπιεικεῖs of 1282 a 26 with the possession of high property-qualifications.

24. ὅσοι μήτε πλούσιοι κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἰσίν see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 5, καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἄλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς, is compared among other passages. For ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν, 'possess no ground of claim in respect of virtue,' cp. 2. 5. 1264 b 8 sqq. and Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 33, μηδὲ ἔχων ἀρετῆς ὁμολογούμενον ἀξίωμα καὶ δόξης.

25. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If we supply φήσειεν ἄν τις εἶναι with οὐκ ἀσφαλές from λύσειεν ἄν τις, 22, we shall thus be able to explain the infinitives ἀδικεῖν ἄν (which Sus., following Rassow, would alter into ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη) and ἁμαρτάνειν. Aristotle is still expressing the views which the imaginary τις of 22 might entertain. See notes on 1259 a 39 and 1280 a 27. Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 51, explains these infinitives as 'dependent on the thought contained in what precedes,' and refers to Waitz on Hermen. 19 a 23. The strong language here used as to the ἀφροσύνη and ἀδικία of the Many as individuals recalls the language of the Persian Megabyzus in Hdt. 3. 81, δμίλου γὰρ ἀχρηίου οὐδέν ἐστι ἀξυνετώτερον οὐδὲ ὑβριστότερον, and that of Plato in Rep. 496 C sq., where μανία and ἀδικία are ascribed

to them; Aristotle himself, if he were expressing his own views, would perhaps use milder terms.

- 28. τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν. Supply ἀρχῆς with μεταδιδόναι and μετέχειν, and εἶναι with φοβερόν. For the risks attending the presence in a Greek State of many ἄτιμοι see [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 12 sq. and Plut. Ages. c. 30. Cp. also 2. 12. 1274 a 17, μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου (i. e. τοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν) κύριος ὧν ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἃν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος, and 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq.
- 31. λείπεται δη κ.τ.λ. For τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν, cp. c. I. 1275 b 18,  $d\rho\chi\eta s$  βουλευτικής  $\dot{\eta}$  κριτικής, where κριτικής = δικαστικής, as appears from 1275 b 16, τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ δικάζειν. Hence τὸ κρίνειν in the passage before us probably means 'judging,' but as Aristotle is speaking of functions exercised by the whole demos gathered in one assembly, and not broken up into a number of dicasteries, he must refer to the judicial functions which fell to the popular assembly (6 (4), 14, 1298 a 3 sqq.). When the holders of magistracies are said in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq. βουλεύεσθαι περί τινών καὶ κρίνειν καὶ ἐπιτάττειν, the word κρίνειν is used in a different sense. In saying that, if the ἐλεύθεροι are excluded from the greatest offices, the only remaining course is to give them rights of deliberating and judging, Aristotle forgets that it would be possible to admit them to minor offices, a course suggested by him under certain circumstances in 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 27 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b II sqq.
- 32. Σόλων. Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 15-21, 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 7, and Plut. Solon, c. 18. As Solon gave the assembly no more power than this, it is difficult to understand why he took the trouble to institute a Boulê of 400 to aid it in the performance of these light duties. Aristotle points out in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq. the risks besetting oligarchies in which οὐχ οὖτοι αίροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς έξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσιν. the Solonian constitution exposed to similar risks? Contrast with Solon's policy that of the founder or founders of the Lacedaemonian Ephorate; this great office was made accessible to all the citizens. It is possible that Solon legislated on this subject in intentional opposition to them. The passage before us reads as if Solon was the first to give the right of electing magistrates to τὸ πληθος τῶν πολιτῶν at Athens. If this is Aristotle's meaning, we must suppose that in 2. 12. 1273 b 41 sqq., where he says that Solon found the magistrates already appointed by election, he means that, though they were thus appointed before Solon's time,

they were not elected by the people. On the question whether Aristotle's statements as to Solon here and in 1282 a 25 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 15 sqq. are reconcilable with 'AO. Hol. c. 8,  $\tau$ às δ' ἀρχὰs ἐποίησε (sc. ὁ Σόλων) κληρωτὰs ἐκ προκρίτων, [o]θs [ἑκάσ]τη προκρίνειε τῶν φυλῶν προὔκρινεν δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας ἑκάστη δέκα, καὶ τού[τοις] ἐ[πεκ]λήρουν (or καὶ [ἐκ] τού[των ἐκλ]ήρουν), Gilbert (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 136. 1) and Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 275. 1) take opposite views, the former thinking that they are and the latter that they are not. To me the latter view seems to be the true one.

τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν. Hippodamus allowed the demos in his ideal State the right of electing the magistrates (2. 8. 1268 a 11), but (so Aristotle thinks) excluded the cultivators and artisans from the most important offices (1268 a 20 sqq.). In some oligarchies the demos, though excluded from office, had the right of electing the magistrates (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.).

τάττουσιν ἐπί τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 151, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς πράξεις σὲ τάττουσι, νομίζοντες τούτων μὲν σὲ κάλλιστ ἀν ἐπιστατῆσαι κ.τ.λ. (Liddell and Scott s. v. τάσσω ii. 1). Aristotle speaks here as if to give the Many the right of electing the magistrates was equivalent to giving them deliberative authority; he distinguishes the two things, however, in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq. As to ἐπί τε κ.τ.λ. see note on 1284 a 35.

34. κατὰ μόνας. See vol. i. p. 257, note 2, and cp. Plato, Polit. 292 B, κατὰ πρώτας. The expression probably includes magistracies administered by Boards in addition to those held by single individuals.

35. For the order of the words in ίκανην αἴσθησιν see note on 1275 a 32.

μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοσι, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20, βουλεύσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῆ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὖτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους. Dr. Arnold has already compared the passage before us with Thuc. 6. 18. 6, where Alcibiades says, καὶ νομίσατε νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ὁμοῦ δὲ τό τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκριβὲς ἃν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ' ἃν ἰσχύειν. See also above on 1276 b 37.

36. ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφή. Food in a more or less raw state, standing in need of some further working-up to fit it for consumption, is termed 'impure food' in De Gen. An. 1. 20. 728 a 26, ἔστι γὰρ τὰ καταμήνια σπέρμα οὐ καθαρὸν ἀλλὰ δεόμενον ἐργασίας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῆ

περί τους καρπούς γενέσει, όταν ή μήπω διητημένη (διηττημένη Z, followed by Aubert and Wimmer, 'sifted through,' from διαττάω), ἔνεστι μὲν ή τροφή, δείται δ' έργασίας πρὸς την κάθαρσιν' διὸ καὶ μιγνυμένη έκείνη μέν τῆ γονῆ, αῦτη δὲ καθαρᾶ τροφῆ, ἡ μὲν γεννᾶ, ἡ δὲ τρέφει. Cp. De Gen. Απ. 1. 18. 725 a 14, της μεν οθν πρώτης τροφης περίττωμα φλέγμα καὶ εί τι άλλο τοιούτον και γάρ το φλέγμα της χρησίμου τροφής περίττωμά έστιν' σημείον δ' ότι μιγνύμενον τροφή καθαρά τρέφει και πονούσι καταναλίσκεται. In Athen. Deipn. 109 c a καθαρὸς ἄρτος, or 'loaf of pure meal,' is opposed to a συγκομιστὸς ἄρτος, or 'loaf of unbolted' (i.e. 'unsifted') 'meal,' and in Hippocr. De Victus Ratione (vol. i. p. 673 Kühn) καθαρὰ ἄλευρα are opposed to συγκομιστὰ ἄλευρα. Aristotle evidently thinks that a large quantity of pure and impure food together is more nutritious than a smaller quantity of pure food. He was much interested in questions about diet (Plut. Alex. C. 8, δοκεί δέ μοι καὶ τὸ φιλιατρείν 'Αλεξάνδρω προστρίψασθαι μάλλον έτέρων Αριστοτέλης, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν θεωρίαν ἢγάπησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοσοῦσιν έβοήθει τοίς φίλοις καὶ συνέταττε θεραπείας τινὰς καὶ διαίτας, ώς έκ τῶν έπιστολών λαβείν έστιν).

- 39. πρώτην μέν is taken up by ταύτην μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 1282 a 23, and answered by ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης, 24. Compare with this ἀπορία the remark ascribed to Anacharsis in Plut. Solon, c. 5 sub fin., ἔφη δὲ κἀκεῖνο θανμάζειν ὁ ἀνάχαρσις ἐκκλησία παραγενόμενος, ὅτι λέγουσι μὲν οἱ σοφοὶ παρ' Ἦλλησι, κρίνουσι δὲ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, and the argument ascribed to him in Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 7. 55–59.
- 41. I have not traced elsewhere the construction ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης, though Liddell and Scott give ὑγιασθεὶς τοῦ τραύματος from Anon. ap. Suid. s. v. ὑγιασθείς.
- 42. οὖτος δ' ἐστὶν ἰατρός.  $M^8$   $P^1$  and possibly  $\Gamma$  add δ before ἰατρός, but probably wrongly: see above on 1253 b 11 and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὖτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32. See also Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq.

όμοίως δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἔχει. For similar omissions of ἔχει see Bon. Ind. 306 a 16 sqq.

- 1. τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. See note on 1297 b 20. 1282 a. . The two words are conjoined also in 1. 9. 1257 a 4 and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 21.
- 3. ἰατρὸς δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and we give the name of physician to the executant, and to the man of directing skill, and thirdly to the man who is merely cultivated in the science.' For the contrast of δημιουργός and ἀρχιτεκτουικός, cp. Polyb. 8. 9. 2, Ἱέρωνος μὲν χορηγοῦ

γεγονότος, ἀρχιτέκτονος δὲ καὶ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ἐπινοημάτων ᾿Αρχιμήδους. In 1. 3. 1253 b 38 the ἀρχιτέκτων is contrasted with the ὑπηρέτης and in Metaph. A. 1. 981 a 30 sqq. and b 31 sq. with the χειροτέχνης. As to ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην, Coray compares Plato, Protag. 312 B, οἶαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου τούτων γὰρ σὰ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνη ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδεία, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει, and Bonitz (Ind. 558 a 4), De Part. An. 1. 1. 639 a 1, περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδείαν τινά πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων.

- 4. εἰσὶ γάρ κ.τ.λ. See critical note on 1282 a 5.
- 7. την αιρεσιν, 'the election' of magistrates and other masters of an art, as well as the review of their conduct.
- 8. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέσθαι ὀρθῶς κ.τ.λ., 'for choosing rightly also [no less than judging rightly] is the work of those who know the particular science or art.' The force of καί is here retained in καὶ γάρ. Compare the remarks of Cicero in Pro Plancio 3. 7 and 4.9.
- 10. εὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if in the case of some kinds of work and some arts some non-scientific persons also do share in the ability to make a good choice, they do not do so in a higher degree than the scientific.' Supply τοῦ ελέσθαι ὀρθῶς with μετέχουσι. Coray, followed by Bekk.2, would read ού τοι in place of ού τι, but ού τι seems to be right here: see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 70, who remarks, 'hoc videtur praemittendum esse, οὖτοι ita distare ab οὖτι, ut illud sententiam restringi significet, cum tì ad où addito nihil aliud nisi particulae negantis vis prematur.' See also Bon. Ind. 539 b The passage before us was perhaps present to the memory of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in De Thucyd. iud. 4, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰς ᾿Απελλοῦ καὶ Ζεύξιδος καὶ Πρωτογένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γραφέων των διωνομασμένων τέχνας οί μή τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχοντες ἐκείνοις ἀρετὰς κρίνειν κεκώλυνται οὐδὲ τὰ Φειδίου καὶ Πολυκλείτου καὶ Μύρωνος ἔργα οἱ μή τηλικοῦτοι δημιουργοί ἐω γὰρ λέγειν, ὅτι πολλων ἔργων οὐχ ήττων τοῦ τεχνίτου κριτής δ ίδιώτης.
- 15. ἀν ἢ τὸ πληθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες. In a passage of the Laws (701 A) which Aristotle probably has before him here Plato had said that the θεατροκρατία which sprang up at Athens after the Persian War would have mattered less if the demos had consisted of ἐλεύθεροι ἄνδρες.

18. περὶ ἐνίων, sc. τεχνῶν. Aristotle would not say this of geometry, for instance.

μόνον ὁ ποιήσας. See critical note.

- 20. ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 601 D, οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζώου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρείαν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἣν ἃν ἕκαστον ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός; Οὕτω. Πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἐκάστω ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητὴ οἶα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τὴ χρείᾳ ῷ χρῆται οἶον αὐλητής που αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγγελεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν οἱ ἃν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οῖους δεῖ ποιεῖν ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσει, and Cratyl. 390. Yet if the user is a better judge of the excellence of some articles than the maker, it does not follow that some users are not better judges than others.
- 22. καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαιτυμὼν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. For the thought see vol. i. p. 258, note 1. Cp. also Alexis, Fragm. Λίνος (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 444),

καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑποκριτῶν πολὺ κράτιστός ἐστιν ὀψοποιός, ὡς δοκεῖ τοῖς χρωμένοις, τῶν δ' ὀψοποιῶν ὑποκριτής.

- 25. δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This probably refers to Plato, Laws 945 B sqq.: see vol. i. p. 258.
- 26. αἱ δ' εὖθυναι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 25, τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἶον περὶ εὐθυνῶν κ.τ.λ.
  - 27. ωσπερ εἴρηται, in 1281 b 32.
  - 28. As to τοις δήμοις and ή ἐκκλησία, see above on 1275 b 7.
- 29. καίτοι κ.τ.λ. introduces a proof that members of the assembly, etc., are φαῦλοι (26). So much mixed up is the conception of φαιλότης and ἐπιείκεια with wealth and poverty. It is here implied that the Boulê is not one of αὶ μέγισται ἀρχαί, whereas in 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30-b 17 it is grouped with the offices of stratêgus and euthynus and logistês and counted among the most important magistracies. Notwithstanding what is said here, a high property-qualification was sometimes required for membership of the assembly, and sometimes none at all (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.). At Athens no one could be a member of the Boulê or the Heliaea till he was thirty years of age (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 265, 392), but Aristotle would perhaps regard this as ἡ τυχοῦσα ἡλικία. We read of Solon in ᾿Αθ. Πολ. c. 7, τὰς μ[ἐν οὖ]ν ἀρχὰς ἀπένειμεν ἄρχειν ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ζευγιτῶν, τοὺς

ἐννέα ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίας . . . τοῖς δὲ τὸ θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδωκε μόνον. Solon, in fact, required the ταμίαι τῆς 'Αθηνᾶς to be Pentacosiomedimni, and the law was the same in Aristotle's day, but it was no longer observed ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 47 init.: c. 7 sub fin.: c. 8. l. 7). It does not appear that there was any property-qualification for the office of stratêgus at Athens, for the stratêgi are said to be elected 'from all' (Gilbert, ibid. p. 230).

- 33. καὶ ταῦτ', i.e. the giving of greater powers to men possessed of a small property-qualification only and youthful in years than to men possessed of a high property-qualification, no less than the giving to unskilled persons of the right to elect magistrates and to review their conduct in office.
- 36. μόριόν ἐστι τούτων, 'is only a part of these.' For the suppression of 'only' cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, c. 11. 1282 b 4, and c. 15. 1286 b 8, and see notes on 1336 b 26, 1340 a 34, and 1292 a 32.

λέγω δὲ μόριον κ.τ.λ. This explanation seems unnecessary, but see above on 1277 b 37 and below on 1282 b 39. See also Vahlen on Poet. 13. 1453 a 4.

- **40.** πάντων τούτων, i. e. the members of the demos, the Boulê, and the dicastery.
- τὸ τῶν καθ' ἔνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1278 b 4, κύριος ἡ καθ' αὐτὸν ἡ μετ' ἄλλων τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας.
- 1282 b. 1. ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία, i. e. the discussion on the ἀπορία raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. This discussion has made it clear that the check of law is necessary to prevent the Many or the Few committing injustice, and that law must be just law if it is to do this.
  - 4. περὶ τούτων, 'only about those things' (see above on 1282 a 36). ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν, 'are wholly unable.'
  - 7. τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν, i.e. τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.
  - 8. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'but it must needs be also that as the constitutions [to which laws belong] are bad or good and just or unjust, so the laws also are the same—this, however, is clear that the laws must be adjusted to the constitution, [not the constitution to the laws]—but if this is so, it is evident that laws in accordance with the normal constitutions must necessarily be just and laws in accordance with the deviation-forms not just.' For the view that laws vary with constitutions, cp. Plato, Laws 714 B sq. Cp. also 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 13, πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλ' οὖ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς

νόμους. Demosthenes insists on this also: see Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 79, where Demosth. c. Androt. c. 30 is referred to, ἄξιον τοίνυν, ὡ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸν θέντα τὸν νόμον ἐξετάσαι Σόλωνα, καὶ θεάσασθαι ὅσην πρόνοιαν ἐποιεῖτο ἐν ἄπασιν οἶς ἐτίθει νόμοις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ὅσω περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ἐσπούδαζεν ἡ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ οῦ τιθείη τὸν νόμον, and also Demosth. in Lept. cc. 105–109, where the variation of the laws respecting rewards under different constitutions is traced. Sus. has already referred to Isocr. Areopag. § 14, ταύτη (i. e. τῆ πολιτεία) καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι, καὶ πράττειν οὕτως ἐκάστους οἵανπερ ἃν ταύτην ἔχωσιν. Εὶ τοῦτο (11), sc. φανερόν ἐστι.

14 sag. Aristotle's inquiries have so far led him to the conclu- C. 12. sion that the true supreme authority is to be found in 'laws in accordance with the normal constitutions,' and we expect him (see vol. i. p. 250) to go on and ask what laws are in accordance with the normal constitutions, but perhaps he feels that he has not yet sufficiently studied how normal or just constitutions should be organized, and that till he has done this he cannot decide what laws are in accordance with them. At all events, instead of asking this question, he makes a new start in the Twelfth Chapter and learns from a renewed inquiry into the nature of Political Justice, (1) that a just or normal constitution will recognize in its distribution of power all attributes which contribute to the being and well-being of the State, and not one of them only, and (2) that under given circumstances the conclusion at which he has arrived in favour of the supremacy of law does not hold good, and that Justice may require that the State shall be ruled not by law, but by the will of an Absolute King supreme over all law. To this extent then the conclusion reached at the end of c. 11 needs to be modified. In teaching that account ought to be taken of other things besides virtue in the award of political power, and that superiority in virtue alone, unless it is transcendent, gives no just claim to exclusive political supremacy, Aristotle differs from the language held by Plato in Laws 756 E-758 A, and especially 757 C, where we read of the nobler of the two kinds of λοότης (ή άληθεστάτη καὶ ἀρίστη λσότης), τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ' έλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν έκατέρω, καὶ δή καὶ τιμάς μείζοσι μεν πρός άρετην άεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δε τουναντίον έχουσιν άρετης τε και παιδείας το πρέπον έκατέροις απονέμει κατά λόγον έστι γάρ δή που καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτό, τὸ δίκαιον. He probably has

also before him Rep. 540 D, ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἡ πλείους ἡ εἶς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι, τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν . . . τὸ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμάς, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῷ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὔξοντες αὐτὸ διασκευωρήσωνται τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν. Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 35.

'Επεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here begins a long string of protases introduced by ἐπεί, which lack an expressed apodosis to take them up: compare 1. 12. 1250 a 37 sqq. The virtual apodosis perhaps comes in 21, ποίων δ' ισότης κ.τ.λ., unless we supply after τὸ κοινη συμφέρον 'we shall do well to inquire what the just is.' Compare Magn. Mor. 1. 1. 1182 b 1, αλλα μην η γε πολιτική βελτίστη δύναμις, ώστε τὸ τέλος αὐτης αν είη ἀγαθόν. For ἀγαθόν (not τὸ ἀγαθόν) see Stallbaum on Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E. For μάλιστα see note on 1252 a 4. That τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθόν is τὸ δίκαιον might be guessed from Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, taken with 1261 b 9, καίτοι τό γε έκάστου ἀγαθὸν σώζει εκαστον. As to ή πολιτική δύναμις, ' αί μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις idem fere sunt ac τέχναι et έπιστημαι, itaque saepe δύναμις vel coniungitur cum verbis τέχνη, έπιστήμη vel pro synonymo usurpatur' (Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq.). The three terms are already used in conjunction by Isocrates in Panath. § 30, ἐπειδή τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω.

- 17. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον, 'and by the just I mean that which is for the common advantage.' Cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 19, ἐν μὲν οὖν τῆ πρώτη κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία). Aristotle adds this remark because he has already explained in c. 6 that the common advantage is the end for which the State originally comes into being and the end of all normal constitutions: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 27 sq.
- 18. δοκεί δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. Cp. c. 9. 1280 a 11 (where see note). By ἴσον τι is probably meant ἴσον κατ ἀναλογίαν: cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 26, πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.
- 19. τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οῖς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἤθικῶν. The reference appears to be to Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 9 sqq. Popular opinion is distinguished from 'philosophical inquiries' very much as in Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 22, ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν: cp. De Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 4, τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. See Bon. Ind. 821 a 18 sqq., and cp. Plato, Symp. 218 A, τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφία λόγων.

- 20. τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, 'for that which is just is a thing and has to do with persons,' or, in other words, justice involves an assignment of a thing to persons.
- 22. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν, 'for this inquiry is productive of questions and of philosophical speculation on politics.' For ἔχει see above on 1268 b 24. It is a merit in inquiries to give rise to aporetic discussion: see above on 1275 b 34. Bonitz (Ind. 820 b 58 sqq.) compares Phys. 1. 2. 185 a 17, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὔ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἴσως ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ σκέψις, and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 12, ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικήν, λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρόν, ὅ τι περ οἰκεῖον ἦν τῷ μεθόδω. Cp. also 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 30.
- 23. ἴσως γὰρ ἄν φαίη τις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has before him the discussion in Plato, Gorg. 490 B sqq. He may possibly have thought that Plato lent some countenance to the view criticized by him when he said of true Justice in Laws 757 C, τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκατέρῳ, yet it is likely that Plato's language in Rep. 454 C (esp. ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐψιλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα) suggested to Aristotle the distinction between attributes contributing to the work to be done and others. See also below on 27.
- 24. νενεμῆσθαι, not νέμεσθαι: cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16: 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13: 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 16: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 10. Compare also 1. 13. 1260 a 4, ὑφήγηται, and 3. 9. 1280 a 16, διήρηται (see note). Saepe quidem in physicis maxime metaphysicisque libris cum aliorum verborum tum huius ipsius ἀκολουθεῖν formae praeteriti ponuntur vix ut praeteriti temporis notionem persentias, velut ut huius quidem verbi exempla pauca ponam, ταύτη δ' ἠκολούθηκε (τῆ καρδία) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν καλουμένων σπλάγχνων ἔκαστον ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς γὰρ ὕλης συνεστᾶσιν, De Part. An. 2. 1. 647 a 34' (Vahlen on Poet. 5. 1449 b 9).
- 25. μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὅντες. For this 'abundantia contraria copulandi,' see Vahlen on Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, who refers among other passages to Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 41, ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον.
- 26. τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. Καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν is added in explanation of τὸ δίκαιον (see note on 1257 b 7) and to show that the kind of τὸ δίκαιον referred to is that which rests on ἀξία, for

there is another kind of τὸ δίκαιον (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3, καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν). That this kind alone is truly just we see from 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16, οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

27. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. In correcting this error (cp. 1283 a 11–14) Aristotle probably has before him a saying of Solon (Diod. 9. 2. 5, δ Σόλων ἡγεῖτο τοὺς μὲν πύκτας καὶ σταδιεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀθλητὰς μηδὲν ἀξιόλογον συμβάλλεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς σωτηρίαν, τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῆ διαφέροντας μόνους δύνασθαι τὰς πατρίδας ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις διαφυλάττειν), a saying which Xenophanes virtually repeats in the well-known lines (Fragm. 2. Bergk),

οὔτε γὰρ εἰ πύκτης ἀγαθὸς λαοῖσι μετείη οὔτ' εἰ πενταθλεῖν, οὔτε παλαισμοσύνην, οὐδὲ μὲν εἰ ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν, τό πέρ ἐστι πρότιμον ρώμης ὅσσ' ἀνδρῶν ἔργ' ἐν ἀγῶνι πέλει, τοὔνεκεν ἄν δἡ μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ πόλις εἴη' σμικρὸν δ' ἄν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ, εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικῷ Πίσαο παρ' ὄχθας' οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλεως

(cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 1 sq.). Plato had lent some momentary countenance to the opposite view in Laws 744 B (see vol. i. p. 260, note 1), but he anticipates Aristotle in Laws 696 B, οὐ γὰρ δὴ δεῖ κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι τὰς τιμὰς ὑπερεχούσας, ὅτι τίς ἐστι πλούτῳ διαφέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὅτι ταχὺς ἡ καλὸς ἡ ἰσχυρὸς ἄνευ τινὸς ἀρετῆς οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἡς ἄν σωφροσύνη ἀπῆ (where he perhaps remembers the saying of Solon and the lines of Xenophanes), except that Aristotle thinks that the rich man has a better claim to office than the swift or handsome or strong man. The Ethiopians were said to make the biggest and strongest man among them their king (Hdt. 3. 20: Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4 sqq.) or else the handsomest (Athen. Deipn. 566 c: Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 142 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 463), other barbarians honoured swiftness of foot in the same way (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 138: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. ibid.), and Euripides had put in the mouth of one of his characters the lines (Fragm. 1035),

σστις κατ' ἰσχὺν πρῶτος ἀνομάζετο ἡ τόξα πάλλων ἡ μάχη δορὸς σθένων, τοῦτον τυραννεῖν τῶν κακιύνων έχρῆν.

Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and 4 (7).

14. 1332 b 16 sqq. as if a great physical superiority conferred a title to rule.

- 30. φανερόν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων. Cp. c. 13. 1284 b 7, δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν.
- 31. τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle first takes the case in which the essential attribute (skill in flute-playing, in the illustrative parallel which he has chosen) is shared by several individuals in an equal degree, and he says that these individuals must be awarded flutes of equal excellence; extraneous qualifications like that of high birth must not be allowed to turn the scale in favour of any one of them (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 8, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλόν). He next passes on (34 sqq.) to the case in which one individual possesses the essential attribute in a far higher degree than the rest, and as to this case he tells us that no inferiority of this individual in respect of higher but non-essential things must lead us to deny him the superior award of flutes which is his due.
- 35. ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν, 'if we push it still further.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 22, δόξειε δ' ἃν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῆ περιγραφῆ: Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 8, μικρὸν προαγαγόντες τὸν λόγον.
- 38. εἰ καὶ μείζον κ.τ.λ. How little respect was felt for the art of flute-playing, we see from 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 18 sqq.

έκαστον here takes the place of έκάτερον, as in Poet. 6. 1449 b 25 (see Vahlen's note on this passage: he says 'έκάστον hic ut alibi est pro έκατέρον' and refers to his Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 50).

39. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. For this really needless explanation see above on 1277 b 37 and 1282 a 36.

κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν, 'if we compare the two ratios,' i. e. the ratio in which noble birth and beauty excel the art of flute-playing and the ratio in which the surpassing flute-player excels his fellows. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 31, ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις.

- 2. In place of τοῦ πλούτου we expect τοῦ κάλλους, but see below 1283 a. on 1323 b 35.
- 3. ἔτι κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον κ.τ.λ., i.e. the λόγος of the imagined opponent in 1282 b 23 sqq. Things that differ very much are not commensurable (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18, τῆ μὲν οὖν ἀληθεία ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς, and 1133 a 19, διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως

είναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή, where  $\pi \omega s = \pi \rho \delta s$  τὴν χρείαν: Phys. 7. 4.

249 a 3 sqq.).

4. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος. Montecatino (vol. iii. p. 191) translates, 'si magis imperiorum et principatus civitatis esse particeps debet,' etc., and so Sus.4, 'for if a given bodily stature [confers political privileges] more [than a certain amount of wealth or good birth].' These interpreters apparently supply δεί μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, or something similar, with μᾶλλον (cp. 1282 b 23 sqq.). Stahr, on the other hand, translates, 'denn wenn eine bestimmte Körpergrösse für irgend etwas höheren Werth verliehe (confers a higher value for anything whatever),' and Bernays, 'denn wenn z. B. einem gewissen Maass von Körpergrösse im Vergleich zu Reichthum und freier Geburt irgend etwas in höherem Grade zukommt.' Prof. Ridgeway brackets μᾶλλου, and another critic would read ἐνάμιλλον in place of it, and Sus.4 mentions these suggestions, though he still retains μᾶλλον in his text. I am myself inclined to supply ἀγαθόν with μᾶλλον from the preceding sentence ('more a good'), and to translate, 'for if a given amount of size is more a good than [a given amount of some other good, such as wealth or free birth].'

καὶ ὅλως ἄν κ.τ.λ., 'size would also generally' (i.e. apart from its amount) 'be capable of being matched against wealth and free birth.'

6. ωστ' εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, if this man excels in size more than this man in virtue' (or in other words, if this man's amount of size is superior to this man's amount of virtue), 'and size generally' (i. e. apart from questions of amount) 'is superior in a higher degree than virtue, everything would be comparable [whatever its amount], for if such an amount is better than such an amount, such an amount will evidently be equal.' I have followed Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος, 8, which may have been repeated by mistake from the preceding line, though it is possible that instead of bracketing μέγεθος we should read ἀγαθόν in place of it. The difficulty of retaining μέγεθος arises from this, that, if we do so, we have to translate, ' for if such an amount of size is better than such an amount [of something else], such an amount will evidently be equal,' and it is doubtful whether we have any right to supply 'of something else.' Aristotle probably means by είη αν συμβλητά πάντα, 8, that all goods would be comparable, not everything, for this is all that his argument proves. For τοσόνδε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., cp. Phys. 7.

4. 248 a 11, εἰ δή ἐστι πᾶσα (sc. κίνησιs) συμβλητή καὶ όμοταχὲς τὸ ἐν ἴσφ χρόνφ ἴσον κινούμενον, ἔσται περιφερής τις ἴση εὐθεία, καὶ μείζων δή καὶ ἐλάττων. Κρεῖττον in 9 must mean 'better.'

- 9. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον. See above on 3.
- 10. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, 'in the case of things political also,' no less than ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων (1282 b 30). For τὰ πολιτικά, cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 11.
- 11. εἰ γὰρ...14. τὴν τιμήν. Here the fragment of Xenophanes quoted in part above on 1282 b 27 is especially present to Aristotle's mind. Οὐδέν is to be taken with δεῖ, as in Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 27, οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. Τὴν τιμήν, 'the honour which falls to them.'
  - 13. ή τούτων διαφορά, 'the superiority possessed by these men.'
- 14. ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ. Ἐν τούτοιs is 'in respect of these things': cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 1, ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴωνται ὑπάρχειν (sc. αὐτοῖs) ἐν τούτοιs ἐν οῖs σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν, and Poet. 2. 1448 a 16, ἐν αὐτῆ δὲ τῆ διαφορᾶ καὶ ἡ τραγφδία πρὸς τὴν κωμφδίαν διέστηκεν. See also Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 452 E, καίτοι ἐν ταύτη τῆ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην. The πόλις is regarded by Aristotle as composed of wealth, free birth, nobility, culture, etc.: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ· λέγω δὲ ποιὸν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν.
  - 16. τῆς τιμῆς, cp. τὴν τιμήν, 14, which answers to τῶν ἀρχῶν, 11.
- 17. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., '[for free birth and wealth are things of which the πόλις is composed,] for 'etc. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 21 (quoted above on 1276 b 37). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33 Aristotle mentions τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὁ καλοῦμεν εὐπόρους, as a necessary part of a State. It is true that in Crete the State defrayed the liturgies which were elsewhere borne by rich men (see above on 1272 a 17), and that this might have been made the general rule, but even then rich men would be needed to contribute to the eisphora. Aristotle says nothing about οἱ εὐγενεῖς, though he has mentioned them in 16, probably because he includes them under οἱ ἐλεύθεροι (cp. 33 sqq.).

τίμημα φέροντας, i.e. contributing to the State a rateable quota of property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, τοῖς ἔχουσι τίμημα, and for φέρειν, 2. 5. 1263 a 3, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν. For the contrast implied here between οἱ ἄποροι and οἱ τίμημα φέροντες, see note on 1279 b 19.

18. οὐ γὰρ ἄν εἴη κ.τ.λ. See above on 1276 b 37 and 1280 a 32. Is there a tacit reference here to the latter passage, in which it was

shown that there could not be a  $\pi \delta \lambda \iota s$  wholly composed of slaves? If so, we have something to add to the other evidence (see vol. i. Appendix C) that cc. 12 and 13 were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

19. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq. (where military prowess and judicial virtue are again mentioned together) and 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 18 sqq. Tyrtaeus had long ago said (Fragm. 12. 15),

ξυνον δ' ἐσθλον τοῦτο πόληί τε παντί τε δήμφ, ὅστις ἀνὴρ διαβὰς ἐν προμάχοισι μένη νωλεμέως κ.τ.λ.,

and as to justice Protagoras had gone farther than Aristotle, for he makes it essential to the very existence of a State (Plato, Protag. 324 D sq., and 326 E, τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν).

21. πλην κ.τ.λ. For the contrast here drawn between είναι πόλιν and οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.

24. πρός μέντοι ζωήν άγαθήν ή παιδεία καὶ ή άρετή μάλιστα δικαίως αν αμφισβητοίησαν. Ζωή αγαθή is taken as the standard in 1. 8. 1256 b 32, and said to be the end which the lawgiver should set before him in 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 7 sqq. Παιδεία and ἀρετή are here conjoined as in Plato, Laws 757 C, and in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 29 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26 sqq. Παιδεία, 'culture,' is connected with aristocracy in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24 sq., where the offices in an aristocracy, which are usually said to be filled ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων (3. 7. 1279 a 35), are said to be filled ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων. In 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq. it is opposed to Bavavola and treated as a note of oligarchy (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 37). Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. ἀμφισβητέω, notes the rare occurrence of ἀμφισβητοίησαν, adding however that ἀμφισβητοίην occurs in Plato, Euthyd. 296 E, and άμφισβητοίεν in Menex. 242 E (see also Demosth. Procem. 46. p. 1453 for ἀμφισβητοῖεν). 'Αμφισβήτησειεν is used in Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24 and 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 12.

26. καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, in c. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This has been already said in substance in c. 9. 1280 a 21 sqq., and it is repeated in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. For πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν, 'to have an equal share with others of everything,' cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 30, ἵνα ἴσον ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς λειτουργίας, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513 Bothe, 547 Dindorf,

σὺ δ' οὐκ ἀνέξει δωμάτων ἔχων ἴσον;

Tàs τοιαύτας πολιτείας, i. e. constitutions which give an equal amount of everything to those who are equal in one thing only, or which give an unequal amount of everything to those who are unequal in one thing only. The reason why such constitutions must necessarily be παρεκβάσεις is that they contravene τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον (cp. c. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq.).

- 29. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. This was said in c. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq. Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Aristotle's original intention probably was, after interposing an explanation of the grounds on which the different claimants base their claims, to continue, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἤδη σκεπτέον, εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾳ πόλει, τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ. In adding this explanation, however, he allows his attention to be diverted and the strict sequence of the passage to be broken (just as in 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.), and thus it happens that μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Μὲν οὖν here, as elsewhere, introduces a more particular and detailed treatment of the subject.
- 30. ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες, ἁπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως. For the repetition of πάντες, cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a I, φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἄρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον.
- 31. οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. In the passage 31-42 Aristotle bears in mind the rule which he has laid down in c. 12. 1283 a 14 sq. that claimants for political power must rest their claims on attributes entering into the composition of a State. The different claimants are represented as doing so. This is indicated by κοινόν (32), πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον (32), πολίται μᾶλλον (34), οἴκοι τίμιος (36), βελτίους (36), and κοινωνικήν άρετήν (38). Κοινόν, 32, 'a public thing,' or in other words, one of the things which are essential to the State: cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5 sqq. Compare also Eth. Nic. 8. 16. 1163 b 5, ούτω δ' έχειν τούτο καὶ έν ταις πολιτείαις φαίνεται οὐ γὰρ τιμάται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ή τιμή δὲ κοινόν. It is implied in the passage before us that the rich will be owners of land, and this may have commonly been the case in Greece; still there were other forms of wealth besides wealth in land (2. 7. 1267 b 10 sqq.), and most of Nicias' wealth was in silver (Plut. Nic. c. 4).
- 32. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. So the Syracusan Athenagoras, though he was the leader of the demos, admits that the rich are the best custodians of money (Thuc. 6. 39): that this was a common view we see from such passages as Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1429 a 34, τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους

čστιν ἰδεῖν νομίζοντας τοὺς πλουτοῦντας δικαιοτέρους εἶναι τῶν πενομένων, and Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 21 sqq. (cp. also Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 92 Nauck). Aristotle does not agree with this view; he requires virtue in a custodian of money (7 (5). 9. 1309 b 6 sqq.).

33. οί δ' ελεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς κ.τ.λ., 'and the free-born and noble claim as not being far from each other, inasmuch as [if the free-born claim on the strength of their citizenship, those who are better born are citizens in a higher degree than the low-born, and nobility is in every State locally prized; and again because it is likely that those descended from better ancestors will be better, seeing that nobility is excellence of race.' The ἐλεύθεροι and the εὐγενείς are classed together in 1283 b 16 as οί κατά γένος άξιοῦντες ἄρχειν: the εὐγενεῖς are in a superlative degree what the ἐλεύθεροι are in a positive degree (cp. 1283 b 19 sq.). In some places the word  $\epsilon \lambda \epsilon i \theta \epsilon \rho o s$  appears to have been used to designate the noble (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq.), none but οί διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας being accounted ἐλεύθεροι. The well-born were citizens in a higher degree than the low-born, for they could reckon more generations of citizen descent, and this was with many a test of citizenship (c. 2, 1275 b 21 sqg.). The fact that nobility is  $\pi a \rho$ έκάστοις οίκοι τίμιος is insisted on, because this shows it to be of importance to the πολιτική κοινωνία, and therefore a just ground of claim. Its champions might have gone further and urged that Greek nobility is recognized everywhere (1. 6. 1255 a 32 sqq.), but this would not have been equally to the point. The sophist Lycophron would not admit that nobility belonged to the class of τίμια καὶ σπουδαΐα (Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 9 sqq.). The fem. form τίμιος is used in the passage before us (possibly because it is followed by ¿τι: see note on 1277 b 25): in De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 24 we have περί μεν εκείνας (sc. τας οὐσίας) τιμίας οὔσας καὶ θείας. For έτι διότι βελτίους είκὸς τους έκ βελτιόνων, cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 29, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παιδεία εἰκὸς γὰρ έξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα τοιοῦτον είναι. For the definition of εὐγένεια as ἀρετή γένους cp. Rhet. 2. 15. 1300 b 22, ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετήν, γενναίον δε κατά τὸ μὴ εξίστασθαι της φύσεως ὅπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ οὐ συμβαίνει τοις εὐγενέσιν, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελείς φορὰ γὰρ τίς έστιν ἐν τοις γένεσιν ανδρών ωσπερ έν τοις κατά τας χώρας γιγνομένοις, και ένίστε αν ή άγαθὸν τὸ γένος, έγγίνονται διά τινος χρόνου ἄνδρες περιττοί, κἄπειτα πάλιν avaδίδωσιν ('deficit,' Bon. Ind. s. v. avaδιδόναι): Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b

18 sqq.: Aristot. Fragm. 85. 1490 b 43, ή μεν εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρετή γένους, ή δ' άρετη σπουδαίον' σπουδαίον δ' έστι γένος έν ώ πολλοί σπουδαίοι πεφύκασιν έγγίνεσθαι. These passages show that άρετη γένους means 'excellence of race ' in the sense that the race to which the εὐγενής belongs has produced in the past a number of virtuous men (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33, ή κατ' ιδίαν ἀρετὴν ἡ κατὰ γένους), so that the εὐγενής stands at any rate a better chance of being virtuous than one who is not evyevýs. We must bear in mind that this definition of εὐγένεια is here placed in the mouth of οἱ ελεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, who would be likely to take the most favourable view of εὐγένεια. We see from Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 34 that εὐγένεια did not, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, necessarily imply descent from ancestors remarkable for virtue; it might imply only descent from ancestors remarkable for wealth or other social advantages; nor did it necessarily imply a frequent occurrence in the family of virtuous individuals, but only of individuals distinguished in some way or other (ἐπιφανεῖs). Cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 88. Still the view that εὐγένεια is ἀρετή γένους is not far from that of Aristotle. In the Rhetoric (2. 15. 1390 b 22 sqq.), as we have seen, it is distinctly adopted by him, though he holds that, owing to the occurrence from time to time of degeneracy in families, most εὐγενεῖs are men of little worth. Compare the view taken in the fragments of the possibly genuine Περὶ εὐγενείας (Aristot. Fragm. 82-85. 1490 a 1 sqq.). Here, however, we find (1490 a 31 sqq.) a reference to the contention that οἱ ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων may be εὐγενείς no less than οἱ ἐκ πάλαι ἀγαθῶν (cp. Julian, Or. 2. p. 81 B, φασὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων εὐγενεῖς), and in the Politics Aristotle seems to adopt as his own the doctrine that εὐγένεια implies descent from ancestors not only virtuous but rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21, ή γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαίος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή: 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 3).

37. ὁμοίως δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'we shall say then that in a similar way virtue also prefers a just claim, for we say that justice, which is necessarily accompanied by all the other virtues, is virtue operative in social relations [and therefore essential to the State: so that virtue as a whole has as good a claim to recognition as justice].' I take the antecedent to ἢ to be τὴν δικαιοσύνην, not κοινωνικὴν ἀρετήν. For the omission of ἀρετάς after τὰς ἄλλας, cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 24: 3. 5. 1278 a 40. Aristotle introduces his own view with δή, just as he introduces it with οὖν in c. 3. 1276 a 13 sqq. For ὁμοίως, cp.

1283 b 16, 19, 31: it is not to be taken with diraiws. That justice is virtue operative in social relations we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25-1130 a 5, and from the definition of virtue ascribed with whatever truth to Plato in Diog. Laert. 3. 91, ή δè δικαιοσύνη (αἰτία) τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγείν: cp. also Plut. De Defect. Orac. c. 24, εἰσὶν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἔτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὖς χρηται (ὁ θεὸς) ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς ἀρεταῖς οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρησίς ἐστι δικαιοσύνης ή χάριτος ή χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς That there is a close connexion between justice and the other virtues, we see from Aristot. Fragm. 75, 1488 b 5, ap. Plut. De Stoic. Repugn. c. 15, (ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ ȳ περὶ δικαιοσύνης . . .) Αριστοτέλει περί δικαιοσύνης αντιγράφων οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι, της ήδονης ούσης τέλους, άναιρείται μέν ή δικαιοσύνη, συναναιρείται δέ τη δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐκάστη, and from Plato, Laws 631 C, έκ δὲ τούτων (i.e. φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης) μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον αν είη δικαιοσύνη.

- 40. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here, as Eaton points out, Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 488 D.
  - 42. λαμβανομένων. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 17, πάντων ληφθέντων.
- ἄρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾳ πόλει κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Gorg. 490 B, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὧμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἁθρόοι ἄνθρωποι κ.τ.λ. Ἦρ' οὖν is repeated in πότερον for the sake of clearness, the parenthetic sentence λέγω δὲ . . . πολιτικόν having intervened: compare the way in which δῆλον ὅτι takes up δῆλον ὡς in 1283 b 17 sqq. after an intervening hypothetical sentence.
- 1283 b. **2.** οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς. The article is omitted before εὐγενεῖς because the rich and noble are classed together in contradistinction to the good: cp. 1283 a 33, οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς.
  - ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, 'and further outside their ranks a mass composed of citizens.' Πολιτικόν is added because there is such a thing as a non-citizen  $\pi\lambda\hat{\eta}\theta$ ος (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων).
  - 4. καθ' ἐκάστην πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 27, καθ' ἔκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων: 2. 6. 1265 b 29, κοινοτάτην τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 5, τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρον τιμήματος τούτων: Sallust, Bell. Iugurth. 19. 7, pleraque ex Punicis oppida, and 30. 4, unam ex tam multis orationem eius.

- 5. τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, 'for it is just in respect of the supreme authority they constitute that they differ from each other' (Bernays).
- 6. τῷ διὰ πλουσίων. For the omission of the article, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24, οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖε ἀριστοκρατίαιε ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖε ἀλιγαρχίαιε ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖε δημοκρατίαιε ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, and see note on 1310 a 6.
- 8. ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχη χρόνον. These constitutions settle the matter in their own way, but still we persist in asking how it ought to be settled. Ταῦτα refers to οἴ τ' ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν: for the gender, see above on 1263 a 1.
- 9. εὶ δη ... 13. ἐξ αὐτῶν. 'Well, if those who possess virtue are quite few in number, in what way should we determine the question? Or perhaps we should [not trouble about their number in itself, but] consider the expression "few" in relation to the work they have to do, [and ask] whether they are able to govern the State, or whether they are numerous enough to constitute a State?' Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 47) and Susemihl think that this paragraph should be transposed so as to precede εὶ δέ τίς ἐστιν, 1284 a 3, but it seems to me to be in its right place. The discussion of the question just raised is introduced by  $\delta \eta$ , as often elsewhere (e.g. in c. 4. 1277 a 14-16 and c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.). Τίνα δεὶ διελείν τρόπον, 10, takes up πως διοριστέον, 9. Aristotle's first impulse is to challenge the claims of the good to rule on the score of the smallness of their number, as he has already done in c. 10. 1281 a 28 sqq. But he drops this ground of attack, probably because he feels that paucity is no bar to a claim to rule. Even a single individual may have a just claim to rule, if his virtue is transcendent. Hence he passes on in 13 sqq. to deal with another objection, the discussion of which brings out this fact. The claims of the good have a weak point which they share with those of the rich and noble. Just as the claims of the rich and noble to rule may be defeated by those of one man who is richer or nobler than all the rest, so the claims of the good may be defeated by those of one man who is better than all the rest. And the claims of the Many may be defeated in a similar way. If this superiority of One Man or of a Few not numerous enough to constitute a State is overwhelming, the fact that they are not numerous enough for

this must not stand in the way of our giving him or them supreme authority.

16. οἱ κατὰ γένος, i. e. οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς.

δηλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'Aliquoties enunciatio per ώς introducta per ὅτι continuatur, e.g. in Phys. 6. 2. 233 a 13 sq.: 1. 7. 190 b 17 sqq.: 8. 7. 260 a 23 sqq.' (Bon. Ind. 872 a 1). For the repetition of δηλον, see vol. ii. p. li, note 6. For the thought, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq. Εἶς πλουσιώτερος ἀπάντων seems to have been almost a proverbial expression: see Plut. Solon, c. 14, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν διὰ μέσου πολιτῶν, τὴν ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ νόμου μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες ἐργώδη καὶ χαλεπὴν οὖσαν, οὐκ ἔφευγον ἔνα τὸν δικαιότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασιν: Plut. De Cupid. Divit. c. 7, ἤ, καθάπερ λέγουσιν, εἶς ὁ πονηρότατος ἐν τῷ γένει γενόμενος καταφάγη τὰ πάντων. In Pausan. 7. 12. 1 we read βεβαιοῖ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ἄρ' ἦν καὶ πῦρ ἐς πλέον ἄλλου πυρὸς καῖον, καὶ λύκος ἀγριώτερος λύκων ἄλλων, καὶ ἀκύτερος ἱέραξ ἱέρακος πέτεσθαι.

- 17. κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.
- 18. For the juxtaposition of τὸν ἕνα and ἀπάντων, see notes on 1281 a 13 and 1285 a 3.
- 23. οὐκοῦν κ.τ.λ., 'therefore if the Many also really ought to be supreme because they are stronger' (κρείττους, not ἀμείνους) 'than the Few.' Cp. 1283 a 40 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 489 E sqq. (Eaton). For εί...γε, cp. Plato, Rep. 433 C, εί δέοι γε κρῖναι.
- 27. πάντα δὴ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. "Οροι are here 'criteria,' such as wealth or virtue, on the strength of which men claim political supremacy. Plato had already used the expression ὀρθὸς ὅρος in Polit. 293 C, ταύτη θήσομεν, ὡς οἶμαι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη, τοῦτον ὅρον ὀρθὸν εἶναι μόνον ἰατρικῆς καὶ ἄλλης ἡστινοσοῦν ἀρχῆς. Aristotle's conclusion is not convincing. It does not follow that a claim is bad because it does not hold under all circumstances.
  - 30. καὶ γὰρ δή, 'for surely.'
- 31. For κυρίους τοῦ πολιτεύματος, an expression which does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics, cp. Diod. 15. 45. 2, τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιστασίας κυρίοις γεγονόσι τοῦ πολιτεύματος.
- 32.  $\tilde{\epsilon}_{\chi 0 \iota \epsilon \nu}$   $\tilde{\alpha}_{\nu}$  is in the plural, though  $\tau \tilde{\alpha} \pi \lambda \tilde{\eta} \theta \eta$  is neuter, possibly because Aristotle is thinking of the individuals of whom  $\tau \tilde{\alpha} \pi \lambda \tilde{\eta} \theta \eta$  are composed (cp. 7(5). 11. 1314 b 2,  $\tilde{\epsilon} \phi$  als  $\tau \tilde{\alpha} \pi \lambda \tilde{\eta} \theta \eta \chi \alpha \lambda \epsilon \pi a i \nu o \nu \sigma \iota \nu$ ). He often, however, uses a plural verb with a neut. plur. nominative, even where this explanation does not hold good: see Waitz on Anal. Pr. 2. 26. 69 b 3, and Bonitz on Metaph. A. 4. 985 a 27.

τὰ πλήθη, as in 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 2 and Diod. 9. 24. 2, οὐ μὴν τὰ πλήθη κατεπλάγη αὐτοῦ τὴν βαρύτητα: so also in Plato, Gorg. 452 E and Soph. 268 B (Liddell and Scott).

35. ἀθρόους, not ἀθρόον: cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 14, οἶκος . . . οὖς κ.τ.λ.

διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. Καί appears to mean that we are not only led to the conclusion stated in 27 sqq., but are enabled to solve an ἀπορία which is raised by some persons. Τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, 'on this basis,' i. e. on the basis of a recognition of the claims both of the Better and of the Many. Who were the persons who raised this ἀπορία? It is difficult to say, though some approach is made to the question by the disputants in Plato, Gorg. 488 B sqq.: cp. also 483 B, ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἶσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι κ.τ.λ., and Laws 757 D. Andocides says in c. Alcib. c. 6, καίτοι ταῦτα διέγνωσται ἄριστα τῶν δογμάτων, ἃ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρμόττοντα μάλιστα τυγχάνει καὶ πλείστους ἐπιθυμητὰς ἔχει.

- 38. τίθεσθαι. We expect rather τιθέναι (Harpocr. s. v. θέσθαι, ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων λέγεται ὡς ἔθηκε μὲν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἔθετο δὲ ὁ δῆμος). So we have ἐτίθει νόμον in 2. 8. 1268 a 6: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 36.
- 39. ὅταν συμβαίνη τὸ λεχθέν, i.e. when the Many taken collectively are better than the Few. The contrary case is dealt with in 1284 a 3, εἰ δέ τίς ἐστιν εἶς κ.τ.λ. Bern. and Sus. take ὅταν συμβαίνη τὸ λεχθέν with ἐνδέχεται ἀπαντᾶν, thus making the sentence ἀποροῦσι, 36 . . . πλειόνων, 39, parenthetical, but the length of the parenthesis by which on this view these words are parted from the words which they qualify makes against this interpretation, and it seems preferable to take them, as Bekker and others do, with ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες κ.τ.λ.
- 40. τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως, 'but [the advantage of neither is to be studied exclusively, for] we must determine that which is correct and normal in a fair and equal fashion.' For ληπτέον, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὖτω ληπτέον. 'Omnino λαμβάνειν est animo concipere, ita quidem ut modo investigandi (Waitz ad Anal. Post. 1. 4. 73 a 24), modo inveniendi cognoscendi definiendi intelligendi vim habeat' (Bon. Ind. 422 b 38). "Ισως is used in the sense of 'equally' in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 22, κληρωτοὺς ἴσως ἐκ τῶν μορίων.

τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 7. 1279 a 31 sq. Plato had already said the same thing, as Giph. points out, p. 371: cp. Cic. De Offic.

1. 25. 85, omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt duo Platonis praecepta teneant: unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quaecumque agunt ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum; alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Cicero perhaps refers to Plato, Rep. 420 B. Solon claimed that he had endeavoured to be fair both to the Few and to the Many (Fragm. 5).

42. πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the absence of the article, see note on 1276 b 28. Compare with the form of the sentence which commences here 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 7, ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἐαυτοὺς ἔκαστος καὶ τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. The statement that the citizen in general is he who shares in ruling and being ruled is based on c. 4: in c. 1, on the other hand, the citizen is defined as ễ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἡ κριτικῆς.

1284 a. 1. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην, 'and to suit the best': cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. Aristotle takes it for granted here that the citizens of the 'best State' will both rule and be ruled, and thus anticipates the conclusion at which he arrives after a discussion in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.

3. τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. For virtue is the main source of 'the most desirable life,' which the citizens of the best State are said to live in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a

30 sqq.

εὶ δέ τίς ἐστιν εῖς κ.τ.λ. This sentence is closely connected with what precedes; it deals with the contrary case to that supposed in  $\emph{δταν}$  συμβαίνη τὸ λεχθέν, 1283 b 39. The sense is, 'but if there is one man or a few of transcendent virtue, we must not treat them as citizens on a level with the rest, or expect them to be content with ruling and being ruled; their part is to rule.' To insert 1283 b 9–13 between  $\pi ρ \grave{ο} s$  τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν and εὶ δέ τίς ἐστιν εῖς κ.τ.λ., as Sus. does, is to destroy the connexion. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 540 D, ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται ἡ πλείους ἡ εἶς κ.τ.λ.

4. μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως. These words are added because Aristotle is now dealing only with the case in which the Good exist in the same community with those possessing other attributes essential to the State (cp. 1283 a 42 sqq.). If the Good are numerous enough themselves to constitute a State, as in

the case of the State sketched in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, then the State will consist of equals, and they may each of them be treated as part of it and subjected to law.

- 6. τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικήν. Translate (with Bern. and Sus.) here and in 10, 'their political capacity,' and τῆ δυνάμει, 13, 'in capacity.' So Plut. Cic. c. 4, ἀνεκίνει τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν. Sepulveda explains, 'facultatem civilem vocat quicquid opis in homine est quod faciat ad civilem societatem iuvandam tuendamque, sive administrandam.' Δύναμις πολιτική answers to δυνάμενος, 2, as ἀρετή answers to προαιρούμενος. For the distinction implied between virtue and political capacity, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq., where virtue is distinguished from δύναμις τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq., where it is distinguished from δύναμις ἡ πρακτική τῶν ἀρίστων. Δυνάμει is used in a different sense, that of 'political influence,' in 20, and πολιτική δύναμις often bears this sense (e. g. in Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 33 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 473 D), but not, I think, here.
- 8. οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως, i.e. we must not treat them as mere fellow-citizens of the rest (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 20), and expect them to take their turn with the rest of ruling and being ruled. Men of this transcendent excellence stand to their inferiors as a whole stands to its part (3. 17. 1288 a 26 sqq.).
- 9. ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων. Τῶν ἴσων refers to 1283 b 40, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως. 'Classic authorities always use the future middle ἀδικήσομαι as passive in place of ἀδικηθήσομαι' (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective s.v.).
- 10. ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις stands in tacit contrast to θεὸν ἐν θεοῖς. A god among men is in a position of transcendent superiority not enjoyed by a god among gods. For the meaning of θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, cp. Plut. Alex. c. 51, "οὐ δοκοῦσιν," εἶπεν, "ὑμῖν οἱ Ἦλληνες ἐν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ὧσπερ ἐν θηρίοις ἡμίθεοι περιπατεῖν;" Θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις was a proverbial expression: cp. Theogn. 339,

χούτως ἃν δοκέοιμι μετ' ἀνθρώποις θεὸς εἶναι, εἴ μ' ἀποτισάμενον μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου,

and (with Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas, p. 3) Antiphanes, Τριταγωνιστής (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121),

θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἢν ἐκείνος, εἰδὼς τὴν ἀληθῶς μουσικήν.

See Crusius ibid. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 360 C. VOL. III.

11.  $\delta\theta\epsilon\nu$ , because treating them as part of a State involves injustice.

12. καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν, 'legislation no less than treating men as part of a State.' Aristotle still has the lawgiver in view whom he has imagined in 1283 b 36 sqq., and is still advising him as to the course he should adopt. If men of the type described exist in the State, he must abstain from meddling with them; he must not attempt to fetter them by legislation.

τους ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῆ δυνάμει, 'equals both in race and in capacity.' Gods are superior to men in both these respects: as to kings, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12. Proportional equals are no doubt included under rovs "rovs: we may infer this from Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 2 26, τοῦτο δὲ (i.e. τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον) ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἡ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατ' άριθμόν ωστε όσοις μή έστι τοῦτο, οὐκ έστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικόν δίκαιον, άλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' όμοιότητα έστι γὰρ δίκαιον οἶς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς. Contrast with this view of law as existing only between equals or proportionate equals the Stoical view set forth by Cicero in De Legibus 1. 7. 23, est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius estque et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio est communis. Quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est.

13. κατά δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος. This expression recurs in St. Paul, Galat. v. 22-23, δ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ Πνεύματός ἐστιν ἀγάπη χαρὰ εἰρήνη . . . κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, where the meaning of κατά is no doubt 'against,' but of κατά in the passage before us among others Bonitz says (Ind. 368 a 34), 'saepissime per κατά τινος ea res significatur de qua aliquid dicitur vel cogitatur.' See for instance 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 2, ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν. Still Aristotle may remember here the expression of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 488 D, where he says of the Many, οἱ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, and κατά may be used (and not περί, as in περί τους "σους, 12) because unfavourable laws are especially thought of, laws, for instance, enforcing on the persons referred to an equality of rights (cp. κατ' αὐτῶν, 15). I incline to think that 'against' is nearer to the meaning of κατά here than 'concerning.' Bern. Sus. and Welldon translate in a more neutral fashion 'for.'

14. αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 2, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων, άλλ' αὐτὸν ώς ὄντα νόμον. This is as much as to say that they are Absolute Kings. The Persian King was a law to the Persians (Plut. Artox. c. 23, χαίρειν ἐάσαντα δόξας Ἑλλήνων καὶ νόμους, Πέρσαις δε νόμον αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ δικαιωτὴν αἰσχρών καὶ καλών ἀποδεδειγμένον). This explains the exclamation of Anaxarchus to Alexander, when the latter had murdered Cleitus and was lying speechless from remorse, οὖτός ἐστιν ᾿Αλέξανδρος, εἰς ον ἡ οἰκουμένη νῦν ἀποβλέπει" ό δὲ ἔρριπται κλαίων ῶσπερ ἀνδράποδον ἀνθρώπων νόμον καὶ ψόγον δεδοικώς, οίς αὐτὸν προσήκει νόμον είναι καὶ ὅρον τῶν δικαίων (Plut, Alex. c, 52). So Xenophon (Cyrop. 8. 1. 22) says of his Cyrus, τον δε αγαθών άρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ανθρώποις ένόμισεν, ότι καὶ τάττειν ἱκανός έστι καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸν ατακτοῦντα καὶ κολάζειν. It was claimed in Justinian's time that to the power of the Roman Emperor αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ὑποτέθεικε, νόμον αὐτὴν ἔμψυχον καταπέμψας ανθρώποις (Nov. 105. c. 4, quoted by Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 713. 2, ed. 1).

15. λέγοιεν γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. Coray remarks on this passage, " ἐντεῦ-θεν ὁ μῦθος, ἡ μᾶλλον τὸ μύθου λείψανον τοῦτο, προσετέθη τῆ Συναγωγῆ τῶν Αἰσωπείων μύθων (Μύθ. 347 ἐμῆς ἐκδόσεως)." See Fabulae Aesopicae, ed. Halm, Fab. 241. The lions asked the hares, 'Where are your claws and teeth?' (Camerarius, Interp. p. 132). Cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, ἀεὶ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἱ ῆττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν, and the words of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 483 E, πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες, καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. Cp. also Philemon, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 3 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 32),

απαντες οἱ λέοντές εἰσιν άλκιμοι,

δειλοί πάλιν έξης πάντες είσιν οί λαγοί.

Antisthenes may have related the fable here alluded to in his 'Cyrus, or on Kingship,' a work mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, 6. 16. Had he before him a version of the fable of the Lion and the Wild Ass (Babrius, Fab. 67) in which lions and hares joined in hunting and fell into a dispute as to the division of the spoil? Compare the fragment of the lyrical poet Cydias preserved by Plato, Charmides 155 D, ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ôs εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλφ ὑποτιθέμενος, εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοῦραν αἰρεῖσθαι κρεῶν αὐτὸς γάρ μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου θρέμματος ἑαλωκέναι. See Bergk on Cydias, Fragm. 1.

17. διὸ καὶ τίθενται κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. from a sense of the immense superiority of certain men) 'States democratically constituted also institute the ostracism [in addition to adopting other democratic measures] for the reason which has been mentioned' (i.e. because they feel that these men are too superior to the rest to be treated as equals). It appears indeed later on (35) that oligarchies also got rid of over-powerful individuals, and in a less humane way than democracies, for they exiled them and put them to death. The democratically constituted States referred to include (in addition to Athens) Argos (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18), Miletus, and Megara (Schol, Aristoph, Eq. 855). At Syracuse the ostracism was for a time represented by the petalism, which, it may be noted, would seem to have been introduced when the constitution of Syracuse was not a democracy, but what Aristotle variously terms an ἀριστοκρατία (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8) or a πολιτεία (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqg.). The account given in the passage before us of the object of the ostracism resembles that given in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and (in substance) the more detailed account given in 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 22, and it is probably correct. It is accepted by Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 188 sqg. and by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 151 sq., though Grote (Hist. of Greece, 3. 197 sq.) and Susemihl (Sus.2, Note 603: Sus.4, 1. p. 415) conceive the object of the ostracism to have been to put an end to dangerous rivalries between two leading statesmen by removing one of them beyond the limits of the State. Aristotle's account of its object receives confirmation from Thuc. 8. 73. 3, from Philochorus, Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 396), and from Diod. 11. 55 and 19.1 (compare Diodorus' account of the object of petalism, 11.86.5-87.2). See also Plut. Aristid. c. 1, Pericl. c. 7, and Themist. c. 22. At Athens, however, and probably elsewhere (cp. 1284 b 20, τàs πόλεις), the ostracism ceased after a time to be used for the object for which it was instituted and was perverted into an instrument of faction (στασιαστικώς, 22). Aristides was not ostracized because he was disproportionately powerful, but because he was an opponent of whom Themistocles wished to be rid. Damon the musician was not ostracized because he was dangerous to the State, but because he was a friend of Pericles. Aristotle regards the original object of the ostracism as not wholly illegitimate. He would indeed prefer that the constitution and the laws should be so framed as to prevent the rise within

the State of any disproportionately powerful person (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 10-18)—with this end in view he would avoid creating great offices held for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq., b 10 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.), and would seek to equalize property (2. 7. 1266 b 14 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.) and to increase the number of the moderately well-to-do (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 1-5)—but, if measures of this kind should fail of their object, he recommends (7 (5), 8, 1308 b 19) that any sentence of removal inflicted on disproportionately powerful men shall be a sentence of removal beyond the limits of the State, in other words he recommends something very like the ostracism. That both the petalism and the ostracism had the evil effect of discouraging the participation of the more distinguished citizens in political life, we see from Diod. 11.87.3 sqq. and from Plutarch's Life of Pericles (c. 7). If there is any truth in Plutarch's view that in choosing the side of the Many Pericles was influenced to some extent by a dread of the ostracism, the institution gave a decisive turn at that moment to the constitutional development of Athens.

19. αὖται γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'for these, I suppose, are thought to pursue equality more than anything else': cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 3 sqq. Aristotle says 'are thought,' because democracies pursue only one kind of equality, arithmetical equality, and lose sight of equality based on desert (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sqq.). 'Even now one discovers a tendency in the United States, particularly in the West, to dislike, possibly to resent, any outward manifestation of social superiority. A man would be ill looked upon who should build a castle in a park, surround his pleasure-grounds with a high wall, and receive an exclusive society in gilded saloons' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 315).

20. διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυφιλίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύν. Cp. Soph. O. T. 540,

ἄρ' οὐχὶ μῶρόν ἐστι τοὐγχείρημά σου, ἄνευ τε πλήθους καὶ φίλων τυραννίδα θηρᾶν, ὁ πλήθει χρήμασίν θ' ἀλίσκεται;

Plato, Rep. 434 B, ἔπειτα ἐπαιρόμενος ἡ πλούτω ἡ πλήθει ἡ ἰσχύϊ ἡ ἄλλω τω τοιούτω εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ εἰδος ἐπιχειρῆ ἰέναι: Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13, οἱ μὲν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὅντες, ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ φίλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. That the possessor of these advantages was not unlikely to be ostracized, we see from what is said of Pericles in Plut. Pericl. c. 7, πλούτου δὲ καὶ γένους προσόντος αὐτῶ

λαμπροῦ καὶ φίλων, οἱ πλεῖστον ἢδύναντο, φοβούμενος ἐξοστρακισθῆναι. We learn what Aristotle means by τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύν from Plut. Aristid. c. 1, τῷ δ' ὀστράκῳ πᾶς ὁ διὰ δόξαν ἢ γένος ἢ λόγου δύναμιν ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς νομιζόμενος ὑπέπιπτεν, though he may perhaps hint that even virtue; as in the case of Aristides, was a cause of ostracism at Athens.

- 21. μεθίστασαν, the technical word used in cases of ostracism: cp. Philoch. Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 396), τοῦτον ἔδει . . . ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἔτη δέκα: Diod. I I. 55. I: [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 6. The same word is used of the banishment of involuntary homicides (Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 45, τῶν ἐπ' ἀκουσίφ φόνφ λέγει μεθεστηκότων). It is used in contrast to φυγαδεύειν and is a milder term than even ἐκβάλλειν.
- 22. χρόνους ὡρισμένους. Cp. c. 14. 1285 a 34 and 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 27. Ten years, or, according to Philoch. Fragm. 79 b, originally ten, and afterwards five. Diodorus (11. 55. 2) makes the term five years. In the petalism it was five (Diod. 11. 87. 1). A temporary absence from the State would not indeed make the ostracized person less wealthy or less well-born, but it would sever him from his friends and followers, and so tend to diminish his influence.

μυθολογείται δέ κ.τ.λ. See Sus.2, Note 604 (Sus.4, 1. p. 416), who refers to Pherecydes of Leros, Fragm. 67 (ap. Schol. Apollon. 1. 1290: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 88), 'Αντίμαχος έν τῆ Λύδη φησὶν έκβιβασθέντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα διὰ τὸ καταβαρεῖσθαι τὴν ᾿Αργὼ ὑπὸ τοῦ ῆρωος. Τούτω καὶ Ποσείδιππος δ έπιγραμματογράφος ήκολούθησε καὶ Φερεκύδης, and Apollodor. Biblioth. 1. 9. 19, Φερεκύδης αὐτὸν ἐν ᾿Αφέταις τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἀπολειφθηναι λέγει, της 'Αργούς φθεγξαμένης μη δύνασθαι φέρειν το τούτου βάρος. See also Prof. Robinson Ellis' note on Catullus 64. 23, where the expression 'mater' probably refers to the Argo-'the idea is not unnatural in itself and agrees with the recurring representations of the Argo as an animate being ('Αργώ a proper name, like Eido, Hypso, Aphro, Brimo, Ioulo), possessed of voice and reason and in part divine. Philo Iud. vol. ii. p. 468 (quoted by Nauck, Fr. Aesch. 20), οὐδ' ή ᾿Αργὼ ναυαρχοῦντος Ἰάσονος ἐπέτρεπεν ἐπιβαίνειν οἰκέταις μεμοιραμένη καὶ ψυχης καὶ λογισμοῦ, φύσις οὖσα φιλελεύθερος όθεν καὶ Αἴσχυλος ἐπ' αὐτῆς εἶπε' Ποῦ δ' ἐστὶν ᾿Αργοῦς ἱερὸν αὕδασον (rather αὐδάσον) ξύλον; Apollod. 1. 9. 19' (quoted above), 'cf. 1. 9. 24, places which all seem to refer to the piece of speaking timber (αὐδῆεν δόρυ) which Athene built into the cut-water, and which

Apollonius describes as urging the start from Pagasae (i. 525) and warning the Argonauts to expiate the murder of Absyrtus by a visit to Circe (iv. 580 sqq.).'

23. διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, 'for a similar reason': cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 19 and 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 6 and b 17. Not τὴν τοιαύτην, as in 18.

26. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας, 'among others those who blame.' In τοὺς ψέγοντας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Sosicles the Corinthian and the speech which he is represented in Hdt. 5. 92 to have addressed to the representatives of the Lacedaemonians and their allies gathered in council, in which, while recounting the misdeeds of the tyrants of Corinth, he dwelt especially on the hint given by Thrasybulus tyrant of Miletus to Periander tyrant of Corinth to get rid of the men who overtopped the rest. Compare Eurip. Suppl. 433 Bothe, 447 Dindorf,

πῶς οὖν ἔτ' ἃν γένοιτ' ἃν ἰσχυρὰ πόλις, ὅταν τις, ὡς λειμῶνος ἢρινοῦ στάχυν, τόλμας ἀφαιρῆ κἀπολωτίζη νέους;

Herodotus, as has been said, makes Thrasybulus give the hint to Periander, whereas Aristotle here makes Periander give the hint to Thrasybulus, but any one who compares the two narratives will see that the story as told by Aristotle is a shortened version of that of Herodotus. How then are we to account for the inversion in it of the parts played by Periander and Thrasybulus? We have already noticed other instances in which a slight divergence from a narrative of Herodotus is observable (see above on 1262 a 19 and 1276 a 28), and the same thing occurs again in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sq. Aristotle's memory may have betrayed him, as it did in the mention of Hector in Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 33 (see below on 1285 a 12) and of Calypso in Eth. Nic. 2. 9. 1109 a 31, where Hom. Odyss. 12. 219 is referred to, but, if this was so, the slip must have been something more than a mere momentary one, for it recurs in 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20. It is natural that Aristotle should credit Periander with the advice, for he believed that many of the traditional maxims of tyranny came originally from Periander (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 36). We notice that Herodotus, a Greek of Asia Minor, ascribes the famous hint to a tyrant of Miletus, while Aristotle, a Greek of Europe, ascribes it to a tyrant of Corinth. For the dative Θρασυβούλφ dependent on the substantive συμβουλίαν, cp. De Part. An. 2. 17. 660 a 35, καὶ χρώνται τῆ

γλώττη καὶ πρὸς έρμηνείαν ἀλλήλοις, and see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20 we have τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμα.

- 28. τὸν πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας. For the order of these words, cp. 1284 b 8, τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας, and c. 12. 1282 b 31, τῶν ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην, and see Vahlen on Poet. 15. 1454 b 16, τὰς ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῆ ποιητικῆ.
- 30. ὁμαλῦναι. 'Ομαλύνειν is a rare word, but it is used by Plato in Tim. 45 E.
- 35. καὶ περὶ τὰς ὁλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας. In sentences of this kind the preposition is usually repeated in the Politics before the second substantive (e.g. in 1. 8. 1256 b 17 we have καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν), and this is so whether 'both . . . and' is expressed by καὶ . . . καί or by τε . . . καί, but sometimes the preposition is not thus repeated (e.g. in the passage before us and in 38: in 2.12.1274 b 24: 3.11.1281 b 33: 4 (7). 7.1328 a 20: 5 (8). 7.1341 b 19: 7 (5). 10.1311 a 29 and b 25 sq.: see also critical note on 1330 b 31). I have not noticed that the preposition is similarly omitted in the Politics when † . . . ἤ, οὔτε . . . οὔτε (οτ μήτε . . . μήτε), εἴτε . . . εἴτε, οτ πότερον . . . ἤ are used, except that in 3.1.1275 b 17 Ms P¹ omit the second περί in † περὶ πάντων † περὶ τινῶν.
  - 37. τρόπον τινά. See above on 1255 a 13.
- 38. οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως. Cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 187, οἱ τῆς ψήφου νυνὶ γεγονότες κύριοι.
- 39. οἷον ᾿Αθηναῖοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is clear from this that the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians were the most powerful States of the Athenian alliance. They had been the leaders in the transfer of the headship of the maritime league against Persia from the Lacedaemonians to Athens (Plut. Aristid. c. 23). Miletus was no longer their equal. We read in ᾿Αθ. Πολ. c. 24, πεισθέντες δὲ ταῦτα καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἀρχὴν (οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι) τοῖς τε συμμάχοις δεσποτικωτέρως ἐχρῶντο πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Σαμίων τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐῶντες τάς τε πολιτείας παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄρχειν ὧν ἔτυχον ἄρχοντες. This remark is obviously not true of the period subsequent to the revolt and subjugation of Samos in B. c. 440, and it probably refers to the Athenian Confederacy in its earlier days before it was converted into an Empire. If we understand it thus, it is not inconsistent with the passage before us. But it is not easy to say what were the infractions of treaties to which Aristotle

alludes. He appears to refer to humiliations inflicted by Athens on Samos, Chios, and Lesbos at a comparatively early period of her ascendency, 'as soon as she had taken a firm grip of her rule.' He can hardly refer, therefore, to humiliations which followed the suppression of revolts, for Samos did not revolt till B. C. 440, nor Mytilene till B.C. 428, nor Chios till B.C. 412. Besides, he seems to be speaking not of humiliations brought about by disloyalty on the part of these States, but of humiliations prompted by Athenian jealousy of their greatness. Athens may have prohibited wars between one of these States and other members of her alliance (see the speech of Hermocrates in Thuc. 6. 76)—it was a prohibition of this kind that led to the revolt of Samos (Thuc. 1. 115) —or demanded the removal of fortifications (compare the case of Chios in B. C. 425, Thuc. 4. 51), or meddled with their territory (as in the case of Thasos, Thuc. 1. 100). No doubt, the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. (see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 6. 309), speaking in B. C. 428, do not charge Athens with any infractions of treaties; on the contrary, they speak of their State having been 'honoured' by Athens, and ascribe their revolt to fear of ultimate subjugation, not to actual wrongs inflicted on Lesbos in the past. Still Plutarch implies in Aristid. c. 25 (where he perhaps follows the same authority as Aristotle does in the passage before us, for he uses the words, υστερον δε των πραγμάτων ἄρχειν εγκρατέστερον, ως ἔοικεν, ἐκβιαζομένων, cp. Thuc. 1. 76. 1) that Athens was guilty of infractions of treaties in her relations with her dependent allies, and it is likely enough that Samos, Chios, and Lesbos did not escape. That a time did come when Athens changed her original easygoing headship into a firm imperial control, we see from Thuc. 6. 76 and Diod. 11. 70. Diodorus (who may here represent Ephorus, a witness likely to be favourable to the dependent allies, as he belonged to the Aeolic Cyme) dates the commencement of this change from the time when Athens became aware that the Lacedaemonians had abandoned all thought of attempting to regain the headship of the maritime league by war. This happened as early as B.C. 475, if Diodorus' chronology is to be trusted (Diod. 11. 50. 8).

41. ὁ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers not only to severities inflicted by the Persians on the Medes, Babylonians, and others after the suppression of revolts (see as to Babylon Hdt. 1. 183 and 3. 159 and Arrian, Anab. 3. 16. 4 and

7. 17. 2), but also and more especially to unprovoked evidences of distrust like that mentioned in Diod. 11. 6. 3, την δε δύναμιν ἀναλαβῶν (ὁ Ξέρξης) ῆκεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Θερμοπύλαις Ἦληνας προτάξας ἀπάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν Μήδους, εἴτε δι' ἀνδρείαν προκρίνας αὐτοὺς εἴτε καὶ βουλόμενος ἄπαντας ἀπολέσαι ἐνῆν γὰρ ἔτι φρόνημα τοῖς Μήδοις, τῆς τῶν προγόνων ἡγεμονίας οὐ πάλαι καταπεπονημένης: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 69, μισθὸν δὲ καὶ τούτοις (i. e. τοῖς φρουροῖς) Βαβυλωνίους ἔταξεν (ὁ Κῦρος) παρέχειν, βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς ὡς ἀμηχανωτάτους εἶναι, ὅπως ὅτι ταπεινότατοι καὶ εὐκαθεκτότατοι εἶεν. Egypt is probably referred to in τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς: cp. Diod. 17. 49, οἱ γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι, τῶν Περσῶν ἦσεβηκότων εἶς τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ βιαίως ἀρχόντων, ἄσμενοι προσεδέξαντο τοὺς Μακεδόνας. Compare Plato's picture of Persian rule in Laws 697 D, which explains Alexander's triumph.

1284 b. 2. πεφρονηματισμένους. 'A word occurring in the Politics alone of Aristotle's writings, but not very uncommon there, is φρονηματίζεσθαι. It occurs later in Polybius and is certainly un-Attic. It is entirely absent from the 'Aθ. Πολ., where θαρρεῖν takes its place' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολιτεία 'Αθηναίων des Aristoteles, p. 37).

ἐπέκοπτε. Ἐπικόπτω is a rare word; the passage before us is, so far as I know, the earliest prose passage in which it occurs. It is a technical term of arboriculture, to 'lop' or 'pollard' (Theophr. Caus. Plant. 5. 17. 3, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπικοπῆς καὶ τῆς κολούσεως ἐν ὀλίγοις ἡ σκέψις . . . καλοῦσι δ' ἐπικοπήν, ὅταν ἀφαιρεθείσης τῆς κόμης ἐπικόψη τις τὸ ἄκρον), and its metaphorical meaning in the passage before us agrees pretty closely with that of ἐταπείνωσαν in 1284 a 41.

- 3. περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς, 'with regard to all constitutions, even the normal ones.' Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 32, καὶ ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστι τροφὴ τοῦτο (i. e. τὸ ὕδωρ), καὶ ἐν τοῖς ξηροῖς. We gather from 25 sqq. that the best constitution will expel, if necessary, men who are disproportionately superior in wealth or political influence, though not men disproportionately superior in virtue. As to the importance of συμμετρία in the members of a State, see 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 33 sqq.
- 4. μέν is answered by οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, as in c. 4. 1276 b 34, c. 6. 1278 b 19, and 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 39 sqq.
- 5. πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι. The opposition between πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι and τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοποῦσας will be noticed. The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the use of ἀποσκοπεῖν by Aristotle. Ἐπισκοπεῖν is also rare in the sense in which it is used in 6. It is not perhaps necessary to supply

ἀγαθόν from the next line with τὸ ἴδιον: cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 30. 1437 a 36, καὶ γὰρ οὖτος ἔνεκά τινος ἰδίου δοκεῖ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος δημηγορεῖν (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 339 a 22).

- 7. δήλον δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 12. 1282 b 30. Τοῦτο, i.e. the fact that a part of a whole which is disproportionate to the whole to which it belongs is not tolerated.
- 8. οὖτε is here followed by οὖτε and οὖδὲ δή ('nor yet surely'). See above on 1272 b 38, and compare the somewhat similar sequence in c. 17. 1288 a 24 sqq. In the passage before us the change from οὖτε...οὖτε to οὖδὲ δή is enough to cause the future ἐάσει to take the place of the optative ἐάσειεν ἄν.
- 10. οὖτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἐάσειεν ἃν ὑπερβάλλειν τῆς συμμετρίας.
- 13. ὅστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν κ.τ.λ. '[The teacher of a chorus does not fall out with his chorus because he excludes from it a disproportionately excellent singer, for his rule over his chorus is beneficial to it, as being exercised for the advantage of the ruled (c. 6. 1278 b 39 sqq.),] and thus, so far as this practice at any rate is concerned, there is no reason why monarchs should not be in harmony with the States they rule, if, when they resort to it, their rule is beneficial to their States.' For μέν solitarium see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Ταῖς πόλεσιν I take to mean 'the States ruled by them': cp. 33, ὅστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. For τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς, cp. 21, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 26, τὰς οἰκείας γυναῖκας.
- 15. διὸ κ.τ.λ., 'hence in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument in favour of the ostracism is not without a certain element of political justice.' Διό introduces an inference from the fact that constitutions which aim at the common good and practitioners of the arts resort to measures akin to the ostracism. Whatever restores the symmetry of the constitution is in a certain degree just. Κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς (cp. 26, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἶον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυψιλίας, ἀλλ' ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετήν) is added to exclude the application of the ostracism to cases in which there is no acknowledged superiority (such, for instance, as that of Hyperbolus). For the phrase τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς cp. Plato, Rep. 569 B and Meno 96 B, and Isocr. Hel. § 12. 'Υπεροχάς is in the plural because there are more kinds of superiority than one (Bon. Ind. 793 a 40, 'ὑπεροχαί, i.e. varia τῆς ὑπεροχής genera'); there is superiority in

virtue, in wealth, in command of friends, in birth, and so forth. For δ λόγος δ περὶ τὸν δστρακισμόν, cp. c. 9. 1280 a 27.

- 17. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'True, it is better,' etc. The same thing is said in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq. For the means by which Aristotle would effect this, see above on 1284 a 17.
- 19. δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς κ.τ.λ. On the proverb δεύτερος πλοῦς, see Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 359 and 2. 24, where the lines of Menander are quoted (Θρασυλέων, Fragm. 2, ap. Stob. Floril. 59. 9: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 139),

ό δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστι δήπου λεγόμενος, ἄν ἀποτύχη τις οὐρίου, κώπαισι πλεῖν

(οὐρίου Grotius, πρῶτου, ἐν or simply ἐν MSS.: see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 5. ccliii). \*Αν συμβῆ, sc. τὸ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἰατρείας. Διορθοῦν, sc. τὴν πολιτείαν.

- 20. ὅπερ οὖκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις, 'which did not come about in connexion with the States' (see note on 1327 b 7), a softened way of saying 'which was not done by the States.' Greek States did not use the ostracism to heal a defect in the constitution.
- 22. τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς, plural in the sense of 'acts of ostracizing.' ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'in the deviation-forms of constitution, then, that the practice of removing persons disproportionately superior is of advantage to each form severally and just according to their several views of justice, is evident, and perhaps this also is evident that it is not absolutely just.' It is not absolutely just, because it is resorted to in the interest of the holders of power, not in the common interest of all the citizens (4 sq.). Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἀλλά, 25.
- 26. οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν. Τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν is emphasized by being placed before τὴν ὑπεροχήν: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 25, τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη, and 34, τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατιῶν αἱ μεταβολαί.
- 27. ἰσχύος must mean 'political strength': cp. 1284 a 21, ή τινα ἄλλην πολιτικήν ἰσχύν.
- 28. ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' άρετήν. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 16, συμβή διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' άρετήν.
- οὐ γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt remembers, as Vict. points out, Heraclitus' indignant censure of the Ephesians for their expulsion of Hermodorus (see vol. i. p. 263, note 2). Compare the language ascribed to the Persian King when Themistocles was driven from Greece to his court (Plut. Themist. c. 28, μακαρίσας δὲ

πρὸς τοὺς φίλους έαυτόν, ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχία μεγίστη, καὶ κατευξάμενος ἀεὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις τοιαύτας φρένας διδόναι τὸν 'Αριμάνιον, ὅπως ἐλαύνωσι τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐξ ἐαυτῶν κ.τ.λ.). Athens was popularly credited with 'envy of the good,' as we see from the epitaph on Aeschylus in Anthol. Pal. 7. 40,

τίς φθόνος, αἴ αἴ, Θησείδας ἀγαθῶν ἔγκοτος αἰὲν ἔχει;

Theseus was believed by some to have been ostracized at Athens (Theophr. Fragm. 131). A current proverb ascribed a similar jealousy to the Megarians—μηδέποτε μηδεὶς Μεγαρέων γένοιτο σοφώτερος (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 528). Observe that δ τοιοῦτος recurs four times in 28–34. This is probably intentional. As to repetitions of this kind see notes on 1331 b 18, 1317 b 5, 1307 a 14, and 1325 b 11, and compare the frequency with which τοῖς ἤθεσιν οτ τῶν ἦθῶν recurs in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 28–39.

30. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν . . .  $\gamma \epsilon$ , 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. Supply φαίεν αν δείν. A question then arises as to the construction and punctuation of the sentence. Hampke (followed by Sus., though not without a good deal of hesitation) places παραπλήσιου γάρ κᾶν εί τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν in a parenthesis, and takes μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς with ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου (φαῖεν αν δεῖν), but Susemihl doubts with some reason whether, if we adopt this view of the construction of the sentence, μερίζοντες should not be μερίζοντας. In any case perhaps the more natural course is (with Bernays) to take μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς with what immediately precedes, i. e. with παραπλήσιον . . . ἀξιοῖεν, and not with ἀλλὰ . . . τοιούτου. But then the further question arises, what is the meaning of μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς? Some have fancied that there is a reference to the 'distribution of offices' by Zeus among the other gods, when he had won supremacy in heaven (cp. Hesiod, Theog. 881-5, 112, and Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 228 sqq.), and have translated the passage, 'for to do so would be much the same thing as if men were to claim to rule over Zeus, distributing the offices (as he did when he succeeded to power).' But it is not likely that this is the meaning of the words. A different interpretation is suggested by the passage in which the conclusion arrived at here is repeated, c. 17. 1288 a 24, ούτε γάρ κτείνειν ή φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' οστρακίζειν δή που τον τοιοῦτον πρέπον έστίν, οὕτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατά μέρος οὐ γάρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῶ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ύπερβολήν έχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ωστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ

πείθεσθαι τῶ τοιούτω, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέμος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Compare with this passage 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 23-27 and 3. 16. 1287 a 16-18, and we shall find that the three passages lend support to Bernays' rendering of μερίζοντες τας άρχας, 'by a rotation in their tenure of the offices' ('gemäss einem reihenweisen Wechsel der Aemterbekleidung'), in which he is anticipated by Sepulveda, who however erroneously supplies οί θεοί as the nom. to άξιοῖεν. Sepulveda, in fact, explains the passage in his commentary thus-'simile, inquit, esset ac si Dii statuerent inter se, ut sic per omnes aut aliquos ipsorum iret imperandi vicissitudo, ut Iuppiter modo imperium teneret, modo esset sub imperio, quod esset absurdissimum.' But does μερίζειν bear this sense in any other passage? I am not aware that any such passage has been produced, and till it has, it will be safer to translate μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς in the ordinary way, 'distributing the offices,' i. e. distributing them among themselves and Zeus, and treating him as on a level with themselves in the matter of ruling, or, in other words, as partly ruling and partly ruled, instead of making him sole ruler. Cp. 1284 a 9, ἀδικήσονται γάρ αξιούμενοι των ίσων. Ι take μερίζοντες τας αρχάς to mean the same as άξιοῦντες αὐτὸν τῶν ἴσων. In Aristoph. Aves 467 sq. and 1225 sqq. (Didot) the Birds go further and claim to rule over Zeus and the gods without giving them even a turn of office. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 41 a 31) on the construction παραπλήσιου καν εὶ 'insolentior videtur usus formulae κᾶν εὶ ubi καί pertinet ad vocabulum similitudinem significans (παραπλήσιον, ομοιον, τὸ αὐτό), as in the passage before us, with which he compares Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 7 sqq. and (a passage very similar in structure to ours)  $\pi \epsilon \rho i$ άναπνοής 9. 475 a II, παραπλήσιον γάρ συμβαίνει κάν εί τίς τινα των ἀναπνεόντων πνίγοι, τὸ στόμα κατασχών. The difficulty of getting the better of Zeus was proverbial (Hom. Il. 1. 396 sqq. and 8. 209 sq.), and indeed the difficulty of ruling over the gods (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 10 sq., already referred to by Eaton: Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 49, 356 sqq., Pers. 749: Hom. Il. 8. 18 sqq.: Aristoph. Plut. 141 sqq. Didot: Diod. 17. 41. 1).

32. λείπεται τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. When willing obedience is rendered to a man, it is a sign that he is a natural King (Xen. Cyrop. 5. 1. 24 sqq.). Cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 10, ή δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς. Is the passage before us present to Milton's memory in the address to Cromwell in the Defensio Secunda.

where we read, 'We all willingly yield the palm of sovereignty to your unrivalled ability and virtue, except the few among us who are either... or who do not know that nothing in the world is more pleasing to God, more agreeable to reason, more politically just, or more generally useful, than that the supreme power should be vested in the best and the wisest of men' (Prose Works, i. 288 Bohn)?

33. βασιλέας ἀιδίους. 'Forma accusativi pluralis plerumque βασιλεῖς, veluti 2. 9. 1271 a 26: 2. 11. 1272 b 37: 3. 14. 1285 a 26: 3. 15. 1286 b 11, sed βασιλέας legitur 3. 13. 1284 b 33' (Bon. Ind. 135 a 21 sqq.), and also in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 24. Βασιλέας is the form found in Attic Inscriptions, though βασιλεῖς appears after B.C. 307 (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 110). The acc. plur. of ἱερεύς in the Politics is ἱερεῖς and of ἱππεύς ἱππεῖς. For the meaning of ἀίδιος see above on 1271 a 40. Not mere temporary kings, like the βασιλεῖς mentioned in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29, but perpetual kings.

35 sqq. μεταβήναι, because a transition is now made from C. 14. a question affecting all constitutions to the study of a single constitution, Kingship. Aristotle had said in c. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq. that he would discuss the normal constitutions first, and Kingship is a normal constitution. The inquiries of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters have had reference to the question of Justice, but now Aristotle asks whether Kingship is expedient, not whether it is just; the two questions, however, do not lie far apart, and when he at length arrives at the end of the inquiry in c. 17. 1287 b 36 sqq., we find that an answer is given to both of them (1287 b 39, δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον: 1288 a 1, οὔτε συμφέρον οὔτε δίκαιον: 1288 a 18, δίκαιον: 1288 a 30, πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταις πόλεσιν ή συμφέρει). The question of the expediency of Kingship cannot be discussed until the various kinds of Kingship have been distinguished, for it may well be that one and the same answer will not hold good of all. Besides, Aristotle is not sorry to seize the opportunity which his classification of Kingships affords him of describing the various forms of Kingship and of correcting the error of those who regarded the Lacedaemonian Kingship as Kingship in a truer sense than any other Kingship according to law (1285 a 3 sqq.); for he holds that the Lacedaemonian Kingship is, in fact, the least of those according to law. It is the expediency of the Absolute Kingship, however, that he really wishes to discuss. In his account of this form Aristotle

probably has the Persian Kingship before him (see notes on 1284 a 14 and 1287 a 1). Socrates had described Kingship as always according to law (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, βασιλείαν δέ καὶ τυραννίδα άρχὰς μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ήγεῖτο κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle takes a different view. Just as in the classification of democracies and oligarchies in the Sixth (Fourth) Book forms in which law is supreme are marked off from those in which it is not, so here in the classification of Kingships the same is the case; but while the democracies and oligarchies in which law is not supreme are the worst, the form of Kingship in which law is not supreme is the best and highest. Aristotle's classification of Kingships would have been simplified, if he had first divided them into Kingships according to law and not according to law, and had then subdivided the class of Kingships according to law. His study of Kingship would probably have been fuller and more complete if he had not studied Kingship according to law on the way, as it were, to an examination of the question as to Absolute Kingship. We are grateful to him for studying barbarian Kingship as well as Greek, for in the case of other constitutions he is silent as to the non-Greek world, if we except his notice of the Carthaginian apιστοκρατία, and not entirely for want of material, for non-monarchical constitutions appear to have existed, for instance, in Lycia (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 185); but his treatment of barbarian Kingship is cursory in the extreme. makes no pretence of being exhaustive, for the kind of barbarian Kingship which Aristotle selects for notice is said by him to exist only among 'some of the barbarians' (c. 14. 1285 a 17). It should also be noted that in the inquiry respecting the downfall and the preservation of Kingship and Tyranny contained in the Seventh (Fifth) Book no notice is taken of the distinction drawn in the Third between different kinds of Kingship, or of that drawn in the Sixth (Fourth) between different kinds of Tyranny. So again in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 Aristotle evidently implies the existence of Kingships not κατὰ γένος, but it is not easy to say to what Kingships he there refers (see note on 1313 a 10). One remark may be added. Aristotle classes under the head of βασιλεία dignities to which we should not allow the name of Kingship. The Aesymneteship, for instance, might be held for only a few months or years, yet it is treated by Aristotle as a form of βασιλεία. It is so because it is exercised over willing subjects and is invested with large powers, for these are the two characteristics of βασιλεία (7 (5). 10. 1313 a 5). Βασιλεία may or may not be αccording to law, may or may not be κυρία πάντων (c. 14. 1285 a 4, b 29), may or may not be elective, may or may not be hereditary, may even be for a less term than life, but these two characteristics are always found in connexion with it.

37. σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον κ.τ.λ. Compare the question raised in 2. Ι. Ι26Ι α 2, άλλα πότερον δσων ένδέχεται κοινωνήσαι, πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνείν την μελλουσαν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλώς, ή τινών μέν τινών δέ οὐ βέλτιον; Τη μελλούση καλώς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρα stands in opposition to τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει, therefore it must mean 'broadly to any city and country which is to be wellconstituted politically.' We have been told in the preceding chapter that in some cases the best constitution must assume the form of a perpetual Kingship, but that does not preclude the raising of the question whether Kingship is advantageous to any political community which desires to be well-constituted or only to Aristotle's readiness to consider the question whether Kingship is expedient or not would be little in harmony with popular opinion in Greece, which was no doubt unfavourable to the institution: cp. Demosth. Philip. 2. 25, βασιλεύς γάρ καὶ τύραννος απας έχθρος έλευθερία καὶ νόμοις έναντίος. Even Isocrates, though he praises Kingship in his Nicocles and Ad Nicoclemhe could hardly do otherwise in works written for a King-speaks of it in his Oration to Philip (§ 107) as little suited to Greeks, though indispensable to barbarians, and allows in his Nicocles (§ 24) that the Lacedaemonians and Carthaginians reserve it for use in war and are oligarchically governed at home. Xenophon's praises of Kingship in his Cyropaedeia refer, at any rate nominally, to a Persian King. Plato, however, had been bolder in his Republic and Politicus, for he certainly has Greeks in view when he advocates in those dialogues Kingship of the most thoroughgoing kind. See on this subject vol. i. p. 277.

38. καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρα. Χώρα probably here means not 'a territory occupied by villages,' as in Strabo, p. 336, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τόπους τοὺς κατὰ Πελοπόννησον πλὴν ὀλίγων, οῦς κατέλεξεν ὁ ποιητής, οὐ πόλεις ἀλλὰ χώρας νομίζειν δεῖ, συστήματα δήμων ἔχουσαν ἐκάστην πλείω, ἐξ ὧν ὕστερον αἱ γνωριζόμεναι πόλεις συνωκίσθησαν, but 'a territory occupied by an ἔθνος οτ ἔθνη,' as in Xen. Anab. 4. 8. 22,

 $\epsilon \nu \tau \hat{\eta}$  Κόλχων χώρα, for in c. 14. 1285 b 30 we have ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη, and in 1285 b 33 πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐνὸς ἡ πλειόνων. Nothing, however, is said of the χώρα or ἔθνος in the recapitulatory summaries in c. 17. 1288 a 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 6 sqq.

41. ἢ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς, 'or has several different forms': cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 33, οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ταὐτὸν ζῷον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς.

1285 a. 2. τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος. In some forms of Kingship (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) the τρόπος τῆς ἀρχῆς is despotic (1285 a 22, b 2 sq.), in others not; in some the King is supreme over more things than in others (c. 15. 1285 b 35 sqq.).

3. πασῶν, sc. τῶν βασιλειῶν. For the juxtaposition of εἶs and πασῶν see note on 1281 a 13.

ή γὰρ ἐν τῆ Λακωνικῆ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Aristotle places first and second in his enumeration of forms of Kingship two existing forms, the Laconian and the barbarian, and then passes on to two obsolete forms, the Aesymneteship, which existed in the ancient days of Greece, and the Kingship of the heroic times.

δοκεῖ, 'is thought,' by whom we are not told: possibly Plato's language in Laws 691 D-692 B respecting the Lacedaemonian Kingship is present to Aristotle's mind. He does not agree with this view; he sees that there are Kingships according to law (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) which are supreme over more things than the Laconian, and therefore are Kingships in a fuller sense, for the true King is κύριος πάντων (c. 17. 1288 a 18 sq.: cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37). In Diog. Laert. 3. 82 a classification of Kingships into Kingships κατὰ γένος and Kingships κατὰ νόμον is ascribed with very doubtful correctness to Plato, and the Lacedaemonian Kingship is brought under the former head, so that it is implied not to be κατὰ νόμον.

5. ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χώραν, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς. Ἐξέρχομαι rarely takes the accusative (see Liddell and Scott).

ήγεμών ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, 'he is the leader in all matters relating to war': cp. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, and Hdt. 9. 33, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ . . . μισθῷ ἐπειρῶντο πείσαντες Τισαμενὸν ποιέεσθαι ἄμα 'Ηρακλειδέων τοῖσι βασιλεῦσι ἡγεμόνα τῶν πολέμων. For τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5, ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον: Anab. 4. 3. 10: Cyrop. 1. 2. 10. 'Ηγεμὼν τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον stands in tacit contrast to ἡγεμονία πολιτική, of which

we read in c. 17. 1288 a 9. In Philip. § 33, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῖς ἀπ' ἐκείνου γεγονόσι καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν εἰς ἄπαντα τὸν χρόνον δεδώκασι, Isocrates appears to distinguish between the Kingship and the ἡγεμονία. According to Hdt. 6. 56 the Lacedaemonian Kings had the right to determine against whom war should be made (πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν ἐπ' ἡν ἃν βούλωνται χώρην), and Gilbert holds (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 46) that there are some indications that this right remained to them even in Xenophon's time (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 34: 2. 2. 7: 4. 7. 1), but Xenophon implies in Rep. Lac. 15. 2, καὶ στρατιὰν ὅποι ἃν ἡ πόλις ἐκπέμπη, ἡγεῖσθαι, that the State and not the Kings possessed it.

6. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς (cp. 1285 b 23) answers to τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. Something more is meant by this phrase than the offering of sacrifices to the gods, sacrifices such as the Kings of the heroic times offered (1285 b 10: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), and it probably includes the right of the Lacedaemonian Kings to name the officers called Pythii, through whom the Delphic oracle was consulted (Hdt. 6. 57. 2), and to have the custody of oracles (6. 57. 4). We learn from Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, εθηκε γαρ θύειν μεν βασιλέα προ της πόλεως τα δημόσια απαντα, ως από θεοῦ οντα, why it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to sacrifice. It was natural that the same authorities should be charged with matters relating to the gods and to war, for success in war was held to be given by the gods. In his account of the prerogatives of the Lacedaemonian Kings Aristotle omits to notice their share in deliberative authority as members of the senate, and also the judicial authority which, as we know from Hdt. 6. 57, they possessed in a particular class of cases (this had perhaps been narrowed: see above on 1270 a 21).

7. αὖτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is taken up by ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, 14, and then at length finds a δέ to answer to it in παρὰ ταύτην δέ, 16. Αὔτη ἡ βασιλεία (cp. 14) means 'this kind of Kingship,' as αὔτη ἡ δικαιοσύνη in Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25 means 'this kind of justice,' for the Lacedaemonian Kingship is not the only Kingship included in the class, as we see from 15, τούτων δ' αἰ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἰρεταί. It appears, in fact, from 10 sqq. that the Kingship held by Agamemnon as leader of the Greek forces before Troy is included in it, a Kingship which we must not confuse with his Kingship of Mycenae, for his Kingship of Mycenae belongs to the fourth class of Kingships, αἱ κατὰ τοὺς

ήρωϊκούς χρόνους βασιλείαι (1285 b 4 sqq.). Aristotle may well have also referred to this class the Kingship, or Leadership, of Greece, which was held for a time by Agesilaus and for life by Philip and Alexander of Macedon. Compare Plut. Ages. c. 40, where Agesilaus is said to have been regarded until the defeat at Leuctra as σχεδον όλης της Έλλάδος ήγεμων καὶ βασιλεύς, with Ages. c. 6, where we read that in a dream which Agesilaus had at Aulis before embarking for Asia, he heard a voice addressing him thus, δ βασιλεύ Λακεδαιμονίων, ότι μεν ούδεις της Ελλάδος όμου συμπάσης ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγός ή πρότερον 'Αγαμέμνων καὶ σὰ νῦν μετ' ἐκεῖνον, ἐννοεῖς δήπουθεν, and with Isocr. Panath. § 76. At a later time Philip of Macedon was elected by the Congress at Corinth ἡγεμών (or στρατηγός) αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Diod. 16. 1, 89, 91: Arrian, Anab. 7. 9. 5: cp. Demosth. De Cor. c. 201 and Justin, 9. 4, and see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 51. 3), and on his death his son Alexander was elected by the Congress to the same dignity (Diod. 17. 4. 9: Arrian, Anab. 1. 1. 2: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 90. 1). Thus the office of ήγεμών, or στρατηγός, αὐτοκράτωρ της Έλλάδος in the hands of Philip and Alexander was an elective office and tenable apparently for life. Long before the time of Agesilaus and Philip, Gelon had asked to be appointed στρατηγός τε καὶ ἡγεμῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον (Hdt. 7. 158). Aristotle can hardly intend to include the Carthaginian Kingship under this form of Kingship, for in 2. 11. 1273 a 30 he distinguishes between the offices of King and General at Carthage. He would seem to omit the Carthaginian Kingship from his enumeration, for it cannot fall under the head of the barbarian Kingship, though the Carthaginians were non-Greeks, inasmuch as its authority was by no means of a 'despotic' type. Would such an office as that of the rayo's of the Thessalians be classed by Aristotle under this form of Kingship?

στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ ἀίδιος. 'Αίδιος is explained by διὰ βίου in 15. Α στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἀίδιος evidently had not the power of life and death. Vict. would read αὐτοκράτωρ in place of αὐτοκρατόρων, partly because the rendering of Vet. Int. is 'imperialis,' and Schneider and Sus., adopting his suggestion, place αὐτοκράτωρ in their text (see critical note on 1285 a 8). But, though στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ is a recognized title, I do not remember to have met with στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ. With στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων may be compared 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. Α στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ differed from

an ordinary στρατηγός in having authority to deal with many questions for himself as to which an ordinary στρατηγός would have to consult the popular assembly or other supreme authority: cp. Polyb. 3. 87. 7, δ δε δικτάτωρ ταύτην έχει την διαφοράν των ύπάτων τῶν μεν γὰρ ὑπάτων έκατέρω δώδεκα πελέκεις ἀκολουθοῦσι, τούτω δ' είκοσι και τέτταρες, κάκεινοι μεν έν πολλοίς προσδέονται της συγκλήτου πρός τὸ συντελείν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, οὖτος δ' ἐστὶν αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός. So in Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 37 A. § 4, ovvaγωγης δέ τῶλ λογιστῶν ή βουλή αὐτοκράτωρ ἔστω, the word αὐτοκράτωρ is explained by Mr. Hicks to mean 'not bound to consult the popular assembly.' Cp. also Thuc. 6. 26 and 5. 27. It was the practice of Greek States to create στρατηγοί αὐτοκράτορες to deal with crises, just as the Romans created a dictator, but the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ had not, like the dictator, the power of life and death, and more στρατηγοί than one could be declared αὐτοκράτορες, whereas the dictatorship was always confided to a single individual, though on one or two occasions we find two dictators in existence at the same time (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 131, ed. 1). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in fact, identifies the Roman dictator, not with the στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ, but with the αἰσυμνήτης (Ant. Rom. 5. 73). Still the position of sole στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ was often the first step to a tyranny in the hands of men like Phalaris (Rhet. 2, 20, 1393 b 10 sqq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 28), Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7.8), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 13.94.6).

8. εἰ μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλεία κ.τ.λ., 'except in a particular Kingship, as for instance [in the Kingship existing] in the time of the ancients, on warlike expeditions by right of force.' Ev xelpos νόμφ is probably to be rendered 'manuum iure' (Lamb. 'lege ea quae est in manibus et armis posita'). It is opposed to ἐν δίκης νόμω (Liddell and Scott s. v. νόμος). Where a person is slain by an exercise of the right which superior force confers, he is said to be slain έν χειρός νόμω, whether he is slain by his adversary on the battlefield or, as in the passage before us, by his King for cowardice in presence of the enemy. Eaton compares Thuc. 3. 66, οθς μέν έν χερσίν ἀπεκτείνατε, ούχ όμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δή τινα έπασχου): compare also the word χειροδίκαι in Hes. Op. et Dies, 189 ('men who use the right of might'). Bernays translates ἐν χειρὸς νόμφ 'als standrechtliches Verfahren' (by process of martial law'). and Mr. Welldon follows him, but the use of the word χειροδίκαι does not support this translation. In the kind of Kingship of

which Aristotle is speaking the King had, I conceive, the right to put to death with his own hand any of his warriors who showed cowardice on a warlike expedition; he had not the right to put any of them to death by judicial process. Sus. renders ἐν χειρὸς νόμω 'im Handgemenge' ('in the mélée'), but I much prefer the interpretation given above. How would the King be able to slav one of his own men while himself engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the foe? For έν τινι βασιλεία, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 17, έν τινι πολιτεία, and 1278 a 28, εν τισι δημοκρατίαις. Sus.3: 'εν τινι βασιλεία seclusit Gifanius, βασιλεία eodem tempore secluserunt Bernaysius et Susemihlius.' The suggestion of Bern, and Sus. is not without plausibility, but I do not think that any change is called for. Aristotle's meaning is that the class of Kingship of which the Lacedaemonian Kingship is the type does not possess, as a class, the power of life and death, but that particular Kingships falling under the class do possess it, and he gives an instance of this. It is doubtful whether, as the emendation of Bern. and Sus. would imply, the Lacedaemonian King possessed the right to put a Spartan citizen to death 'in a certain case'; we expect also to be told what case is referred to, but the only case mentioned is that of οί ἀρχαῖοι. The Lacedaemonian King does not appear to have possessed the power which Kings of this type possessed ἐπὶ τῶν άρχαίων; the punishment provided by the Lacedaemonian law for οί τρέσαντες seems, on the contrary, to have been a severe form of ατιμία (Plut. Ages. c. 30).

11. κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων κ.τ.λ. 'For instance, in Il. 1. 225 sqq.' (Sus.², Note 618: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 422). See also Il. 2. 224 sqq.

12. ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἢν. For ἐξελθόντων see above on 1281 b 4, 13. Καὶ κτεῖναι, not merely not to tolerate, but even to put to death.

λέγει γοῦν κ.τ.λ. The quotation is from Il. 2. 391, where Agamemnon says,

" ον δε κ' εγων ἀπάνευθε μάχης εθελοντα νοήσω μιμνάζειν παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, οὔ οἱ ἔπειτα ἄρκιον εσσεῖται φυγεειν κύνας ήδ' οἰωνούς." ως εφατ' 'Αργεῖοι δε κ.τ.λ.

In Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 32 these threats are ascribed to Hector, for there we read, ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὧσπερ ὁ Εκτωρ

δυ δέ κ' εγών ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω, οὕ οἱ ἄρκιον εσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας. Aristotle probably remembered the similar threats placed by Homer in the mouth of Hector in Il. 15. 348 (cp. Il. 12.

248 sqq.),

δυ δ' αν έγων απάνευθε νεων έτερωθι νοήσω, αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι, οὐδε νυ τόνγε γνωτοί τε γνωταί τε πυρὸς λελάχωσι θανόντα, αλλὰ κύνες ἐρύουσι πρὸ ἄστεος ἡμετέροιο,

and was thus led into the error of ascribing the lines quoted by him to Hector, and not to Agamemnon. It will be seen that Aristotle abbreviates this passage of Homer in quoting it both here and in Eth. Nic. 3. 11, that in the latter passage he substitutes πτώσσοντα for έθέλοντα μιμνάζειν παρά νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, and that in the passage before us he adds πάρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος after olwoous, words which do not appear in our text. is nothing surprising in the abbreviation or the substitution to which reference has been made, but the addition of πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος is remarkable. The passages in which the text of Homer as quoted by Aristotle differs from the text handed down in the extant MSS. and other authorities are very numerous. A list of them will be found in Bon. Ind. 507 a 29 sqq. In some of them Aristotle's memory may well be at fault (compare his inaccurate quotation from Isocrates in Rhet. 3. 9. 1410 a 1, and see Prof. Butcher in Class. Rev. 5. 310 sq.), and if the addition before us stood alone, we might be tempted to account for it by supposing a confusion with αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι in the similar passage, Il. 15. 348 sqq. But it does not stand alone. In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 25 Aristotle attributes to Homer the line (which is not to be found in our Homer),

άλλ' οἷον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,

and in Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 33 sqq. he adds after Il. 11. 542,

Αΐαντος δ' ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο,

the following line, which does not occur in the MSS., but which Plutarch also found there (see De Audiend. Poet. c. 6. 24 C and c. 14. 36 A),

Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσασχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο.

So again, as we learn from Soph. El. 4. 166 b 6 sqq. (cp. Poet. 25. 1461 a 22) Aristotle found the words δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι in the address of the Dream to Agamemnon (Il. 2. 23 sqq.), but they are not to be found there now, though the words δίδομεν δέ τοι

εθχος ἀρέσθαι occur in Il. 21. 297. For other instances of the same thing see Bon. Ind. 507 b 52 sqq. Variations of this nature must probably be ascribed to a difference between the text of Homer which Aristotle had before him and that which has come down to us. Even as early as the time of Alcibiades it seems to have been usual for grammarians to 'correct' the text of Homer (Plut. Alcib. c. 7, έτέρου δὲ (γραμματοδιδασκάλου) φήσαντος έχειν "Ομηρον ύφ' αύτοῦ διωρθωμένον, "εἶτ'," ἔφη, "γράμματα διδάσκεις "Ομηρον επανορθούν ίκανδι ών; ούχι τούς νέους παιδεύεις;"), and, as Camerarius long ago pointed out (Interp. p. 134), Alexander possessed a copy of the Iliad corrected by Aristotle himself (Plut. Alex. c. 8: Strabo, p. 594). It is likely enough, therefore, that in the time of Alexander, and even earlier, more texts than one of Homer were current, with not a few varieties of reading. Recent discoveries of Homeric papyri add to the likelihood of this. See as to them Mr. F. G. Kenyon 'On the Geneva Fragments of Homer' in Class. Rev. 8. 134 sqq., and also in Class. Rev. 11. 406. The text of the quotations from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo given in Thuc. 3. 104 differs widely from that of our MSS. (see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 15. p. 309).

13. οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν, 'it shall not be a sure thing for him to escape'—perhaps a Litotes for 'he shall have no hope of escaping.'

15. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Κατὰ γένος does not perhaps necessarily imply that the Kingship passed from father to son, but only that it was confined to members of a given family. In place of αἰρεταί we have in c. 15. 1285 b 39 κατὰ μέρος, a wider term, for an office held κατὰ μέρος may be filled by election or otherwise. See below on 1285 b 39. To what elective Kingships of the Lacedaemonian type does Aristotle refer? Hardly to the Carthaginian (see above on 1285 a 7); perhaps, among others, to the office of ἡγεμῶν αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος held for life, as we have seen (above on 1285 a 7), by Philip of Macedon and Alexander: whether he refers to the office of ταγός of the Thessalians, is doubtful, though this office was elective.

16. παρὰ ταύτην δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μοναρχίας εἶδος, as in 29 sq., not βασιλείας, as in 15, while in 1285 b 4 we have εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς. Yet in the recapitulation, 1285 b 20 sqq. (cp. c. 15. 1285 b 34, 1286 a 5), all the forms which Aristotle enumerates are classed as βασιλείας εἴδη. Perhaps he is in doubt whether the

barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship are really forms of Kingship or of Tyranny; in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq. they are treated as forms of Tyranny shading off into Kingship, and we are there told that the barbarian Kingship was elective, which we do not learn here, unless it is implied in 1285 b 2 sq. (see note). He speaks of the 'barbarian' form of Kingship as existing only among 'some' of the barbarians of Europe and Asia. Other barbarian races perhaps had hereditary Kings whose power was more limited. Others again were not ruled by Kings at all; we hear, for instance, of Θράκες άβασίλευτοι in Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 17. The Kingship of the Thracians, Illyrians, Phoenicians, and Ethiopians may have been of the type here described by Aristotle. Hardly the Molossian Kingship (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 23 sq.), or the Macedonian, for the Macedonians were very outspoken to their King (Polyb. 5. 27. 6, είχου γάρ ἀεὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς), and the Macedonian people seem to have been the judges in capital cases in time of peace (Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 136, note).

18. ἔχουσι δ' αὖται κ.τ.λ. It is natural to expect that when the power of a Kingship is great, it will not be governed by law and hereditary. Tyranny is regarded by Aristotle as not hereditary, for though tyrannies often passed from father to son, the inheritor of a tyranny was apt to lose it (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 21 sqq.). Πατρικός is apparently not used by Aristotle elsewhere in the sense of 'hereditary,' and in 24, 33, and 1285 b 5, 9 we have πάτριος used in this sense, but πατρικός often bears this meaning (e.g. in Thuc. 1. 13). As to the extent of the authority of barbarian Kings, cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν γὰρ ἄπασα πόλις Ἑλλὰς ἐβασιλεύετο, πλὴν οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ βάρβαρα ἔθνη δεσποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμους τινὰς καὶ ἐθισμοὺς πατρίους (this is perhaps based on Theophrastus, but Aristotle would say that the barbarian King also governed according to law): Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Antig. 8. 182 C: Eurip. Hel. 246 Bothe, 276 Dind.,

τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλην ένός.

19. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain how it happens that the law in these countries authorizes a despotic rule and that these Kingships are hereditary. As to the slavishness of barbarians, cp. Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 291 Nauck,

ιω τυραννί βαρβάρων άνδρων φίλη,

and Isocr. Philip. § 107. Aristotle advised Alexander in ruling his empire τοῖς μὲν Ἦλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρῆσθαι (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.: see note on 1324 b 36). That Asiatics were especially slavish, we see from 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 27 sqq. and Plut. De Vitios. Pud. c. 10, πάντες οἱ τὴν ᾿Ασίαν κατοικοῦντες ἐνὶ δουλεύουσιν ἀνθρώπῳ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μίαν εἰπεῖν τὴν Οὐ συλλαβήν.

- 22. τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, not, as in c. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq., in the sense of 'rule exercised for the advantage of the master' (for then this form of Kingship would not be a normal constitution, as it is), but 'despotic rule,' as in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3).
- 23. τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'thus while they are of a tyrannical type for the above-mentioned reason, they are safe' (and therefore unlike tyrannies), 'because they are hereditary and in accordance with law.' Does 'for the above-mentioned reason' mean because the subjects are slavish, or because the power of the King is as great as that of a tyrant? Bernays and Welldon take the former view, but, looking to 1285 b 2 sq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq., I lean rather to the latter. It is easy to understand why conformity to law confers safety, but why are Kingships the safer for being hereditary? Probably because men more willingly submit to rule when it has come down to the ruler from his ancestors and has become traditional. Thus ἐκόντων takes the place of πάτριαι in 27.
- 24. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The bodyguard of a barbarian King is composed of natives of the State for the same reason for which his tenure of power is safe, i. e. because it is hereditary and in accordance with law, and therefore willingly submitted to. We see that Kings no less than Tyrants and Aesymnetes (c. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.) had a bodyguard—usually at any rate, though perhaps not invariably (c. 15. 1286 b 6 sqq.)—but the King's bodyguard was not intended, like the Tyrant's, to secure his throne, but merely to enforce obedience on any of his subjects who might be for the moment recalcitrant (c. 15. 1286 b 27 sqq.).
- 25. οἱ γὰρ πολῖται κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 and Isocr. Hel. § 37. The Lacedaemonian Kings were guarded by citizens (Isocr. Epist. 2. 6).
- 26. τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενικόν. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 7. 8), Aristodemus of Cumae had

three bodyguards, one of the lowest of the citizens, another of manumitted slaves, and a third of hired barbarians.

30. ἔτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and another which existed among the ancient Greeks, [the monarchy of those] who are called Aesymnetes.' The εἶδος μοναρχίας is loosely explained by the name given to those who held it: compare 2. 11. 1273 a 30, τàs μεγίστας (ἀρχάς), τούς τε βασιλείς και τους στρατηγούς, and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 10. Pittacus and, it would seem, Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.) are counted by Aristotle among the ancient Greeks, but not of course Dionysius the Elder (3. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.). 'We find the word αἰσυμνητήρ correctly explained in Etym. Magn. αἰσυμνᾶν ὅ ἐστι τὸ αἰσίων μνήμην ποιείσθαι' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 280. 1). The title αἰσυμνήτης was not confined to the extraordinary magistrates to whom Aristotle here refers. At Cyme (we are not told which Cyme) the magistrates generally were called by this name (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1556 b 44 sqq.); in Hom. Odyss. 8. 258 the αἰσυμνῆται are umpires in contests for prizes; and in Megara and her colony Chalcedon and also in Chersonesus, a colony of the Pontic Heracleia, which was itself a Megarian colony, the functions of the αἰσιμνᾶται or αἰσιμνῶντες seem to have been those of the πρυτάνεις at Athens (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 72. 3, 188. 1, 194. 5, 280. 1). We are here concerned, however, only with the extraordinary Aesymnete. The nature of his office may be gathered from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 54 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 389), which refers to Miletus, Ἐπιμενης μετὰ ταῦτα αἰσυμνήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονείται λαβων έξουσίαν κτείνειν ους βούλεται καὶ ος τῶν μὲν παίδων 'Αμφιτρῆτος οὐδενὸς οἶός τ' ἦν ἐγκρατὴς γενέσθαι' ύπεξηλθον γὰρ παραχρημα δείσαντες τὰ δὲ ὄντα αὐτοῖς ἐδήμευσε, καὶ ἀργύριον έκήρυξεν, εί τις αὐτούς κτείνειεν' των δε κοινωνών τοῦ φόνου τρεῖς ἀπέκτεινε, τοις δὲ ἄλλοις φυγήν προσείπεν οἱ δὲ ἄχοντο. Οἱ μὲν δή Νηλείδαι κατελύθησαν ωδε. This is the earliest extraordinary Assymnete we hear of, unless the Aesymneteship of Tynnondas in Euboea (Plut. Solon, c. 14) was still earlier. The μόναρχος έξουσία which the Athenian Aristarchus held at Ephesus at the time of the overthrow of the Medes by Cyrus (B.C. 559) may possibly, as Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141, points out, have been that of an Aesymnete, but this is not certain. The Aesymnete had larger powers than any Greek King-larger than even the Greek King of heroic times, for the administration of the State lay wholly in his hands. He is, in fact, commonly described as a tyrant (31: cp. c. 15. 1286 b 38: Plut. Solon, c. 14: Theophrast. ap. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73),

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though Pittacus is not unnaturally spoken of as a king in the popular ditty (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr., Carm. Popul. 43),

ἄλει μύλα ἄλει<sup>.</sup> καὶ γὰρ Πιττακὸς ἀλεῖ, μεγάλας Μιτυλάνας βασιλεύων.

Thus tyrants in early days were called Aesymnetes (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1557 a 5 sqq.). The Aesymnete ruled κατά την αύτοῦ γνώμην (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 16), though his office is implied in 1285 a 32 to be κατὰ νόμον: the law, in fact, empowered him to rule κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην. Like the tyrant, he had a bodyguard, though his bodyguard would be smaller than the tyrant's (c. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.) and composed of citizens, like the bodyguard of the king, not of mercenaries, like that of the tyrant. Aristotle evidently conceives a resemblance to exist between the Aesymneteship and the barbarian Kingship (32), and it is possible that the Greeks borrowed this great office from the barbarians, for we are told in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 11 that elective αὐτοκράτορες μόναρχοι existed among some of the barbarians. Dionysius of Halicarnassus finds its equivalent in the Roman Dictatorship (Ant. Rom. 5. 73, ἔστι γὰρ αίρετή τυραννὶς ή δικτατορία δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ τοῦτο παρ' Ἑλλήνων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὸ πολίτευμα λαβείν οι γὰρ Αἰσυμνηται καλούμενοι παρ' Έλλησι τὸ ἀρχαίον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περί βασιλείας ίστορεί Θεόφραστος, αίρετοί τινες ήσαν τύραννοι ήρουντο δέ αὐτοὺς αἱ πόλεις οὔτ' εἰς ἀόριστον χρόνον οὔτε συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς, όπότε δόξειε συμφέρειν καὶ εἰς ὁπόσον χρόνον ώσπερ καὶ Μιτυληναῖοί ποθ' είλοντο Πιττακόν πρός τους φυγάδας τους περί 'Αλκαίον τον ποιητήν, where Theophrastus evidently has this passage of the Politics before him, though he says nothing of the Aesymnetes mentioned by Aristotle who held office for life). The Aesymneteship resembled the Roman Dictatorship in being called into play 'in asperioribus bellis aut in civili motu difficiliore' (Speech of the Emperor Claudius in the Lyons Tables, 1. 28: Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 1. 140), but there were some important differences between the two The Aesymnete, for instance, was elected by the people, whereas the dictator was named by one of the consuls. dictator held office for not more than six months; Pittacus, on the contrary, remained Aesymnete for ten years (Diog. Laert. 1. 75), and Aristotle knew of Assymnetes who held office for life. The dictator was always created to deal with some specified business; this was frequently, but not always, it would seem, the case with the Aesymnete. The Aesymnete was master of

the State in civil no less than in military affairs; the civil authority of the dictator was less extensive (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 1. 141 sqq.). It is not surprising that the Aesymneteship soon fell into disuse. It might not have done so if its power had been less, or if its tenure had been limited, like that of the Roman dictatorship, to six months. Pittacus surrendered it after holding it for ten years and retired into private life, but there were not many Greeks of his stamp, and there must always have been a risk of Aesymnetes declining to retire. Hence the Greek States allowed the office to disappear, and made shift with στρατηγοί αὐτοκράτορες in its place. Indeed, the creation even of a sole στρατηγώς αὐτοκράτωρ was sometimes attended with peril to the State, for the risk of the establishment of a tyranny was always greater in Greece than at Rome. Still Greece probably lost something by allowing the Aesymneteship to fall into disuse. It was an office which in the hands of good men was a means of suppressing tyranny.

- 32. της βαρβαρικής, εc. μοναρχίας.
- 34. μέχρι τινῶν ὡρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, 'till the expiration of some definite time or the performance of some definite actions.'
- 36. τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν κ.τ.λ. Compare the very similar expression in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 19, οἱ φυγάδες, ὧν οἱ 'Αλκμεωνίδαι προειστήκεσαν.

'Αντιμενίδης καὶ 'Αλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. In a passage of Diogenes Laertius based on Aristotle (2. 46: Aristot. Fragm. 65. 1486 b 34) we find the form 'Αντιμενίδας, which is the correct Lesbian form. He was a brother of Alcaeus, and another brother was named Κίκις (Alcaeus, Fragm. 137), κίκις meaning 'strength,' so that the names of all the three brothers were indicative of strength and prowess. See note on 1311 b 29.

37. δηλοῖ δ' ᾿Αλκαῖος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently anticipates that his statement that Pittacus was elected tyrant by the Mytileneans will hardly be credited by his own contemporaries—an elective tyranny would seem to them to be a contradiction in terms—and he supports it with the strongest testimony he can find, that of the foe whom Pittacus was elected to put down. The fact would hardly have been forgotten if the songs of Alcaeus had not, like those of Simonides (Aristoph. Nub. 1353 sqq.), passed somewhat out of fashion. Alcaeus, however, can only have known of Pittacus' election by hearsay, for he was an exile when it took place. His scolion, or convivial song, was probably composed in the camp of

the exiles leagued against Mytilene, but it would not be long in finding its way into the city. It would be sung with most zest by others than the Mytileneans, for it satirized them as ἐθελόδουλοι, a grave reproach to Greeks (cp. Hdt. 3. 143 and 1. 62 sq., and Theogn. 847–850).

39. τον κακοπάτριδα Πιττακον κ.τ.λ. Alcaeus, Fragm. 37 A Bergk. There is a reference to this fragment in Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 a 30 sqq. 'Respicit Plutarchus, Erot. c. 18, κοινη τὸν "Ερωτα συνεγγράφουσιν είς θεούς ποιητών οί κράτιστοι καὶ νομοθετών καὶ φιλοσόφων άθρόαι φωναί μέγα έπαινέοντες, ώσπερ έφη τον Πιττακον ό 'Αλκαίος αίρεισθαι τοὺς Μιτυληναίους τύραννον, ubi cum Reiske ἀθρόα φωνά coniecisset, illud ipsum Schneidewin Alcaeo tribuit' (Bergk). The epithet κακόπατρις, 'born of a mean father,' is no doubt applied to Pittacus because his father was a Thracian and perhaps a slave. As to his Thracian extraction cp. Duris, ap. Diog. Laert. 1. 74: we see from Thuc. 4. 107 that Pittacus was a Thracian name. Τὸν κακοπάτριδα closes a line, and then follow two complete lines. In the second of these, Ἐστάσαντο κ.τ.λ., the second syllable is long, but this syllable may be either long or short in this metre, and thus we are not obliged to regard the a of Πιττακός as long. Ahrens (De Graec. Ling. Dial. 1. 246) accentuates Πίττακον: he remarks (1. 10), 'Grammatici uno ore testantur, Aeoles accentum in ultima acutum fugientes retraxisse in priores syllabas, exceptis tantummodo, ut accuratiores monent, praepositionibus et coniunctionibus.'

In place of πόλεως and ἐπαινέοντες Alcaeus probably wrote πόλιος (Ahrens, I. 116) and ἐπαίνεντες (Ahrens, I. 142), but it is doubtful whether Aristotle did so in quoting his lines. Not much dependence can be placed on our MSS. in this matter, but it deserves notice that even when in citations from non-Attic writers they in the main preserve the dialect, as they do here—and this is often not the case (see for instance the quotation from Heraclitus in 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 30 sq.)—they allow Attic forms to slip in: thus we have  $\epsilon \sigma \theta \lambda \hat{\omega} \nu$  (not  $\epsilon \sigma \lambda \omega \nu$ ) in the quotation from Sappho in Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 8 sqq., and Simonides may have written apara and καλέοισιν in the passage (Fragm. 12) quoted from him in Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 b 7 sqq. See also critical note on 1340 b 26. Έπαίνεντες is not only the correct Lesbian form, but it is required by the metre, unless the third and fourth syllables of emaineoures can be regarded as coalescing. It may possibly be a technical word for the expression of assent to the election of a magistrate (cp. Alcaeus, Fragm. 128, Hesych. Ἐπαίνους τὰς κρίσεις καὶ τὰς συμβουλίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας Σοφοκλῆς Θυέστη Σικυωνίω καὶ ᾿Αλκαῖος (MSS. ἀλκέοι) ταῖς ἐπαινήτεσιν), but see Bergk on this fragment.

ἀχόλω, 'meek,' 'lacking gall.' Compare [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 27, καὶ οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν χολὴν οὐδε ὀργὴν ἔχων φανήσεται ἐφ' οἶς ὁ βδελυρὸς καὶ ἀναιδὴς ἄνθρωπος οὑτοσὶ βιάζεται τοὺς νόμους; and a passage quoted from Plutarch by Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 3. 1. 3 (referred to by Liddell and Scott), ὡς δέον ἄθυμον καὶ ἄχολον καὶ καθαρεύουσαν ὀργῆς καὶ πικρίας ἀπάσης τὴν γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι συμβίωσιν. Compare also Aristoph. Lysistr. 463,

πότερον έπὶ δούλας τινὰς ἥκειν ἐνόμισας, ἢ γυναιξὶν οὐκ οἴει χολὴν ἐνεῖναι;

where the proverb ἔνεστι καὶ μύρμηκι χολή (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 111) is alluded to. Hamlet's 'I lack gall To make oppression bitter' is familiar.

- 2. aỗ tai  $\mu$ èv oỗ v k.t.l. Aỗ tai, 'these monarchies' (cp. aỗ tai, 1285 b. 1285 a 18 and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 14). Eloi perhaps refers to the barbarian Kingship (cp. 17,  $\epsilon$ loi), and  $\tilde{\eta}$ oav to the Aesymneteship (cp. 30,  $\tilde{\eta}$ v). If so, the barbarian Kingship is here implied to have been elective, which we have not been told before, though we learn the fact in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 11 sq.
- 4. τέταρτον δ' είδος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not tell us whether he includes only Greek Kingships in this class, but probably this is his meaning, for he makes ή βαρβαρική βασιλεία a separate kind. Κατὰ νόμον should be taken with γιγνόμεναι ('which arose in accordance with law in the heroic times, voluntary and hereditary in character'); these Kingships are said to arise in accordance with law, because they do not, like tyranny, owe their origin to the arbitrary action of an individual (compare the contrast of κατὰ τὴν αύτοῦ βούλησιν and κατὰ νόμον in c. 16. 1287 a 1 sqq. and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sqq.); they owe it, in fact, as is explained in the next sentence, to their subjects' gratitude for benefits conferred. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 7, υπάρχει δ' ή γένεσις εὐθὺς έξ έναντίων έκατέρα των μοναρχιών κ.τ.λ. Τους ήρωϊκους χρόνους, 'the times of the heroes,' the times of Heracles (Probl. 30. 1. 953 a 13 sq.) and Priam (Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1100 a 7 sq.). Thus Isocrates (Evag. § 65) calls the Trojan War 'the war of the heroes.' The 'heroic times' seem to come to an end before, or perhaps with, the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese (Paus. 7. 17. 1, "Aργος μέν ές πλείστον

ἀφικομένην δυνάμεως πόλιν ἐπὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἡρώων ὁμοῦ τῆ μεταβολῆ τῆ ἐς Δωριέας ἐπέλιπε τὸ ἐκ τῆς τύχης εὐμενές). As to 'the heroes,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 17, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μιμηταί' οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ῆρωες, οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι.

6. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ justifies ἐκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι γιγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον by introducing an explanation in detail of the way in which this came about.

τοὺς πρώτους, 'the first kings of each dynasty,' 'the founders of dynasties.'

τοῦ πλήθους εὖεργέτας. The founders of the heroic Kingships won their thrones, according to Aristotle, by services to the people, just as it was the revolt of the people that overthrew Kingships (15). Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 84) has already pointed out that this account is hardly consistent with 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq., where Kingship is said to have come into being for the protection of the ἐπιεικεῖs from the demos. However, the origin of Kingship generally (including the Persian Kingship, for Cyrus is referred to) is traced in a very similar way in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq. Aristotle refers the origin of Kingship to the will of the people, but the Kings themselves would probably claim that they owed their thrones to Zeus, from whom they sprang (see Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 23).

7. κατὰ τέχνας, 'in connexion with arts.' Bernays translates 'by the invention of arts,' and no doubt services of this nature are especially present to Aristotle's mind, but the phrase is wide enough to include cases like that of Melampus, who was made joint-king of Argos with his brother and the previous King Anaxagoras for healing the Argive women of their madness (Paus. 2. 18. 4). As to Kings who won their thrones by discoveries in connexion with the arts, we may compare the words of Atreus in Eurip. Fragm. 853,

δείξας γὰρ ἄστρων τὴν ἐναντίαν όδὸν δήμους τ' ἔσωσα καὶ τύραννος ἰζόμην,

where Nauck refers to Strabo, p. 23 (Polyb. 34. I. 4 sqq.), καὶ Πολύβιος δ' ὀρθῶς ὑπονοεῖ τὰ περὶ τῆς πλάνης τὸν γὰρ Αἴολον τόν προσημαίνοντα τοὺς ἔκπλους ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν πορθμὸν τόποις ἀμφιδρόμοις οὖσι καὶ δυσέκπλοις διὰ τὰς παλιρροίας ταμίαν τε εἰρῆσθαι τῶν ἀνέμων καὶ βασιλέα νενομίσθαι φησί, καθάπερ Δαναὸν μὲν τὰ ὑδρεῖα τὰ ἐν "Αργει παραδείξαντα, 'Ατρέα δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου τὸν ὑπεναντίον τῷ οὐρανῷ δρόμον, μάντεις τε καὶ ἱεροσκοπουμένους ἀποδείκνυσθαι βασιλέας, τούς θ' ἱερέας τῶν Αἰγυπτίων

καὶ Χαλδαίους καὶ Μάγους σοφία τινὶ διαφέροντας τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμονίας καὶ τιμῆς τυγχάνειν παρὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν. Camerarius (Interp. p. 137) compares Diod. 1. 43. 6.

ἢ πόλεμον. Aristotle no doubt remembers the way in which Bellerophon came to be King of the Lycians (Hom. II. 6. 189 sqq.).

ή διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν, sc. τὸ πληθος. Συνάγειν is used here in the sense of 'forming into a πόλις' (cp. c. 6. 1278 b 21 sq., Diod. 3. 56. 3, μυθολογοῦσι δὲ πρῶτον παρ' αὐτοῖς Οὐρανὸν βασιλεῦσαι καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σποράδην οἰκοῦντας συναγαγεῖν εἰς πόλεως περίβολον, Paus. 2. 30. 9, and Isocr. Hel. § 35), so that it answers to κτίσαντες in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38. In Plato, Laws 681 C we have τοῖς ἡγεμόσι καὶ ἀγαγοῦσι τοὺς δήμους, οἶον βασιλεῦσι. Cp. also Conon ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 131 a 23 Bekk., παραλαβὼν τὴν βασιλείαν (Αἰγιαλός), ἐπεὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἤθροισέ τε τὸν λαὸν σποράδην οἰκοῦντα καὶ πόλιν ἔκτισεν ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ μεγάλην καὶ εὐδαίμονα, Καῦνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπονομάσας.

† πορίσαι χώραν. So the Heracleidae, being heirs to Argos, Lacedaemon, and Messene, made over their territories to their comrades in the invasion of Peloponnesus and received Kingships in return for them (Isocr. Archid. § 17 sqq. and especially § 20). Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38, † κτίσαντες † κτησάμενοι χώραν, ἄσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν, and Polyb. 6. 7. 4, χώραν κατακτώμενοι (sc. οἱ βασιλεῖς).

8. καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι, 'and hereditary for those who succeeded to them.' So Bern., 'und für die folgenden Geschlechter ward diess dann ein angestammtes Verhältniss.'

9. κύριοι δ' ἦσαν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle says nothing of the share of the Kings in deliberative authority as conveners of the γερουσία (Hom. Il. 9. 68 sqq.). For τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 9.

10. των θυσιων, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαί. The sacrificial functions of the Kings passed to the βασιλείς or ἄρχοντες or πρυτάνεις, as to whom see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq., and note on that passage. The Egyptian King was a priest according to Plato, Polit. 290 D sq.; not so the Greek King of heroic times. The sacrificial and judicial prerogatives of early Greek Kings were no doubt sources of profit to them, and their military position would bring them plunder.

καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον. Did the King try all the actions that were brought? If so, there cannot have been many of them, especially as the King would be from time to time absent

on campaigns. Gilbert (Beiträge zur Entwickelungsgeschichte des griech. Gerichtsversahrens und des griech. Rechtes, p. 445) thinks that in the earliest days of Greece the whole people sat in judgement on offences affecting the collective interests. He infers this from the practice in historical times of the Macedonians (see note on 1285 a 16), the Epirots (Polyb. 32. 21 Hultsch), and the Acarnanians (Liv. 33. 16). But he holds that the right of trying these offences passed to the King in those States of Eastern Greece in which, as at Mycenae, a powerful Kingship came into existence, though the King may probably have exercised it with the advice of his  $\gamma \acute{\epsilon} \rho o \nu \tau \epsilon s$  (p. 446).

11. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίουν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὀμνύοντες, οἱ δ' ὀμνύοντες. In times later than the heroic Greek judges and dicasts probably always adjudicated on oath (cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 47, απασι δέ προσετάττετο παριούσι καθάπερ έν δικαστηρίω μεθ' δρκου την ψηφον ἐπιφέρειν): the oath of the Athenian dicast is well known (see vol. i. p. 273, note 1, and below on 1287 a 25). Hence Aristotle's mention of the fact that some Greek Kings in the heroic times adjudicated unsworn. Those Kings who adjudicated on oath would no doubt swear to judge justly, and possibly to judge according to the laws. We must not assume that the Kings who adjudicated unsworn did not take an oath from time to time to rule according to the laws. The Lacedaemonian Kings swore to the Ephors every month that they would so rule (Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 7), but we do not hear of their adjudicating on oath, though they may have done so. Plutarch in Quaest. Rom. 44 speculates why the priest of Jupiter at Rome was not allowed to swear - πότερον ότι βάσανός τις έλευθέρων ὁ όρκος έστί, δεί δὲ ἀβασάνιστον είναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἱερέως; ἡ ὅτι περὶ μικρῶν ἀπιστεῖσθαι τὸν τὰ θεῖα καὶ μέγιστα πεπιστευμένον οὐκ εἰκός ἐστιν; ἢ ὅτι πᾶς ὅρκος εἰς κατάραν τελευτά της έπιορκίας, κατάρα δε δύσφημον καὶ σκυθρωπόν; . . . ή κοινός ό της επιορκίας κίνδυνος, αν ανήρ ασεβής και επίορκος εύχων κατάρχηται καὶ ἱερῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως; That the oath was a check on the King we see from Soph. Fragm. 428,

δρκου δὲ προστεθέντος ἐπιμελεστέρα ψυχὴ κατέστη δισσὰ γὰρ φυλάσσεται, φίλων τε μέμψιν κεἰς θεοὺς ἄμαρτάνειν.

The Athenians out of respect for Xenocrates would not allow him to give his testimony on oath (Cic. ad Att. 1. 16. 4). We have δμνύοντες here, as we have δμνύονσι in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 9 and in

'Aθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 11. See Liddell and Scott as to the use of ὀμνύω, and Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 153. See also note on 1324 b 20.

12. ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἦν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις. The article is absent before ¿maváraois, as is often the case when the genitive comes first: cp. Thuc. 4. 12. 2, των τε χωρίων χαλεπότητι, and 3. 58. 4, ές πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας (Richards). Cp. also 3. 4. 1277 a 11 sq., b 19, 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 29, τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας, and see critical note on 1331 b 5. Ἐπανάτασις, not simply ἀνάτασις, because the sceptre is lifted up in a particular direction. For the fact see Hom. Il. 7. 412: 10. 321. Compare the oath of Abraham (Gen. xiv. 22, And Abram said to the king of Sodom, I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, that I will not take from (thee?) a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take anything that is thine). The lifting-up of the sceptre perhaps signified that the King staked his sceptre on the honesty of the judgement. No words needed to be uttered, no gods to be named; in both these respects the oath referred to differed from ordinary oaths, in which it was common to name three gods (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 21. 9). Cp. Alexis, Fragm. Θητεύοντες (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 420),

ορκος βέβαιός έστιν αν νεύσω μόνον,

and Cratin. Χείρωνες, Fragm. 11 (Meineke, 2. 155),

οίς ην μέγιστος δρκος

ἄπαντι λόγφ κύων, ἔπειτα χήν θεοὺς δ' ἐσίγων, where see Meineke's note.

13. οἱ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οἱ ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοι include οἱ ἡρωϊκοὶ χρόνοι, in which these Kingships came into being, but also far later times (see above on 1285 a 30). For ἄρχειν with the accusative of the matters over which rule is exercised, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 9, where Π have ἄρχει πάντα. If we read with all the MSS. (except M³, which omits the first τά, and P¹, which adds κατά before ἔνδημα) καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια (St. Hilaire and Sus. would omit the first καί), we shall probably be right in translating, with Bernays, 'both matters in the city and matters in the territory and matters beyond the frontier,' though τὰ ἔνδημα usually means 'home-affairs,' and it would be possible to take it in this sense here, translating 'both matters in the city and home-affairs generally and matters beyond the frontier.' Those who strike out καί before τὰ κατὰ πόλιν translate 'the affairs of the State, both home-affairs and affairs beyond

the frontier.' Τὰ κατὰ πόλιν might probably mean 'the affairs of the State' (cp. Plato, Polit. 287 B, D, 295 E, 305 E, and see Holden on Xen. Oecon. 11. 14), but τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν (Isocr. De Pace, § 49) or τὰ ἐν τῷ πόλει (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 11) is more commonly used in this sense, τὰ κατὰ πόλιν meaning rather 'matters in the city' in contradistinction to 'matters in the country': compare for the contrast of κατὰ πόλιν and κατ' ἀγρόν Xen. Oecon. 11. 14 and Cyneg. 13. 15, Plato, Theaet. 142 A and Rep. 475 D, and Menand. 'Υδρία Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 207). If we are right then in taking τὰ κατὰ πόλιν in the sense of 'matters in the city,' the three-fold division in the passage before us will answer to that in Plato, Phaedrus 230 C, οῦτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὕτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὕτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι.

14. συνεχῶς ἦρχον, unlike the later βασιλεῖς (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), who were annual officers.

Κingship compare 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 38 sqq. and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, where Theophrastus is probably followed, as in the passage immediately preceding. Both Dionysius and Polybius (6. 7. 6–9) speak as if the Kingship of heroic Greece always passed into a tyranny before it fell (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 10 sqq.), but we gather from the passage before us and from 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 40 sq. that this was not always the case.

15. τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων. Aristotle probably refers in the first place to Theseus (Plut. Thes. cc. 24, 25), but also to Theopompus the Lacedaemonian King (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq.) and to the Kings of the Molossians (1313 a 23 sqq.).

τὰ δὲ τῶν ὅχλων παραιρουμένων. The diminution of the powers of the Kingship is commonly attributed by the authorities to οἱ πολλοί οτ ὁ δῆμος. Cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, ἀρξαμένων δέ τινων ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις πλημμελεῖν, καὶ νόμοις μὲν ὀλίγα χρωμένων, ταῖς δ' ἑαυτῶν γνώμαις τὰ πολλὰ διοικούντων, δυσχεράναντες ὅλον τὸ πρᾶγμα οἱ πολλοὶ κατέλυσαν μὲν τὰ βασιλικὰ πολιτεύματα, νόμους δὲ καταστησάμενοι καὶ ἀρχὰς ἀποδείξαντες, ταύταις ἐχρῶντο τῶν πόλεων φυλακαῖς. Pausanias speaks of ὁ δῆμος in 4. 5. 10 and 2. 19. 2. Polybius also assigns the chief part in the overthrow of monarchy to the πλῆθος (6. 8. 1), and so does Lucretius (5. 1136 sqq.). Their view is confirmed by the fact that in the Achaean cities Kingship was succeeded by democracy (Polyb. 2. 41. 4 sq.). Aristotle speaks of Kingship as designed to protect the ἐπιεικεῖς from the δῆμος (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9), and it is

natural that he should regard the Many as the agents in its overthrow. If we ask how it happened that, though Kingship was overthrown by the Many, it was nevertheless usually succeeded by the supremacy of the Few, Polybius has an answer ready; the Many effected the overthrow of Monarchy by means of προστάται, and they allowed these προστάται to rule over them (Polyb. 6. 8. 1 sq.).

- 16. αἱ πάτριοι θυσίαι are so termed in contradistinction to αἱ ἐπίθετοι (᾿Αθ. Πολ. c. 3: Isocr. Areopag. § 29). The Kingship was reduced to priestly functions at Cyrene (Hdt. 4. 161) and Ephesus, where we read of the descendants of Androclus in Strabo, p. 633, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὀνομάζονται βασιλεῖς ἔχοντές τινας τιμάς, προεδρίαν τε ἐν ἀγῶσι καὶ πορφύραν ἐπίσημον τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, σκίπωνα ἀντὶ σκήπτρου, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας Δήμητρος.
- **20**. μèν οὖν is taken up by μèν οὖν, 28, and then answered by  $\pi \dot{\epsilon} \mu \pi \tau \sigma \nu$  δè κ.τ.λ., 29.
- 22. ἐπί τισι δ' ώρισμένοις, 'but held on certain fixed conditions.' Though the submission rendered to the heroic Kingship by its subjects was a willing submission, it was not unconditional. Aristotle conceives the heroic Kingship to have been granted to the Kings by the people on the condition that they should be generals and judges and supreme over matters relating to the gods. This form of νομική βασιλεία resembles νομική φιλία (Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1162 b 25, ἔστι δή νομική μὲν (φιλία) ή ἐπὶ ἡητοῖς κ.τ.λ.).
- 24. ἐκ γένους, literally 'resulting from family,' 'by right of family.' 'Εκ here signifies the 'origo et causa' of the ἀρχή (Bon. Ind. 225 b 15). Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 238 D, οὖτοι δὲ (i. e. βασιλεῖς) τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους τοτὲ δὲ αἰρετοί. Elsewhere we have κατὰ γένος.
- 26. For τετάρτη τούτων, 'fourth of these which I am enumerating,' cp. 2. 11. 1272 b 28, and see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.
- 27. αὖτη δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle forgets that he has included under the Lacedaemonian type of Kingship not only hereditary but also elective Kingships (1285 a 15: cp. also c. 15. 1285 b 39). His recapitulations are not always exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and above on 1258 a 17 and 1278 a 34.
- 29. πέμπτον δ' είδος κ.τ.λ. Πάντων is here neuter (though in c. 16. 1287 a 11 we have τὸ κύριον ἔνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν): cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 13, οὖτος γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ, and Demosth. Ol. 1. 4, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐκεῖνον ἕνα ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥητῶν καὶ ἀπορρήτων. It is characteristic of Monarchy to be supreme over

everything (Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37 sq.), though all Kings were not so (1285 a 4). Compare with Aristotle's language here the address of the Chorus to the King of the Argives in Aesch. Suppl. 370 sqq. Sus. appears to take πάντων with τῶν κοινῶν, reading ὧνπερ in place of ὥσπερ with Buecheler, but Bernays seems right in following Bekker, who places a comma after ὧν and takes ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη τῶν κοινῶν together.

- 30. τῶν κοινῶν, 'public matters,' as in c. 5. 1278 b 4 (not 'public property,' as Bern.).
- 31. τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν, sc. ἀρχήν, 'answering to household rule.' Supply βασιλεία from εἶδος βασιλείας (cp. 34). Bonitz (Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.) explains τάττειν here as used 'de notionum ordine logico,' and refers among other passages to 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 32, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 18, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη, and Top. 5. 7. 137 a 30 sqq., where τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγόμενον is used synonymously with τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τεταγμένον.

ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Supply  $d\rho\chi\dot{\eta}$  with  $\dot{\eta}$  οἰκονομικ $\dot{\eta}$ . In saying that the rule over a household is a kind of Kingship (see above on 1278 b 37), Aristotle is thinking of the relation of the father to his children, not of that of the husband to his wife or of the master to his slaves.

- 32. οὖτως ἡ βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Sus. would read παμβασιλεία in place of βασιλεία, but Aristotle speaks of the fifth kind of Kingship simply as Kingship (cp. τὴν βασιλείαν, c. 16. 1287 b 35), because it is Kingship κατ' ἐξοχήν. Πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ένὸς ἡ πλειόνων is of course dependent on οἰκονομία, not on βασιλεία.
- C. 15. 33 sqq. Aristotle seems to take it for granted that if he discovers whether the two extreme forms are expedient or not, he will have solved the question of the expediency of the intermediate forms. In just the same way Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis sketches the extreme variations of the human race under the influence of climate and region, closing the treatise with the words, at μèν ἐναντιώταται φύσιές τε καὶ ἰδέαι ἔχουσιν οῦτως ἀπὸ δὲ τουτέων τεκμαιρόμενος τὰ λοιπὰ ἐνθυμέεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήση. Aristotle may also have felt that a discussion of the expediency of the heroic Kingship and the Aesymneteship would have only an historical, and a discussion of the expediency of the barbarian Kingship only a scientific, interest for Greeks.
  - 35. των ἄλλων αι πολλαί. Aristotle probably refers to the heroic

Kingship and possibly also to the barbarian Kingship, for the power of the Aesymnete seems to have been quite unbounded.

36. ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the late appearance of εἰσί in this sentence cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 35 sqq. and see note on 1332 b 42.

τῆς παμβασιλείας, literally 'Kingship over everything' (cp. παμμήτωρ = πάντων μήτηρ), as we see from c. 16. 1287 a 8 sqq. It would seem from the expression τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, 1287 a 8, and from the absence of any remark in the passage before us, that the word was not coined by Aristotle, as Schneider thinks, but was a recognized Greek word. Παμβασιλεύς does not occur in Aristotle's writings, though it occurs in Σοφία Σειράχ 50. 15 and in C. I. G. 4725. 6 (Liddell and Scott).

- 39. ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος. See above on 1285 a 15, where we have τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἰρεταί. Tenure 'by family' is opposed to tenure 'by turns,' because tenure 'by turns' makes the office accessible to all, not indeed simultaneously but successively. Tenure 'by turns' is a wider term than tenure 'by election,' because, when tenure 'by turns' is the rule, the dignity may pass by election or it may not.
- 2. τὸ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'now to inquire as to the kind of Generalship 1286 a. we have mentioned is to enter on an inquiry belonging in species rather to inquiries respecting laws than to inquiries respecting constitutions.' The inquiry started by Aristotle in c. 14. 1284 b 35 sqq. is an inquiry respecting Kingship as a constitution (cp. 1284 b 39, ἡ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον). So too in 3. 1. 1274 b 32 it is taken for granted that the subject for consideration is the constitution: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, ἡμῶν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείαs. For ἔχει εἶδος Bonitz (Ind. 218 b 17) compares Rhet. 2. 22. 1395 b 20, περὶ δ' ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῦν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἐκατέρου τούτων ἐστίν. Notwithstanding what he says here, Aristotle describes in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 17 sqq. an attempt to abolish the Lacedaemonian Kingship as an attempt to alter 'a part of a constitution.'
- 4. ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. and see note on that passage.

For τοῦτο referring to τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας, see notes on 1263 a 1 and 1291 a 16, and cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 25, where ταῦτα refers to  $\phi\theta$ οραί and σωτηρίαι.

5. ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην. Aristotle evidently intended to treat of laws some time or other: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11 sqq.

- 7. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. This is the initial inquiry; it is followed by the further inquiries, τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς (c. 17. 1288 a 30 sq.). The question whether the rule of men or of law is best was as old as the time of Pittacus, if we may trust Diod. 9. 27. 4 and Diog. Laert. 1. 77 (see above on 1281 a 34), and of Solon, to judge by Plut. Solon, c. 14, πολλοί δὲ καὶ τῶν διὰ μέσου πολιτῶν τὴν ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ νόμου μεταβολήν ορώντες έργωδη καὶ χαλεπήν οὖσαν, οὖκ ἔφευγον ἔνα τὸν δικαιότατον καὶ Φρονιμώτατον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. Athenian public opinion had long decided the question in favour of law; it identified Democracy with the rule of law and Monarchy and Oligarchy with the rule of persons (vol. i. p. 494, note), and it is in this spirit that Theseus speaks as the representative of Democracy in Eurip. Suppl. 415 sqq. Bothe (429 sqq. Dind.): cp. also Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 9. 23, ο[ ν] γαρ ανδρός απειλήν, αλλα νόμου φωνήν κυριεύειν δεί των εὐδαιμόνων. The teaching of Socrates, however, gave new life to the discussion. No one rendered a more willing obedience to the laws than he, yet his view that he who knows is the true ruler, and that a parallel exists between the ruler of a State and the master of an art, furnished Monarchy, or at any rate Monarchy in the hands of a scientific ruler, with a fresh ground of claim. master of an art would be prepared to fetter his practice of his art by written rule? It does not appear that Socrates himself ever raised this question, but his views undoubtedly suggested those to which Plato gives expression in Polit. 294 A sqq. and Laws 874 E sqq. See as to Plato's views vol. i. p. 270 sqq. Aristotle in his first inquiry on the subject, contained in c. 15, is led, after a brief discussion (1286 a 9-21) of the question whether the best man or the best laws should rule, to suggest a compromise-let the best man promulgate laws and let laws rule except where they deviate from what is right, or in other words let the best man rule in subjection to law, except where right requires that he shall overrule law. But at the beginning of c. 16 Aristotle discovers that a ruler in this position would not be an Absolute King, whereas it is the claims of Absolute Kingship that he has promised to examine. Hence the compromise has to be abandoned and a fresh inquiry into the subject undertaken in c. 16 with the result that law should rule in some cases and the One Best Man in others.
  - 9. δοκοῦσι δὴ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Polit. 294 A sqq. Aristotle

agrees that the law from its inevitable generality is unable to regulate some things and fails to regulate others well (1286 a 24), even when the utmost possible degree of ἀκρίβεια is imparted to it. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14. 1137 b 13–32: Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 9 sqq.: 3. 11. 1282 b 1–6: 3. 15. 1286 a 36 sq.: Rhet. 1. 13. 1374 a 18 sqq. Law is said in c. 16. 1287 b 22 to be unable to regulate things about which men deliberate. For πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 5. 16, πρὸς τὸ συμπῖπτον ἀεὶ διατάττων ἐπορεύετο.

12. For ἄρχειν, used of the master of an art, cp. c. 6. 1279 a 4 sq.

καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτω κ.τ.λ., 'and in Egypt it is permissible for the physicians to change' (i.e. to depart from) 'the rules of treatment prescribed by law after four days' treatment, while if a physician does this before, he does it at his peril.' Bonitz (Ind. 391 a 7) is probably right in supplying τοὺς γεγραμμένους νόμους with κινείν, unless indeed we should rather supply τὰ γράμματα from 12. μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 7) supplies μελέτην: perhaps, however, θεραπείαν is the word which is suppressed (cp. C. 16. 1287 a 40, την έκ των γραμμάτων θεραπείαν). For έπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ (not αύτων) κινδύνω, cp. c. 16. 1287 b 30, τούς γάρ τη άρχη καὶ αύτοῦ φίλους ποιούνται (οί μόναρχοι) συνάρχους, and Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 a 9, άπλως μεν γάρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται έκων, ἐπὶ σωτηρία δ' αύτοῦ καὶ των λοιπων απαντες οι νουν έχοντες. As to the fact Camerarius (Interp. p. 136) refers to Diod. 1. 82. 3, κατὰ δὲ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς τῆς χώρας εκδημίας θεραπεύονται πάντες οὐδένα μισθὸν ιδία διδόντες οἱ γὰρ ιατροί τὰς μέν τροφὰς έκ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαμβάνουσι, τὰς δὲ θεραπείας προσάγουσι κατά νόμον ἔγγραφον, ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δεδοξασμένων ἰατρῶν ἀρχαίων συγγεγραμμένου καν τοις έκ της ίερας βίβλου νόμοις αναγινωσκομένοις άκολουθήσαντες άδυνατήσωσι σώσαι τὸν κάμνοντα, άθώοι παντὸς έγκλήματος ἀπολύονται, ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ποιήσωσι, θανάτου κρίσιν ὑπομένουσιν, ήγουμένου τοῦ νομοθέτου της έκ πολλών χρόνων παρατετηρημένης θεραπείας και συντεταγμένης ύπο των αρίστων τεχνιτών ολίγους αν γενέσθαι συνετωτέρους. The authority followed by Diodorus does not seem to have been aware that the physicians in Egypt were free after four days to depart from the treatment prescribed by law, if desirable. The reason why they were allowed to do so may have been that a crisis in the disease was thought to occur on the fourth day: cp. Hist. An. 5. 20. 553 a 9, al δε μεταβολαί γίνονται τοις πλείστοις κατά τριήμερον ή τετραήμερον, ωσπερ καὶ αἱ τῶν νόσων συμβαίνουσι κρίσεις. See also Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 347 sqq. Kühn, where the

writer explains that the crisis in fevers occurs on days uneven in number, the third, fifth, seventh, or ninth, and adds, μεθίει δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἐν τῆσι περισσῆσι διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ἐν τῆσιν ἀρτίοισι τῶν ἡμερέων ἔλκει τὸ σῶμα ἀπὸ τῆς κοιλίης, ἐν δὲ τῆσι περισσῆσιν ἀφίει, but this teaching hardly agrees with that of the passage just quoted from the History of Animals. Or the view may have been that the full effect of the drugs administered would not be experienced by the patient till the third day: see Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 341 Kühn.

16. διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, for the same reason for which ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους θεραπεία is not the best—the reason being that the γράμματα καὶ νόμοι may be unsuitable in the given case.

άλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This is the rejoinder of an advocate of law. 'But yet [if it is made an objection to law that it embodies an universal principle, that universal principle too [no less than other things] must be possessed by the rulers, [so that their sway is open to the same objection, and that from which the affective element is wholly absent is better than that in which it is innate. Now the affective element finds no place in the law, whereas every human soul must have it. Hence the law is a better ruling authority than a man.]' Κάκεῖνον τὸν λύγον τὸν καθόλου takes up 10, τὸ καθόλου μόνον λέγειν. That without ὁ καθόλου λόγος a ruler cannot rule aright, we see from 1. 13. 1260 a 17, διό τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεί την ηθικήν ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστίν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), and Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 20-28: cp. Plut. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 3, τίς οὖν ἄρξει τοῦ ἄρχοντος; ὁ νόμος, ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς θνητών τε καὶ άθανάτων, ως φησι Πίνδαρος, οὐκ ἐν βιβλίοις έξω γεγραμμένος, οὐδέ τισι ξύλοις, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχος ὧν έαυτῷ λόγος, ἀεὶ συνοικῶν καὶ παραφυλάττων καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν έῶν ἔρημον ἡγεμονίας.

17. κρεῖττον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq. and Plato, Laws 713 E sqq. As to τὸ παθητικόν see above on 1254 b 8, and compare c. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq., where τὸ παθητικόν is represented by ἐπιθυμία. For ὧ συμφυές cp. Plato, Timaeus 70 E, καὶ κατέδησαν δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον (i.e. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) ἐνταῦθα ὡς θρέμμα ἄγριον, τρέφειν δὲ ξυνημμένον ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ τι μέλλοι τὸ θνητὸν ἔσεσθαι γένος.

19. ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 34 sqq., and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 18, καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ πρῶτος τὰ τεταγμένα μὲν ποιεῖ τῷ πόλει, τὰ τεταγμένα δὲ λαμβάνει, μέτρον δὲ αὐτῷ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλὰ ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. ᾿Λνθρωπίνην is probably added because the proposal was to put a man in the place of the law.

20. ἀντὶ τούτου, perhaps rather 'in return for this' than 'in

compensation for this' ('pro eo quod affectibus non caret,' Bon. Ind. 63 a 57). The presence of an affective element in the individual human being is the price he pays for his deliberating better about particulars. Cp. Hdt. 3. 59, παρὰ δὲ Ἑρμιονέων νῆσον ἀντὶ χρημάτων παρέλαβον.

- 21. ότι μεν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. Αὐτόν, i.e. τον ἄριστον ἄνδρα. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Polit. 295 D-E, 300 C. He draws the provisional conclusion that it will be best to have a Lawgiver-King content in general to leave supremacy to the law which he has made, but ready to overrule it when it is well that he should do so. (Compare c. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq., where a similar arrangement is suggested.) Plutarch describes in Ages. c. 30, how Agesilaus after Leuctra, seeing how numerous those were who had lost courage in the battle (οἱ τρέσαντες), advised that the laws which imposed a severe form of aripia in such cases should 'sleep for a while.' Aristotle, however, goes much further than this, and asks that his Lawgiver-King shall overrule the law not only in critical times, but whenever it deviates from the right. We may compare the powers of overruling law possessed by the Roman Senate, and afterwards by the Emperor, even before the Principate became an Absolute Monarchy (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 823 sqq., ed. 1), and also the dispensing power of the Popes and the English Kings (Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 6). Cowell in the earlier editions of his 'Interpreter, or Law Dictionary,' writing in the reign of James I, who found it necessary to suppress the work by proclamation, said under the title 'King,' 'And though at his coronation he take an oath not to alter the laws of the land, yet, this oath notwithstanding, he may alter or suspend any particular law that seemeth hurtful to the public estate' (Hallam, Const. Hist. of England, c. 6). It must be borne in mind that the King whom Aristotle would invest with powers of this nature is ex hypothesi an avhp apioros.
- **24.** ὄσα δὲ κ.τ.λ. The antecedent to ὅσα is τούτων or ταῦτα (after ἄρχειν). Κρίνειν, 'to decide,' as in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 29.
- 26. καὶ γὰρ νῦν κ.τ.λ. Συνιόντες takes up πάντας (cp. c. 11. 1281 b 34, πάντες . . . συνελθόντες). Κρίνουσιν, 'come to decisions.' Both judicial and deliberative decisions are probably referred to, whereas in c. 11. 1281 b 31, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 5, and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 4 κρίνειν refers only to the former. The point of the addition, αὖται δ' αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον, will become clear if we supply

after τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον the words 'which are just the things that the law cannot deal with.'

- 28. μèν οὖν, 'true.' This passage seems to be based on c. 11. 1281 a 42 sqq.
- 29. ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, 'but the State is made up of many individuals, [and therefore is better than any single individual].' Cp. c. 11. 1282 a 38 sq.
- 30. μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. An έστίασιε συμφορητόε is really a number of έστιάσειε, and it is compound, not ἀπλῆ.

διὰ τοῦτο. For the asyndeton cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 33, διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ηὕξατο Φωκυλίδης: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 11, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν κ.τ.λ.: 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 12, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς: Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 36, διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται: Magn. Mor. 2. 11. 1209 a 24, ταῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγονται.

καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον, 'also decides better' [besides being better].

- 31. ἔτι μᾶλλον . . . 33. ἀδιαφθορώτερον. A numerous body not only arrives at better decisions than a single individual or a few, but is also less likely to be led astray from the just conclusions at which it arrives. For the structure of the sentence see above on 1253 b 35-37. Μάλλον ἀδιάφθορον, 'less easily seduced': cp. Plato, Laws 768 B, δικαστάς έκ τοῦ παραχρημα άδιαφθόρους ταῖς δεήσεσι δικάζειν, where the word is explained in Bekk. Anecd. 1. p. 343 by τὸ μὴ παρακεκινημένον της ὀρθης γνώμης (see Stallbaum on the passage). For the thought, cp. 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 41, καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιείν ὀρθῶς εὐδιαφθορώτεροι γὰρ (οί) ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν εἰσὶν κ[aì] κέρδει κ[aì] χάρισιν, and Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 78, 'The legislator can be "got at," the people cannot ... The legislator may be subjected by the advocates of women's suffrage or liquor-prohibition to a pressure irresistible by ordinary mortals, but the citizens are too numerous to be all wheedled or threatened.' Yet the Constitution of the United States looks, and not in vain, to the President to act as a check on the tendency of Congress 'to yield to pressure from a section of its constituents or to temptations of a private nature' (Bryce, 1. 75 sq.).
- 33. τοῦ δ' ἐνὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been pleading that the decisions of a multitude are less easily seduced by the wrongful influence of others than those of one man, and now he goes on to plead that they are less easily warped by internal passion. Sus. reads γάρ e conj. in place of δ', which is the reading of ΓΠ, but not,

I think, rightly. When a whole people did come to be mastered by anger, to appease it was impossible; the only thing possible was to let its anger have full course in the hope that it would exhaust itself after a time (Eurip. Orest. 678 sqq. Bothe, 696 sqq. Dindorf).

- 36. ἔστω δὲ τὸ πληθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 701 A, εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δημοκρατία ἐν αὐτῆ τις μόνον ἐγένετο ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ἄν πάνυ γε δεινὸν ἦν τὸ γεγονός, c. 11. 1281 b 15 sqq., 23 sq., and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sq. Aristotle evidently connects the overriding of law with the rule of a πληθος of the kind which bears sway in extreme democracies (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 15, 23 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), a πληθος including other elements than οἱ ἐλεύθεροι (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 38 sqq.).
- 38. εἰ δὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, 'this abstinence from overriding of the law.' A high degree of virtue is not attainable by the Many (c. 7. 1279 a 39 sqq.: 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 39). 'Αλλ' εἰ πλείους κ.τ.λ., 'still if there were a plurality of persons good both as men and as citizens.' This is the characteristic of true ἀριστοκρατία (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sq.). For ἀλλά cp. c. 5. 1278 a 9.
- 1. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. As Giph. points out (p. 395), this view is 1286 b. implied in the argument of Darius in favour of Monarchy (Hdt. 3. 82): compare also the answer of Alexander to the proposal of Darius to share the Persian Kingship with him (Diod. 17. 54. 5). In the quaint story preserved in Stob. Floril. 10. 50 Aristotle hints that even in an individual the right side may fall out with the left. And if the One Man does escape internal discord, his rule may nevertheless be productive of στάσις, for others will be apt to fall out with him (Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 29).
- 2. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Good men do not fall out among themselves (Eth. Nic. 8. 4. 1156 b 11 sq.). Σπουδαΐοι τὴν ψυχήν, cp. Thuc. 2. 40. 5.
- 3. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 445 D, ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἐνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἃν κληθείη, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία. (Contrast the account given of ἀριστοκρατία in Plato, Polit. 301 A.) Aristotle is speaking aporetically in the passage before us. It is not his deliberate view that Kingship differs from Aristocracy in being the rule of one good man, while Aristocracy is the rule of several. The true King is one who surpasses in virtue and political capacity all the rest of the citizens put together. No such superiority is possessed by the individual rulers of an Aristocracy.

- 6. καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ., 'both when the Kingly office is accompanied with a bodyguard and when it is not.' It was a drawback to Kingship that it usually involved a bodyguard, and Aristotle says that Aristocracy would be better than Kingship, even if the King had no bodyguard. That Kingship is an  $d\rho\chi\dot{\eta}$ , we see from 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8.
- 7. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it was perhaps only owing to this that, etc. 'Only' is often left unexpressed by Aristotle: see above on 1282 a 36 and b 4. The account of the succession of constitutions given in the passage which commences here is aporetic only, and is not in agreement with Aristotle's deliberate opinion on the subject. A quite different account is given in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sag, where constitutional changes are connected with changes in the art of war; indeed, in the criticism of Plato which is 'tacked on' (see vol.i. p. 519, note) at the close of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.) Aristotle seems to deny that there is any regular succession of constitutions (1316 a 20 sqq.). The object of the review here given of the succession of constitutions appears to be to show that the days of Kingship were long past, and that it was in place only when States were small and a few much surpassed the rest in virtue. When States became larger, its place was naturally taken, first by an equal constitution, and then by degenerate forms of this ending in democracy, and when they became larger still, democracy came to be the only constitution which could easily be introduced.
  - 8. For omárior with the infinitive see Liddell and Scott.
- 9. ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. Πόλεις here seems to mean 'States,' not 'cities': see notes on 20 and 1310 b 17. It is implied in the latter passage that States were small when Kingship prevailed.
- 10. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'besides, men instituted their Kings in consequence of benefit conferred, and benefits are the work of good men, [and good men were then rare].' 'Από in ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας marks the 'origo et causa' (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.). For the fact, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 sqq. That benefits are the work of good men is implied in Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 4, ὁ δ' 'Αρμένιος συμπρούπεμπε (τὸν Κῦρον) καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθόν. In an inscription found at Lycosura and published by Cavvadias in his 'Lycosura' we read ὅπως ἢι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γνωστὰ ᾶ τε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐεργεσία ἅ τε τᾶς πόλιος εἰς τοὺς ἀξίους εὐχαριστία.

Complimentary decrees declaring individuals εὐεργέται often speak of them as ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί (see e. g. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 92 and No. 138, line 40).

12. οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον κ. τ. λ., 'they no longer endured [to be ruled by Kings], but sought for something shared in common by all, and established a constitution.' Cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C (quoted on 1287 a 22), Isocr. Hel. § 35, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (Θησεὺς) κοινὴν τὴν πατρίδα καταστήσας καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν συμπολιτευομένων ἐλευθερώσας ἐξ ἴσου τὴν αμιλλαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐποίησε κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 9. 5. 16, τὸ δὲ έντεῦθεν διὰ πλειόνων πολιτεύεσθαι μηδε ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς ένὸς ήρτησθαι τὰ πάντα ἄμεινον ἐφαίνετο τοῖς Θηβαίοις. We should infer from the passage before us that the constitution established after the fall of Kingship was one which gave supreme power to 'many' (cp. 12, πολλούς δμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν), but we are told in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that it was an oligarchy of knights. For κοινόν τι, cp. c. 3. 1276 b I, εἴπερ γάρ έστι κοινωνία τις ή πόλις, έστι δε κοινωνία πολιτών πολιτείας: Plut. Aristid. c. 22, γράφει ψήφισμα ('Αριστείδης) κοινήν είναι την πολιτείαν καὶ τους ἄρχοντας έξ' Αθηναίων πάντων αίρεισθαι: and (with Bon. Ind. 399 a 60) Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq. In the passage before us, as often elsewhere when the object is easily supplied, 'accusativus eius rei, quam quis ὑπομένει, omittitur' (see Bon. Ind. 800 b 61, where Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 b 18 is referred to among other passages). indeed quite in Aristotle's way to suppress the accusative governed by a verb: see below on 18, and see note on 1273 b 18. Here, as in the Seventh (Fifth) Book, Monarchies, or at any rate Kingships, are marked off from Constitutions (see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii).

14. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D sqq., which is corrected in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. The meaning of ἔντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον will be clearer if we translate 'for they made wealth [and not virtue] the honoured thing.' In an aristocracy virtue should be honoured above wealth, if it is to be durable (2. 11. 1273 a 37-b 1). That τὸ ἔντιμον ποιεῖν τὸν πλοῦτον is a sign of oligarchy, we see from Eurip. Fragm. 628,

δήμω δὲ μήτε πῶν ἀναρτήσης κράτος μήτ' αὖ κακώσης, πλοῦτον ἔντιμον τιθείς.

Cp. also Plato, Rep. 564 D.

16. ἐκ δὲ τούτων κ.τ.λ. Plato in the Republic (555 B sqq.) had made oligarchy pass into democracy and democracy into tyranny, but Aristotle here makes oligarchy pass into tyranny and tyranny

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into democracy, ingeniously suggesting that tyranny is an intensification of oligarchy, both these constitutions resting on a sordid love of gain (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8 sqq.), but differing in this that tyranny claims for one man what oligarchy claims for a few (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq.). Oligarchy did often pass into tyranny (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and tyranny into democracy (1316 a 32), but in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 20–39 Aristotle appears to reject anything like a fixed succession of constitutions. We are also there told that constitutions less often change into cognate forms than into opposite forms (1316 a 18 sqq.), so that we do not expect oligarchy often to pass into the cognate form, tyranny.

17. τῶν τυραννίδων. The article is added because τυραννίδας precedes in 16. For other instances of the same thing see 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12–15 (ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων followed by τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους), 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 38 sq., 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 36, 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 37, 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 33, 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 22 sq., etc.

18. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the object of ἄγοντες see above on 12: τὴν πολιτείαν is probably to be supplied, cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 36, ἔτι δ' ὅταν ἔνιοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἔλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25, οἱ τὸ μέσον ἐκβαίνοντες καθ' αὐτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν. For the risks attaching to the exclusion of a large number of citizens from office see above on 1281 b 28. For ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθυς κατέστησαν, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρόν.

20. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but now that States have come to be even larger [than they were when it first happened that many were alike in virtue, perhaps it is no longer even easily possible, [much less suitable to the circumstances, for any other constitution than democracy to come into existence. Έπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους είναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πύλεις answers to II, ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλούς όμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν. Ι translate τὰς πόλεις 'States' (with Sus. and Welldon), not 'cities' (as Bernays), because the words must apparently bear the same meaning as in 10, where I render πόλεις 'States.' Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq., 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 17 sq. Compare also Isocr. Areopag. § 62, where the word πόλεων seems to mean 'States,' not 'cities.' In [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 75 it is not clear whether ή πόλις means 'the State' or 'the city.' In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq. τας πόλεις evidently means 'the cities.' For οὐδὲ ῥάδιον, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 10, οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 1287 b 8, οὐδὲ ράδιον, and c. 2. 1275 b 32, οὐδὲ δυνατόν.

- 23. πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; Bonitz (Ind. 150 b 4) explains τὸ γένος here by τὰ τέκνα, but perhaps it means the descendants generally (cp. Thuc. 1. 126. 12, 13).
  - 25. κύριος ἄν, 'although he has the power to do so.'
- 26. ἀλλ' οὐκέτι κ.τ.λ., 'but here we reach a statement which it is no longer easy to believe,' 'here we pass the point at which belief is easy.' For οὐκέτι cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq. Aristotle's friend Antipater, however, refrained on his deathbed from passing on his regency to his son Cassander and appointed Polysperchon, who was not related to him, regent instead (Diod. 18. 48. 4: Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 7. 238). Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand, shrank from excluding his son Commodus from the succession, 'and his weakness must reflect strongly on his memory. He may have judged, indeed, that the danger to the State from a bad prince was less than the danger from a disputed succession, especially in the face of the disasters accumulating around it' (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, 8. 348). Giphanius (p. 397) thinks that Aristotle is led by the difficulties which he raises in the passage before us to reject hereditary Monarchy altogether, but this is not the case, for he believes in the existence of families in which surpassing virtue is hereditary, and in their case he approves of hereditary Monarchy (c. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq.).
- 27. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ., 'there is matter for debate, again, in the question with respect to the bodyguard also [as well as in that with respect to the children], whether,' etc. "Εχει is here used impersonally: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 31 sqq., where Phys. 1. 2. 185 b 11, ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου . . . πότερον ἐν ἡ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλου, is referred to. The Lacedaemonian Kings had a bodyguard (Isocr. Epist. 2. § 6), and in Hom. Il. 1. 324 Agamemnon says of Achilles,

εὶ δέ κε μὴ δώησιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ελωμαι ἐλθὼν ξὺν πλεόνεσσι τό οἱ καὶ ρίγιον ἔσται.

31. μηδὲν πράττων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1286 a 36 sq. and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, νόμοις μὲν ὀλίγα χρωμένων, ταῖς δ' ἐαυτῶν γνώμαις τὰ πολλὰ διοικούντων.

34. μεν οῦν is answered by δέ, c. 16. 1287 a 1.

τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον, i.e. τὸν κατὰ νόμον βασιλέα.

35. δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχὸν κ.τ.λ. Μέν really belongs to ἰσχύν, but 'interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis VOL. III.

cernitur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20, where 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12 sqq. is referred to: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.).

36. ὥστε κ.τ.λ. For the suppression of εἶναι, see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where reference is made to Poet. 15. 1454 a 34, ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός (sc. εἶναι). See also notes on 1277 a 38 and 1327 a 34.

ξκάστου καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων. Cp. Plato, Laws 932 C, εἰς δικαστήριον εἰσαγόντων αὐτοὺς εἰς ἔνα καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν, οἴτινες ἄν ὧσι πρεσβύτατοι ἀπάντων, where ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον seems to mean much the same thing as ἕνα ἕκαστον. No other instance of the occurrence of the word συμπλείονες in Aristotle's writings is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and it is an extremely rare word. Ξύμπολλοι occurs in Plato, Polit. 261 E and elsewhere.

37. τοῦ πλήθους, 'the whole body of citizens': cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b
18, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους.

καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., 'after the fashion in which the ancients granted bodyguards, whenever they set up one whom they called Aesymnete or tyrant of the State.' Bonitz (Ind. 779 b 52) is probably right in making τύραννον as well as αἰσυμνήτην in the accusative after ἐκάλουν and not taking τύραννον with καθισταῖεν. As to οἱ ἀρχαῖοι see above on 1285 a 30. For ὅτε καθισταῖεν, 'whenever they set up,' cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7, 21. The contrast with ὅτ' ἢτει illustrates Eucken's remark (De Partic. Usu, p. 67), 'ὅτε utrum cum indicativo an cum optativo ponatur, ab Aristotele accurate distinguitur.'

39. ὅτ' ἢτει τοὺς φύλακας. Cp. Diod. 13. 95. 3 sqq.

C. 16. 1. τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος. 1287 a. Aristotle is thinking of a King like the King of the Persians (Hdt. 3. 31, ἄλλον μέντοι ἐξευρηκέναι νόμον, τῷ βασιλεύοντι Περσέων ἐξεῖναι ποιέειν τὸ ἄν βούληταί).

4. καθάπερ εἴπομεν, in c. 15. 1286 a 2 sqq.

ἐν πάσαις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The example of the Lacedaemonian ἀριστοκρατία shows that a perpetual, and indeed an hereditary, generalship might exist in an ἀριστοκρατία. Perpetual magistracies were also not unknown in democracies, though the tendency there was to clip their wings (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 41 sqq.). As to Thessaly, cp. Diod. 15. 60. 2, διόπερ οἱ Θετταλοὶ προστησάμενοι τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμόνα Ἰάσονα τούτφ τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπέτρεψαν. We are reminded of the Stadtholders of Holland, as to whom see Lord Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 2. 'The Stadtholder,' he says, 'commanded the forces of the common-

wealth, disposed of all military commands, had a large share of the civil patronage, and was surrounded by pomp almost regal.'

β. καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ενα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως, 'and many make one man supreme over the internal administration of the State'the opposite province to that of a perpetual general—and thus virtually constitute a Kingship according to law of a different kind. Διοίκησις is here opposed to στρατηγία, as Sus.3 (Index s.v.) has already pointed out: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 128, καὶ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ περί διοίκησιν της πόλεως, and 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 43 init., where ai περί την έγκύκλιον διοίκησιν άρχαί are distinguished from at πρός του πόλεμου. Cp. also Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 97, του μεν εν ταις πολεμικαις πράξεσιν ἄπιστον γεγενημένον, έν δὲ ταις κατά την πόλιν οἰκονομίαις ахруотого. As to Epidamnus, ср. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 25. Epidamnus and Opus were both of them oligarchical States (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 39 sqq., 236). Some oligarchies went further and placed the greatest offices—both military and civil, it would seem in the hands of one man (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22). Pharsalus was probably an oligarchy when it placed the administration in the hands of Polydamas (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 2, οὖτος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῆ ἄλλη Θετταλία μάλα εὐδοκίμει, καὶ ἐν αὐτῆ δὲ τῆ πόλει οῦτως ἐδόκει καλός τε κάγαθος είναι ώστε και στασιάσαντες οι Φαρσάλιοι παρακατέθεντο αυτώ την ακρόπολιν, και τας προσόδους επέτρεψαν λαμβάνοντι, όσα εγέγραπτο έν τοις νόμοις, είς τε τὰ ίερὰ ἀναλίσκειν καὶ είς τὴν ἄλλην διοίκησιν). But the same tendency is traceable even in democracies. For instance, we find a great authority wielded at Athens by δ ἐπὶ τῆ διοικήσει (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 248). This important office, however, to judge by the silence of the 'A $\theta\eta$ ναίων Πολιτεία, did not exist at the time when this treatise was written (Gilbert, ibid.), and very possibly did not come into existence till after Aristotle's death. A multiplicity of magistrates (ή πολυαρχία), with the attendant 'circumlocution' and rivalries, often did harm to Greek States, as we can judge from Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18 and Plut. Camill. c. 18, and they often gained by placing power in the hands of one man, thus anticipating on a small scale the experience of the Romans in relation to the Empire.

7. καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, 'at Epidamnus for instance' (see above on 1266 b 22, καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα).

καὶ περὶ Ὁποῦντα δὲ κατά τι μέρος ἔλαττον, 'and indeed at Opus to a certain smaller extent': cp. Plato, Laws 757 D, εἰ μέλλει στάσεων έαυτῆ μὴ προσκοινωνήσειν κατά τι μέρος, and Tim. 86 D, τὸ δὲ

ἀληθές, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ μέρος διὰ τὴν ένὸς γένους ἔξιν ὑπὸ μανότητος ὀστῶν ἐν σώματι ῥνώδη καὶ ὑγραίνουσαν νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονε: Diog. ap. Stob. Floril. 9. 49, οὐ γὰρ πειράσεται αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ καθ' ἐν μέρος. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 41. 1) thinks that the office at Opus referred to is that of the ἀρχός mentioned in an inscription (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 63, p. 118), but this is uncertain. The office of κοσμόπολις, to which Sus.², Note 671 (Sus.⁴, 1. p. 439), takes Aristotle to refer, existed at the Epizephyrian Locri (Polyb. 12. 16. 6, 9), but we do not know that it existed among the Opuntian Locrians.

- 8. περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης κ.τ.λ. Susemihl places the mark of a lacuna after ὁ βασιλεύς, 10, but not, it would seem, rightly, for a sentence constructed in a very similar way occurs in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 40, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔοικεν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε κ.τ.λ. We should probably supply ποιητέον τὴν σκέψιν after βασιλεύς, 10, from 2.
  - 9. ἄρχει πάντα, cp. c. 14. 1285 b 13 sq.
- 10. ἐαυτοῦ. In 1287 a I all MSS. have αὐτοῦ (except those which have wrongly αὐτοῦ), and this form 'longe frequentius apud Aristotelem exhibetur' (Bon. Ind. 211 b 45). In 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17 all MSS. have κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην.

οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 'not even natural,' much less expedient, and the question raised at the commencement of c. 14 was whether Kingship is expedient. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 172 (from the ᾿Αντιγόνη),

οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἄρχειν οὔτ' ἐχρῆν ἄνευ νόμου (εἶναι νόμον libri) τύραννον εἶναι' μωρία δὲ καὶ θέλειν, δς τῶν ὁμοίων βούλεται κρατεῖν μόνος.

- 11. For ἔνα πάντων see note on 1281 a 13.
- 12. τοις γὰρ ὁμοίοις κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 12. 1282 b 26, τοις γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἔτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, and 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 27.
- 14. ἄστ' εἴπερ . . . 16. τοὺς ἴσους. For the structure of this sentence see above on 1253 b 35-37. Goettling and Sus. add καί e conj. before οὔτως, but without necessity. The pleonastic addition of τοίνυν in the apodosis, 16 (Π¹ omit it, but in all probability wrongly), is quite Aristotelian (see περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως 2. 455 a 12-26 and Bonitz, Aristotel. Studien, 2. 72 sq.), no less than the similar use of οὖν in the apodosis, as to which see Bon. Ind. 540 b 15 sqq. and Bonitz, Aristot. Stud. 2. 59 sqq. Ἦχειν is to be supplied with τὸ ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους in 16.

τροφην η ἐσθητα. As to τροφήν, Mr. Broughton has already referred to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36 sqq. (cp. also Plato, Laws 691 C). As to ἐσθητα, a big man in a small garment would suffer physically from cold, and a small man in a large garment from heat.

16. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 32 sqq. The subject of ἄρχειν is τοὺς ἴσους supplied from the preceding sentence.

18. ή γὰρ τάξις νόμος. Τάξις and νόμος are conjoined in Plato, Phileb. 26 B and Laws 673 E. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 29.

τον ἄρα νόμον κ.τ.λ. 'Inter articulum et nomen ἄρα collocatum legitur in De Caelo 4. 4. 311 b 27, τὸ ἄρα πῦρ οὐδὲν ἔχει βάρος' (Bon. Ind. s.v.). Μᾶλλον is occasionally used by Aristotle not only in the same clause with a comparative (as in Plato, Polit. 259 C sub fin.), but also, it would seem, in close connexion with it (e.g. in Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 b 5, μᾶλλον φανερώτερα: see other instances given in Bon. Ind. 402 b 53 sqq.), and it may be so used here (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 23, καὶ ὅλως τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἶον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεῖνον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν). But as Bonitz says of the passages in which μᾶλλον is used with a comparative, 'saepe dubites utrum μᾶλλον "magis" an "potius" significet,' and μᾶλλον ἢ may mean 'potius quam' in the passage before us.

20. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and in accordance with this same contention, even if it should be better that certain individuals should rule [and not the law alone], it will be right to make these individuals guardians of the laws and ministers to the laws, [for otherwise the law will not rule].' Magistrates who are only guardians of the laws are contrasted with Kings by Plato in Polit. 305 C, καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν ἄρα ῥώμην ἀνευρίσκομεν οὐ βασιλικὴν οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ νόμων φύλακα καὶ ὑπηρέτιν ἐκείνηs: compare what Plutarch says of Theseus in Thes. c. 24, τοῖς δὲ δυνατοῖς ἀβασίλευτον πολιτείαν προτείνων καὶ δημοκρατίαν αὐτῷ μόνον ἄρχοντι πολέμου καὶ νόμων φύλακι χρησομένην. Cp. also Plato, Laws 715 C-D. The archons at Athens swore συμφυλάξειν τοὺς νόμους (Pollux, 8. 86).

22. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Magistrates are necessary, because there are things which the law cannot regulate (1287 b 19–25). With ἔνα τοῦτον (cp. c. 17. 1288 a 19) supply ἄρχειν, and cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C, οῦτω δὴ τύραννός τε γέγονε, φαμέν, καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ δημοκρατία, δυσχερανάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν ἕνα ἐκεῖνον μόναρχον.

- 23. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. See on this passage vol. i. p. 273, note 2, where the view which Bernays takes of it has been explained. His rendering is, '[hier wendet vielleicht Jemand ein: gegen die Lückenhaftigkeit des Gesetzes helfen Beamte nicht, denn] wo das Gesetz ausser Stande scheint, etwas Bestimmtes zu verordnen, wird auch wohl kein Mensch im Stande sein, sich ein festes Urtheil zu bilden.' I still prefer the explanation which has been given in vol. i. p. 273. I take ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε to introduce not an objection proceeding from an advocate of the claims of the One Best Man—objections are commonly introduced by ἀλλά, as in c. 15. 1286 b 24, 26—but a still more cogent argument in favour of the claims of Law than those which have hitherto been urged. ('Aλλά μὴν ... γε introduces a similar transition from a statement advanced with less emphasis to a statement advanced with more in 2. 9. 1271 a 18-22, 3. 13. 1284 b 30, and 3. 16. 1287 a 41.) Aristotle has been reminded by what he has just said, avaykaîov yap είναι τινας ἀρχάς (22), that there are things which the law cannot regulate, so that as to them the law cannot rule, as he has said in 18 sqq. that it ought to do, and now he adds that with respect to these things the law is no worse off than a human being would be. They are as much beyond the cognizance of a human being as they are beyond definition by the law. But the law does all that can be done in relation to them, for it educates the magistrates to supply its own defect of particularity, and it also allows of its own amendment.
- 25. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1287 b 25, κρίνει γὰρ ἔκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς. It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 273, note 1), that Aristotle here has before him the oath taken by the Athenian juror. See Demosth. in Lept. c. 118. A similar oath is prescribed to be taken by jurors in an inscription from Eresus in Lesbos (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 125, p. 211). The expression κατὰ γνώμαν τὰν δικαιστάταν occurs also in an inscription from Calymna and in the oath of the Delphian Amphictyons (Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, 1. 170). Its meaning may be gathered from Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 63, ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ὅρκου ἐξήλειψαν τὸ ψηφιεῖσθαι γνώμη τῆ δικαιστάτη καὶ οὕτε χάριτος ἕνεκ' οὕτ' ἔχθρας. The term τοὺς ἄρχοντας, however, includes not only jurors (cp. 1287 b 15 sq.) but office-holders generally, as may be inferred from the words κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν. For ἐφίστησι κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας Schneider compares Isocr. Areopag.

§ 37, ὥστε τὴν ἐξ ᾿Αρείου πάγου βουλὴν ἐπέστησαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς εὐκοσμίας. Τὰ λοιπά, 'whatever it cannot regulate in detail.'

27. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Laws 772 B, ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ τάξαντος νομοθέτου κοινῆ, τέλος δὲ σχόντος αὐτὰς ἐκάστας τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας εἰσφερούσας τὸ παραλειπόμενον τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, μέχρι περ ἂν τέλος ἔχειν ἔκαστον δόξη τοῦ καλῶς ἐξειργάσθαι. Contrast Plato's language in Polit. 294 B sq.

28. ὁ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. I take οὖν here to contain an inference, as in 1. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note), and translate 'therefore.' Attention has been drawn in what precedes to the reasonableness of law. The contrast of θεός and θηρίον and of both with ἄνθρωπος is familiar to us from 1. 2. 1253 a 27 sqq. The rule of law had been represented by Plato (Laws 713 C-714 A) as an approach to the rule of the δαίμονες of Cronus, νόμος being explained as νοῦ διανομή (cp. Laws 674 B). Reason is, in fact, often identified with God, e.g. in Eurip. Fragm. 1007,

ό νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστω θεός:

cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 281,  $\nu\hat{\varphi}$   $\pi\epsilon i\theta ov$ :  $\delta\mu oia$   $\tau\hat{\eta}$ ,  $\pi\epsilon i\theta ov$   $\theta\epsilon\hat{\varphi}$ . Aristotle conceives a human being as an union of a god in the shape of reason (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq.) with a brute, much as Plato in Rep. 588 C sqq. conceives the human soul as three shapes under the external aspect of a man, the shape of a many-headed animal, the shape of a lion, and the shape of a man, representing respectively desire,  $\theta\nu\mu\delta$ , and reason. That a brute is present in every human being was suggested by such phrases as those used by the Chorus of Women in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes (683 sq. Didot),

εὶ νὴ τὼ θεώ με ζωπυρήσεις, λύσω τὴν ἐμαυτῆς ὖν ἐγὼ δή,

where a proverb is alluded to (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 318).

31. καὶ ὁ θυμὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers Hom. II. 9. 553,

άλλ' ὅτε δὴ Μελέαγρον ἔδυ χόλος, ὅστε καὶ ἄλλων οἰδάνει ἐν στήθεσσι νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων,

and Pindar, Olymp. 7. 27-31. The remark would gain in interest if it was suggested by the complicity of Dion in the murder of Heracleides at Syracuse (Plut. Dion, cc. 47, 53) or by Alexander's murder of Cleitus in B. c. 328, but it would be rash to assume this.

For διαστρέφει cp. Polyb. 8. 24. 3, Καύαρος ὁ Γαλάτης, ὧν τἄλλα ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, ὑπὸ Σωστράτου τοῦ κόλακος διεστρέφετο.

- 32. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν, 'hence' (i.e. because Law is God and Reason unmixed with anything else) 'Law is Reason without appetite,' and Reason without appetite is better than Reason with appetite (c. 15. 1286 a 17 sq.). Cp. De An. 3. 10. 433 a 26, νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὖκ ὀρθή. Anaxagoras had said that it is by virtue of being ἀμιγής and pure that νοῦς subdues everything (Fragm. 6 in Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 249: Aristot. Phys. 8. 5. 256 b 24 sqq.: De An. 3. 4. 429 a 18 sqq.).
- 33. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ. This corrects the argument used in c. 15. 1286 a 11 sqq. Τοτι κ.τ.λ. gives, in explanation of τὸ τῶν τεχνῶν παράδειγμα, the point which the parallel of the arts is adduced to prove.
- **34.** For καὶ αἰρετώτερον cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἦττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, Pol. 2. 4. 1262 a 30, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 37. See critical note.
- 35. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for [it is better to be treated by physicians rather than by written rule only because] physicians do not do anything contrary to right reason for the sake of friendship.' I follow Bernays in thus completing the reasoning. For παρὰ τὸν λόγον cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1151 b 34, ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων κ.τ.λ., and 4. 11. 1125 b 33 sqq.
- 37. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plut. Aristid. c. 4, where Plutarch says of Aristides, οὐ μόνον δὲ πρὸς εὔνοιαν καὶ χάριν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ πρὸς ἔχθραν ἰσχυρότατος ἢν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιστῆναι. As to ἐπήρεια see note on 1311 a 37.
- 38. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. This passage may be rendered in two different ways. 1. With Liddell and Scott (who compare Strabo, p. 259, πρῶτοι δὲ νόμοις ἐγγράπτοις χρήσασθαι πεπιστευμένοι εἰσί) and others, we may take διαφθείρειν as in the infinitive after πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, and translate 'since when [the case is otherwise and] patients suspect physicians of being commissioned by their enemies to destroy them for the sake of gain.' 2. We may (with Bernays) take διαφθείρειν as in the infinitive after ὑποπτεύωσι τοὺς ἰατρούς. I incline to prefer the latter rendering, especially as διὰ κέρδος comes in a little awkwardly, if we adopt the former. Aristotle has

before him here Plato, Polit. 298 A, καὶ δὴ καὶ τελευτῶντες ἢ παρὰ ξυγγενῶν ἢ παρά τινων ἐχθρῶν τοῦ κάμνοντος χρήματα μισθὸν λαμβάνοντες (οἱ ἰατροὶ) ἀποκτιννύασιν: indeed, he only repeats what Plato himself in effect says in Polit. 300 A. If it was not clear that he has this passage of Plato before him, we might be tempted to imagine that he alludes to a well-known incident in Alexander's career, the relation of which in Plutarch's Life of Alexander (c. 19) begins thus, ἐν τούτω δὲ Παρμενίων ἔπεμψεν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, διακελευόμενος αὐτῷ (i. e. ᾿Αλεξάνδρω) ψυλάξασθαι τὸν Φίλιππον (his physician Philip the Acarnanian) ὡς ὑπὸ Δαρείου πεπεισμένον (cp. πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς) ἐπὶ δωρεαῖς μεγάλαις (cp. διὰ κέρδος) καὶ γάμω θυγατρὸς ἀνελεῖν ᾿Αλέξανδρον: compare Arrian, Anab. 2. 4. 9, ἐν τούτω δὲ ᾿Αλεξάνδρω δοθῆναι ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ Παρμενίωνος ψυλάξασθαι Φίλιππον ἀκούειν γὰρ διεφθάρθαι ὑπὸ Δαρείου χρήμασιν ὥστε φαρμάκω ἀποκτεῖναι ᾿Αλέξανδρον. This happened in B. C. 333.

- 40. την ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν, 'the treatment prescribed by the writings,' like τὸν ἐκ τῶν νόμων χρόνον in Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 28.
- 41. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν... γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. 'Ἰατρὸν εἰσάγειν τινί, to call in a physician for another, Xen. Mem. 2. 4. 3, Demosth. c. Everg. et Mnesib. c. 67, but in Med. of the physician himself when ill' (Liddell and Scott, who refer to the passage before us). 'Εφ' ἐαντούς, 'to take charge of themselves' (see note on 1273 b 19, ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις). Not only do patients prefer a written scheme of treatment to treatment by physicians whom they regard as corrupted by their foes, but physicians themselves show distrust even of medical advice which is simply wanting in dispassionateness, for, when they are sick, they do not treat themselves, but call in other physicians. They do so because they feel that they are themselves at such a time under the influence of emotion, and that they need the guidance of a neutral dispassionate authority.
- 3. διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὅντες. Cp. Thuc. 1. 1287 b. 63, παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χηλὴν διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενός τε καὶ χαλεπῶς, and see Mr. W. H. Forbes, Thucydides Book i. p. 151. For ἐν πάθει ὄντες cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 a 27 sqq. and 7. 5. 1147 b 9 sqq. Aristotle seems to think that not only sick physicians, but also gymnastic trainers, when engaged in gymnastic exercises, would be ἐν πάθει.

ώστε δήλον κ.τ.λ. Supply οἱ τὸν νόμον ζητοῦντες as the nom. to

ζητοῦσιν. In 1287 b 23 we have to supply in a similar way 'the advocates of the supremacy of law.' 'And so it is clear that [those who seek for written law] in seeking for that which is just seek for that which is neutral, for the law is that which is neutral.' This is made clear by the practice of physicians to which reference has just been made. So that the parallel of the arts, far from telling against the use of written law in the State, as some claimed that it does, in reality furnishes an argument in favour of its use. That the way to the just lies through the neutral, we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 19 (already compared by Eaton), διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴν βούλεται εἶναι οἶον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίον τευξόμενοι. Sus., following Thurot, reads ὁ δὲ νόμος in place of ὁ γὰρ νόμος without MS. authority and not, I think, rightly.

5. ἔτι κυριώτεροι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been asserting the value of written law (cp. 1287 a 34, κατά γράμματα, and 40, την έκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν), and now he says that the case is even stronger in favour of unwritten law. For the distinction between οί κατὰ γράμματα νόμοι, 'laws resting on writings,' and οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη, 'laws resting on (unwritten) customs,' cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 86 (a passage professing to record Plato's views), νόμου διαιρέσεις δύο δ μέν γάρ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένος, ὁ δὲ ἄγραφος ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πολιτευόμεθα, γεγραμμένος έστίν, ό δε κατά έθη γενόμενος, ούτος άγραφος καλείται, and Plato, Polit. 200 A, κατηγορείν δε τον βουλόμενον, ώς οὐ κατὰ τὰ γράμματα τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκυβέρνησε τὰς ναῦς, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔθη. For οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη νόμοι, which are here implied to be unwritten (as ἔθη are in Plato, Polit. 295 A, 299 A, and Laws 841 B), cp. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 40 sq. On ἄγραφοι νόμοι see Cope, Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 239-244, where he concludes (p. 244) that customs are 'what we are to understand principally by the vóμοι ἄγραφοι in the Politics,' so that the term is used in the Politics in a wider sense than it is when it refers, as it sometimes does (see Cope), to 'the great fundamental conceptions and duties of morality,' such as 'the worship of God, duty to parents, gratitude, the requital of benefits,' and the like. For the fact that more important matters are dealt with by unwritten than by written laws, cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Zeuxidam. 1, 221 B, Ζευξίδαμος, πυθομένου τινός διὰ τί τοὺς περὶ ἀνδρείας νόμους ἀγράφους τηροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς νέοις απογραψάμενοι οὐ διδόασιν ἀναγινώσκειν, "Οτι, έφη, συνεθίζεσθαι [δεί] ταις

ἀνδραγαθίαις κρεῖττον ἢ ταῖς γραφαῖς προσέχειν. As to ἀσφαλέστερος see vol. i. p. 270, note. We have οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη in 6 and τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in 7. Compare the change from ἔθος in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 14 to ἔθεσιν in 1292 b 16.

8. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ., 'then again, it is not even easy, [much less well,] for the one man to keep an eye on many things.' Eurip. Phoeniss. 692 Bothe (745 Dindorf), εἶs ἀνὴρ οὐ πάνθ' ὁρậ, had passed into a proverb (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 378). Cp. also Xen. Oecon. 4. 6, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀμφὶ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ οἴκησιν (sc. τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἶς ὡπλίσθαι προστέτακται) αὐτὸς (i.e. ὁ βασιλεύς) ἐφορậ, τοὺς δὲ πρόσω ἀποικοῦντας πιστοὺς πέμπει ἐπισκοπεῖν, and Cyrop. 8. 2. II, εἰ δὲ τις οἴεται ἕνα αἰρετὸν εἶναι ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται ὁλίγα γὰρ εἶς γ' ἄν ἴδοι καὶ εἶς ἀκούσειε. Were the Lacedaemonian ephors at their origin designed to be the 'eyes' of the Kings? The word ἔφοροι is used in the sense of 'spies' by Megasthenes ap. Strab. p. 707 (see note on I3I3 b I2).

10. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ πλείονας εἶναι ἄρχοντας.

11. πρότερον, in c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq.

12. ϵἴπερ κ.τ.λ. In  $\tau \circ \hat{v}$  δὲ ένὸς κ.τ.λ. the apodosis is introduced by δέ. For the use of δέ in the apodosis after a conditional sentence introduced by εἰ or ἐάν, see above on 1278 a 32.

13. τὸ " σύν τε δύ ἐρχομένω," Hom. Il. 10. 224,
σύν τε δύ ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν,
ὅππως κέρδος ἔη μοῦνος δ' εἴπερ τε νοήση,
ἀλλά τέ οἱ βράσσων τε νόος, λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις,

and 13. 235 sqq. Cp. Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 450,
ναῦν τοι μί' ἄγκυρ' οὐδαμῶς σώζειν φιλεῖ,
ὡς τρεῖς ἀφέντι προστάτης θ' ἀπλοῦς πόλει
σφαλερός, ὑπὼν δὲ κἄλλος οὐ κακὸν πέλει,

and Archil. Fragm. 144 (ap. Aristid. 2. 137), καὶ δ μέν γε κατ' ἰσχὺν προφέρων, εἰ καὶ ἐνὸς εἴη κρείττων, ὑπὸ δυοῖν γ' ἃν αὐτὸν κατείργεσθαί φησι καὶ ᾿Αρχίλοχος καὶ ἡ παροιμία, where the Scholiast (quoted by Bergk) adds, ἡ μὲν παροιμία φησίν οὐδὲ Ἡρακλῆς πρὸς δύο τὸ δὲ ᾿Αρχιλόχου ἡητὸν οἶον μέν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἴσως δὲ ἃν εἴη τοιοῦτον.

14. καὶ ἡ ϵὖχὴ κ.τ.λ. Hom. Il. 2. 372, where Agamemnon is speaking of Nestor (Sus.², Note 651).

15. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1287 b 8, δεήσει ἄρα... 11, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, in which words the suggestion is made that the powers which it is proposed to entrust to the One Man should rather be given to a plurality of magistrates. Τασπερ ὁ δικαστής, for

it was well known from the terms of the dicast's oath (see above on 1287 a 25) that he had to regulate matters as to which the law was silent. Aristotle has already implied in 1287 a 25 sqq. that the magistrates have to do so too in relation to some matters. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.

- 18. ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. Cp. 1287 a 26, κρίνειν καὶ διοικείν.
- **20**. διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν.  $\Delta \iota a \pi o \rho ε \hat{\iota} v$  here  $= a \pi o \rho ε \hat{\iota} v$  according to Bon. Ind. 187 b 1 sqq., where Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 11, διαποροῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἄττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἔνεκα κ.τ.λ., is placed next to the passage before us.
- 23. οὐ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., 'nay, [the advocates of the supremacy of law] do not make this counter-assertion that' etc. Οὐ τοίνυν is used in self-correction: see above on 1267 a 5 and compare in addition to the passages there referred to Plato, Rep. 603 B, and Strato, Fragm. Φοινικίδης, 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 546),

"οὕτω λαλεῖν εἴωθε." μὴ τοίνυν λάλει οὕτως παρ' ἐμοί γ' ὧν.

- 24. ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ ἔνα μόνον, SC. εἶναι δεῖ τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.
- 26. ἄτοπόν τ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. For the thought compare Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12, a passage which seems to be present to Aristotle's memory here. Ἰδοι evidently suits ὄμμασι only, not ἀκοαῖς or what follows, but Aristotle 'often expects us to supply a word from a previous clause which is not altogether suitable': see above on 1257 a 21. For ἀκοαῖς in the sense of 'organs of hearing' see Bon. Ind. s. v.
- 27. Suoîv is apparently the reading of all extant MSS. (one cannot tell from 'duobus' what reading Vet. Int. found in his text), but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings as the dative of δύο—it is common enough in them as the genitive, but δυσί or δύο are the forms of the dative mostly used by Aristotle—and here it strikes us as all the more strange because it is followed by δυσίν and δυσί. According to Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschriften, p. 124 (ed. 2), δυοῖν is used as the genitive and dative in Attic Inscriptions down to B. C. 329, δυεῖν from B. C. 329 to B. C. 229, and δύο as the genitive, δυσί as the dative, in Roman times. Thus, if the MSS. are to be trusted, Aristotle often departs in this matter from the usage of the Attic Inscriptions of his time.

29. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. Πολλούς is emphatic (see note on 1275 a 32): cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 11, έκ τούτου δή καὶ πολλοὶ ἐνομίσθησαν βασιλέως ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ πολλά ὧτα εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ἕνα αίρετὸν εἶναι όφθαλμὸν βασιλεί, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται ὀλίγα γὰρ εἶς γ' ἄν ἴδοι καὶ εἶς ακούσειε κ.τ.λ., where Xenophon probably intends to correct Hdt. 1. ΙΙ4, ὁ δὲ αὐτέων διέταξε τοὺς μὲν οἰκίας οἰκοδομέειν, τοὺς δὲ δορυφόρους είναι, τὸν δέ κού τινα αὐτέων ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλέος είναι τῷ δέ τινι τὰς αγγελίας εσφέρειν εδίδου γέρας, ως εκάστω εργον προστάσσων. The messengers mentioned by Herodotus would be included among the 'King's feet' referred to by Aristotle here. The 'many ears and eyes' of a King became proverbial: cp. Lucian, Adv. Indoct. c. 23, οὐκ οἶσθα ὡς ὧτα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ πολλοὶ βασιλέως; The important fact that Cyrus had fallen in the battle of Cunaxa was discovered and reported to Artaxerxes by an 'eye of the King,' Artasuras (Plut. Artox. c. 12). Institutions as unlike as the ωτακουσταί of Hiero I of Syracuse (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 13 sqq.: cp. Plut. De Curiositate, c. 16) and the 'younger members' of the Nocturnal Council of Plato's Laws (964 E: see vol. i. p. 448 sq.) were probably suggested by this Persian institution. According to Megasthenes (ap. Strab. p. 707) a similar institution existed in India: see his account of the έφοροι.

30. τοὺς γὰρ τἢ ἀρχῆ καὶ αύτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. Aristotle probably remembers the words of Achilles to his friend Phoenix in Il. 9. 616,

ίσον έμοι βασίλευε και ήμισυ μείρεο τιμής.

Cp. also Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 18 sub fin., καὶ τὸ Δαρείου γένος ἐβασίλευσεν, ἀνδρὸς οὐ μόνον ἀδελφοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλοις ἐπισταμένου κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτων καὶ δυνάμεως, and Thuc. 2. 97. 3, where we read of οἱ παραδυναστεύοντές τε καὶ γενναῖοι 'Οδρυσῶν (i. e. associates of the King of the Odrysae in his rule). Monarchs expect of those whom they make partners in rule not only friendliness to their rule but also friendliness to themselves. The two things are not the same. Alexander, we remember, called Craterus φιλοβασιλεύς and Hephaestion φιλαλέξανδρος (Plut. Alex. c. 47: Diod. 17. 114): cp. Plut. Brut. c. 8, λέγεται δὲ Βροῦτος μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν βαρύνεσθαι, Κάσσιος δὲ τὸν ἄρχοντα μισεῖν, where Julius Caesar is of course referred to. Τῆς ἀρχῆς φίλοι should probably be read (with Casaubon and Richards: see critical note) in place of τῆ ἀρχῆ φίλοι, though this expression is used in an unfavourable sense in Lucian, Catapl. c. 11, ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι πάντες οἱ καὶ προσκυνοῦντες καὶ τῶν λεγομένων

καὶ πραττομένων εκαστα επαινούντες ή φόβω ή ελπίσιν έδρων της άρχης όντες φίλοι καὶ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἀποβλέποντες; In place of αὐτοῦ (MSS. wrongly αὐτοῦ) Sus. would read αὐτοῖς, which is found in the version of the passage given by the Aldine edition of the Scholia on Aristophanes (Acharn. 92: Duebner excludes this quotation from the Politics from his text of the Scholia—see Dindorf's Preface, pp. iv-v Duebner, as to the Aldine edition), but not, I think, rightly: see above on 1286 a 12. The title 'friend of the King' probably came originally from Egypt, where we trace it as early as the Twelfth Dynasty (see Maspero, Histoire Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient, p. 104, ed. 1), and even the Sixth (Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, Eng. Trans., p. 72). The Macedonian Kings made those whom they raised to the dignity of 'friends' so far partners in rule that they consulted them on the most important matters and employed them on the most important commissions (see Spitta, De Amicorum, qui vocantur, in Macedonum Regno Condicione, p. 38, who refers among other passages to Diod. 17. 54, and Arrian, Anab. 1. 25. 4). Ποιούνται here takes the place of ποιούσιν, 29, just as in c. 5. 1278 a 34 ποιοῦσιν takes the place of ποιοῦνται, 1278 a 30.

31. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες κ.τ.λ., '[friends indeed they must of necessity be, for] if they are not friends,' etc.

- 33. ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος. Cp. Plato, Laws 837 A, φίλον μέν που καλοῦμεν ὅμοιον ὁμοίφ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἴσον ἴσφ.
  - 34. οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, SC. ὁ βασιλεύς.
- **35.** οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. Cp. 4 (7). I. I 323 a 24, where see note.
- C. 17. 36. ἐπὶ μέν τινων, 'in the case of some persons.' I follow Bernays, from whom Sus. differs (Sus.<sup>4</sup>, 1. p. 443: Qu. Crit. p. 396 sqq.), in taking τινων to be masculine: cp. c. 14. 1284 b 40, ἡ τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει, and c. 17. 1288 a 31, καὶ τίσι.
  - 37. ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστὸν κ.τ.λ., 'for there is that which is marked out by nature to be ruled by a master, and another to be ruled by a King, and another marked out for free government, and it is expedient and just that each should be thus ruled.' For καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον, cp. 41, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὕτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὕτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq., and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16 sq. I prefer the rendering which I have given of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον to that of Sepulveda, 'et horum imperiorum cuiusque aliud est ius et alia commoditas,' though Bernays translates the passage in a somewhat

similar way. Richards would add τοῦτο after δίκαιον, 39. For ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστόν, cp. 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 36 sqq. Πολιτικόν in 38, καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικόν, appears to be used in reference to the kind of free government which obtains in a Polity, for Aristotle is evidently speaking of normal constitutions only, and he can hardly refer in πολιτικόν to Aristocracy. Of course, if we regard 1288 a 6–15 as authentic and as placed where it stands by Aristotle, we have an additional reason for taking πολιτικόν to refer to the Polity, for it clearly refers to the Polity in 1288 a 7, 12.

- 40. οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, 'nor any of the other constitutions.' For the genitive, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30, and Diod. 5. 21. 2, οὕτε γὰρ Διόνυσον οὕθ' Ἡρακλέα παρειλήφαμεν οὕτε τῶν ἄλλων ἡρώων ἡ δυναστῶν ἐστρατευμένον ἐπ' αὐτήν.
- 41. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε κ.τ.λ. See as to this passage vol. i. p. 274-5. In 1288 a I we have a μέν solitarium (see above on 1262 a 6).
- 2. πάντων is here masculine (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 11, τὸ κύριον ενα 1288 a. πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν). This is clear from 3, οὕτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν κ.τ.λ.
- 3. ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον. Supply κύριον ὄντα after αὐτόν. As to the chiasmus in οὖτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, see note on 1277 a 31.
- 4. οὐδ' ἄν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ἢ may be added to correct a dictum of Plato to Dionysius the Elder recorded in Diog. Laert. 3. 18, δ δὲ διαλεγόμενος περὶ τυραννίδος καὶ φάσκων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο κρεῖττον δ συμφέρει αὐτῷ μόνον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀρετῆ διαφέροι, προσέκρουσεν αὐτῷ. Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37.
  - 6. πρότερον, in c. 13. 1284 a 3 sqq.

πρῶτον δὲ...15. ἀρχάς. Susemihl brackets this paragraph as an interpolation, and it looks at any rate like a subsequently added passage. It may well be from the pen of Aristotle—its contents do not seem to be seriously at variance with his teaching elsewhere (see vol. i. Appendix D)—but it is doubtful whether it was placed where it stands by his hand or by that of another. A similar doubt arises as to other passages in the Politics (see for instance vol. i. p. 569 and p. 519, note). The position of this paragraph in relation to its context is certainly remarkable. Aristotle is discussing Kingship, and in particular is about to describe what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess: why should he pause at this point to explain

who are fit subjects for Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity, when he is concerned for the moment only with Kingship? And why is it necessary to enter into this question as to Aristocracy and Polity first (πρῶτον, 1288 a 6), before stating what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess? again, though the recapitulation in 1288 a 30 sqq. makes it clear that in what has preceded it has been explained for whom Kingship is an expedient institution, this may refer only to what has been said in 1288 a 15-19. On the other hand, it may be urged in defence of the paragraph that it is after a long argument in favour of Aristocracy (in the sense of the rule of a plurality of good men) that Aristotle interposes his closing remark in 1287 b 36 sq., 'but perhaps these things are so in the case of certain persons and not in the case of others,' and that therefore he may naturally wish to explain before he goes further who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Aristocracy hold good, no less than who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Kingship hold good. Nor is it altogether surprising that he should add a similar explanation as to Polity, for he has implied in 1287 b 37 sqq. that there are those who are marked out by nature for each of the normal constitutions. Still it must be admitted that the paragraph has an intrusive look where it stands.

- 8. τὸ τοιοῦτον here refers not to anything preceding; but to what follows. See for other instances of the same thing note on 1337 b 6. As to φέρειν, see vol. i. p. 290, note 1. The case is omitted in which Kingship falls to a single individual, not a γένος.
- 9. πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν. Πολιτικήν is added to show that a mere fitness for ἡγεμονία πολεμική is not enough. Cp. πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν in 12 and πλῆθος πολεμικόν in 13. The King is to be capable of πολιτικὴ ἡγεμονία, the rulers in an aristocracy of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή. The word ἡγεμονία belongs especially to Kingship: cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 1. 1420 a 21, where οἱ ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς βασιλείας ἡγεμονίαν τεταγμένοι are contrasted with οἱ ἐν δημοκρατία πολιτευόμενοι, and Plut. adv. Colot. c. 31, οὐχ οἱ τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις λέγοντες; οὐχ οἱ τὸ βασιλεύειν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ διάπτωσιν ἀποφαίνοντες; Cp. also Plato, Laws 711 C, τῆ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἡγεμονία.

άριστοκρατικόν δέ . . . 15. τὰς ἀρχάς. See vol. i. Appendix D.

11. κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν, and not κατὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, as in oligarchies (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1161 a 2 sq.).

12. πολιτικήν ἀρχήν, the rule which is exercised over persons ὅμοιοι τῷ γένει καὶ ἐλεύθεροι (c. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.).

πολιτικον δὲ πληθος κ.τ.λ. The law in a polity gives office to the well-to-do, just as in an aristocracy office falls to the γνώριμοι (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2). Does κατ' ἀξίαν imply that office will be elective in a polity? If so, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq. and contrast 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8–11 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 34 sqq., passages which, however defective the text of the latter may be, seem to show that magistrates might be appointed by lot in a polity (see vol. i. pp. 509, 573).

15. As to τῶν ἄλλων see critical note.

18. καὶ κύριον πάντων is added because not all Kings are κύριοι πάντων (c. 14. 1285 a 4).

19. πρότερον, in c. 13. 1284 b 25 sqq.

20. τὸ δίκαιον, i.e. τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν δίκαιον, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 17, κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον.

- 22. πάντη γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they entirely claim on the basis of superiority, though not the same superiority.' Aristotle's account in Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq. of the 'superiority' on which the partisans of democracy base their claims does not agree with the account given in Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sqq., for in the former passage (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28 sqq.) they are said to base their claims on ἀξία—the ἀξία, in fact, which ἐλευθερία confers—and in the latter not on ἀξία but on number. Still, whichever of the two passages we follow, they base their claims on a 'superiority.'
- 24. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν, i.e. because no other course is becoming or in accordance with nature: cp. c. 13. 1284 b 28 sqq.

28. τοῦτο, i.e. to constitute the whole of which the rest are parts.

31. πως, 'under what conditions' (so Bern.). Cp. c. 3. 1276 a 17, ἔοικε δ' οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πως ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἡ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἐτέραν.

32. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. At this point a transition is made from the C.18. question what are the different forms of Kingship and for whom Kingship is advantageous to the question how a Kingship or an Aristocracy (for the two forms turn out in 34 sqq. to be nearly related, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 2 sq., 31 sq.) is to be brought into being. For a similar transition cp. 6 (4).

8. 1294 a 25 sqq. The reasoning of the paragraph which commences at  $i\pi i$   $\delta i$  is—the best State is an aristocratical or Kingly State, but the virtue of a citizen of the best State is the same as the virtue of a good man; hence the virtue of a citizen of an aristocratical State or of a man of Kingly mould is identical with the virtue of a good man; hence to institute an aristocratical or Kingly State it is necessary to have recourse to the education and customs which produce good men. This preface prepares us to find in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books what we do find there—inquiries directed to the discovery of the education and customs which produce good men. As to the transition from the Third to the Fourth Book see vol. i. p. 292 sqq.

34. The use of the word οἰκονομουμένην indicates the completeness of the control exercised: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 31 sqq.

37. ἐν δὲ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. Appendix B.

39. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν. Cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ διὰ ἄλλων, and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται κ.τ.λ.

41. ωστ' ἔσται κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle corrects the view expressed by Plato in his Politicus that the essence of the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός is to possess a certain science. Just as he had said in 1. 7. 1255 b 20 that ὁ δεσπότης οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδε είναι, so he now implies the same thing as to the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός. The education which is to produce them is not the communication of a science; it is the communication of an έξις. Contrast Plato, Polit. 292 Β, την βασιλικήν ἀρχήν των έπιστημών είναι τινα έφαμεν, οίμαι, and 292 E; also 259 B. Aristotle, however, allows in 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3.13.1284 a 5 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.) that the ruler should possess not only virtue but also political aptitude. In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8 certain πολεμικαί και πολιτικαι ἀσκήσεις are referred to which find a place apparently in Aristotle's scheme of education, though their exact nature is left obscure, and these πολιτικαὶ ἀσκήσεις may perhaps be one means by which he would seek to develope this political aptitude, but he probably thought that the art of ruling was mainly acquired in the course of being ruled (3. 4. 1277 b 8 sqq.).

1288 b. 1. καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι, and Menex. 241 C, μαθόντας καὶ ἐθισθέντας μὴ φοβείσθαι τοὺς βαρβάρους. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, on the other hand, it is implied that παιδεία comprises an element of habituation.

- 2. In place of πολιτικόν we expect ἀριστοκρατικόν, but the rulers in the best State have already been spoken of as πολιτικοί in c. 5. 1278 b 3.
- 4. τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς. The same two questions are raised as to the Polity in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30 sqq.

## BOOK IV (VII).

- 14. Compare the very similar sentence in De An. 2. 4. 415 a 14, C. 1. αναγκαίον δε τον μελλοντα περί τούτων σκέψιν ποιείσθαι λαβείν έκαστον 1323 α. αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν. For μέλλω with the aor. infin. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 b 11, έκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς αν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. Phrynichus condemns as un-Attic the use of μέλλεω with the aor. infin., but that it is so used by Attic writers is undoubted: see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 74. Schanz remarks in his Prolegomena to Plato's Symposium, § 5, 'aoristi infinitivi cum μέλλειν a Platone copulati exempla apud Platonem exstant, quae haud facile quispiam in dubitationem vocare possit.' He refers among other passages to Protag. 312 B, μέλλεις παρασχείν, and Gorg. 512 E, δυ μέλλοι χρόνου βιωναι, and 525 A. It is natural that Aristotle should find the clue to the best constitution in the inquiry what is the most desirable life, for we read in 6 (4). II. 1295 a 40 that 'the constitution is the mode of life chosen by the State.' See vol. i. p. 200 sqq. An instructive commentary on the first chapter will be found in the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze, Über ein Capitel aus Aristoteles' Politik, from which I shall frequently have occasion to make quotations.
- 16. For πρῶτον in the sense of πρότερον Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 5, note) compares 3. 4. 1276 b 19.
- 17. ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν κ.τ.λ., 'for [the best constitution and the most desirable life go together, inasmuch as] it is fitting that those who live under the best constitution their circumstances enable them to attain should fare best, unless something contrary to expectation happens.' It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 294, note 2) that the reasoning latent in the Greek cannot be fully expressed in English. For the thought cp. Plato, Laws 828 D, ώς ἔσθ ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις σΐαν οὐκ ἄν τις ἐτέραν εῦροι τῶν νῦν περὶ χρόνου σχολῆς καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξουσίας, δεὶ δὲ αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον, ξῆν εὖ. We hardly expect Aristotle to add the

qualification 'their circumstances enable them to attain' (ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς), for those who fare best must be those who live under the absolutely best constitution, which is contrasted in 6 (4).

1. 1288 b 25 sq., 32 with the best attainable under given circumstances (ἡ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη, ἡ ἐνδεχομένη ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων).

20. πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν, 'all individuals, so to say,' for πᾶσιν corresponds to ἐκάστφ, cp. 1323 b 21. Aristotle first discusses the question what is the most desirable life for the individual (1323 a 21-b 29), and then the same question as to the State.

21. χωρίς, i.e. έκάστω, 'for the individual': cp. 1323 b 40, καὶ χωρὶς έκάστω καὶ κοινῆ ταῖς πόλεσιν, 3. 6. 1278 b 24, and Soph. Fragm. 521,

νῦν δ' οὐδέν εἰμι χωρίς' ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἔβλεψα ταύτη τὴν γυναικείαν φύσιν, ὡς οὐδέν ἐσμεν,

where, as Gomperz remarks (Die Bruchstücke der griech. Tragiker, p. 33),  $\chi\omega\rho$  (=  $i\delta$ ia, 'privatim,' 'seorsum') serves to distinguish the individual lot of the speaker from the general lot of women.

νομίσαντας οὖν . . . 23. αὐτοῖς, 'holding then that many of the things said in the non-scientific inquiries also respecting the best life are adequately said, we must now too make use of them.' On the question what 'non-scientific inquiries' are here referred to, something has been said in vol. i. p. 299, note 1. The expression έξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, when used by Aristotle, does not necessarily refer to non-scientific inquiries of his own, still less to writings of his own, but it probably refers to writings of his own in the passage before us, for, besides that, as Zeller remarks (Gr. Ph. 2, 2, 119, 2: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4), the contents of the passage are quite Aristotelian in spirit, it seems to be implied in the words καὶ νῦν, 'now too,' that Aristotle has himself said these things before (cp. Meteor. 1. 3. 339 b 36, είρηται μεν οὖν καὶ πρότερον εν τοῖς περὶ τὸν ἄνω τόπον θεωρήμασι, λέγωμεν δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ νῦν, and 341 a 12 sqq.). Whether, as Bernays held (Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 69 sqq.), a Dialogue of Aristotle is here 'used,' is uncertain, for the non-scientific writings of Aristotle were not all of them Dialogues (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 123: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 119 sq.). What is the exact meaning of χρηστέου? word recurs in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 26, λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς (i.e. της ψυχης) και έν τοις έξωτερικοις λόγοις άρκούντως ένια, και χρηστέον αὐτοῖς, where χρηστέον seems to introduce merely a statement of results, but it does not follow that it always means no more than

this. Bernays thought that we have in 1323 a 24 sqq. a verbatim extract from the non-scientific composition made use of. Against this Vahlen argues in the second of his Aristotelische Aufsätze. Zeller holds (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4) that the contents of the non-scientific composition are reproduced, not indeed verbatim, but pretty closely ('ziemlich eng anzuschliessen scheint'), and we are certainly conscious (with Bernays) of a freer flow of periods in the first chapter than we often meet with in Aristotle's writings, though Vahlen has shown that many of the expressions used occur elsewhere in them. Bernays takes the use of the έξωτερικοί λόγοι to extend to the end of the first chapter, and it would seem from the words περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης Cons in 23 that all that is said on this subject is based on them, so that they will have been used at any rate down to σώφρων, 1323 b 36. If we ask why Aristotle has recourse on this subject to the έξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, and not, as in c. 13. 1332 a 7 sqq. and 21 sqq., to the Nicomachean Ethics-Zeller finds teaching to the same effect in Eth. Nic. 1. 6 sqq., 10. 6 sqq.—the answer probably is that he prefers, when he can, to refer to the more popularly written and more generally accessible class of compositions. Zeller (Hermes, 15. 553 sqq.: see vol. ii. p. x, note 1) thinks that the passage 1323 a 21 sqq., in addition to Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 9 sqq., was before the writer of Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 32, πάντα δή τάγαθὰ ή έκτὸς η έν ψυχη, καὶ τούτων αίρετώτερα τὰ έν τη ψυχη, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοις ἐξωτερικοις λόγοις φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετή καὶ ἡδονή ἐν ψυχῆ, ων ένια ή πάντα τέλος είναι δοκεί πασιν, but perhaps the passage in the έξωτερικοί λόγοι was itself before him. For the agrist νομίσαντας, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 3 and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 27, and see above on 1271 b 4. As to the case of voulouvas see note on 1275 a 16.

24. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for in truth against one division [of goods] at any rate no one would contend,' etc. Γάρ introduces a justification of the use of the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι on the ground of the absence of dissent. For ἀμφισβητεῖν πρός, cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 35: Isaeus 11. 9, ἀμφισβητεῖς πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνου διαθήκας: Demosth. in Phorm. c. 33, ἀμφισβητεῖς πρὸς ἐν ῥῆμα τῶν ἐν τῆ συγγραφῆ: Polyb. 2. 2. 10, ἀμφισβητούντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα. But how would an assertion that the happy need not possess all three kinds of goods run counter to the division of goods into these three kinds? Apparently in this way. The division implies that all the three kinds of goods are goods, and it is taken for granted that those who are to

be happy should possess all goods (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.). There were other divisions of goods—among them a division into ἐπαινετά, τίμια, and δυνάμεις (Eth. Nic. 1. 12). As to the division into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, see vol. i. p. 299, note 1. That wealth should be accompanied by virtue had often been said by the poets (Sappho, Fragm. 81: Pindar, Olymp. 2. 53 sqq. and Pyth. 5. 1 sqq.: Eurip. Fragm. 163: compare Lysander's remark to the younger Cyrus in Cic. De Senect. 17. 59, recte vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuae fortuna coniuncta est), and Simonides (Fragm. 70) had said that health should accompany wisdom. Cp. also Rhet. 1.5. 1360 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 17 sqq. When Aristotle sought to show in the inquiry which commences here that the chief ingredient in εὐδαιμονία is virtue, his work was half done for him by the ordinary use of the Greek language. To the Greeks ό εὐδαίμων was ὁ εὖ πράττων (1323 b 29 sqq.), and ὁ εὖ πράττων was ό τὰ καλὰ πράττων, and τὰ καλὰ πράττειν implied virtue. Our word 'happiness' has no such link with virtue.

27. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The word μακάριος is used throughout the first chapter as interchangeable with εὐδαίμων, but it is a slightly stronger word, as we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 6-8. Aristotle offers no proof that the happy should possess external goods and the goods of the body, no doubt because he considers it unnecessary to do so; the only question likely to be raised is whether they need possess the goods of the soul. Compare Plato, Phileb. 21, which is evidently present to his memory. For φαίη μακάριον without εἶναι cp. 2. 3. 1261 b 22.

29. δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μυίας. We read in a fragment of Plutarch (Libr. Perdit. Fragm. 7. 10), φαρμακοπώλην δέ τινα εἰδέναι ὑπὸ μὲν δρακόντων καὶ ἀσπίδων μηδὲν πάσχειν, μύωπα δὲ φεύγειν μέχρι βοῆς καὶ ἐκστάσεως, but Aristotle is thinking not of gadflies, but of harmless flies. As to cowardice of this kind see Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 4 sqq.

30. ἀπεχόμενον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τῶν ἐσχάτων is in the gen. after μηδενός. Το act thus is to be like a wild beast: cp. Plato, Laws 831 D, μηδὲν δυσχεραίνοντα, ἐὰν μόνον ἔχη δύναμιν καθάπερ θηρίω τοῦ φαγεῖν παντοδαπὰ καὶ πιεῖν, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀφροδισίων πᾶσαν πάντως παρασχεῖν πλησμονήν, which is imitated in Epist. 7. 335 A sq. For ἐπιθυμήση τοῦ φαγεῖν ἡ πιεῖν Vahlen compares Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 16, τοῦ εὐδοξεῖν ἐπιθυμῶν, and 1. 7. 3, and Xen. Oecon. 14. 9.

- 32. δμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1174 a 1, οὐδείς τ' ἄν ελοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν έχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἶς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα. For τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον Vahlen compares Phylarch. ap. Athen. Deipn. 536 e, οὕτως ἐξαπατηθῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν . . . ὧστε τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὑπολαβεῖν βιώσεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὅτι μόνος εὕροι τὴν ἀθανασίαν. For τι παιδίον, cp. 1323 b 8, ὅργανόν τι, and see Bon. Ind. 763 a 16 sqq., where Meteor. 3. 3. 372 b 13, καὶ διότι περὶ τὸν ῆλιον ἡ τὴν σελήνην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περί τι τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, is referred to.
- 34. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'but these things almost all men would admit when said; they differ, however, in respect of the quantity they desire of each good and in respect of their relative superiority.' As to λεγόμενα Vahlen remarks that it is to be taken in close connexion with συγχωρήσειαν, and compares among other passages Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 32, διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς έξεις μη μόνον άληθες είναι τουτ' είρημενον: Plato, Rep. 436 E, οὐδεν άρα ήμας των τοιούτων λεγόμενον έκπλήξει: Hdt. 2. 146, τούτων ων αμφοτέρων πάρεστι χρασθαι τοισί τις πείσεται λεγομένοισι μαλλον, and 4. ΙΙ, έστι δέ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος ἔχων ὧδε, τῷ μάλιστα λεγομένω αὐτὸς πρόσκειμαι. For ώσπερ πάντες, where ώσπερ = 'fere,' Vahlen compares Rhet. 1. 6. 1363 a 11, ωσπερ γάρ πάντες ήδη όμολογοῦσιν, εί καὶ οἱ κακως πεπονθότες, perhaps not a quite conclusive parallel. Closer ones may be found in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v., who refers in illustration of the use of ωσπερ in the sense of 'fere' to Protag. 346 A, ωσπερ ἀσμένους, among other passages. For ταις ὑπεροχαις cp. 1323 b 14, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. A different interpretation of ταις ὑπεροχαις from that given above is, however, possible; it might mean 'in respect of the excess they desire of this or that good' (cp. την ὑπερβολήν, 38, and 1323 b 8), but 'superiority,' not 'excess,' is probably the meaning. Υπεροχαίς appears to be in the plural because three different sorts of goods are measured against each other, so that whichever sort is preferred will conceivably possess one degree of superiority over the second and another over the third.
- 36. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ. 'Οποσονοῦν is severed from τῆς ἀρετῆς by the whole length of the sentence for the sake of emphasis: see above on 1281 a 14. Aristotle here remembers Plato, Apol. Socr. 29 D, ὡ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, 'Αθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ

έπιμελεί οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; and 29 E, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περι ἐλαχίστου ποιείται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος.

- 37. For πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων Vahlen compares 1. 9. 1257 b 7, ποιητική γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων. Πλοῦτος is explained in 1. 13. 1259 b 20 as ἡ τῆς κτήσεως ἀρετή. Cp. also c. 5. 1326 b 33, περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας.
- 38. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν. See vol. i. p. 295, note 2. Vahlen compares the use of ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν in De An. 1. 3. 406 b 22, also Metaph. Γ. 5. 1010 a 15, ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν, and Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 16 sqq. As to ἡμεῖς see above on 1270 a 9.
- 39. ὅτι ῥάδιον μὲν κ.τ.λ. Μέν is taken up by οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, 1323 b 6 (see note on 1284 b 4). Περὶ τούτων, i. e. whether it is right to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods. In place of διαλαμβάνειν Lambinus followed by Bekk.² reads λαμβάνειν (Sus. and Bonitz, Ind. s.v., also bracket the διά), and it is true that in 2. 3. 1262 a 17 we have ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις, and that no parallel has hitherto been adduced for the expression διαλαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, but it is not perhaps absolutely certain that διαλαμβάνειν is wrong. Many verbs compounded with διά are occasionally used in a sense but little removed from that of the simple verb, e.g. διαναγκάζειν, διαπορεῖν, διαλανθάνειν, διαφυλάττειν, etc.
- 40. δρώντας ὅτι κ.τ.λ. So that those who possess the virtues have the means of acquiring external goods in addition, whereas those who possess external goods have not necessarily the means of acquiring the virtues, whence it follows that the virtues are to be sought in preference to external goods. A little later, however, Aristotle says that external goods are the gift of fortune (1323 b 27 sq.). He continues here to make use of the Apology of Plato, 30 Α, οὐδεν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων εγώ περιέρχομαι ή πείθων ύμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδε ούτω σφόδρα, ώς της ψυχης, όπως ώς αρίστη έσται, λέγων ότι οὐκ έκ χρημάτων άρετη γίγνεται, άλλ' έξ άρετης χρήματα και τάλλα άγαθα τοις ανθρώποις απαντα καὶ ιδία καὶ δημοσία. Compare the definition of εὐδαιμονία in Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 16 as εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετά δυνάμεως φυλακτικής τε καὶ πρακτικής τούτων: Isocr. De Pace, § 32, τοις γαρ αγαθοίς οις έχομεν έν τη ψυχή, τούτοις κτώμεθα και τας άλλας ωφελείας ων δεόμενοι τυγχάνομεν. ωσθ' οί της αύτων διανοίας άμελοῦντες λελήθασι σφας αὐτούς αμα τοῦ τε φρονεῖν αμεινον καὶ τοῦ

πράττειν βέλτιον τῶν ἄλλων ὀλιγωροῦντες: Xenocr. Fragm. 63 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 3. 127), Ξενοκράτης δὲ ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτῆσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῆ δυνάμεως εἶτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ῷ γίνεται, φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχήν ὡς δὲ ὑφ' ὧν, τὰς ἀρετάς ὡς δὲ ἐξ ὧν, ὡς μερῶν, τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός (cp. Plato, Rep. 403 D): Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 58 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 344), δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος ἄνευ ξυνέσιος οὐκ ἀσφαλέα κτήματα.

1. τῷ χαίρειν = ἡδονῆ, as in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 1 (referred 1323 b. to in Bon. Ind. s. v. χαίρειν). Protarchus in Plato, Phileb. 21 A sqq. finds the Good to be τὸ χαίρειν or pleasure. The word μακάριος was supposed to be derived from χαίρειν (Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 6 sq., quoted by Vahlen). Tyrants were thought to be εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι if they were seen to be in the daily enjoyment of bodily pleasures (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 28 sqq.).

2. εἴτ ἐν ἀμφοῖν. Cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 34, φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῷ, ὧν ἔνια ἡ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. Εὐδαιμονία is said to be a combination of τὸ καλόν and pleasure in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19: see vol. i. p. 296, note 1.

ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ. Compare the remark of Solon quoted in Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 9, καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ, ὡς ἄετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ, and Plato, Euthyd. 281 B, ἄρά γε ὀνίναιτ ἃν ἄνθρωπος πολλὰ κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; ἡ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα νοῦν ἔχων; (cp. Laws 660 E). Compare also the remark of Bias to Croesus, made in support of Solon (Diod. 9. 27. 3), τὰ γὰρ ἐν σοὶ βούλεται (ὁ Σόλων) θεωρήσας ἀγαθὰ διαγνῶναι, νυνὶ δὲ τὰ παρὰ σοὶ μόνον ἐόρακεν εἶναι δὲ δι ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἡ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας, and two lines variously ascribed to Antiphanes (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 41: Meineke, 3. 521), and Menander (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 41: Meineke, 4. 273),

ψυχὴν ἔχειν δεῖ πλουσίαν τὰ δὲ χρήματα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὄψις, παραπέτασμα τοῦ βίου.

4. τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, 'the external acquisition of goods.' Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 16, note 1) compares Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1098 b 26, τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν. Compare also Plato, Rep. 443 C, τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτο μέν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν

ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς, περὶ ἐαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τὰλλότρια πράττειν ἔκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῆ ψυχῆ γένη, and Aristot. De Gen. An. 3. 3. 754 a 33, τὸ τῶν βατράχων ῷὸν μόνον στερεόν ἐστι καὶ στιφρὸν πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σωτηρίαν.

5. πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 16, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (Vahlen), and Isocr. De Pace, § 90, πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν.

τούτοις, i. e. τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀγαθοῖς, or (as in 10) τοῖς περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθοῖς.

- 6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle proves that it is not well to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods by showing (1) that the goods of the soul are not, like external goods and ὅργανα generally, harmful or useless when in excess, but on the contrary increase in utility with every increase in their amount; (2) that the best state of the soul is as much more precious (τιμιώτερον) than the best state of property and of the body as the soul is more precious than property and the body; (3) that external and bodily goods are desirable for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of external and bodily goods. On all these three grounds it is clear that the goods of the soul are to be sought to a far greater extent than the goods of the body and external goods.
- 7. ωσπερ δργανόν τι, cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ωσπερ δ δικαστής. That instruments have a limit, we see from 1. 8. 1256 b 35 sqq. and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 35 sqq.
- 8. πᾶν δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον κ.τ.λ., 'and everything that is useful' (not merely external goods but bodily goods also, vol. i. p. 299, note 2, and εὐτυχία as a whole, Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.) 'belongs to the class of things whose,' etc. Supply τούτων with ἐστιν (with Giph.). Τὰ χρήσιμα (οτ ἀφέλιμα) are goods that are desirable for the sake of other goods (Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 13 sqq.: 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν: 8. 2. 1155 b 19). Cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 3 sqq. and De Part. An. 2. 5. 651 a 36 sqq.
- 9. ἀναγκαῖον. 'In the first chapter of the Fourth Book of the Politics, which Bernays is probably right in believing to be taken over (herübergenommen) from an ethical dialogue, ἀνάγκη and ἀναγκαῖον are interchanged in such a way that the latter stands where the use of ἀνάγκη owing to its being followed by a vowel would have produced an hiatus' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολιτεία

'Aθηναίων des Aristoteles, p. 10). Kaibel has apparently overlooked the fact that the same rule is followed throughout the Politics: see for instance 3. 11. 1282 b 8–13 and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39–b 1. I have noticed only one passage in the Politics in which ἀνάγκη stands before a vowel, 2. 4. 1262 b 14, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἡ τὸν ἕνα, and the reason why it is used there probably is that ἀναγκαῖον occurs in the next line, unless indeed τούς should be added before ἀμφοτέρους. On the other hand there are several passages in which ἀναγκαῖον stands before a consonant.

For αὐτῶν used pleonastically in addition to the relative, cp. Plato, Rep. 395 D, and Stallbaum's notes on this passage and on Gorg. 452 D. The same usage occurs in English, e.g. in 'Who is the poet but lately arrived in Elysium whom I saw Spenser lead in and present him to Virgil?' (Lyttelton's Dialogues of the Dead).

10. τῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. With εἶναι supply ἀναγκαῖον from 9. Δέ answers to μέν in 7, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτός, and we expect in 11 not χρήσιμον εἶναι, but χρήσιμόν ἐστιν. See however Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 24 sqq., who adduces other passages (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 2 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sqq.: De An. 2. 5. 417 a 22 sqq.) in which the second limb of an antithesis suffers a similar change, and is caught into the structure of an intervening sentence.

11. εἰ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Menand. Monost. 579 is in the same spirit: νοῦς ἐστι πάντων ἡγεμῶν τῶν χρησίμων.

13. δλως τε κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly it is manifest that we shall say that the best state of every individual thing, if we match one against another, corresponds in respect of superiority to the distance between the things of which we say that these very states are states,' i.e. if we match two things one against the other, the superiority of the best state of the one thing over the best state of the other corresponds to the distance between the one thing and the other. Odws marks a transition from statements as to this or that class of goods to a broad universal proposition as to έκαστον πράγμα: see above on 1262 b 3. For έκάστου πράγματος πρώς άλληλα Vahlen compares among other passages Poet. 23. 1450a 24. ων έκαστον ως έτυχεν έχει προς άλληλα. Ήνπερ είλη $\phi$ ε διάστασιν $= au\hat{\eta}$ διαστάσει ήνπερ είληφε, and τη διαστάσει is dependent on ἀκολουθείν. In Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15 sq. and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23 we find ἀκολουθείν followed by κατά, and many have connected it here with κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, but Vahlen (whose interpretation I have

followed) is probably right in connecting ἀκολουθεῖν with τῆ διαστάσει (understood), and not with κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. That εἴληφε διάστασιν is a perfectly possible phrase (no less than εἴληχε διάστασιν, the reading of  $\Pi^1$ ) is shown by Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 30), who compares among many other passages Plato, Tim. 65 A, ὅσα δὲ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἑαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις εἴληφε, τὰς δὲ πληρώσεις ἁθρόας καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα.

16. ωστ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 697 B, 727 D sq., 731 C, Symp. 210 B, and Protag. 313 A. When Alcestis says in Eurip. Alcest. 292 Bothe, 301 Dindorf,

ψυχης γαρ οὐδέν έστι τιμιώτερον,

she means by ψυχή 'life.'

17. καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 2. 1129 b 5 and Rhet. 3. 19. 1419 b 16 sq.

καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου. Πλοῦτος is said to be the ἀρετή of κτῆσις in 1.13.1259 b 20.

**22.** ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, 'moral and intellectual virtue': cp. 1323 a 27–34 and 1323 b 2, τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας. An important addition. Hitherto we have been told only this, that those who are to be happy must possess as much virtue as possible, but now we are told that action in accordance with the virtues is also essential to happiness, and this is not lost sight of in the sequel (cp. 31-36, 41 sqq.).

23. μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, 'appealing to the happiness of the Deity in proof of this.' Vict. 'quod inquit posse nos hoc videre utentes Deo teste, non intellexit debere nos adhibere ipsum testem et quasi invocare ut hoc confirmet, sed uti illo tanquam signo quodam certo et exemplo huius rei claro atque illustri.' Μάρτυρι χρῆσθαί τινι is commonly used in the sense of 'producing some one as a witness,' as in Rhet. I. 15. 1375 b 30, 'Λθηναῖοι 'Ομήρω μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος, but here, as Vahlen points out, μάρτυς has the same meaning as in Plato, Phileb. 67 B, τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ κ.τ.λ. or as 'testes' in Cic. De Fin. 2. 33. 109. Cp. also Metaph. Λ. I. 1069 a 25.

24. δς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος κ.τ.λ. As to the source and nature of the happiness of God, cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἔτερον, ἐκείνω δὲ (i. e. τῷ θεῷ) αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν, and Plut. De Is. et Osir. c. 1, οὐ γὰρ ἀργύρω καὶ χρυσῷ μακάριον τὸ θεῖον, οὐδὲ βρονταῖς καὶ κεραυνοῖς ἰσχυρόν, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρονήσει. As to the phrase εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος see note on 1314 b

28. 'In the earlier days of Greece εὐδαίμων would hardly be used of a deity, as we can easily understand if we look to the original meaning of the word; later also it appears to have gone out of use again to some extent as an epithet of the gods. On the other hand we often find it thus used by Plato and other writers of his time (see Ast, Lexicon Platonicum). I have found it elsewhere in Aristoph. Aves 1741, τῆς τ' εὐδαίμονος "Ηρας, in Aristot. Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 8, τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, and' in the passage of the Politics before us (Heinze, Der Eudämonismus in der griech. Philosophie, 1. 663).

26. ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'since it is just on account of this' (i.e. because happiness does not spring from external goods) 'that prosperity also differs from happiness [no less than external goods differ from goods of the soul], for the spontaneous and fortune are the cause of goods external to the soul [the abundance of which constitutes prosperity], whereas no one is just or temperate [or consequently happy from fortune or owing to fortune. 'Επεί introduces a justification of the statement that the happiness of the individual is proportionate to his virtue and moral prudence and to the degree in which he acts in accordance with them: if this were not so and his happiness sprang from external goods, it would not differ from prosperity. That prosperity consists in an abundance of external goods, we see from Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 b 39, εὐτυχία δ' ἐστίν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα ἡ τὰ μέγιστα. That it was identified by many with happiness we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 7 sq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.

**28**. As to ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη see vol. i. p. 21 sqq. δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Protag. 323 D sq.

29. ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην. This expression is used for the sake of emphasis: cp. Plut. De Fortuna, c. 1, πότερον οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα, οὐδὲ ἰσότης, οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, οὐδὲ κοσμιότης, ἀλλ' ἐκ τύχης μὲν καὶ διὰ τύχην ᾿Αριστείδης ἐνεκαρτέρησε τῆ πενία . . . ἐκ τύχης δὲ καὶ διὰ τύχην Φιλοκράτης λαβὼν χρυσίον παρὰ Φιλίππου πόρνας καὶ ἰχθῦς ἡγόραζε;

ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and next in order, and calling for the same arguments to establish it, comes the truth that the best State also is happy and does well.' But it cannot do well—Aristotle in effect proceeds—unless it does noble things, and it cannot do noble things without moral and intellectual virtue, and the courage,

justice, and wisdom of a State are identical in nature with the same virtues in an individual, so that the happiness of a State, like that of an individual, cannot exist apart from the moral and intellectual virtues and action in accordance with them; its happiness is inseparable from the very same virtues with which happiness is associated in the individual. Bernays and Susemihl, who substitute  $\gamma \acute{a}\rho$  in 31 for the  $\delta \acute{\epsilon}$  of the MSS., regard the passage  $\emph{d}\delta\acute{v}\nu a\tau o\nu$ , 31- $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu$ , 36, as containing the proof of the preceding sentence  $\emph{e}\chi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu o\nu$ , 29- $\kappa a\lambda \acute{\omega}s$ , 31, but Vahlen has already pointed out (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 45 sq.) that the former passage is rather a deduction from

latter. The arguments used in the passage 31–36 are not the same as those used in 1323 a 38-b 29, nor do they prove that the best State is happy; what is proved in 31–36 is that the happy State will possess the same courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom which are possessed by the virtuous individual. One can conceive that the State might be happy without possessing the virtues of the virtuous individual; the object of 31–36 is to show that this is not the case, and that any happy State must possess these virtues, and thus to supplement and complete 29–31. It follows that the best State will possess them. In saying that the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of a State are identical with the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of an individual Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 435 B sq. and 441 C sq. With ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν κ.τ.λ. compare the reasoning in Plato, Gorg. 507 C.

34. ἔχει, not ἔχουσι, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 34 sq. and Plato, Phileb. 64 Ε, μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.

35. μορφήν. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) remarks of this passage, 'μορφή idem fere quod δύναμις significat.'

The suppressed antecedent of ων must be τη ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρονήσει: we expect therefore ἀνδρεῖος καὶ δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος in place of δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων, but Aristotle is not careful of exact correspondence in enumerations of this kind, as Vahlen shows by comparing Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 4–8, Pol. 1. 13. 1259 b 39–1260 a 2, Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 6–9, and Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 36–1283 a 3, where we expect τοῦ κάλλους in place of τοῦ πλούτου in 1283 a 2. The same thing is observable in Plato: see Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 490 C.

37. μέν is probably answered not by δέ in νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω, 40,

but by δέ in πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 1324 a 5 (see Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 25).

πεφροιμιασμένα. Not only what has been said on this subject, but the whole contents of the first three chapters are introductory, because they merely prepare the way for the inquiry with which Aristotle is mainly concerned, the inquiry as to the best constitution (cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., c. 4. 1325 b 33 sqq.).

- 38. θιγγάνειν 'is rare in the best Prose (ἄπτομαι being the common verb), but is used by Xenophon, Cyrop. 1. 3. 5, 5. 1. 16, 6. 4. 9, and by Aristotle' (Liddell and Scott s. v.). See also Rutherford, New Phrynichus, pp. 169, 391. Ἐπεξελθεῖν (aor. infin.) is used though θιγγάνειν (pres. infin.) has preceded, probably because ἐπεξέρ-χεσθαι is not used in this sense.
- 39. ἐτέρας σχολῆς, i.e. ἐτέρας μεθόδου (Sus.³ Ind. s. v. σχολή), cp. 1324 a 2, ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, and 21, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προηρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν. Compare also Plut. Pericl. c. 39, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐτέρας δόξει πραγματείας εἶναι. Νῦν δέ, 40, is in opposition to ἐτέρας σχολῆς.
- **40**.  $\mu$ έν should rather follow ὑποκείσθω, but ' $\mu$ έν interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. s. v.).
- 41. κεχορηγημένης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 32 sq. and 10. 9. 1179 a 4 sqq. Xenocrates, on the other hand, had identified the good and the happy life, and his view is consequently corrected here (Top. 7. 1. 152 a 7, καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων αἰρετώτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων εν γὰρ τὸ αἰρετώτατον καὶ μέγιστον), and also that of the Cynics, for they held that virtue needed only the addition of the strength which Socrates possessed to be sufficient for happiness (Diog. Laert. 6. 11, αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος).
- 1. The suppressed subject of μετέχειν probably is, not τὸν βίον, but 1324 a. ἔκαστον καὶ τὰς πόλεις.
- 2. ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, 'for the time of the present inquiry': cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 a 34, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος, and Isocr. Paneg. § 167, ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν ἡλικίας, and see Bon. Ind. 268 a 5–13.
- 5. Πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said that the courage, C. 2. justice, etc., of a State are the same as the corresponding virtues in an individual, and now he asks whether this is also true of happiness. The question marked out for inquiry in 1323 a 20 sq., πότερον ὁ αἰρετώτατος βίος κοινῆ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἡ ἔτερος, has been so

far answered that we have been told that the most desirable life both for the State and for the individual is μετ' ἀρετῆς, but we have not yet learnt whether the happiness of the State resembles the happiness of the individual (1323 b 21 sqq.) in springing from virtue and being proportionate to it, and, till we know this, we cannot affirm that the happiness of the State and that of the individual are the same. We are now told that this is the case (1324 a 13, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιστέραν). Plutarch claims that Lycurgus was already aware of this (Lycurg. c. 31, ὥσπερ ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς βίφ καὶ πόλεως ὅλης νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτήν, and Ages. c. 33). He often seems tacitly to defend Lycurgus against Aristotle's criticisms (see notes on 1270 a 4, 19, and 1324 b 7).

12. ἀποδέχεται, 'accipit cum assensu, probat' (Bon. Ind. s. v.). Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 25.

14. ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ. For συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως see note on 1293 a 4, κοινωνοῦσι καὶ πολιτεύονται. As to the question here raised and the parties to the discussion, see vol. i. p. 305 sqq. In using the words ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος Aristotle probably has before him not only the language of Aristippus in Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 13, ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι . . . οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλήω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι, but also the example of Anaxagoras, who lived many years at Athens, though a Clazomenian, and when he was forced to leave it, did not return to his native city, but preferred to live a stranger's life at Lampsacus and died there (Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 15).

17. For διάθεσιν πόλεως cp. Plato, Rep. 579 Ε, εἴπερ τῆ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἦς ἄρχει ἔοικεν.

18. κοινωνεῖν πόλεως = συμπολιτεύεσθαι, to take an active share in a State (cp. 15).

19. εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. For καί, cp. c. 9. 1329 a 7, τρόπον μέν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ ἐτέροις.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The best MSS. have ἐκεῖνο μὲν γάρ in 22, though  $P^{4.6}$  Ls omit γάρ and Vet. Int. has no equivalent for it (Vet. Int. occasionally fails to render γάρ: see vol. ii. p. lxiii). Γάρ should probably be retained in the text, and if we retain it, we must place the apodosis at ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 23. After a string of protases introduced by ἐπεί, the apodosis is often introduced by οὖν in Aristotle's writings (see Bonitz, Aristot. Studien, 2. 59 sqq.). In c. 13. 1331 b 26 sqq. and in De An. 1. 4. 408 a 5 sqq. the

apodosis is introduced by  $\mu \hat{\epsilon} \nu$  où after a protasis introduced by  $\hat{\epsilon} \pi \epsilon i$  or  $\epsilon i$ .

τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας. Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 20, θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις. Bonitz (Ind. 186 a 28) explains διάνοια here as 'cogitandi actio' (i.e. 'thought'), referring to Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 6, πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἡ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας, Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11 sq., and De Interp. 14. 23 a 32 sq.

23. ταύτην καθ' ην τάξιν, i.e. ταύτην την τάξιν καθ' ην. Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 33) compares 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19, ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρφ μέρει της πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλφ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 8. Cp. also De Gen. An. 4. 4. 772 a 2.

24. καν δοτισούν, whether πρακτικός οτ θεωρητικός.

25. ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογούντων κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 16. 1335 a 39, τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα (where see note), and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 2, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλευόμενα. For this use of παρά see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 440 a. 1.

27. ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἶον θεωρητικός τις, ὃν μόνον τινές φασιν είναι φιλόσοφον. Aristotle was on the point of saying ό φιλόσοφος, as in 32, but he substitutes this long phrase, because he declines to identify this kind of life exclusively with the philosophic life. He selects three strong assertions for review, each containing the word µόνον, and this is the first of them. The other two are μόνον γάρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν είναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν, 39, and οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονά φασιν, 1324 b 2. As to the passage before us cp. c. 3. 1325 a 18, οί μεν γαρ αποδοκιμάζουσι τας πολιτικάς αρχάς, νομίζοντες τόν τε τοῦ έλευθέρου βίον ετερόν τινα είναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αίρετώτατον, οί δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον. Πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, however, means something more than a mere rejection of political office; Aristotle probably has Anaxagoras in his mind, his refusal to be cumbered even with property, his passion for θεωρία and ελευθερία: compare the account of Anaxagoras in Plut. Pericl. c. 16, where ανόργανον καὶ ἀπροσδεή της έκτὸς ύλης έπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς κινεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν may be compared with πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, in Himer. ap. Phot. Biblioth. 1088 R (quoted by Menage on Diog. Laert. 2. 6), where πάσης έαυτους της έξωθεν ἀσχολίας έλευθερώσαντες may be compared with the same phrase, and in Diog. Laert. 2. 6, οὖτος (i.e. 'Αναξαγόρας) εὐγενεία καὶ πλούτω διαφέρων ην, άλλὰ καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνη, δε γε τὰ πατρώα παρεχώρησε τοις οικείοις, αιτιαθείς γάρ ύπ' αὐτῶν ώς ἀμελῶν, "Τί οὖν," ἔφη,

"οὐχ ὑμεῖς ἐπιμελεῖσθε;" καὶ τέλος ἀπέστη καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρίαν ήν, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν πολιτικῶν. See also Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 912. 5), 'Αναξαγόραν . . . την θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος είναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης έλευθερίαν: Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 b 6 sqq. and 1. 5. 1216 a 10 sqq. Aristotle, however, may also be thinking of Empedocles (cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, quoted below on 1325 a 19). Ον μόνον τινές φασιν είναι φιλόσοφον perhaps contains a reminiscence of Plato, Theaet. 175 D, οὖτος δη έκατέρου τρόπος, ω Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν έλευθερία τε καὶ σχολή τεθραμμένου, ον δή φιλόσοφον καλείς, and Rep. 476 Α, καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὖς μόνους ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους: cp. Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 30, ai σώφρονες (ψυχαί) μετά σχολής ἀπράγμονα καὶ φιλόσοφον στέρξασαι βίον. Aristotle hints in these words that it is possible to lead a philosophic life without withdrawing altogether from politics; he probably remembers that Socrates, Archytas, and Epaminondas had done so. Cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 26, much of which chapter is thought by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 892. I (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 441, note 1), to be based, in substance at any rate, on Dicaearchus, Σωκράτης γοῦν οὕτε βάθρα θεὶς οὕτ' εἰς θρόνον καθίσας οὖτε ὥραν διατριβής ἡ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμοις τεταγμένην φυλάττων, άλλα και παίζων, ὅτε τύχοι, και συμπίνων και συστρατευόμενος ένίοις, καὶ συναγοράζων, τέλος δὲ καὶ συνδεδεμένος καὶ πίνων τὸ φάρμακον έφιλοσόφει, πρώτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἄπαντι χρόνω καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασιν άπλῶς ἄπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον, and Cic. de Orat. 3. 34. 137, septem fuisse dicuntur uno tempore, qui sapientes et haberentur et vocarentur. Hi omnes praeter Milesium Thalen civitatibus suis praefuerunt. Plato, again, though he speaks of the true philosopher as scorning political office (Rep. 521 A sq.), will not hear of his philosophic class refusing political office, at any rate in his ideal State. Cp. also Gorg. 500 D. Chrysippus was so far from thinking the σχολαστικός βίος the only one fit for a philosopher that he classed it as an hoover's Bios (Plut. De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, c. 2).

29. σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 36, αὐτοὶ δὲ πολιτεύονται ἡ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. For οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετήν, cp. (with Eaton) 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 29, μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. Φαίνονται προαιρούμενοι, 'evidently choose.'

31. καὶ τῶν προτέρων (e.g. Anaxagoras and, as we shall see, Gorgias) καὶ τῶν νῦν (e.g. Isocrates and Epaminondas). Οι

2.2.

πρότεροι does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics (οἱ πρότερου is the usual phrase), but it occurs in Plato, Phaedr. 274 B and Menex. 241 D.

λέγω δὲ δύο κ.τ.λ. See critical note.

32. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably has before him the words of Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 500 C, όρᾶς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὖ τί ἃν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἡ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὰ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ (the political life) . . . ἡ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφία.

33. ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Rep. 540 A, ἀναγκαστέον . . . ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνω, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἑκάστους κ.τ.λ. (cp. Laws 702 A sub fin.).

35. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is possible that Anaxagoras had expressed himself to this effect: he seems at any rate to have implied in his account of the happy man that he was not a δυνάστης (Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.). Isocrates had said in his Letter to the Sons of Jason (§ 11), έμοι γαρ αίρετώτερος ὁ βίος είναι δοκεί και βελτίων ό των ιδιωτευόντων ή ό των τυραννούντων, και τας τιμάς ήδίους ήγουμαι τὰς ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἡ τὰς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις: compare the spurious Fourth Philippic ascribed to Demosthenes, c. 70. As Eaton points out, Plato had already made Thrasymachus in Rep. 344 A sqq. speak of τυραννίς as ή τελεωτάτη άδικία: cp. also Gorg. 478 E, Polyb. 2. 59. 6, αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὔνομα (of tyrant) περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην έμφασιν, καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας, and Paus. 8. 27. 11, τούτω τώ 'Αριστοδήμω καὶ τυραννοῦντι έξεγένετο δμως επικληθηναι Χρηστώ, and 8. 36. 5. In μετ' άδικίας τινός είναι της μεγίστης ('accompanied with injustice of the very greatest kind') τινός lends emphasis: cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 3. 12, & Ἡράκλεις, ώς δεινήν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος είναι ('how very terrible'), and Soph. O. C. 560, and see Liddell and Scott, s.v. 715 A. ii. 8.

37. πολιτικῶς δέ, i.e. if rule is exercised as it should be exercised over men free and equal (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.: 1. 7. 1255 b 20).

38. ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν τῆ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερία, and so not to be productive of τὸ ἄριστα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως (24). As to ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν see above on 1266 a 27. Τῆ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερία, in contrast to ἡ ἐκτὸς εὐημερία (health, food, etc.), Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1178 b 33 sqq.

τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. As Bonitz points out (Ind. 247 b 23), ἐξ ἐναντίας takes a dative in Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 31.

- 39. μόνον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This was the view of Gorgias as expressed by Meno in Plato, Meno 71 E, αὖτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὰ της πόλεως πράττειν (and perhaps also of Prodicus and Protagoras, Rep. 600 C sq.): compare what Socrates says to Callicles, the friend of Gorgias, in Gorg. 500 C, δυτινα χρή τρόπου ζην, πότερου έπὶ ον σύ παρακαλείς έμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμω καὶ ρητορικήν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ον ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφία, and what Callicles himself says in Gorg. 485 D of one who continues to study philosophy after he has ceased to be young, ὑπάρχει τούτω τῷ ανθρώπω, καν πάνυ εὐφυης η, ανάνδρω γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα της πόλεως και τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αις ἔφη ὁ ποιητής τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπείς γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., and Hipp. Maj. 281 B sq. Gorgias formed himself (Hipp. Maj. 282 B) and his disciples (Xen. Anab. 2. 6. 16) on this model; his ideal of human life stood in the strongest possible contrast to that of Anaxagoras. Nowhere can it have found more sympathy than at Athens (cp. Thuc. 2. 40). The added remark (c. 3. 1325 a 21 sqq.), αδύνατον γάρ τον μηδέν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, την δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ την εὐδαιμονίαν είναι ταὐτόν, may also be due to Gorgias. In 2. 2, 1261 b 1 (cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.) Aristotle leaves the question open whether ruling is a good thing or not.
- 40. ἐφ' ἐκάστης γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This was not the general view: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς' οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἦττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. Aristotle, however, seems to have said, if the προτρεπτικός ascribed to him was really his, that Kings were favourably circumstanced for philosophizing (Fragm. 47. 1483 a 41 sqq.): compare the view of Marcus Aurelius (Comm. 11. 7), and contrast Plut. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 5, where Plutarch suspects that Alexander was half inclined to regard his own splendour and power ὡς κώλυσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀσχολίαν. For ἐπί with the gen. in the sense of 'in respect of,' cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17, and Plato, Rep. 460 A, ὥστε τὸν φαῦλον ἐκεῖνον αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστης συνέρξεως τύχην.
- 1324 b. 2. οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ. By 'the despotic and tyrannical form of the constitution' Aristotle means a form of constitution devised πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν τῶν πέλας. No notice is taken of those who praised the life of the tyrant, probably because no one would claim

that the tyrant was alone happy. For τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 11, ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας, and 2. 7. 1267 a 17, ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. Thibron and other writers on the Lacedae-monian constitution are probably referred to (see c. 14. 1333 b 18 sqq.), for they seem to have called the Lacedae-monian State happy because it ruled over many, and to have ascribed its happiness to the framer of its constitution (1333 b 22 sq., 29 sqq.). Aristotle may have thought that Alexander needed warning on the subject (cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 13: Aristot. Fragm. 614. 1581 b 18 sqq.).

- 3. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and in some States this is the distinctive aim both of the constitution and of the laws, that the members of the State may exercise a despotic rule over others.' In the Lacedae-monian and Cretan States, for instance, both constitution and laws were framed with this end in view (c. 14. 1333 b 5 sqq.). For ὅρος τῆς πολιτείας cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 10 sq. Compare also the use of ὑπόθεσις in 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 27 sqq.
- 5. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις. Καί = 'though': cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 2, 'Αθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ οὐ μεταλαβόντες τούτου τοῦ χρυσίου ὅμως πρόθυμοι ἦσαν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, and see Liddell and Scott s. v. καί B. ii. 4.

νομίμων = νόμων: cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 42 and 1269 a 1, and see Bon. Ind. s. v. νόμιμος.

- 6. εἴ πού τι πρὸς εν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, cp. Plato, Laws 963 A, πρὸς γὰρ εν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ἀεὶ πάνθ' ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων βλέποντ' εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἀρετήν που ξυνεχωροῦμεν πάνυ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι.
- 7. ὅσπερ κ.τ.λ. The same thing is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq. and of Lacedaemon in 2.9. 1271 b 2 sqq.: cp. also 1325 a 3, and Plato, Laws 626 A, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρήσεις οὕτω σκοπῶν τὸν Κρητῶν νομοθέτην, ὡς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἄπαντα δημοσία καὶ ἰδία τὰ νόμιμα ἡμῖν ἀποβλέπων συνετάξατο. We should hardly have guessed that this was so from the part of the Code of Gortyna which has come down to us, but the account of Cretan institutions given in Strab. p. 480 on the authority of Ephorus so far bears out the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, that it represents the development of courage in the young citizens to have been one main aim of the constitution. Plutarch probably has similar charges before him when in Lycurg. c. 31 and Ages. c. 33 he tries to make out that the aim of Lycurgus was very much that which Plato and Aristotle said that it ought to have been (see above on 1324 a 5). For ἢ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος, cp. c. 14. 1333 b 9, τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν. For τὸ

τῶν νόμων πληθος, 'most of the laws,' Bonitz (Ind. 603 b 17 sqq.) compares 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31, 32 and 2. 5. 1264 a 13.

- 9. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further in all the non-Greek nations that are capable of winning at the expense of others warlike prowess is honoured.' Aristotle has before him Hdt. 2. 167, δρέων καὶ Θρήϊκας καὶ Σκύθας καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Λυδούς (he substitutes the Celts for the Lydians) καὶ σχεδὸν πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀποτιμοτέρους τῶν άλλων ήγημένους πολιητέων τους τας τέχνας μανθάνοντας και τους έκγόνους τούτων τούς δε απαλλαγμένους των χειρωναξιέων γενναίους νομιζομένους είναι, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ές τὸν πόλεμον ἀνειμένους μεμαθήκασι δ' ὧν τοῦτο πάντες οί Έλληνες, καὶ μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, where there is a transition from the barbarians to the Lacedaemonians, just as in the passage before us there is a transition from the Lacedaemonians to the barbarians. He probably also has before him Plato, Laws 637 D, πότερον, ωσπερ Σκύθαι χρώνται καὶ Πέρσαι, χρηστέον, καὶ ἔτι Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Κελτοὶ καὶ "Ιβηρες καὶ Θράκες, πολεμικὰ ξύμπαντα οντα ταῦτα γένη, ἡ καθάπερ ὑμεῖς (i. e. the Lacedaemonians and Cretans), and perhaps Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 10. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 67, ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχικώτατα μέν τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἔχοντα Σκύθαι καὶ Θράκες καὶ Πέρσαι. The phrase τοις δυναμένοις πλεονεκτείν recurs in 8 (6), 3. 1318 b 4, where οἱ κρατοῦντες takes its place in the next line: cp. Demosth. De Chers. c. 42, ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχείν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες. No doubt among the barbarians of Europe in Aristotle's day, as among those of Africa in our own, there were raiding and raided races. 'Η τοιαύτη δύναμις, i. e. ή πολεμική δύναμις, referring to προς τους πολέμους, 8 (cp. την άρετην ταύτην, 13). Thus πολέμιον is emphatic in 16 and 18, and τῶν πολεμίων in 20. For the perfect τετίμηται see above on 1280 a 16, διήρηται, and see Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, ἀναπέπταται.
- 12. καὶ νόμοι τινές εἰσι, 'laws also' providing for the giving of honours, as well as honours. The honours might be given apart from any provisions of law.
- 13. καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance at Carthage men receive, we are told, their decoration composed of armlets with as many armlets as they have served campaigns.' Coray would read ἐκ τοσούτων κρίκων, but Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 34) rightly disapproves of this attempt to secure a more exact correspondence between antecedent and relative. I translate κρίκων 'armlets,' not 'rings,' for the κρίκος which Demosthenes wore was not a ring but an armlet (Plut. Demosth. c. 30, 'Ερατοσθένης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν κρίκων

φησί κοίλω το φάρμακον φυλάσσειν τον δε κρίκον είναι τοῦτον αὐτῷ φόρημα περιβραχιόνιον: cp. Dec. Orat. Vit. Demosth. 847 B), and those worn by Carthaginian soldiers may well have been so too. Compare the armillae given to Roman soldiers for brilliant feats of arms (Liv. 10. 44: Guhl and Koner, Life of the Greeks and Romans, Eng. Trans. p. 586). We hear very little of similar rewards for gallant service in Greece. It was with land that Pittacus was rewarded for slaving his antagonist Phrynon (Plut. De Herod. Malign. c. 15). It was not by rewards given to the brave but by the education of youth that the Lacedaemonians and Cretans developed military prowess in their citizens. The Carthaginian custom may have been derived from the Libyans around them (cp. Hdt. 4. 176), or possibly from Egypt (Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. 3. 201, p. 168. 25 sqq. Bekker). It seems likely from the passage before us that the decoration of κρίκοι was confined to citizens of Carthage and was intended to induce them to serve in war and not to leave military service to mercenaries.

15. ἢν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and there was at one time a law in Macedon also that he who had slain no foeman should be girded with his halter (instead of a belt).' A man girded with a halter would cut a sorry figure beside one girded with a handsome belt adorned with metal, and possibly golden, buckles (Guhl and Koner, Eng. Trans. p. 235). Among the Cappadocians to wear a belt meant to be an officer (Anth. Pal. 11. 238: Liddell and Scott s. v. ζώνη). Compare the Macedonian custom mentioned by Hegesander, quoted in Athen. Deipn. 18 a, Ἡγήσανδρος δέ φησιν οὐδὲ ἔθος είναι έν Μακεδονία κατακλίνεσθαί τινα έν δείπνω, εί μή τις έξω λίνων δυ κεντήσειεν εως δε τότε καθήμενοι εδείπνουν, where we read that Cassander, though a brave man and a skilful hunter, had not been able to fulfil this requirement at the age of thirty-five and still sat at dinner. A closer parallel may be found in the iron ring worn by many of the Chatti till they had slain an enemy in war (Tac. Germ. c. 31, et aliis Germanorum populis usurpatum raro et privata cuiusque audentia apud Chattos in consensum vertit, ut primum adoleverint, crinem barbamque submittere, nec, nisi hoste caeso, exuere votivum obligatumque virtuti oris habitum . . . Fortissimus quisque ferreum insuper anulum (ignominiosum id genti) velut vinculum gestat, donec se caede hostis absolvat. Plurimis Chattorum hic placet habitus). Similar customs are traceable among the Sauromatae (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460). 'It is a rule

among all the tribes' [of the head-hunting Malays of Borneo] 'that no youth can regularly wear a mandau (sword) or be married or associate with the opposite sex, till he has been on one or more head-hunting expeditions. A mandau is presented to him probably at his birth or when he receives a name, but not till he has washed it in the blood of an enemy can he presume to carry it as part of his every-day equipment' (Bock, Head-hunters of Borneo, p. 216). Under Cetewayo, a Zulu who had not 'washed his spear,' that is, who had not killed an enemy, could not marry. We light on a more genial form of the same custom in the island of Skye. 'In Dunyegan Castle is kept an ox's horn, hollowed so as to hold perhaps two quarts' (of what liquid?) 'which the heir of Macleod was expected to swallow at one draught as a test of his manhood, before he was permitted to bear arms or could claim a seat among the men' (Dr. Johnson's Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8. 289).

17. ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις κ.τ.λ. Now we pass from laws to customs (cp. 22). The result is attained by law at Carthage and in Macedon, by custom among the Scythians and Iberians. Eaton compares Hdt. 4. 66, where however there is no mention of the σκύφος περιφερόμενος, so that it is doubtful whether Aristotle derives his statement from this source. See however above on 1262 a 19, 1276 a 28, and 1284 a 26. The σκύφος was used by herdsmen and country people (Athen. Deipn. 498 f) and is quite in place among the Scythians: some, in fact, imagined an etymological connexion between σκύφος and Σκύθης (Athen. Deipn. 499 f). For πίνειν σκύφον Eaton compares Hom. II. 8. 232,

πίνοντες κρητήρας ἐπιστεφέας οίνοιο.

18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἦρηροι κ.τ.λ. Why have we ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις in 17, and ἐν δὲ τοῖς ဪρηροιν here? Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 21, where see note. A similar custom existed among the Sindi, a Scythian race dwelling at the foot of the Caucasus on the East coast of the Euxine (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 121: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460, Σίνδοι τοσούτους ἰχθῦς ἐπὶ τοὺς τάφους ἐπιβάλλουσιν, ὅσους (ἄν) πολεμίους ὁ θαπτόμενος ἀπεκτονὼς ἢ). For καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον, cp. Thuc. 5. 11. 1, περιέρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον (with Arnold's note). The word ὀβελίσκος is usually explained here as meaning 'an obelisk,' but this use of it is rare, and if we explain it thus, we must suppose that a long pointed stone is referred to, for soldiers after a battle would not find it easy to set up real obelisks at the grave

of a comrade. It is possible that the word should be translated here 'a small spit.' This is its usual meaning, and every soldier had a small spit ready to hand (Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophth., Scipio Minor 16, 201 B). Spits might be thought likely to be useful to the dead man, like the fish thrown on the grave by the Sindi. I am glad to see since the foregoing words were written, that Dr. Jackson also translates δβελίσκους 'spits' (see his note in Sus.4). Professor Ridgeway (Academy, Aug. 29, 1885), rendering the word 'obelisk,' makes the interesting suggestion that the passage before us throws light on the original purpose of stone circles. I read in the Athenaeum for Dec. 14, 1895, that 'at Monte Pitti in the province of Pisa, near some remains of ancient walls, an Etruscan necropolis has been discovered, the tombs of which are enclosed in circles of rude stones.' See also Dr. Thurnam, Ancient British Barrows in Archaeologia 42, p. 211, quoted by Prof. Boyd Dawkins, Early Man in Britain, p. 285, and the remarks of Mr. Arthur Evans quoted by Prof. Windle, Life in Early Britain, p. 54 sq. We expect  $\delta\iota\epsilon\phi\theta a\rho\kappa\dot{\omega}s\ \dot{\eta}$ , not  $\delta\iota a\phi\theta\epsilon\dot{\iota}\rho\eta$ , for the destruction of the foe must necessarily precede the fixing of the δβελίσκοι, but compare the use of the present participle in 2. 8. 1268 a 8, kai vois παισί των έν τω πολέμω τελευτώντων έκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι την τροφήν. The present is probably used in these passages because a thing occurring frequently is referred to. That the Iberians were a warlike race, had been remarked by Plato, Laws 637 D, and by Thucydides (6. 90, "Ιβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους): compare the story told in Diod. 14. 75. 8 of their gallant behaviour when deserted by the Carthaginians. Aristotle mentions the fact, partly in confirmation of the statement in 10 that it is among warlike races that these customs prevail, partly because the Iberians were little known to the Greeks, though they had been mentioned by Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides. They must have become better known in Greece after their employment as mercenaries by Dionysius the Elder, and still more after the arrival in Greece of a contingent of Celtic and Iberian mercenaries sent by him in B.C. 369 to aid the Lacedaemonians against the Thebans (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 20). It is possible indeed that an Iberian belonging to this contingent may have been buried in Greece in the manner here described by Aristotle.

20. καταπηγνύουσι. The forms πηγνύω, καταπηγνύω are 'rare in classical authors' (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective,

- S.v. πήγνυμι). We find ἀπολλύουσι in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 (in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 23 some MSS. have ἀπολλύασι and others ἀπολλύουσι). As to δεικυύουσι see Bon. Ind. 167 b 50 sqq., and cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 36. As to ὀμυύουσι see note on 1285 b 11.
- 21. καὶ ἔτερα δὴ κ.τ.λ. For καὶ . . . δή, see above on 1253 a 18. Νόμοις κατειλημμένα, 'ratified by laws,' cp. Plato, Laws 823 A, τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 29, κατειλημμένων δὲ τοῖς ἐθισμοῖς ήδη τῶν κυριωτάτων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, and see Prof. J. C. Wilson on Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 16 sqq. in Academy, Feb. 18, 1888.
- **24.** The suppressed nominative to  $\mathring{a}\rho\chi\eta$  is probably not  $\delta$   $\pi$  $o\lambda\iota\tau\iota$ - $\kappa\delta s$ , but  $\tau\iota s$ : see as to this use of the third person singular Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.
- 26. πῶς γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. \*Η νομοθετικόν is added to strengthen the argument, for it is still more difficult to suppose that what is not νόμιμον is νομοθετικόν than that it is πολιτικόν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. II29 b I2, τά τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν, and Eurip. Ion 404 Bothe (442 Dind.),

πως οὖν δίκαιον τοὺς νόμους ὑμῶς βροτοῖς γράψαντας αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ὀφλισκάνειν;

- 27. οὐ νόμιμον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and it is not lawful to rule not only justly but unjustly, and it is possible to conquer [and so to acquire rule] unjustly as well as justly,' so that it is possible to rule over unwilling subjects unjustly. This is added because some held that Might is Right (1. 6. 1255 a 18). Conquering (τὸ κρατεῖν) is the first step to ruling over others (c. 14. 1333 b 30). Οὐ νόμιμον δέ, as always, like οὐ καλῶς δ᾽ ἔχει (c. 7. 1328 a 8), οὐ ῥάδιον δέ (c. 10. 1330 a 6), οὐκ ἔστι δέ (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 9), οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δέ (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 34), etc.
- 29. τοῦτο, i.e. that it is the function of the master of the art to rule over unwilling, no less than willing, subjects.
- 30. τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι, which are the characteristics of rule over the unwilling, for they are the characteristics of despotic rule: cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, τὰς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πλεονεξίας ἀπάσας (αὶ μοναρχίαι) περιειλήφασιν καὶ γὰρ παρασκευάσασθαι δυνάμεις καὶ χρήσασθαι ταύταις, ὥστε καὶ λαθεῖν καὶ ὀφθῆναι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πεῖσαι, τοὺς δὲ βιάσασθαι . . μᾶλλον αὶ τυραννίδες τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν οἶαί τ' εἰσίν. Plato contemplates the use of persuasion and force by the physician in Laws 720 D and Polit. 296 B (cp. Gorg. 456 B), but perhaps

he would not dispute what Aristotle here says, that the function of the physician, qua physician, is not to persuade or coerce, but to heal (cp. Rep. 488, esp. D-E). Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 427 f sq.

- 32. ἀλλ' ἐοίκασι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 91, ὧν ἀμελήσαντες οἱ γενόμενοι μετ' ἐκείνους οὐκ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τυραννεῖν ἐπεθύμησαν, ἃ δοκεῖ μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν δύναμιν, πλεῖστον δ' ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται.
- 33. καὶ ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, the antecedent to ὅπερ, = τὸ ἄρχειν μὴ Βουλομένων, οτ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν. Cp. 3.17.1287 b 41 sqq.
- 36. ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37, ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστόν, and 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. Thus Aristotle urged Alexander to rule the Greeks ἡγεμονικῶs and the barbarians only δεσποτικῶs (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.), perhaps remembering the advice of Isocrates to Philip (Philip. § 154, φημὶ γὰρ χρῆναί σε τοὺς μὲν Ἑλληνας εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστων ἄρχειν).
- 40. ἔστι δὲ θηρευτόν, sc. πρὸς τοῦτο, i.e. ἐπὶ θοίνην ἡ θυσίαν, for as a rule only animals fit to be eaten were offered in sacrifice, though it is true that dogs were sacrificed to Hecatê and that some other exceptions to the rule occur (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 26).
- 41. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt has before him the State sketched in the Laws of Plato (704 C, ΑΘ. γείτων δὲ αὐτῆς πόλις ἆρ' ἔσται τις πλησίου; ΚΛ. οὐ πάνυ διὸ καὶ κατοικίζεται παλαιὰ γάρ τις ἐξοίκησις ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενομένη τὴν χώραν ταύτην ἔρημον ἀπείργασται χρόνον ἀμήχανον ὅσον). The Islands of the Blest (to which Aristotle playfully compares his best State in c. 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.) lay far away from men: cp. Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 167,

τοῖς δὲ δίχ' ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ ήθε' ὀπάσσας Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατὴρ ἐς πείρατα γαίης.

It was a situation of this kind that the Phaeacians were taught by experience to seek out: cp. Hom. Odyss. 6. 2,

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βη ρ' ε'ς Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν δημόν τε πόλιν τε, οὶ πρὶν μέν ποτ' εναιον ε'ν εὐρυχόρω Ύπερείη, ἀγχοῦ Κυκλώπων, ἀνδρῶν ὑπερηνορεόντων, οῖ σφεας σινέσκοντο βίηφι δὲ φέρτεροι ἦσαν. ἔνθεν ἀναστήσας ἄγε Ναυσίθοος θεοειδής, εἶσεν δ' ε'ν Σχερίη, έκὰς ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων.

- 4. ĕота. For the future cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 18, 2. 8. 1267 b 1325 a. 34 sqq., etc.
  - 5. τοιοῦτον, i.e. πολέμιον.

δήλον ἄρα ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'it is evident, then, that while all cares and studies with a view to war are to be considered noble, they are not to be so considered as being the highest end of all, but as existing for the sake of that end.' That they are not the highest end of all, or in other words that they do not constitute happiness, is evident because happiness is attainable by States in which they are not practised, and also because they are not the ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (1324 b 22 sqq.), whose end is to produce happiness. There were probably those who regarded 'cares and studies with a view to war' as the highest end of all; thus an admirer of the Lacedaemonians claims in Isocr. Panath. § 202 that gratitude is due to them, ὅτι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων εύρόντες αὐτοί τε χρώνται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατέδειξαν, and explains in § 217 that he refers to τὰ γυμνάσια τἀκεῖ καθεστῶτα καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν τῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ τὴν δμόνοιαν καὶ συνόλως τὴν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμέλειαν. As to δῆλον ἄρα őτι see critical note.

7. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου κ.τ.λ., 'and the good lawgiver's business is to see with respect to a State and a race of men and every other association how they are to share [not in conquest, but] in good life and the measure of happiness attainable by them.' Cp. Plato, Laws 631 B, where happiness is implied to be the end of laws, and Rep. 521 A, οἱ τῷ ὅντι πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσίου, ἀλλ' οῦ δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφρονος. Γένος = ἔθνος, as in 2. 9. 1269 b 25 sq. (cp. Plato, Gorg. 483 D, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεοι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν). Aristotle keeps both πόλεις and ἔθνη in view here, because he has had both in view in his criticisms (1324 b 3 sqq.). It should be noticed that he regards the ἔθνος as a kind of κοινωνία. Ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς is emphasized by its position in the sentence: cp. Plato, Rep. 413 C, τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον.

10. διοίσει μέντοι κ.τ.λ., i.e. though this will always be the end at which he aims, the laws by which he seeks to attain it will differ according as his State has neighbours or not. If it has no neighbours, his laws will be less directed to the encouragement of military prowess than in the contrary case. For τῶν ταττομένων ἔνια νομίμων cp. Plato, Laws 743 Ε, τῶν προσταττομένων αὐτόθι νόμων.

11. καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it is the province of the legislative art, if the State has neighbours, to consider this, [not how to subjugate them all indiscriminately, but] what sort of studies should be practised in relation to each sort of neighbour, or how the State is to adopt the measures which are appropriate in relation to each of

its neighbours. Της νομοθετικής takes up τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου. Πρὸς ποίους and πρὸς έκάστους are emphatic. The lawgiver should not lay down one indiscriminating rule, as the Lacedaemonian lawgiver had done, but rather a rule varying according to the character of the neighbours with whom the State has to deal. Hola means πολεμικά ή είρηνικά. We may infer from c. 14. 1333 b 38 sqq. that the lawgiver will teach his State to practise military studies in relation to aggressive neighbours or neighbours who deserve to be enslaved, but not in relation to others. Πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον is a wider inquiry than ποία πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον, and includes the whole subject of the action of the State in relation to its neighbours both in peace and in war, which of them should be ruled ήγεμονικώς and which δεσποτικώς, how war should be waged with them, if they are Greeks (cp. Plato, Rep. 471 A sqq.), and other questions of the same kind. Aristotle evidently does not agree with Isocrates when he says that laws affect only the internal organization of States, and not their mutual relations (De Antid. § 79: see vol. i. p. 552).

14. йотерог, in с. 13. 1331 b 26 sqq. and с. 14. 1333 a 11 sqq.

19. τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, so termed, as we see from 3. 6. 1279 a 8 °C. 3. (where see note), in contrast to the ἀρχαί of the head of a household, a ship-captain, or a training-master, and the like, and also to priesthoods (6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18).

τε should follow not τόν, but ἔτερον: for other instances of its displacement see Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq. and above on 1259 a 13.

τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν (i.e. Empedocles) καὶ 'Αριστοτέλης ἐλεύθερον γεγονέναι καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριον, εἴ γε τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῷ διδομένην παρητήσατο, καθάπερ Ξάνθος ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγει, τὴν λιτότητα δηλονότι πλέον ἀγαπήσας: Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted above on 1324 a 27), 'Αναξαγόραν . . . τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν: Plut. De Exil. C. 12, οὖτω τῆς φυγῆς πρὸς ἐν μέρος τὸ ἄδοξον ἐντεινόμενοι παρορῶμεν τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὴν σχολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

20. With τοῦ πολιτικοῦ supply βίου, as with τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ in 24.

21. οί δε τοῦτον ἄριστον, SC. είναι νομίζουσιν.

άδύνατον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Gorgias may probably have used this argument. Aristotle is of the same opinion: cp. 1325 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 32 sqq.

22. τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν κ.τ.λ., so that one who does nothing cannot be happy. Cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ή δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις

 $\epsilon i \pi \rho a \xi i a$  γάρ, and Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 14, where  $\epsilon i \delta a \iota \mu o \nu i a$  is said to be often defined as  $\epsilon i \pi \rho a \xi i a$   $\mu \epsilon \tau$   $\dot{a} \rho \epsilon \tau \dot{\eta} s$ .

24. οἱ μὲν ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Τοῦ ἐλευθέρου = the man who avoids political offices. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 6. § 11, ἐμοὶ γὰρ αἰρετώτερος ὁ βίος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίων ὁ τῶν ἰδιωτευόντων ἡ ὁ τῶν τυραννευόντων, a proposition in favour of which Xenophon often makes Hiero argue (e.g. in Hiero 1. 2, 7 sqq.).

**25.** οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἡ ἐπίταξις ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων is implied to be the function of ὁ δεσποτικός (cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.: 3. 4.

1277 a 33 sqq.).

- 27. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν κ.τ.λ. It is apparently implied that those who rejected political office regarded all rule as despotic, yet in c. 2. 1324 a 35 sqq. they are said to have distinguished between despotic and constitutional rule.
  - 28. οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1333 b 27 sq.
- 30. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, in 1. 7. 1255 b 16 sqq. This reference to the πρῶτοι λόγοι might well be taken to show that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books do not fall within them, were it not that a similar reference occurs in 3. 6. 1278 b 17 sq., a chapter which certainly seems to form part of the πρῶτοι λόγοι (see vol. ii. p. xxi).
- 32. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further the actions of the just and temperate have in them the perfect realization of many things that are noble': cp. Plato, Tim. 90 D, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου, and Epinomis 985 A, θεὸν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν τέλος ἔχοντα τῆς θείας μοίρας ἔξω τούτων εἶναι, λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς. Πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν stands in contrast to οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν (26).
- 34. καίτοι τάχ' ἄν κ.τ.λ. The tyrant Jason is here alluded to (see vol. i. p. 237, note 1). A saying of his is mentioned in Rhet. 1. 12. 1373 a 25 (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 24 and De Sanitate Tuenda, c. 22), δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν, which no doubt referred to the acquisition of a tyranny. Jason was a great admirer of Gorgias (Paus. 6. 17. 9), and it is possible that Gorgias' praises of the practical and political life may have influenced him. Be that as it may, Aristotle evidently fears that his own identification of εὐδαιμονία with τὸ εὖ πράττειν (for this is what he means by τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων, cp. 1325 b 14 sq.) may lead some one to the same conclusion as Jason, but he hastens to explain that absolute power does not bring with it τὸ εὖ πράττειν, except in the hands of one who is as superior to those he rules as

a master is to his slaves (1325 b 3 sqq.). Aristotle does not dispute that political power makes it easier to do noble things (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 32 sqq.), but then political power must not be out of proportion to the worth of its possessor.

36. πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων ... πράξεων. This takes up πολλών καὶ καλών, 32.

ωστε οὐ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Susemihl reads e conj. δεῖν for δεῖ, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the indirecta oratio is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is describing the views of others. In the Phoenissae of Euripides Eteocles, who has deprived his brother Polyneices of his share of the Kingship, or Tyranny, of Thebes, refuses to give up the Tyranny to him, and Aristotle no doubt has his famous speech in his memory. He says (470 sqq. Bothe, 504 sqq. Dindorf),

ἄστρων ἃν ἔλθοιμ' ἡλίου πρὸς ἀντολὰς καὶ γῆς ἔνερθε, δυνατὸς ἃν δρᾶσαι τάδε, τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὥστ' ἔχειν τυραννίδα. τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ χρηστόν, μῆτερ, οὐχὶ βούλομαι ἄλλφ παρεῖναι μᾶλλον ἡ σώζειν ἐμοί.

- 38. καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων κ.τ.λ. This reads as if Aristotle were quoting from some solemn covenant for the establishment of a tyranny: compare the oath taken in support of Drusus in Diod. 37. II, τὸν αὐτὸν φίλον καὶ πολέμιον ἡγήσεσθαι Δρούσω, καὶ μήτε βίου μήτε τέκνων καὶ γονέων μηδεμιᾶς φείσεσθαι ψυχῆς, ἐὰν (μὴ) συμφέρη Δρούσω τε καὶ τοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον ὁμόσασιν. Polybius (7. 8. 9) dwells with emphasis, and perhaps with a little surprise, on the loyalty of Gelon to his father Hiero II, tyrant of Syracuse.
- 39. δλως, 'broadly,' not only fathers and children (who are one kind of friends), but friends of all sorts.

As to ὑπολογίζειν see critical note.

πρὸς τοῦτο, 'in comparison with this': cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. 1108 b 16, αἱ μέσαι ἔξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν.

- 1. τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἰρετώτατον, i.e. τὸ εὖ πράττειν. Isocrates had 1325 b. called τυραννίς in Evag. § 40 τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὅντων and τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγιστον καὶ σεμνότατον καὶ περιμαχητότατον.
- 2. ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος, 'in assuming this as the foundation of their argument they assume what is false.'
  - 3. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ. The reply of the Chorus to the speech of

Eteocles referred to above on 1325 a 36 (Eurip. Phoeniss. 492 sq. Bothe: 526 sq. Dind.) is perhaps present to Aristotle's memory:

οὐκ εὖ λέγειν χρὴ μὴ 'πὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τοῦτ', ἀλλὰ τῆ δίκῃ πικρόν.

Compare also the remark of Plato to Dionysius the Elder quoted above on 1288 a 4, Hdt. 3. 142, and Eurip. Fragm. 172.

7. τοις γὰρ ὁμοίοις κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq. Τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον is an expression which frequently recurs: cp. Plato, Gorg. 484 A, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, and Laws 854 C, ὡς δεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια πάντα ἄνδρα τιμῶν.

10. διὸ κὰν ἄλλος τις κ.τ.λ. This takes up and corrects 1325 a 36 sqq. Aristotle perhaps remembers the saying of Aristides when he surrendered his day of command at Marathon to Miltiades (Plut. Aristid. c. 5, καὶ παρ' ἡμέραν ἐκάστου στρατηγοῦ τὸ κράτος ἔχοντος, ὡς περιῆλθεν εἰς αὐτὸν ἡ ἀρχή, παρέδωκε Μιλτιάδη διδάσκων τοὺς συνάρχοντας ὅτι τὸ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν ἐστι καὶ σωτήριον). Aristides behaved in just the same way to Themistocles also, serving under him willingly and accepting the second place in the State (Plut. Aristid. c. 8: Aristid. et Cat. inter se comp. c. 5).

κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, 'in virtue and in the power which is capable of effecting the best things': cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 31, πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. Some take τῶν ἀρίστων after κρείττων and as masc., 'superior to the best men,' but not, I think, rightly. For ἀρετὴ καὶ δύναμις see above on 1284 a 6. The repetition of κατά may be for the sake of emphasis (κατά is not repeated in 3. 13. 1284 a 9, ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὅντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν). That Aristotle attaches importance to the presence of both qualifications is evident from 12 sqq. Compare the effect of the repetition of prepositions in 3. 11. 1281 b 15, περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος, and in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 4, οἶον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἱστρφ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι συμβέβηκεν.

11. For the repetition of τούτω see notes on 1317 b 5 and 1284 b 28.

12. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but [if a man is to be followed and obeyed as a sovereign,] he should possess,' etc. So in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. Aristotle requires of those who are to hold the more important magistracies that they shall possess not only virtue, but δύναμις μεγίστη τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς and attachment to the

existing constitution. Compare Callicles' description of οι κρείττους in Plato, Gorg. 491 A sq.

- 15. εὐπραγίαν. Aristotle uses both εὐπραγία and εὐπραξία: 'in Attic prose εὐπραγία was preferred' (Liddell and Scott).
- 16. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Two separate assertions are here made— (1) that activity is not necessarily in relation to others, and (2) that it is not necessarily a means to something else, but that thoughts which are an end in themselves may be of an active type. The first of these two assertions does not seem to be quite in harmony with the spirit at any rate of Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 30 sqq., but still we gather from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 31 sqq. that there is an use of virtue not προς έτερον but καθ' αύτόν (τελεία δ' ἐστίν (sc. ή όλη δικαιοσύνη), ότι ό έχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς έτερον δύναται τῆ ἀρετῆ χρησθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν). The second of them clearly conflicts with De An. 1. 3. 407 a 23, των μέν γάρ πρακτικών νοήσεων έστι πέρατα (πασαι γαρ έτέρου χάριν), αι δε θεωρητικαι τοις λόγοις όμοιως δρίζονται. But Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 368. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 400, note 1) that Aristotle sometimes uses the word πράξις in the Nicomachean Ethics in a wider sense than usual, and includes even pure thought under it-e.g. in Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 b 24, έπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἀπλη εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται, where he must refer in ή αὐτή πρᾶξις to contemplative activity.
- 17. καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες. Aristotle probably refers to the persons whose opinion is stated in 1325 a 21 sqq., for they appear to have held that a man who lives a contemplative life does nothing and is not πρακτικός. Epaminondas was regarded at the outset of his career as ἀπράγμων because he was a philosopher, and was consequently despised (Plut. Pelop. c. 5).
- 18. For the severance of ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν from τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν, on which it depends, compare c. 4. 1326 b 8, ὁ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὕταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, where κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν is similarly severed from πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. As here πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, so in the passage before us τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν is emphasized by its position in the sentence. Cp. also Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 179, τὰ ἐξενεγχθέντα ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἱερὰ ἀγάλματα ὑπὸ τῶν Περσῶν.
- 20. θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις, cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19, της πολιτικης διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας.
  - 21. ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία κ.τ.λ., ' for doing well is the end, and there-

fore there is a kind of action which is the end, [so that there is nothing strange in thoughts which are an end in themselves being active, and we predicate action also [as well as thought] in the truest and fullest sense, even in the case of actions done in relation to others, of those who as master-agents direct action by their thoughts, [and whose thoughts are therefore more an end in themselves than those of the journeymen they direct]. Των εξωτερικών πράξεων is in the gen. after ἀρχιτέκτονας. For καὶ πράττειν (i.e. πράττειν as well as διανοείσθαι), see above on 1255 a 14, καὶ βιάζεσθαι. That the thoughts of a master-agent are more an end in themselves than those of a subordinate, we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 14, έν άπάσαις δὲ (ταῖς τέχναις) τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αίρετώτερα των ύπ' αὐτά τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκείνα διώκεται. In 21-23 Aristotle corrects Plato, who in Polit. 259 C, E had identified πρακτικοί with χειροτεχνικοί, and had said that the ἀρχιτέκτων is γνωστικός, not πρακτικός (ΞΕ. της δή γνωστικής μάλλον ή της χειροτέχνικης καὶ όλως πρακτικης βούλει τὸν βασιλέα φωμεν οἰκειότερον είναι; and ΣΕ. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικός, ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί. ΞΕ. παρεχόμενός γέ που γνῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ χειρουργίαν. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οῦτω. ΞΕ. δικαίως δὴ μετέχειν αν λέγοιτο της γνωστικής ἐπιστήμης). In Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 24 sqq., however, the word πρακτικόs is used in the narrower sense in which Plato had used it in the Politicus, for here ή ἀρχιτεκτονική φρόνησις is marked off from another kind which is said to be πρακτική (cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 6. 1217 a 6, των μήτ' εχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν άρχιτεκτονικήν ή πρακτικήν). For ή γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις, cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ή δ' εὐδαιμονία πράξίς τις εὐπραξία γάρ, and De An. 3. 2. 426 a 27, εί δ' ή συμφωνία φωνή τίς έστιν.

23. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle, after proving the second of the two assertions contained in 16 sqq. (οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας κ.τ.λ.), takes up and proves the first of them (τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἐτέρους). States situated by themselves have already been said not to be necessarily unhappy (c. 2. 1324 b 41 sqq.), and now they are shown not to be necessarily inactive.

25. ούτω, i. e. καθ' αύτάς and not πρὸς έτέρους.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for this also [as well as other things] can take place by sections [and not alone between whole States].' Τοῦτο = τὸ πράττειν. For καὶ τοῦτο cp. c. 4. 1326 a 13, καὶ πόλεως. For κατὰ μέρη cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 27 sqq. Among the 'other things' referred to rule would be included, for it was a familiar fact

that rule might be exercised by successive sections of the citizenbody (1325 b 7 sq.).

26. πολλαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is implied that, if there are κοινωνίαι ('relations') between the parts of the State, activity will exist. We may suppose that when the parts of the State have relations with each other, inter-action results or co-operative action or both. What is meant here by the expression 'the parts of the State'? Among the parts referred to are probably rulers and ruled: cp. c. 4. 1326 b 12, εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων, and c. 14. 1332 b 12, ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων.

27. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο = τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀπρακτεῖν τὸν ζῆν καθ' αὐτὸν προηρημένον. For ὑπάρχειν κατά τινος, cp. De Interp. 3. 16 b 13 and Anal. Pr. 2. 22. 67 b 28.

28. σχολή γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise God and the whole universe [could hardly be active, and so] could hardly be well circumstanced [which all agree that they are], seeing that they have no actions external to them over and above their internal actions.' That God is well circumstanced we see from De Caelo, 2. 12. 202 a 22, folke γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἄριστα ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἄνευ πράξεως. The universe consists according to Aristotle of concentric spheres with the earth in the centre (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 447 sqq.: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 487 sqq.), and God, who is an incorporeal being distinct from the universe, is outside its outermost sphere, so far as an incorporeal being can be said to be in any particular place. He is the First Mover of the universe, but he moves it passively, as the object of love (Metaph. A. 7. 1072 b 3, κινεί δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον); he does not act upon it otherwise. Action is not to be predicated of him (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 8 sqq.: De Caelo, 2. 12. 292 a 22 sq., quoted above); at least not action in the ordinary sense of the word, for it would be beneath him; his only activity is thought, and as his thought must be exercised on what is best, it must be exercised on himself (Metaph. A. 9. 1074 b 33, αύτον ἄρα νοεί, είπερ έστι το κράτιστον, και έστιν ή νόησις νοήσεως νόησις). Acts of thought exercised by God on himself, therefore, are the οἰκείαι πράξεις ascribed to God in the passage before us. But if God has no έξωτερικαὶ πράξεις, neither has the universe, for in Aristotle's view there is but one universe in existence (De Caelo, 1. 8. 276 a 18 sqq.: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 446 sq.—Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 485 sq.); there is nothing corporeal outside the universe, and therefore nothing on which it can act. Plutarch maintains the opposite view, arguing for a plurality of worlds, in De Defect. Orac. c. 24, εἰσὶν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἔτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὖς χρῆται (ὁ θεὸς) ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς ἀρεταῖς, οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρῆσὶς ἐστι δικαιοσύνης ἡ χάριτος ἡ χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλους. For ὁ θεὸς καὶ πῶς ὁ κόσμος cp. Plato, Laws 821 A, τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον. For the contrast here of οἰκεῖος and ἐξωτερικός cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 33, where ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις stands in opposition to ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἔτερον: cp. also Plato, Rep. 521 A, οἰκεῖος ὧν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ τοιοῦτος πόλεμος.

- 32. τοις ἀνθρώποις, = τοις πολίταις, cp. c. 4. 1326 a 6, where τῶν ἀνθρώπων corresponds to πολιτῶν, c. 4. 1325 b 40, and also Isocr. Archid. § 81, οὐ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, and Thuc. 6. 18. 7.
- C. 4. 33. περὶ αὐτῶν, cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 2, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.
  - 34. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. This would seem to refer to the contents of the Second Book: cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 29, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολιτείας.
  - 37. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). I. I 288 b 39, νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας ζητοῦσι μόνον.
  - 38. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. See above on 1265 a 17, where the same remark occurs. We read in Plato, Rep. 456 C, οὖκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὖδὲ εὖχαῖς ὅμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, and in Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 68, εἰ γὰρ αὖ καλῶς μὲν ἔχοι, μὴ δυνατὸν δέ τι φράζοι, εὖχῆς, οὖ νόμου, διαπράττοιτ ἀν ἔργον, and these passages agree with that before us in implying that men often pray for impossibilities: yet εὔχου δυνατά is one of the Precepts ascribed to the Seven Wise Men in the Collection of Sosiades (Stob. Floril. 3. 80: Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 217). Προϋποτεθεῖσθαι is middle; the perfects τέθειμαι, ἐντέθειμαι are used more commonly in a middle than in a passive sense (see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, pp. 635, 636). The reason of this is, as Richards points out, that κεῖσθαι is used in their place to express the passive.
  - 39. λέγω δὲ οἶον περί τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας, sc. δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. Plato, who begins the construction of his State in the Laws (737 C sqq.) with arrangements respecting these matters, had in Aristotle's opinion (2. 6. 1265 a 10 sqq.) fixed the number of the citizens at an impossibly high figure.

40. ὅσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 709 C sq. (which Aristotle probably has before him), and Xen. Hipparch. 6. I, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄν τις δύναιτο πλάσαι οἷον βούλεται, εἰ μὴ ἐξ ὧν γε πλάττοιτο παρεσκευασμένα εἴη ὡς πείθεσθαι τῆ τοῦ χειροτέχνου γνώμη οὐδέ γ' ἄν ἐξ ἀνδρῶν, εἰ μὴ σὺν θεῷ οὖτω παρεσκευασμένοι ἔσονται ὡς φιλικῶς τε ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα κ.τ.λ.

4. τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτη. See note on 1274 b 36. 1326 a.

5. ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and under the head of political equipment falls first [for consideration] the body of men composing the State, how many and what sort of men they should be by nature,' etc. Compare the similar sentences in 6 (4). 15. 1200 a 4, ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον της πολιτείας πολλάς διαφοράς, πόσαι τε άρχαί, καὶ κύριαι τίνων κ.τ.λ., and 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 30-32. Πολιτική χορηγία, 'the equipment necessary to a State' (answering to την οἰκείαν ὕλην, 4), is different from the equipment necessary to an individual, but both are the gift of Nature and Fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sqq.: 1332 a 29 sqq., 39 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sq.). Nature supplies men possessing the needful qualities of body and soul (1332 a 40 sqq.), and Fortune supplies external and bodily goods (c. 1. 1323 b 27 sq.). Των ἀνθρώπων = πολιτών, 1325 b 40, and τών πολιτευομένων, c. 7. 1328 a 17. Aristotle is not here concerned with the number or quality of the slaves of the State or of its metoeci. As he says that the question of the characteristics of the men and the territory is the first which needs consideration under the head of 'political equipment,' we infer that there are others which need consideration, and what are they? Probably the questions which arise as to the subsidiary classes of cultivators and artisans; these are dealt with in cc. 8-10. Twás in 6 seems to belong both to πόσους and to ποίους, and τινά in 8 both to δσην and to ποίαν, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 17, περί μέν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισται σχεδόν, and c. 10. 1329 b 38, καὶ πόσην τινά χρή καὶ ποίαν είναι την χώραν (so apparently Bonitz, Ind. 533 a 59 sqq.). For κατὰ τὴν χώραν, 7 ('in connexion with the territory'), cp. Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 7, των δέ περί τους ανθρώπους ή κατά γυναίκα πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια. "Οσην, 7, is probably right: see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Crito 48 A, and cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 18, τῷ δὲ ἐρώτημά τι προύβαλε πεφροντισμένης δεύμενον αποκρίσεως, οδον όστις άριστος έν τοίς ανδράσιν ή ποία τις ή τοῦδε πράξις, and Herondas 2. 28, όστις έστὶ κάκ ποίου Πηλού πεφύρηται. Ms P1 have όπόσην, not πόσην, in 1328 a 18.

8. οἴονται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 742 D, ἔστι δὴ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος πολιτικοῦ βούλησις, φαμέν, οὐχ ἢνπερ ἀν οἱ πολλοὶ φαῖεν, δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην ὡς μεγίστην τε εἶναι τὴν πόλιν, ἢ νοῶν εὖ νομοθετοῖ, καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα πλουσίαν: cp. also Rep. 460 A, where there may be an allusion to the name of Megalopolis founded in B. c. 369 shortly before the time when many think that the Republic saw the light. See also Rep. 423 A sq. (referred to by Eaton) and Laws 737 D.

11. τῶν ἐνοικούντων, 'of the inhabitants,' not merely of the citizens, so that according to these authorities a city would be μεγάλη which

included a large number of slaves, metoeci, and aliens.

12. δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Caelo, 1. 5. 271 b 11, τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἡ μεγέθει, and Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 36, οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ ὁρίζων τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ ὀλίγον, ἀλλ' ἡ δύναμις τοῦ τε ἀποδιδόντος καὶ τοῦ λαμβάνοντος. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 32) remarks that δέ in εἰς δὲ δύναμιν is used in the same sense as ἀλλά, and compares Metaph. K. 3. 1061 a 23, μὴ τοῦ ὅλου λόγου, τοῦ τελευταίου δὲ εἴδους, and De An. 1. 5. 409 b 28.

13. καὶ πόλεως, 'of a State also [as well as of other things]': cp.
c. 3. 1325 b 25, καὶ τοῦτο.

18. οὐ κατὰ κ.τ.λ., 'it is not in respect of any and every multitude that we must do so.' For κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πληθος cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 26 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq. It is evident from what follows that Aristotle counts βάναυσοι here among δοῦλοι, just as he does in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq. Camerarius (Interp. p. 279) has already referred to the story told of Agesilaus by Plutarch in Ages. c. 26. The allies of the Lacedaemonians had contrasted the large number of troops which they contributed to the army of Agesilaus with the small number of the Spartans, and Agesilaus by way of reply ordered all the potters, smiths, carpenters, masons, and other βάναυσοι τεχνῦται in his army to stand up successively. Nearly every man in the contingent of the allies stood up, but not a single Spartan, and Agesilaus remarked, with a smile, ὁρᾶτε, ὁ ἄνδρες, ὅσφ πλείονας ὑμῶν στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπομεν ἡμεῖς. Aristotle may remember this story.

ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This would be especially the case in a State like that which Aristotle is constructing—a State in which the citizens are not allowed to practise handicrafts or to till the soil. It would also be the case in a State like that of Plato's Laws (848 A). But even in actual Greek States ξένοι were numerous.

Many handicraftsmen were \(\xi\)\(\epsilon\) (3. 5. 1278 a 7). \(\textit{Z}\)\(\epsilon\)\(\text{voi}\) were especially numerous in seaports (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), but even at Sparta there were \(\xi\)\(\xi\)\(\text{voi}\) (Plut. Agis, cc. 8, 10), not merely slaves. The rapid development of the arts and of commerce in ancient Greece was largely due to the ease with which its chief cities drew metoeci and other aliens from the Greek colonies in Asia and elsewhere and from Asia generally (see as to Sidonian residents in Athens Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 157). Many of these metoeci were skilled craftsmen. Asia and probably Egypt were to some of the arts of ancient Greece what Italy was to those of mediaeval Europe. Italy, indeed, did not supply metoeci to the ruder nations to the same extent. Even at the present day in Roumania commerce and industry are in the hands of foreigners, principally Jews, the upper classes being landed proprietors' (Times, March 18, 1897).

- 19. δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν. Here, as in 2. 7. 1266 b 10 sqq., ἀριθμός takes the place of πληθος. So in Phys. 6. 7. 237 b 33 τῷ πλήθει τῶν μορίων = τῷ ἀριθμῷ τῶν μορίων (Bon. Ind. 603 a 41).
- 20. ἀλλ' ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. Καὶ ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μορίων is added to explain in what sense ὅσοι πόλεώς εἰσι μέρος is used. It is implied in what follows that hoplites are οἰκεῖα μόρια τῆς πόλεως (cp. c. 9. 1329 a 37, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.), but not βάναυσοι, who are here contrasted with hoplites, though it is clear (see above on 18) that they often served as hoplites.
- 23. ἐξέρχονται. Aristotle probably remembers the description of the Egyptian Thebes in Hom. Il. 9. 383,

αΐ θ' έκατόμπυλοί είσι, διηκόσιοι δ' ἀν' έκάστας ἀνέρες εξοιχνεῦσι σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὅχεσφιν,

and perhaps also ἐκπέμπομεν in the story of Agesilaus related above on 18.

- 24. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. For the use of τε, compare c. 10. 1329 b 1, καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν.
- 25. ἀλλὰ μὴν... γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' i. e. that not only is a populous State not necessarily a large one, but that a very populous State cannot easily be a well-ordered one. And a State which is not well-ordered is only a State in name (3.9. 1280 b 5-8).

- 27. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν κ.τ.λ. 'Ανειμένην πρὸς τὸ πληθος, 'set free in the direction of number': cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 10, διαφθείροντας ἄμα τοῖς ἤθεσι τὰ σώματα πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνειμένα καὶ πλησμονήν. Carthage must have been an exception, unless we suppose its citizen-body to have been smaller in Aristotle's day than it afterwards became (see vol. ii. Appendix B). As to the Lacedaemonian State, cp. Isocr. Archid. § 81, where Archidamus is made to say, τῶν Ἑλλήνων διενηνόχαμεν οὐ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., and as to Athens, which was in the contrary plight, De Antid. § 172, διὰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων οὐκ εὐσύνοπτός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀκριβὴς κ.τ.λ.
- 29. ὅ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι. 'Id etiam conversum posuit libro tertio' (3. 16. 1287 a 18), 'ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος' (Camerarius, Interp. p. 280).
- 32. θείας γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'for surely this' (i. e. the ordering of a great number of things) 'is [beyond the power of man and] is the function of divine power, which is such as to hold together even the vast universe in which we live; the beautiful, in fact, [which is closely allied with order, is commonly found in connexion with a given number and magnitude.' For θεία δύναμις Bonitz (Ind. 324 a 1) compares the spurious De Mundo, 6. 397 b 19. Aristotle clearly has before him Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 22, αλλά θεούς γε τούς αεὶ όντας καὶ πάντ' ἐφορῶντας καὶ πάντα δυναμένους, οἱ καὶ τήνδε τὴν τῶν ὅλων τάξιν συνέχουσιν ἀτριβη καὶ ἀγήρατον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ ὑπὸ κάλλους καὶ μεγέθους άδιήγητον, τούτους φοβούμενοι μήποτε άσεβες μηδεν μηδε ανόσιον μήτε ποιήσητε μήτε βουλεύσητε: cp. also Plut. Dion, c. 10, πρὸς τὸ θειότατον ἀφομοιωθείς παράδειγμα των ὄντων καὶ κάλλιστον, ὧ τὸ πῶν ήγουμένω πειθόμενον έξ ακοσμίας κόσμος έστί, and for τόδε τὸ πᾶν, Plato, Polit. 269 C, τὸ γὰρ πῶν τόδε τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ξυμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτὲ δ' ἀνῆκεν, and Gorg. 508 A, καὶ τὸ δλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν. Συνέχειν is used as equivalent to ένοποιεῖν in De An. 1. 5. 410 b 10, ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ένοποιοῦν αὐτά (i. e. τὰ στοιχεῖα). ὕλη γὰρ ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα κυριώτατον γὰρ έκεινο τὸ συνέχον ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, and to μίαν ποιείν in De An. 1. 5. 411 b 6 sqq.: cp. Polyb. 11. 19. 3. Aristotle probably regards God as holding the universe together passively by being the common object towards which everything strives: see above on 1325 b 28. That the beautiful is closely allied with order we see from Metaph. M. 3. 1078 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ώρισμένον: cp. Plato, Phileb. 64 Ε, μετριότης γάρ καὶ

ξυμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι (both passages already quoted by Eaton). Vict. compares with the passage before us Poet. 7. 1450 b 34, ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἄπαν πρᾶγμα ὁ συνέστηκεν ἔκ τινων οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί, and Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1123 b 6, ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ.

34. διὸ καὶ πόλις κ.τ.λ., 'hence a State also,' as well as other things. For the 'nominativus pendens' πόλις, see Bon. Ind. s. v. Anacoluthia, where 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 9 sqq. is referred to among other passages, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Cratylus 403 A, ὁ δὲ κιδης, οἱ πολλοὶ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸ ἀειδὲς προσειρῆσθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ, and Riddell, Apology of Plato (Digest of Idioms, § 271 b), who quotes among other instances Theaet. 173 D and Rep. 565 D-E. Cp. also De Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 31 sqq. and De Part. An. 3. 8. 671 a 12 sqq., and see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 19. Bekker and Sus. have πόλιν in place of πόλις, but all MSS. except Γ M³ have πόλις, and there can be little doubt that πόλις is right, for this 'nominativus pendens' is a not uncommon form of anacoluthon.

ἡs κ.τ.λ., i.e. ἡs ὅρος μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος ὑπάρχει. Cp. 1326 b 23, οὖτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος. So in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 15, ἀλλ' ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ βουλομένων the words τύραννός ἐστι are to be supplied. See also note on 1279 b 38. 'O λεχθεὶς ὅρος is the standard of not being too large to be well-ordered.

35. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι κ.τ.λ., 'but in fact [apart from questions of beauty and good order] there is a due measure of size for a State also, as well as for everything else.' Not only will too large a State fail of being well-ordered and beautiful, but it will fail also to be able to discharge the function of a State and to realize self-completeness in respect of good life, and the same thing may be said of too small a State likewise. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29, τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερου πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἡ ἔστι τι μέτρου καὶ ψιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὕτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ᾶν πόλις οὕτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν: De Gen. An. 2. 6. 745 a 5, ἔστι γάρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις πέρας τοῦ μεγέθους, διὸ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀστῶν αὐξήσεως: De An. 2. 4. 416 a 16, τῶν δὲ ψύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἐστὶ πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως: De An. Motione, 3. 699 a 34, ἔστι γάρ τι πλῆθος ἰσχύος καὶ δυνάμεως καθ' ἡν μένει τὸ μένον,

ἄσπερ καὶ καθ' ἡν κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν: Plut. Sympos. 5. 5. 1, καὶ γὰρ συμποσίου μέγεθος ἱκανόν ἐστιν, ἄχρι οὖ συμπόσιον ἐθέλει μένειν ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερβάλη διὰ πλῆθος, ὡς μηκέτι προσήγορον ἑαυτῷ μηδὲ συμπαθὲς εἶναι ταῖς φιλοφροσύναις μηδὲ γνώριμον, οὐδὲ συμπόσιόν ἐστι. Compare also Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21–35. As to ὄργανα, see 1. 8. 1256 b 35 sq. We note that a State is distinguished by Aristotle from an ὅργανον. It is not a mere ὅργανον πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωήν for the individual, but a moral being like the individual, only nobler and greater than he (Eth. Nic. 1. 1094 b 7 sqq.).

- 39. ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως. Compare such expressions as ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως (Meteor. 4. 11. 389 b 10, φθειρόμενα καὶ ἐξιστάμενα τῆς φύσεως) οτ χωρίζεσθαι τῆς φύσεως (Meteor. 4. 1. 379 a 14), which stand in contrast to ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν (Poet. 4. 1449 a 15, ἔσχεν ἡ τραγωδία τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν).
- 41. δυοίν σταδίοιν, cp. Poet. 7. 1451 a 2, οἶον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῷον.
- εἰς δέ τι μέγεθος ἐλθόν, 'but when it has assumed a measured size.' Cp. Meteor. 1. 14. 352 a 6, ξηραινόμενοι γὰρ οἱ τόποι ἔρχονται εἰς τὸ καλῶς ἔχειν.
- 1326 b. 2. ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq., where the view expressed by the Platonic Socrates in Rep. 369 D, εἴη δ' ἃν ῆ γε ἀναγκαιστάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν, is corrected.
  - 3. ή δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν κ.τ.λ. Α πόλις consisting of too large a number of citizens is not a πόλις because a πόλις is a κοινωνία πολιτών πολιτείας (3. 3. 1276 b 1), and a constitution cannot easily exist in a very large πόλις, for magistrates cannot easily exist in it, and a constitution implies the existence of magistracies (6 (4). I. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μέν γάρ έστι τάξις ταις πόλεσιν ή περί τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται). It seems to be implied that the constitution is the source of 'completeness in respect of good life.' Aristotle's argument here throws some light on his reference to Babylon in 3. 3. 1276 a 27 sqq., where it is implied that Babylon covered too large a space to be one city. He would probably also say that its inhabitants were too numerous to possess a constitution or to be marshalled by a general. When he says that an ἔθνος possesses only 'completeness in respect of necessaries,' is he speaking of ἔθνη composed of πόλεις (see note on 1261 a 27), as well as of εθνη composed of villages? As to Aristotle's account of the εθνος something has already been said in vol. i. p. 39. We should have been glad if he had told us more on the subject (see note on 1274 b 34 sqq.).

The ἔθνος appears to be a κοινωνία (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν): it has νόμιμα οτ νόμοι (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 9 sqq.); it is bound together not only by internal trade and by united action against external foes, but also by intermarriage and common sacrifices; it is often ruled by a King, and may even have an Absolute King at its head (3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), but it is too large to have a constitution—we must suppose that the word constitution is here used in a sense exclusive of Kingship—apparently because it is too large to be controlled by common magistrates (cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 40). We may conjecture that in Aristotle's view the members of an ἔθνος have not that desire to promote the virtue of their fellows which is to him one distinguishing mark of a citizen (3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.). An ἔθνος is, in fact, rather a συμμαχία and something more than a πολιτική κοινωνία.

- 7. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Here again, as in 2, the Platonic Socrates is corrected (see above on 2). Cp. c. 8. 1328 b 16 sq. and 2. 2. 1261 b 12. Take πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν together (see note on 1325 b 18). Κατά seems to mean 'in connexion with': cp. c. 2. 1324 a 15, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος) ἡ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος. For τοσούτου followed by ὅ, see above on 1267 a 24.
- 9. ἐνδέχεται δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μείζω is bracketed by Schneider, Bekker², and Susemihl, but it appears to be correct: cp. De Gen. An. 4. 4. 77 I b 33, ἀλλ', ὅσπερ καὶ τελεουμένων τῶν ζώων ἔστιν ἐκάστου τι μέγεθος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ὧν οὔτ' ἄν μεῖζον γένοιτο οὔτ' ἔλαττον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ διαστήματι τοῦ μεγέθους λαμβάνουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, καὶ γίνεται μείζων ὁ δ' ἐλάττων ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁτιοῦν, οῦτω καὶ κ.τ.λ. A man must be of a certain minimum size, if he is to be a man at all; if he exceeds that minimum and does not exceed the maximum, he is a larger man; if he exceeds the maximum, he ceases to be a man. The same thing, we are told in the passage before us, holds of the πόλις.

11. ωσπερ εἴπομεν, in 1326 a 34 sqq.

14. ἄρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον. Κρίσις here refers especially to judicial decisions (cp. τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων in the next sentence). In the similar passage, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., on the other hand (μάλιστα δ' ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας, ὅσαις ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο' τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν), κρῖναι does not refer to judicial decisions, for here Aristotle is speaking of ἀρχαί in

a sense exclusive of τὸ δικαστικόν, of which he treats in another chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 16).

πρὸς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων seems to be given as an instance of ai των ἀρχόντων πράξεις, and τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ' άξίαν as an instance of αι των άρχομένων. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Laws 738 D, ὅπως αν... φιλοφρονωνταί τε ἀλλήλους μετα θυσιών και οικειώνται και γνωρίζωσιν, οδ μείζον οὐδεν πόλει αγαθών ή γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ὅπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοις τρόποις, άλλα σκότος, οὖτ' αν τιμης της άξίας οὖτ' άρχων οὔτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἃν της προσηκούσης δρθώς τυγχάνοι: cp. also Laws 751 D and 766 E. Dr. Johnson says of the lairds' courts in the Highlands of Scotland (Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8. 320)—'When the chiefs were men of knowledge and virtue, the convenience of a domestic judicature was great. No long journeys were necessary, no artificial delays could be practised; the character, the alliances, and interests of the litigants were known to the court, and all false pretences were easily detected.' See also vol. i. p. 314, note 3. In ώς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Athens, for though in addressing an Athenian audience Hyperides says (Pro Lycophr. col. xii. 5, ed. Blass), λαθείν γάρ τὸ πλήθος τὸ ὑμέτερον οὐκ ἔνι οὔτε πονηρὸν ὄντα οὐδένα τῶν ἐν τῆ[ι] πόλει οὕτε ἐπ[ι]εικῆ, Isocrates describes Athens in De Antid. § 172 as too large to be εὐσύνοπτος (cp. Thuc. 8. 66. 3, already referred to by Eaton). Still even at Athens owing to the publicity of men's life in ancient Greece fellow-citizens knew each other far better than they do in a modern city of the same size: see Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 179 sq., who however goes too far when he says, 'tout se savait, tous se connaissaient à Athènes.' It is, indeed, difficult to understand how even in a citizen-body of (say) 5,000, with all the help derivable from frequent festivals, every citizen could be known, either personally or by repute, to his fellows. Yet Aristotle seems to imply that the citizens of a State ought to be acquainted with the character of every member of their body, if not with his person. The experience of the United States fully confirms the view of Plato and Aristotle that where fellow-citizens are not well acquainted with each other's characters, offices will not be well filled. 'In moderately-sized communities men's characters are known, and the presence of a bad man in office brings on his fellow-citizens evils which they are not too numerous to feel individually.... In large cities the results are different because the

circumstances are different' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, Part 3, c. 62). 'City governments begin to be bad when the population begins to exceed 100,000 and includes a large proportion of recent immigrants. They are generally pure in smaller places, that is to say, they are as pure as those of an average English, French, or German city' (ibid. Part 3, c. 67: vol. ii. p. 521, ed. 1. See also c. 61, vol. ii. p. 435). Aristotle would, of course, think a citizen-body even of 100,000 ten times more numerous than it ought to be. As to London, compare a remark made by a member of the County Council of London at its first meeting. 'Provincial corporations could easily proceed to elect aldermen, because in the provincial towns persons knew all about each other, but it was quite different in the metropolis' (Times, Feb. 1, 1889).

20. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις κ.τ.λ. This frequently happened at Athens. The register of citizens was kept by the deme: 'l'assemblée du dème est peu fréquentée; c'est un petit nombre de voix qu'il faut acheter, et quelques drachmes suffisent : ici cinq drachmes par tête, ailleurs peut-être moins encore.' See Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 32 sqq., who refers to Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 50, οὖτοι γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, βουλομένους τινας ανθρώπους ξένους πολίτας γενέσθαι, 'Αναξιμένην και Νικόστρατον, κοινή διανειμάμενοι πέντε δραχμάς έκαστος προσεδέξαντο. Those whose names got upon the register in this or in other unlawful ways were called παρέγγραπτοι. The larger the State was, the less check there would be on the registering authority. The Attic demes of Halimus, Sunium, and Potami, all of them on the coast, were especially credited with a readiness to admit aliens to the register (Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 32). It will be noticed that Aristotle speaks only of aliens and metoeci, not of slaves.

- 22. δήλον τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 314.
- 24. εὐσύνοπτος must apparently mean 'easily within the view of the magistrates and the citizens' (cp. 14 sqq.).
- 26. Παραπλησίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Similarly,' because Aristotle has just C. 5. said that the larger the State is, the better, if only it is εὐσύνοπτος, and now he goes on to say that the most self-complete territory is the best, and one which is large enough to support its citizens in a life, not temperate only, but temperate and liberal, though it must be εὐσύνοπτος (1327 a 1). Αὐταρκεστάτην, 27, takes up

αὐτάρκειαν, 24. For τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας, cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 23, τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων. We more often have the acc. after περί in phrases of this kind in the Politics.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For περί in the sense of 'quod attinet ad,' see Vahlen on Poet. 23. 1459 a 16, who quotes Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 25, καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσι διττοί, and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 29. With ποίαν τινά supply δεὶ εἶναι τὴν χώραν. In his preference for a territory as self-complete as possible Aristotle follows Plato, Laws 704 C, Αθ. τί δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ χώρα; πότερα πάμφορος ἡ καὶ τινῶν ἐπιδεής; ΚΛ. σχεδὸν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεής, and Critias 110 E, and also Solon (Hdt. 1. 32, ὥσπερ χώρη οὐδεμίη καταρκέει πάντα έωντῆ παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει, ἐτέρου δὲ ἐπιδέεται ἡ δὲ ἄν τὰ πλείστα ἔχη, ἀρίστη αὕτη). Hesiod, indeed, had already said of the just (Op. et Dies, 236),

θάλλουσιν δ' ἀγαθοῖσι διαμπερές οὐδ' ἐπὶ νηῶν νίσσονται, καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα, with which Virgil's lines (Ecl. 4. 38 sq.) may be compared, Cedet et ipse mari vector, nec nautica pinus Mutabit merces: omnis feret omnia tellus.

Thessaly was famed for the variety of its produce; it was rich in corn and wine and timber, and in pasture for horses cattle and sheep (Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland, 1. 47); Cyprus was rich in corn, wine, oil, timber, and copper (Strabo, p. 684). We read of the χώρα πάμφορος of the Tyrrhenians in Diod. 5. 40. 3, and of the νησος εὐδαίμων καὶ πάμφορος of Sardinia in [Aristot.] De Mir. Auscult. 100. 838 b 22. Isocrates speaks of Egypt in Busir. § 12 as πλείστα καὶ παντοδαπὰ φέρειν δυναμένην. Messenia (Eurip. Fragm. 1068) and Laconia (E. Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 218) were remarkable for the variety of their produce. All these were fertile regions, but there were countries which were at once πάμφοροι and rugged, and it is a territory of this kind that Plato prefers (Laws 704 D). Aristotle would hardly follow him in this. He would hardly be satisfied with a territory like the Attic, which comprised much poor land (Plut. Solon, c. 22), though it is called παμφορωτάτη by Xenophon (De Vect. 1. 3: cp. Plato, Critias 110 E, and Antiphanes, Fragm. 'Ομώνυμοι: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 98). The main reason which leads both Plato and Aristotle to prefer a πάμφορος territory is that in a State possessing such a territory importation and exportation are reduced to a minimum, and consequently also the commercial class. States with a barren territory

have often in the history of the world been forced to become commercial in order to exist—e.g. Aegina (above on 1258 a 34), Phocaea (Justin, 43. 3. 5), Elea (Strabo, p. 252). As to Chios see note on 1291 b 20. Much of the territory of Corinth was infertile, and this helped to make her a commercial State (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 516). 'It was on a bare rock surrounded by deep sea that the streets of Tyre were piled up to a dizzy height' (Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 24). As to Venice see H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 251. 'Nuremberga, cuius agro nihil magis sterile fieri potest, omnium tamen Germaniae urbium populosissima et opificum multitudine florentissima putatur' (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 518). The word παυτοφόροs appears to be extremely rare: πάμφοροs is common enough.

30. πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει κ.τ.λ. With τοσαύτην we should probably supply, not πᾶς τις ἄν ἐπαινέσειε, but δεῖ εἶναι as with περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά, 26 (cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41 sqq.). See 2.6. 1265 a 28–38, where the same standard is adopted, in correction of Plato, Laws 737 D, γῆς μὲν ὁπόση πόσους σώφρονας ἄντας ἱκανὴ τρέφειν. Yet Plato's language in Critias 112 C, τὸ μέσον ὑπερηφανίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας μεταδιώκοντες κοσμίας ῷκοδομοῦντο οἰκήσεις, is quite in the spirit of that of Aristotle here. Aristotle does not wish the citizens of his 'best State' to live either like the people of Myconus, who were charged with stinginess (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 175), or like the Boeotians, of whom the comic poet Eubulus said (Meineke, 3. 222),

κτίζε Βοιωτών πόλιν

ανδρών αρίστων έσθίειν δι' ήμέρας.

See also vol. i. p. 316, note 1. For the use here of πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει, cp. c. 6. 1327 b 3, περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. We have μείζων καὶ πλείων used in a somewhat similar way in Meteor. 2. 5. 363 a 15, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸν τόπον εἶναι πολὺ πλείω ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀναπεπταμένον μείζων καὶ πλείων καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλεεινὸς ἄνεμος ὁ νότος ἐστὶ τοῦ βορέου, and in Aen. Poliorc: c. 8, προσδεχόμενον πλείω καὶ μείζω δύναμιν πολεμίων. Σχολάζοντας, 31, 'though at leisure.'

33. ὖστερον. This is one of the promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it (see vol. ii. p. xxvii sqq.).

περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας. Καί is explanatory, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας being added to make it clear in what sense κτῆσις will be dealt with. Κτῆσις has been dealt with from

another point of view in 1. 8. 1256 a 1 sqq. Compare what Plato says on the subject in Rep. 591 D sq. For  $\tau \eta s$  περὶ  $\tau \eta \nu$  οὐσίαν εὐπορίας cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3, προσόδων εὐπορίας, and Isocr. Panath. § 7,  $\tau \eta s$  περὶ τὸν βίον εὐπορίας. See also below on 1327 a 8,  $\tau \eta s$  περὶ ξύλα ὕλης.

35. πως δεί και τίνα τρόπον έχειν προς την χρησιν αυτήν, 'how and in what way it should stand to the use made of it': cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 99, εὐπορία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τις πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βίφ χρήσεις οὕτως ἔχη ὥστε καὶ φίλους εὖ ποιῆσαι καὶ φιλοτίμως καὶ εὐπόρως ἀπολειτουργῆσαι, and Xen. Hiero, 4. 8, οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἀριθμῷ οὕτε τὰ πολλὰ κρίνεται οὕτε τὰ ίκανά, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις ωστε τὰ μεν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὰ ἱκανὰ πολλά έστι, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἱκανῶν ἐλλείποντα ὀλίγα. For πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον, cp. Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 31, ώστε τοῦτο σκεπτέον λαβοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀρχήν, εἴ τι κινεῖ αὐτὸ αὑτό, πως κινεί και τίνα τρόπον: Hippocr. De Capitis Vulneribus, vol. iii. p. 356 Kühn, χρή δὲ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν τὸν τετρωμένον ὅπως ἔπαθε καὶ τίνα τρόπον: Plato, Laws 964 D, πως οὖν δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὧ ξένε, απεικάζοντες αὐτὸ τοιούτω τινὶ λέγομεν; and Polyb. 1. 32. 2, πως καὶ τίνι τρόπω γέγονεν, and 2. 31. 7, οὕτω καὶ τούτω τῷ τρόπω: see also Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 681 D, οὖτω τε καὶ ταύτη. Αὐτήν is added to την χρησιν to contrast 'the use itself' with τὰ πρὸς την χρησιν: cp. c. 13. 1331 b 24, περί δὲ της πολιτείας αὐτης, where 'the constitution itself' is tacitly contrasted with matters preliminary to the constitution and not falling within it. Vet. Int. wrongly refers αὐτήν to της περὶ την οὐσίαν εὐπορίας, translating 'qualiter oportet habere et quo modo ipsam ad usum.'

36. πολλαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.. 'for there are many disputes on the subject of this inquiry, arising because of those who,' etc. For ἔλκειν ἐψ' ἐκατέραν τὴν ὑπερβολήν, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 22, ἔλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, and Plato, Laws 890 A, ἐλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ ψύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον. Should τὴν χρῆσιν be supplied with ἔλκοντας? On the side of γλισχρότης were the Pythagoreans (see a fragment of Aristophon in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 362, and fragments of Alexis, ibid. 3. 474, 483), the Cynics (Diog. Laert. 6. 8 sub fin.: 6.25: Diog. Cynicus, Fragm. 273 Mullach), and writers like Ephorus (see above on 1265 a 30), to say nothing of the lawgivers of Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 5 sq.: Plut. Lycurg. c. 17) and Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 22); while on the side of τρυφή were Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 68, 69, 84) and others (vol. i. p. 301, and p. 302, note 1: also p. 199, note 1).

39. τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας κ.τ.λ. Wyse, followed by Sus.4, is

probably right in placing δεῖ δ' ἔνια—ἐμπείροιs in a parenthesis and making ὅτι κ.τ.λ. dependent on εἰπεῖν. Τὸ εἶδος τῆς χώρας, 'the character of the territory,' i.e. its geographical character, as distinguished from the character of the soil, which has been dealt with in 1326 b 26–30. Cp. Plato, Laws 625 C, τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁρᾶτε, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς, and 834 C.

δεὶ δ' ἔνια κ.τ.λ., 'and we must be guided in respect of some matters by the opinion also of those who are experienced in questions of generalship [as well as that of those who look especially to the supply of commodities, the subject which has just been before us].' Aristotle may probably have before him the work of Aeneas Tacticus entitled Στρατηγικὰ βιβλία οτ περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα, of which we possess a part in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas (see below on 1331 a 16): cp. c. 8, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν χώραν προσδεχόμενον πλείω καὶ μείζω δύναμιν πολεμίων πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν δυσείσβολον τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δυσστρατοπέδευτον καὶ δυσπόρευτον κατασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ποταμοὺς δυσδιαβάτους καὶ δύσπλους, and c. 16. 16 sqq. Aristotle learns something from generals in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 16 sqq. as well as here.

40. ὅτι χρὴ μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον. Compare what is said of the city in c. 11. 1330 b 2 sqq. and 1331 a 3 sqq. Egypt (see vol. i. p. 316, note 2, and Strabo, p. 819) and Persis (Plut. Alex. c. 37) were difficult of access to foes, and Socrates claimed (vol. i. p. 316, note 2) that Attica was so, but Laconia is probably especially present to Aristotle's mind, for it was δυσεμβολωτάτη (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24: Eurip. Fragm. 1068: see Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 217, 311). Boeotia, on the contrary, lay comparatively open to the foe (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Epaminond. 18. 193 Ε, καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑπτίαν οὖσαν καὶ ἀναπεπταμένην πολέμου δρχήστραν προσηγόρευεν, ώς μή δυναμένους κρατείν αὐτης, αν μή την χείρα διὰ πόρπακος ἔχωσι), and of Elis we read in Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 6, 'No region of the Peloponnese is less protected against attacks from without. A broad river-valley leads, like an open entrance-road, from the interior into the midst of Elis; the mountains at the back of the territory afford little protection, because they are only the lower ranges of higher mountains. The level coast-line offers the easiest of approaches from the North and the South; the plains and the villages are exposed on all sides to landings from a hostile fleet.' That a country might be at once

hard of entrance to foes and easy of exit for friends we see from Plato, Laws 761 A, δύσβατα δὲ δὴ πάντα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὅ τι μάλιστα εὔβατα, ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ ὑποζυγίοις καὶ βοσκήμασιν, ὁδῶν τε ἐπιμελουμένους κ.τ.λ. Another characteristic which the territory should possess, but which is not noticed here, is that it should be such as to favour the unity of the State (7 (5). 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). Χρὴ τοῖς μέν, not χρὴ μὲν τοῖς, is the logical order, but 'μέν interdum non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20): see above on 1268 b 12.

1327 a. 2. ούτω καὶ τὴν χώραν, Sc. εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι δεῖ.

3. της δε πόλεως την θέσιν κ.τ.λ. The recommendation that the territory should be well within reach for purposes of protection leads on naturally to the question as to the site of the city. This question is here dealt with only so far as the position of the city with reference to the territory and the sea is concerned; other matters come up for consideration in c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. city should be placed where it will be readily able to protect the territory and to receive supplies of commodities. purposes it must be near the sea, yet it must also be well situated with respect to the territory. Whether Aristotle's opinion was known to Alexander when he founded Alexandria in B. C. 332, it is impossible to say, but at any rate the site of this city in many respects fulfilled Aristotle's requirements. Cp. Strabo, p. 798, τη̂s δ' εὐκαιρίας της κατά την πόλιν τὸ μέγιστόν έστιν ὅτι της Αἰγύπτου πάσης μόνος έστιν οὖτος ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἄμφω πεφυκώς εὖ, τά τε ἐκ θαλάττης διὰ τὸ εὐλίμενον, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὅτι πάντα εὐμαρῶς ὁ ποταμὸς πορθμεύει συνάγει τε είς τοιούτον χωρίον ὅπερ μέγιστον ἐμπόριον τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐστί. (No doubt Aristotle would not rejoice in the greatness of Alexandria as an emporium or in its close contiguity to the sea.) Some cities had the fault of being at a great distance from their territory (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.). In not a few cases part of the territory was cut off from the city by mountains (this was the case with the Thyrean territory of Argos and the Lepreate territory of Elis), or by an arm of the sea (as when island cities held territory on the adjacent mainland). On the other hand, there were cities like Sparta, which were too far from the sea. Sparta is probably especially present to Aristotle's mind in 1327 a 3-27. It was evidently in his opinion not situated so well either for the protection of its territory or for the transmission of produce from its territory, as it would have been if it had been nearer to the sea,

Nor was it (18 sqq.) easily within reach of rescue by sea or capable of striking a blow by sea, nor could it well receive by sea commodities lacking to it or send away by sea its surplus produce. The cities of Elis and Messene were also too far from the sea. Cp. Polyb. 2. 5, ταύτας γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰς χώρας (i.e. τὴν Ἡλείαν καὶ τὴν Μεσσηνίαν) Ίλλυριοι πορθούντες διετέλουν διά γάρ το μήκος τής παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ μεσογαίους είναι τὰς δυναστευούσας εν αὐταῖς πόλεις μακραὶ καὶ βραδείαι λίαν εγίνοντο τοις προειρημένοις αι παραβοήθειαι προς τας αποβάσεις των Ἰλλυριων, όθεν άδεως ἐπέτρεχον καὶ κατέσυρον ἀεὶ ταύτας τὰς χώρας. In Aristotle's view the ideal site for a city was one which placed it in easy communication with both land and sea. Rome, according to Cicero (De Rep. 2. 5. 10), was marked out for empire by a position of this kind, and much the same thing may be said of London. We learn, indeed, from c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. that a city should be in easy communication, not only with its own territory and with the sea, but also with the mainland on the verge of which it lies. Such was the situation of Athens: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, καὶ μὴν οὐ περίρρυτός γε οὖσα (ἡ ᾿Αττικὴ) ὅμως ὥσπερ νῆσος πασιν ανέμοις προσάγεται τε ων δείται και αποπέμπεται α βούλεται αμφιθάλαττος γάρ έστι. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπόρια ἤπειρος γάρ ἐστιν. Aristotle evidently prefers the site of Athens to that of Sparta, and indeed to those of most other Greek cities. It is easy to see from 1327 a 3-27 that Greek cities at a distance from the sea, and especially those whose communications with the coast were difficult -such cities, for instance, as Tegea and Mantineia—were neither very secure from foes nor very well supplied with commodities, and that cities immediately on the coast—and most Greek colonies were thus situated—tended to become denationalized and disorderly owing to the multitude of aliens which flocked to them, and also to suffer an increase in the number of their citizens not conducive to efficient government. In this matter as in others Aristotle favours a mean; the city should be neither on the sea nor too far from it.

- 4. πρός τε τὴν θάλατταν κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words cp. c. 11. 1331 a 12 sqq. and c. 16. 1335 b 5 sqq. 'Τε... τε, ut apud omnes prosarios, apud Aristotelem quoque raro in usum venit' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 16, who gives as another instance in the Politics c. 10. 1329 b 2 sq.).
- 5. εἶς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος. We expect μὲν οὖν in place of μέν, but cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 19, εἶς μὲν τρόπος διδασκαλίας ἦν αὐτῷ οὖτος τοῦ

παρείναι ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and Thuc. 2. 97. 2, τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαύτη ἦν.

- 7. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κ.τ.λ., i.e. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι εὐπαρακόμιστον κ.τ.λ. I follow the punctuation of Jackson, Welldon, and Sus. The fact that Athens lay near the coast must have greatly facilitated and cheapened the transport to it of the produce of its territory, and especially the transport of heavy commodities like timber, stone, marble, and metals.
- 8. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further, of material for timber and for any other industry of the kind that the territory may possess.' Aristotle passes from τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν, 7, to commodities like wood, stone, and metals which are ἄκαρπα μὲν χρήσιμα δέ (1. 11. 1258 b 27 sqq.: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 5, ἔστι δὲ καὶ γῆ ἡ σπειρομένη μὲν οὐ φέρει καρπόν, ὀρυττομένη δὲ πολλαπλασίους τρέφει ἡ εἰ σῖτον ἔφερε). Attica was rich in marble and silver (ibid. 1. 4 sq.). For ἐργασίαν, cp. Thuc. 4. 105, κτῆσίν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῆ περὶ ταῦτα Θράκη. For τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, cp. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας, and Top. 2. 7. 113 a 31, διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθήσεως τὴν ἐν ἐκάστω μορφὴν γνωρίζομεν, and see Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.
- 11. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας κ.τ.λ. The persons C. 6. referred to here held that nearness to the sea was prejudicial to orderly government in two ways—(1) it involved the residence in the city of aliens bred up under other laws and likely to exercise an unfavourable moral influence on the citizens; (2) it involved the existence of a very numerous citizen-body, inasmuch as the numbers of the citizen-body would be swollen by a body of merchants, who, it is taken for granted, would be citizens. (That the word πολυανθρωπία refers to the number of the citizens appears from 1327 b 7-9, where it is explained that in Aristotle's 'best State' there will be no πολυανθρωπία in connexion with the oarsmen of the fleet, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως.) Aristotle contends, on the contrary, that nearness to the sea does not necessarily involve either of these results. The city might be placed at a little distance from the sea and might possess a port on the coast, whose inhabitants might be restrained from free communication with the inhabitants of the city; and this port should be a small port, intended for the supply of the needs of the members of the State, not of those of the world in general. Who were the critics whose views are here controverted? Possibly Plato is referred to, but this is not certain, for though he objects

to nearness to the sea in Laws 704 D sqq. (see Stallbaum on this passage, who refers to Cic. De Rep. 2.3.5 sqq., and cp. Laws 949E sq., 952 D sqq.) on account of the risk of evil influences from aliens, he does not object to it on the ground of its involving πολυανθρωπία. In all probability the views here controverted were those of persons oligarchically inclined. That πολυανθρωπία is unfavourable to good government we have already seen (c. 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). Many Greek cities were much exposed to the influence of aliens. Byzantium was overrun with them (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14: cp. Athen. Deipn. 526 e), and at Agrigentum in its palmy days, if we may trust Diodorus (13. 84. 4), there were 180,000 aliens, while the citizens numbered somewhat more than 20,000. Haussoullier (Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 189) shows how foreign worships were instituted at the Peiraeus by aliens for their own behoof, and some of these probably spread to the citizens. We know that the seaports of Dundee and Leith were the channels through which the Reformation found its way into Scotland. "" The knowledge of God," says Knox, "did considerably increase within the realm, and this was chiefly effected by merchants and mariners belonging to Dundee and Leith," who imported the reformed doctrines from abroad' (Academy, Feb. 11, 1893). That contact with aliens might have ill results, we see from Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35. 95, Carthaginienses fraudulenti et mendaces non genere, sed natura loci, quod propter portus suos multis et variis mercatorum et advenarum sermonibus ad studium fallendi studio quaestus vocabantur. Contact with aliens even of a satisfactory type might well affect the fidelity of the citizens of a Greek State to its traditions, and many of the aliens who crowded to Greek seaports were Asiatics of a type the reverse of satisfactory. The people of Epidamnus found that those of their citizens who had much communication with their Illyrian neighbours became demoralized (Plut. Quaest. Graec. 29, γιγνομένους πουηρούς). We read of the Spartan Callicratidas in Diod. 13. 76. 2, οὖτος δὲ νέος μὲν ἦν παντελως, ἄκακος δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν άπλους, ούπω των ξενικών ήθων πεπειραμένος, δικαιότατος δε Σπαρτιατών. Machiavelli in his Discourses on the First Decad of Livy (r. 55) ascribes the integrity and piety of the Germans of his day in part to the fact that 'they have never had much commerce with their neighbours, being seldom visited by them and seldom going abroad themselves, but live contented with the food and clothing that are the product of their own country, thereby preventing

all opportunities of evil conversation that might corrupt their manners.' It should be noticed that the argument here reproduced by Aristotle assumes that aliens did not take up their abode in inland cities; this does not, however, seem to have been invariably the case, for we hear of metoeci at Thebes (Diod. 17. 11: Lys. Or. 23. 15) and under the name of πάροικοι at Thespiae (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 294. 1). Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in c. 4. 1326 a 18 sqq. as if a body of aliens and metoeci was a necessary appendage to every Greek State.

15. γίνεσθαι μεν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., sc. τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν. With διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πληθος Bonitz (Ind. s. v. διαπέμπειν) compares De Part. An. 4. 5. 681 a 28, ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον δύο πόρους καὶ μίαν διαίρεσιν, ἢ τε δέχεται τὴν ὑγρότητα τὴν εἰς τροφήν, καὶ ἢ πάλιν διαπέμπει τὴν ὑπολειπομένην ἰκμάδα.

18. μèν οὖν appears to be answered by δέ, 32. ταὖτα, i.e. τὸ ἐπιξενοὖσθαί τινας and ἡ πολυανθρωπία.

19. πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων. States in command of the sea were for one thing less exposed to famine than States which were not ([Xen.] De Rep. Ath. 2. 6). See also Plato, Laws 705 A (quoted in the next note). We can imagine with what anxiety cities at a distance from the sea, for instance those of Arcadia, watched the prospects of the corn-harvest. The worship of Demeter and of Zeus, the giver of rain, would be especially congenial to such localities. They no doubt kept a vigilant eye on their rivers and the catabothra through which they in some cases flowed off to see that no flooding occurred and that they were not interfered with by rival neighbouring States. Greek colonies, on the other hand, were mostly at no great distance from the sea, and their command of necessaries must consequently have been much superior to that of many districts of Greece proper.

μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, cp. 25, ἀμφοτέρων (i.e. γῆς καὶ θαλάττης) μετέχουσιν. Susemihl, following Bojesen, reads μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, referring to c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. and to c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq., but compare on the other hand 32, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας κ.τ.λ., and Plato, Laws 705 A (a passage perhaps present to Aristotle's mind here), πρόσοικος γὰρ θάλαττα χώρα τὸ μὲν παρ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ, μάλα γε μὴν ὅντως άλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα. The territory no less than the city may be said μετέχειν τῆς θαλάττης, for it draws part of its supplies from the sea and sends part of its

surplus produce away by sea, besides being more easily protected against foes. Aristotle had advised in c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. that the city should be well placed in relation both to its territory and to the sea. No one had disputed that it should be well placed in relation to its territory, but a doubt had been raised whether it ought to stand in any relation whatever to the sea. Hence what is uppermost in Aristotle's mind is to show that it should not be far from the sea. That it will be well placed in relation to its territory, he takes for granted.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For evidence of this fact, see vol. i. p. 317. Compare also Thuc. 5. 82. 5 sq. The successful resistance of the seaport Stralsund to the besieging army of Wallenstein illustrates Aristotle's remark. 'The problem of overcoming the resistance of a fortress open to unlimited succours by sea is one of the most difficult in the whole art of war' (S. R. Gardiner, Thirty Years' War, p. 107). The Duke of Wellington preferred Calcutta to Agra as the seat of British Government in India (Lord Stanhope's Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 306). For πρὸς τὸ ῥᾶον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους (for so we should probably read with Sylburg in place of τοὺς πολεμίους, which is the reading of ΓΠ), cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 27, πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν, and 2. 9. 1270 a 33, μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις.

23. καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι κ.τ.λ., fand with a view to injuring assailants, if it should not be possible [to be easily succourable] both by land and by sea, the State will be more in a position to be so by one or the other, if it shares in both.' I do not think with Susemihl (Bericht über Aristoteles, etc., in the Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. 1894, p. 273) that Argyriades is right in bracketing πρός before τὸ βλάψαι. The suppressed nom. to δυνατόν (έστιν) is not τὸ βλάψαι, but τὸ εὐβοηθήτους εἶναι. defended itself in both ways against Xerxes, and Syracuse against Athens. Agrigentum, on the other hand, had no fleet when it was besieged by the Carthaginians (Diod. 13. 85 sqq.: Holm, Griech. Gesch. 2. 592). Athens would have had little prospect of success in the Peloponnesian War if she had only been able to strike at her assailants by land. The Lacedaemonian State suffered from not being able to attack its Theban invaders by sea. Compare a saying of Epaminondas (Aristid. Leuctr. 1. p. 421, 18, quoted by Schäfer, Demosth. 1. 104. 4), λέγειν γαρ έφη προς αυτούς Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ώς οὐδεν όφελος τῶν ἐν τῆ γῆ πλεονεκτημάτων, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν θάλατταν δι' αὐτῶν ἔξουσιν.

- 25. δσα τ' ἄν κ.τ.λ. It seems to be implied that the import and export of commodities was only possible by sea: Athens, however, imported many commodities by land (Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ (ἡ ᾿Αττικὴ) δέχεται ἐμπόρια), and that there was traffic by land in Greece we see from Plato, Polit. 289 E, οἱ δὲ πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ πεζῆ. But the land-trade of Greece was not comparable in extent to its trade by sea (see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 444 sqq.).
- 27. αὐτῆ γὰρ ἐμπορικήν κ.τ.λ. takes up and justifies ὅσα τ' ἄν μὴ τυγχάνη παρ' αὐτοῖς ὅντα κ.τ.λ. A State may do things for itself which it would demean itself by doing for others (cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19 sqq. and 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sq.).
- 29. οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες κ.τ.λ. This remark is directed against Athens. Isocrates had claimed that in instituting a great mart at the Peiraeus, Athens had done Greece a service (Paneg. § 42); Aristotle, however, asserts that Athens had had the increase of her revenue in view. No doubt she derived a large revenue from the Peiraeus (see Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sq., 4. 40, and [Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 a 5 sqq.), but the existence of a great emporium there also added largely to her influence; we see how bitterly the Megarians felt their exclusion from it (Thuc. 1. 67, 139). Among the chief sources of revenue at Athens were the fiftieth on exports and imports, the duty on sales, and the impost paid by metoeci (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 350 sqq.); the existence of a great emporium at the Peiraeus would largely increase the receipts from these and other sources. The revenue of States which did not possess an emporium must have been much smaller than the revenue of those which did. The revenue of inland States especially must have been limited, and few inland democracies can have been able to provide pay for attendance at meetings of the assembly and dicasteries.
- 30. τοιαύτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, 'to share in greed of this kind,' i.e. greed for revenue, for πλεονεξία probably does not mean 'gain' here, though it often bears this meaning. Cp. Plato, Tim. 27 C, πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν.
- 32. πολλαίς . . . καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν, e. g. the territories and cities of Athens, Corinth, Megara, etc.
- 33. ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας. Ἐπίνεια are port-towns: cp. Suidas S.V., πόλισμα παραθαλάσσιον, ἔνθα τὰ νεώρια τῶν πόλεών εἰσιν, ὥσπερ Πειραιεὺς τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων καὶ Νίσαια τῆς Μεγαρίδος δύνασαι δὲ ἐπὶ παντὸς

ἐμπορίου καὶ παραθαλασσίου χρήσασθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ, ὁ νῦν οἱ πολλοὶ κατάβολον καλοῦσιν.

εὐφυῶς κείμενα. Cp. Diod. 13. 85. 4, λόφον . . . κατὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐφυῶς κείμενον.

- 34. ὧστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν, sc. εἶναι, 'so as neither to occupy the same city [as the buildings of the city] nor to be very far away.' The subject of νέμειν appears to be ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας understood, unless we supply τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας. "Αστυ is used of the central city of the State lying round its central acropolis, in contradistinction to other cities comprised within the territory. For the omission of εἶναι, see above on 1277 a 38 and 1286 b 36. Cyllene, the port of Elis, and Gytheium, the port of Sparta, would be thought by Aristotle to be too far from Elis and Sparta.
- 35. ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ., 'but to be held in subjection by walls and other similar defences' (such as trenches, ep. Xen. Anab. 2. 4. 22).
- 36. διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, 'through participation in them,' i.e. in ports and harbours.
- 37. εὶ δέ τι βλαβερόν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 952 D sqq. Compare the plan adopted by the people of Epidamnus of appointing a  $\pi\omega\lambda\eta\tau\dot{\eta}s$ , through whom alone all purchases from, and sales to, their Illyrian neighbours were to be made (Plut. Quaest. Gr. 29).
- 41. βέλτιστον, thus used, is less common in the Politics than βέλτιον, but we have it in Plato, Gorg. 500 C.
- οὐ γὰρ μόνον κ.τ.λ. We read of Dionysius the Elder in Diod. 14. 107. 4 that he required Rhegium to surrender to him its fleet of seventy triremes, διελάμβανε γὰρ τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν βοηθείας ἀποκλεισθείσης ράδίως ἐκπολιορκήσειν τὴν πόλιν. For αὐτοῖς φοβεροὺς εἶναι, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 7–10 and 3. 15. 1286 b 27–31. Sections of the citizenbody were often the originators of στάσις (7 (5). 3–4) and might need to be controlled.
- 3. περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους κ.τ.λ., 'but when we come 1327 b. to the amount and magnitude of this force, with respect to that,' etc. For πλήθους καὶ μεγέθους, see above on 1326 b 30.
- 4. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. That a Greek State could not live a life of hegemony without possessing a fleet, is virtually implied by the view, which dates back as far as the days of the Persian Wars, that a hegemony confined to the land is a 'lame hegemony' (Diod. 11:

- 50). Epaminondas held this view (see above on 1327 a 23, and also Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10.416-419, and Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 104 sq.).
- 5. πολιτικόν, 'spent in relations with other States,' not a solitary life, like that of the States referred to in c. 3. 1325 b 23 sqq. Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22. Πολιτικόν is a broader term than ἡγεμονικόν, for a State may have political relations with others without standing to them in a relation of hegemony.
- 7. τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὅχλον, 'the excessive number of citizens which arises in connexion with the mass of trireme-oarsmen.' So Sus. 'jene Pöbelmenge die aus dem Schiffsvolk entspringt.' For γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὅχλον, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 20, ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις. Γίγνεσθαι περί with the acc. means 'to happen to' in Plato, Protag. 309 B, and in Polyb. 1. 16. 7, 1. 22. 1, and 5. 110. 7, but I do not think that this is what it means here. As to πολυανθρωπία, see above on 1327 a 11. The Athenian demos was largely composed of triremeoarsmen (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23).
- 11. πλήθους δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion of this sentence with that which precedes it would have been clearer if it had run, 'but the oarsmen need not be citizens, for, as a mass of perioeci and cultivators of the territory will be forthcoming, there will necessarily be no lack of sailors also.' Would Aristotle's serfs, who are not to be θομοειδείς, make good sailors? His plan of employing serfs as oarsmen had been anticipated not only at Heracleia on the Euxine, but also by Jason of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 11, ἀνδρῶν γε μὴν ταύτας (sc. τὰς ναῦς) πληροῦν πότερον 'Αθηναίους ἡ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς μᾶλλον δύνασθαι, τοσούτους καὶ τοιούτους έχοντας πενέστας;). 'Quod idem nostra quoque aetate Veneti factitant, qui ad instruendas classes in agris delectum habere et valentiores agricolas triremibus adscribere consuerunt' (Giph. p. 945). Even at Athens, where a large section of the demos was composed of trireme-oarsmen (see above on 7), metoeci and aliens, and occasionally slaves, were also thus employed (Thuc. 1. 143, 3. 16, 8. 73: Isocr. De Pace, §§ 48, 79). The oarsmen of the Lacedaemonian fleet were Helots or hired men (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 12).
- 13. δρῶμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. takes up 1327 a 32 sqq. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' i. e. τὸ ἀφθονίαν εἶναι ναυτῶν, as well as favourably situated ports and harbours. As to the fleet of the Pontic Heracleia, see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 12. 623. 3. Heracleia waged a vigorous

naval war with Leucon, prince of the Cimmerian Bosporus, who reigned from about B.C. 392 to 352. In later days (B.C. 280) her ships of war with five and six banks of oars and her one great δκτήρης helped Ptolemy Ceraunus to defeat the fleet of Antigonus Gonatas (Memnon, ap. Phot. Biblioth. p. 226 b 19 sqq. Bekker: Droysen, Gesch. des Hellenismus 2. 2. 332).

- 14. Ἡρακλεωτῶν. P<sup>4.5.</sup> Sb Vb have Ἡρακλειωτῶν, but the forms Ἡρακλεώτης, Ἡρακλεωτικός appear elsewhere in Aristotle's writings without any recorded variant. Ἡρακλειώτης is the earlier form (see Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., p. 34, ed. 2) and appears in an Attic inscription prior to B. C. 403, but Aristotle probably used the form Ἡρακλεώτης, which is found in an Attic inscription of B.C. 298.
  - 15. τῷ μεγέθει, i.e. in respect of the number of its citizens.
- 16. λιμένων is placed next to χώρας, because the harbours were to be outside the city, not, as was often the case, within it.

πόλεων, i.e. the ἄστυ and its ἐπίνειον or port.

- 17. ἔστω διωρισμένα. Cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 39, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων.
  - 19. πρότερον, in c. 4. 1326 b 22 sqq.
- 21. βλέψας κ.τ.λ. A similar contrast is drawn between ai ἐπιφα- C. 7. νέσταται πόλεις and ἡ ὅλη οἰκουμένη in Polyb. 1. 4. 6. The change in the preposition (ἐπί—πρός) finds many parallels in Aristotle's way of writing. Cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, χωρὶς τά τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 38, ὅσον εἰς γηδίου κτῆσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ γεωργίας: 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 17, οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν. See also 2. 8. 1267 b 27, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 33 sq., 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 38–41, and 6 (4). 15, 1299 b 16 sq.; and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 450.
- 22. ὡς διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, literally 'how it is divided into sections by nations': cp. c. 12. 1331 a 20, and Plato, Laws 886 A, τὰ τῶν ὡρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ μησὶ διειλημμένα, and Phaedo 110 B, ἡ γῆ αὕτη . . . ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλημμένη.
- 23. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the nations inhabiting cold countries, and in particular those in Europe,' etc. Καί introduces an explanation and limitation of τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 435 E, and of Hippocrates, De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 547 sqq. Kühn, and esp. p. 553 (as Giph. points out, p. 948: see also Eaton): cp. Androt. Fragm. 36 (Müller, Fr. Hist.

Gr. 1. 375). Aristotle probably held that a connexion exists between coldness of climate and abundance of θυμός. He may have traced the connexion thus. Cold hardens the animal frame and makes it dry and earthy, not watery (De Gen. An. 5. 3. 783 a 15 sqq.), and animals in whose blood the earthy element predominates are spirited in character (De Part, An. 2. 4. 650 b 33 sqq.), whereas those whose blood is of a more watery nature have a more subtle intelligence, and, if this wateriness is extreme, are cowardly (650 b 18 sqg.). See vol. i. p. 319, note 1, and De Part. An. 2. 2. 648 a 2-11. A different explanation may be deduced from passages in the Problems ascribed to Aristotle, which are not, however, one of his authentic works (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 100: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 96). Θυμός is connected with internal warmth (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 35, θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητικόν δ θυμός: cp. Probl. 10. 60. 898 a 5, ή δτι δ θυμός μετά θερμότητος; ὁ γὰρ φόβος κατάψυξις ὅσων οὖν (SC. ζώων) τὸ αἶμα ἔνθερμόν έστι, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ θυμοειδή), and a cold climate, according to Probl. 14. 16. 910 a 38 sqq., makes the flesh close and solid, and so prevents the escape of the internal heat. As to the 'spirit' of the barbarians to whom Aristotle refers, cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 b 28, διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ή βαρβαρική ἀνδρία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν: Polyb. 2. 35. 3, διὰ τὸ μή τὸ πλείον άλλὰ συλλήβδην ἄπαν τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἡ λογισμῷ βραβεύεσθαι: Seneca, De Ira, 1. 11, quid Cimbrorum Teutonorumque tot millia superfusa Alpibus ita sustulit ut tantae cladis notitiam ad suos non nuntius sed fama pertulerit, nisi quod erat illis ira pro virtute, and 2. 15 (referred to by Giph. p. 948), 'ut scias,' inquit, 'iram habere in se generosi aliquid, liberas videbis gentes quae iracundissimae sunt, ut Germanos et Scythas'... Deinde omnes istae feritate liberae gentes, leonum luporumque ritu, ut servire non possunt, ita nec imperare. Non enim humani vim ingenii, sed feri et intractabilis habent : nemo autem regere potest, nisi qui et regi. Fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos qui mitiore caelo utuntur. As to the meaning of Εὐρώπη here, see vol. i. p. 318, note 3. In Hom. Hymn. in Apoll. 250 sq., 290 sq. Εὐρώπη is distinguished from the Peloponnese and the islands, but not from

25. διόπερ κ.τ.λ., 'hence they continue comparatively free, but devoid of constitutional organization and unable to rule their neighbours.' They are free in comparison with Asiatics (3. 14.

1285 a 21). Aristotle can hardly include the Macedonians among the 'nations of Europe,' for they were not unable to rule over others, but does he regard them as Greeks? He is probably thinking of the Scythians, Thracians, and Illyrians among other European races: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 1. 4, καὶ γάρ τοι τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε (Κῦρος) τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων . . . ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν Σκύθης, καίπερ παμπόλλων ὄντων Σκυθῶν, ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενὸς δύναιτ' ἄν ἔθνους ἐπάρξαι, ἀγαπώη δ' ἄν εἰ τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἔθνους ἄρχων διαγένοιτο, καὶ ὁ Θρậξ Θρακῶν καὶ ὁ Ἰλλυριὸς Ἰλλυριῶν, καὶ τἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως ἔθνη ἀκούομεν τὰ γοῦν ἐν τῆ Εὐρώπη ἔτι καὶ νῦν αὐτόνομα εἶναι καὶ λελύσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Contrast Isocr. Paneg. § 67, where the Scythians and Thracians, as well as the Persians, are described as ἀρχικώτατα τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἔχοντα.

27. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ᾿Ασίαν κ.τ.λ. For ἄθυμα, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn, περί δε της άθυμίης των άνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀνανδρείης, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ ᾿Ασιηνοὶ καὶ ήμερώτεροι τὰ ήθεα κ.τ.λ. Hippocrates, however, in the same treatise (p. 554 Kühn) says justly enough, εύρήσεις δὲ καὶ τοὺς ᾿Ασιηνοὺς διαφέροντας αὐτοὺς έωυτέων, τοὺς μεν βελτίονας τοὺς δε φαυλοτέρους εόντας. Would Aristotle say of the Persians (cp. c. 2. 1324 b 11) what he says of the Asiatics here? Modern observers take much the same view of Asiatic character. 'The Asiatic is as clever as the European with his hands and wits, though he lacks initiative and the power of government' (Speech of Sir H. H. Johnston, Times, Nov. 7, 1894). Aristotle's account of the Asiatics was hardly flattering to Alexander as the conqueror of Asia, nor did it lend support to his scheme of fusing Greeks and Asiatics. See on the subject vol. i. p. 319, note 3. Aristotle traces similar contrasts between animals to those which he here traces between the nations of Europe and Asia (Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 12, διαφέρουσι δὲ (τὰ ζῶα) καὶ ταῖς τοιαῖσδε διαφοραῖς κατὰ τὸ ἦθος τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι πρᾶα καὶ δύσθυμα καὶ οὐκ ἐνστατικά, οἷον βοῦς, τὰ δὲ θυμώδη καὶ ἐνστατικὰ καὶ ἀμαθή, οἷον δς άγριος, τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ δειλά, οἷον ἔλαφος, δασύπους κ.τ.λ.).

28. διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ, i.e. enslaved to their rulers. Kingship prevailed over most of Asia (Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn), and in many places of a despotic type (3. 14. 1285 a 16 sqq.).

29. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος κ.τ.λ. Contrast Isocrates' account of the difference between Greeks and barbarians in De Antid. § 293, καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ προέχετε καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων οὐ ταῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείαις, οὐδ' ὅτι κάλλιστα πολιτεύεσθε καὶ μάλιστα φυλάττετε

τοὺς νόμους οὓς ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι κατέλιπον, ἀλλὰ τούτοις οἶσπερ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ζώων διήνεγκε καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν βαρβάρων, τῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄμεινον πεπαιδεῦσθαι τῶν ἄλλων.

ῶσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους. The ὀμφαλός at Delphi was regarded as the centre both of Greece and of the habitable earth, (Strabo, p. 419, τῆς γὰρ Ἑλλάδος ἐν μέσω πώς ἐστι τῆς συμπάσης, τῆς τε ἐντὸς Ἰσθμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐκτός, ἐνομίσθη δὲ καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης, καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τῆς γῆς ὀμφαλὸν κ.τ.λ.). Xenophon claims the same position for Athens (De Vect. 1.6), and Strabo for Italy (p. 286). Cp. also [Plato,] Epinomis 987 D, τόδε γε μὴν διανοηθῆναι χρὴ πάντ ἄνδρα ελληνα, ὡς τόπον ἔχομεν τὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐν τοῖς σχεδὸν ἄριστον. τὸ δ' ἐπαινετὸν αὐτοῦ χρὴ λέγειν, ὅτι μέσος ἃν εἴη χειμώνων τε καὶ τῆς θερινῆς φύσεως.

- 32. καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. See vol. i. p. 321, note 1, and compare also the exclamation of Agesilaus in Plut. Ages. c. 16, and Isocr. Paneg. § 131. For μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 16 sqq.: Plut. Pelop. c. 24, πᾶσαν ᾿Αρκαδίαν εἰς μίαν δύναμιν συνέστησαν, and Diod. 15. 59, ἔπεισε τοὺς ᾿Αρκάδας εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ταχθῆναι: Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 263, οὔπω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἐν συνφκισμένων. What kind of 'unity of constitution' Aristotle has in his mind is not clear; he may be thinking of the establishment of a common council of Greece by Philip of Macedon after the battle of Chaeroneia (vol. i. p. 321, note 1), or of an union of the free States of Greece, not under the headship of Macedon, but under some Federal bond. The latter kind of union would be more truly an union of Greeks than an union under the headship of Macedon, and it is of an union of Greeks that Aristotle speaks.
- 34. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον. Among Hellenic races possessed only of θυμός Aristotle probably counted the Arcadian (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 168) and Aetolian, and possibly also the Boeotian (see above on 1274 a 32), and among those possessed only of διάνοια some of the Ionians of Asia Minor.
- 36. φανερὸν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. Compare for the phrase εὐαγώγους τῷ νομοθέτη Plato, Laws 671 B. Plato had claimed (Rep. 376 A sqq.) that the mildness of the dog to those whom he knows is due to the philosophic element in his nature, and had concluded (376 B), οὐκοῦν θαρροῦντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μέλλει πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾶός τις ἔσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν

cival; Aristotle claims, on the contrary, that what Plato ascribes to the philosophic element is really due to  $\theta \nu \mu \delta s$  (38 sqq.), inasmuch as it is  $\theta \nu \mu \delta s$  that makes men loving. Few ruling races have possessed in perfection the combination of qualities which Aristotle demands in the citizens of his best State. In most perhaps there has been more  $\theta \nu \mu \delta s$  than  $\delta \iota \delta \nu \nu \delta s$ .

38. ὅπερ γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for as to what,' etc. The reference is to Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Plato is referred to as τινες also in c. 10. 1329 b 41 sq. and in other passages collected by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 62, note 41. Plato's remark that dogs are fierce to those whom they do not know was no doubt suggested by Heraclitus, Fragm. 115 Bywater, κύνες καὶ βαΰζουσι ον αν μὴ γινώσκωσι. The connexion of θυμός with affectionateness appears also in Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 21, τὰ δὲ (τῶν ζώων) θυμικὰ καὶ φιλητικὰ καὶ θωπευτικά, οἶον κύων. Compare also Top. 2. 7. 113 a 35 (referred to by Schneider), οἶον εἰ τὸ μῖσος ἔπεσθαι ὀργῷ ἔφησεν, εἴη αν τὸ μῖσος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ὀργή σκεπτέον οὖν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, ἡ φιλία εἰ γὰρ μή, ἀλλ ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἐστὶν ἡ φιλία, οὖκ αν ἔποιτο μῖσος ὀργῷ. Camerarius (Interp. p. 289) remarks that Theognis had already connected love and hatred with θυμός (Theogn. 1091,

ἀργαλέως μοι θυμὸς ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι).

**41**. For ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, cp. De An. 2. 3. 414 a 29 sqq.: Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως 1. 467 b 16 sqq.: and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 207 a 46 sqq.

1. σημεῖον δέ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 42, σημεῖον γὰρ οὐ μικρὸν 1328 a. ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἐν γὰρ τοῖs ὀλυμπιονίκαις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle finds an indication that θυμός is the faculty of love in the fact that when it is stirred it is more stirred in relation to those we love than in relation to those who are unknown to us. Is the following fragment of the Medea of Neophron (Fragm. 2), a tragic poet of the time of Euripides or possibly somewhat earlier, based on the passage of Archilochus of which Aristotle quotes a part?

εἶεν τί δράσεις, θυμέ; βούλευσαι καλῶς πρὶν ἡ ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ τὰ προσφιλέστατα ἔχθιστα θέσθαι. ποῖ ποτ ἐξῆξας (cp. αἴρεται), τάλας; κάτισχε λῆμα καὶ σθένος θεοστυγές. καὶ πρὸς τί ταῦτα δύρομαι ψυχὴν ἐμὴν ὁρῶσ ἔρημον καὶ παρημελημένην (cp. ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι) πρὸς ὧν ἐχρῆν ῆκιστα;

Cp. also Plato, Laws 717 D, θυμουμένοις τε οὖν (τοῖς γονεῦσιν) ὑπείκειν δεῖ καὶ ἀποπιμπλᾶσι τὸν θυμόν . . . ξυγγιγνώσκοντα ὡς εἰκότως μάλιστα πατὴρ νίεῖ δοξάζων ἀδικεῖσθαι θυμοῖτ' ἄν διαφερόντως, and (with Eaton), Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 2, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις (ὀργίζονται) μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἢ μή. For ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται, cp. Probl. 27. 3. 947 b 32, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀναζεῖν καὶ τὸ ὀρίνεσθαι τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ταράττεσθαι, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς ἀλλ' οἰκείως, and 2. 26. 869 a 5, καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ζέσις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐστὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, and also Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adespota, 321 Nauck,

πηδών ὁ θυμὸς των φρενών ἀνωτέρω.

- 3. διὸ καὶ ᾿Αρχίλοχος κ.τ.λ., 'hence Archilochus for instance ' (see above on 1255 a 36), 'when he complains of his friends, fittingly enough discourses to his spirit [which is closely connected with friends, saying,] "For thy tortures surely were from friends." 'See Archil. Fragm. 66, 67. For ἀπάγχεο, cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 686 Didot, ὁ μάλιστά μ' ἀπάγχει ('excruciat').
- 6. καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ κ.τ.λ., i.e. the principle of rule and freedom as well as the capability of affection. Here Aristotle does not dissent from Plato, but agrees with him. He remembers Plato, Rep. 375 B, ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὖ παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος; where there is evidently a tacit reminiscence of the saying of Heraclitus quoted in 7 (5). II. I315 a 30 sq. Compare also Eth. Eud. 3. I. I229 a 27, ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ (ἀνδρεία) ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται, and Eth. Nic. 4. II. II26 a 36, ἐνίστε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν.
- 8. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ. With χαλεποὺς εἶναι supply δεῖν, as in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3. See note on 1335 b 5. This takes up 1327 b 40, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας ἀγρίους, and corrects Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Magnanimous men are fierce only to those who act unjustly, and so far from being fiercer to such persons when unknown to them, they will be fiercer to them when they are familiar friends. Plato, however, had himself said in Laws 731 B, θυμοειδῆ μὲν δὴ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα εἶναι, πρῶον δὲ ὡς ὅ τι μάλιστα.
- 10. πλήν. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De An. 2. 1. 412 b 20, ης ἀπολειπούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλην ὁμωνύμως.
- 13.  $\pi\alpha\rho$  of  $\gamma\lambda\rho$  k.t. $\lambda$ ., 'for in quarters in which they conceive there should be a feeling that the benefit conferred in the past is owed back [and ought to be requited], they think that in addition

to the injury done them they are defrauded also of the benefit.' Aristotle mentions in Rhet. 2. 8. 1386 a 11, among things that arouse compassion, τὸ ὅθεν προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι, κακόν τι συμβῆναι.

15. ὅθεν εἴρηται "χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν." We learn from Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 5, χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκεν, ὄντες, χαλεπώτατοι τοῖς γονεῦσιν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν, that this is a fragment of Euripides (Fragm. 965): cp. Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 228 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 355), ἡ τῶν ξυγγενέων ἔχθρη τῆς τῶν ὀθνείων χαλεπωτέρη μάλα.

16. οι τοι πέρα κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 563 E, καὶ τῷ ὅντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιείν μεγάλην φιλεί εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ῆκιστα.

17. τῶν πολιτευομένων, 'those who exercise the rights of citizens in the State': cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 40 and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, and also 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 4 sq.

18. For πόσην, see above on 1326 a 5.

19. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for we must not aim at the same exactness of detail by means of theoretical inquiries as is realized by means of what is presented to us through sense-perception.' For ζητεῖν διὰ τῶν λόγων κ.τ.λ., cp. c. 17. 1336 a 5 sqq., and Plut. Pericl. c. 9, θεωρείσθω διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἡ αἰτία τῆς μεταβολῆς. For τῶν γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, cp. De Caelo, 3. 4. 303 a 22, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐνδόξων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀναιρεῖν, and for the contrast of οἱ λόγοι and τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, see Bon. Ind. 20 b 30–39, and above on 1261 b 29. The double διά is awkward, but of this kind of awkwardness there are many instances in the Politics: see 2. 6. 1266 a 21 sq., 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 1 sqq., and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 9 sqq. The same thing happens with other prepositions—with πρός in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 18 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 38, with περί in 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 34, and with ἐν in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 29 sq. and 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 2.

21 sqq. Aristotle here passes on to the question who are to be C. 8. 'parts of the State.' It is from cc. 8-10 that we learn most of the little that he tells us as to the constitutional and social organization of his 'best State.' He begins by laying down a principle which holds of all things existing by nature, and therefore of the  $\pi \delta \lambda \iota s$ , and indeed of all kouvovial which issue in 'something one in kind.' In all things that exist by nature the necessary conditions of the existence of the thing are to be distinguished from its parts. Not

all the necessary conditions are parts of the thing, but only those which have something in common. In a πόλις the 'something in common' is 'the best attainable life' (1328 a 36), or in other words εὐδαιμονία, and as this is inseparable from virtue (c. 9. 1329 a 22), no class of persons is rightly a part of the State whose occupation precludes its attainment of virtue. Hence cultivators, artisans, day-labourers (c. 9. 1329 a 35 sq.), and traders (c. 9. 1328 b 30) are not to be parts of the State, or in other words are not to be citizens. The classes which will be parts of the State and which will constitute its citizen-body will be τὸ πολεμικόν (c. q. 1329 a 2), or rather τὸ ὁπλιτικόν (c. 9. 1329 a 31, 37), τὸ βουλευόμενον περί των συμφερόντων, and τὸ κρίνον περί των δικαίων. Aristotle takes no notice here of a class which he recognizes in 6 (4). 4. 1201 a 34 sqq., the official class (τὸ δημιουργικόν), but this also he would no doubt reckon as a part of the State. He is not, however, satisfied with excluding from citizenship the classes which are not δημιουργοί της άρετης (c. q. 1329 a 20); he requires that those who exercise deliberative and judicial functions in his 'best State' shall be over a certain age and yet not too old. In other words he gives supreme authority in his State to men of mature but not too advanced age, who will be presumably possessed of φρόνησις. Plato in his Republic had reserved the rule of the State for a special class of men highly gifted in intellect and character and prepared for rule by a long-continued philosophical training, but Aristotle does not think that the soldiers of the State would submit to be ruled by a class into which they would not ultimately rise: he also insists rather on the possession of φρόνησις by his rulers than on a philosophical training, and poornous is according to him the fruit in fit minds of a ripe age. He follows in fact rather in the track of Plato's Laws than in that of his Republic, for Plato had required in the Laws that the holders of the chief offices should be men of mature years. But Plato had not, like Aristotle, arranged that deliberative and judicial functions should be withdrawn from men over a certain age, though he contemplates in Rep. 498 C the retirement of infirm old men from political and military duties. This was, it would seem, a more or less novel suggestion. Its importance was no doubt brought home to Aristotle's mind by his observation of the ill effects of advanced age on the holders of life-offices in the Lacedaemonian State (2.9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and probably also in many oligarchies. It will be

noticed that in Aristotle's 'best State' the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance would rest, not with the soldiers who would have to fight for the State in case of war, but with the older citizens (contrast the view of the young Archidamus in Isocr. Archid. § 3 sqq.), and that judicial authority. including no doubt the momentous right of inflicting the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, would also rest with the older citizens. Aristotle evidently thinks that the prospect of succeeding to these great powers after the attainment of a certain age would reconcile the younger citizens to their non-possession of them. He appears to allow the younger citizens to be owners of land (c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.), and perhaps to hold all but the chief military offices. But they are to have nothing to do with deliberative or judicial functions. In this Aristotle would seem to go too far. The attainment of a certain age has often been made a condition of the tenure of the highest political offices. This was the case at Rome (Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 242). Even restrictions of this kind would now and then exclude a William the Silent or a William Pitt. But it is one thing to impose a limit of age on the tenure of the highest offices and another to exclude the younger men from the exercise of all deliberative and judicial functions. How is the future statesman to learn his business, if his earlier career is to be exclusively devoted to the profession of arms, and he is not allowed to hold even minor civil offices? Aristotle is evidently too uncompromising, but we must bear in mind two things, if we wish to do him justice—(1) that he desires supreme authority in the State to be in the hands of those who are morally as well as politically ripe for its exercise; he desires Reason to rule in the State as it rules in the well-constituted individual; (2) that one of his aims is the limitation of war and of indiscriminate conquest, and that his exclusion of the more martially-disposed part of the citizen-body from supreme power in his 'best State' is closely connected with this aim. Nothing had done more to break up and weaken Greece in the fourth century B.C. than the incessant wars which had been waged between the various States-between the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans, the Thebans and the Phocians, the Thessalians of Pherae and the Thessalians of Larissa-and Aristotle may well have thought that the best way to check these wars was to place supreme power in the hands of the older citizens.

21. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but since, as in the other things which are constituted according to nature, not all those things are parts of the whole organization without which the whole would not exist, it is evident that neither must all those things be taken to be parts of the State which must necessarily be possessed by States, nor must we take as parts of any other union issuing in something one in kind all the things which are essential to such an union.' As this sentence stands, the words των άλλων των κατά φύσιν συνεστώτων would seem to be in the gen. after της όλης συστάσεως, but it is probable that Aristotle began the sentence with the intention of making these words in the gen. after μόρια and inserted της όλης συστάσεως only by an afterthought. For the thought, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἄν είη πόλις, and for the distinction between ων οὐκ ἄνευ and μέρη, cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Eud. 1. 2. 1214 b 26, ων ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε εὐδαιμονείν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσιν. Plato had already drawn a similar distinction: cp. Polit. 287 D, ὅσαι γὰρ σμικρὸν ἡ μέγα τι δημιουργούσι κατά πόλιν όργανον, θετέον άπάσας ταύτας ώς ούσας συναιτίους άνευ γάρ τούτων οὐκ άν ποτε γένοιτο πόλις οὐδὲ πολιτική, τούτων δ' αὖ βασιλικης έργον τέχνης οὐδέν που θήσομεν, and (with Eaton) Phaedo oo B, and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. I (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 360, note 1). Τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτα are so termed in contradistinction to τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης and to τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης and ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου (De Part. An. 1. 1. 640 a 27-b 4). They are things which have in them a principle of motion and rest, whether that motion takes the form of locomotion, or increase and decay, or alteration: cp. Phys. 2. 1. 192 b 8, των ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτά καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἶον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀἡρ καὶ ὕδωρ' ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν. πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὅντα πάντα φαίνεται έχουτα εν εαυτοίς άρχην κινήσεως και στάσεως, τὰ μεν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν (whereas the products of art have no such principle of motion and rest in them, except accidentally, so far as they are formed of earth or stone or other natural entities). Some of these natural entities are eternal, others are subject to generation and decay (De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 22 sqq.); some of them are bodies and magnitudes (for instance, the human body), others possess body and magnitude (for instance, a human being), others are principles within beings possessing

body and magnitude (for instance, the soul): cp. De Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 4 sqq., and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 384. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 417, note 2). The πόλις, we learn from the passage before us, belongs to the class of natural entities; it must belong to the subdivision of this class which consists of 'things possessing body and magnitude.' As to the words οὐδ ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς, ἐξ ἦς εν τι τὸ γένος, see vol. i. p. 43, note 1.

27. οἷον εἴτε τροφη κ.τ.λ. Food is the 'common thing' in the case of a συσσίτιον, a certain amount of land in the case of the owners of an undivided estate (2. 5. 1263 b 23 sq.).

28. ὅταν δ' ἡ κ.τ.λ. That there is nothing in common between the craftsman who uses an instrument and the instrument used, we learn in Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32, έν οίς γάρ μηδέν κοινόν έστι τώ άρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένω, οὐδὲ φιλία οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον ἀλλ' οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχή πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον ἀφελείται μέν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἡ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἡ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὅργανον, τὸ δ' ὅργανον άψυχος δοῦλος: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 17-24 and 7. 10. 1242 a 11 sqq. A slightly different lesson is taught in the passage before us. Here we learn that there is nothing in common between the instrument and the craftsman on the one hand and the product they bring into being on the other, except this, that the instrument and the craftsman act and the product is acted upon. That where one thing acts and another is acted upon there must be something common to the two things, we see from De An. 3. 4. 429 b 22, ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ δ νοῦς ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ απαθές και μηδενί μηδεν έχει κοινόν, ωσπερ φησίν 'Αναξαγόρας, πως νοήσει, εί τὸ νοείν πάσχειν τί έστιν ή γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοίν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιείν δοκεί τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. But two things thus related to each other need not have much in common: see vol. i. p. 323, note 1. The usual antithesis to ποιείν is πάσχειν, not λαμβάνειν, but we find λαμβάνειν την μορφήν contrasted with ποιείν in De Gen. An. 1. 21.729 b 6 sqq.: cp. also Hist. An. 6. 23. 577 a 29 sqq., where  $\lambda a \mu \beta \acute{a} \nu \epsilon i \nu = \delta \acute{\epsilon} \chi \epsilon \sigma \theta a \iota$ . In the passage before us the instrument and the craftsman who uses it are said ποιησαι and the work produced by them λαβείν.

34. οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως, because property stands to the πόλις as a means stands to the end to which it is a means, and thus there is nothing in common between property and the πόλις except that the former acts on the πόλις and the πόλις

is acted upon. It follows that slaves, who are animate articles of property—and χερνητες, including βάνανσοι τεχνίται, are brought under the head of slaves in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq.—are not parts of the State. 'It was a maxim of ancient jurisprudence,' says Gibbon (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, c. 2), 'that a slave had not any country of his own; he acquired with his liberty an admission into the political society of which his patron was a member.' Contrast with οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως, Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 10, πόλις μὲν οὖν οἰκιῶν πληθός ἐστι καὶ χώρας καὶ χρημάτων αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

- 35. ἡ δὲ πόλις κ.τ.λ. Τῶν ὁμοίων is emphatic. Κοινωνία τις, because there are other κοινωνίαι τῶν ὁμοίων besides the πόλις, e.g. trading or religious associations. For the thought, cp. 6 (4). II. 1295 b 25, βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα. When Aristotle says in 2. 2. 1261 a 22, οὐ μόνον δ΄ ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων, he is thinking of the distinction between rulers and ruled, so far as he is not using the word πόλις in a wider sense (see vol. i. p. 40).
  - 37. αύτη δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 13. 1332 a 7 sqq.
- 38. τέλειος is here the fem., as in Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 16, Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 b 17, and Phys. 8. 8. 264 b 28. In c. 13. 1332 a 9 we have χρησιν ἀρετης τελείαν, and the form τελεία seems to be the commoner form of the fem. in Aristotle's writings, to judge by the Index Aristotelicus.
- συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Slaves have no share in happiness (3. 9. 1280 a 33). Βάναυσοι, ἀγοραῖοι, and γεωργοί live lives unfavourable to virtue (c. 9. 1328 b 40 sqq.), and so do not share in happiness. There are persons excluded from happiness on account of some defect of nature or fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sq.). For συμβαίνειν ωστε, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 34 sq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12.
- 40. δηλον ως κ.τ.λ. For the various accounts given in the Politics of the causes of constitutional diversity, see vol. i. p. 220 sqq. For εἴδη καὶ διαφοράς, cp. Phys. 3. 5. 205 b 31, τόπου δὲ εἴδη καὶ διαφοραὶ τἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὅπισθεν καὶ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερόν.
- 41. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Αλλον τρόπον is a wider expression than δι' ἄλλων, which is added in explanation and to give increased precision to its meaning. Cp. c. 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, and 3. 18. 1288 a 39. For τούς τε βίους καὶ τὰς πολιτείας, cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως. For the

middle ποιοῦνται, 'make for themselves' (not ποιοῦσιν), cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31, συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος, and Meteor. 1. 5. 342 b 22, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων φασμάτων ὅσα ταχείας ποιεῖται τὰς φαντασίας.

- 2. καὶ πόσα κ.τ.λ., i.e. not only what the parts of the State are, 1328 b. but also how many are the things without which the State cannot exist. For the omission of the article before πόλις, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἃν εῖη πόλις, and 2. 2. 1261 a 24, οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων: also 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 34 sq.
  - 4. ἐν τούτοις ἄν εἴη (ἃ) ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. See critical note.
- 5. τῶν ἔργων, 'the services which a State needs' (cp. 1328 b 19, ἐργασίας).

έσται δήλον, i.e. πόσα ταυτί έστιν ων άνευ πόλις οὐκ αν είη.

- 6. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 369 C, ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν ἔνεκα. Παντάπασί γε. Δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ἔστι ταῦτα: also Critias 110 C, ἄκει δὲ δὴ τότ' ἐν τῆδε τῆ χώρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔθνη τῶν πολιτῶν περὶ τὰς δημιουργίας ὄντα καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφήν, τὸ δὲ μάχιμον ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν θείων κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφορισθὲν ἄκει χωρὶς κ.τ.λ.
  - 7. ὀργάνων. Cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 20, καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὅργανα.
- 8. καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς, 'within their own body also,' as well as in the hands of any mercenaries they may employ or any allies they may possess. Cp. Plato, Laws 697 E, where the misery of a State dependent for its defence on mercenaries is depicted, and Philoch. Fragm. 132 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 406), μὴ ξενικὴν ἀλλ' αὐτῶν ᾿Αθηναίων. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., and Thuc. 1. 121, δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἶοί τ' ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας· ὧνητὴ γὰρ ᾿Αθηναίων ἡ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἡ οἰκεία.

πρός τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 27-31.

- 10. χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, 'a certain abundance of money,' in contradistinction to εὐπορία τροφῆς, ὀργάνων, etc.
- 11. καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς. Schneider, Bekker², and Susemihl add τάς before πολεμικάς, but cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχειν. 'In the non-repetition of the article, and also of prepositions, Aristotle appears, if I do not mistake, to go further than other prose-writers' (Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 3. 330).

- 12. καὶ πρῶτον, 'and first in excellence,' cp. Isocr. Areop. § 29, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον. Τὰ δαιμόνια are placed first in the list of subjects of official competence given in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειστάτης (πολιτείας), and Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 23, τῶν δὲ κτημάτων πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ ἡγεμονικώτατον τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἄνθρωπος.
- 13. πάντων ἀναγκαιότατον. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5 sqq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 22-b 2.
- 15. μèν οὖν is answered by δέ, 24. Susemihl places in a parenthesis everything between  $\dot{\eta}$  γάρ, 16, and συμφερόντων, 23, but the parenthesis should stop at  $\tau a \dot{\nu} \tau \eta \nu$ , 19, for ἀνάγκη  $\tau o \dot{\nu} \nu \nu \nu$ , 19, introduces an inference from 15,  $\tau \dot{\alpha}$  μèν οὖν ἔργα  $\tau a \dot{\nu} \dot{\tau}$  ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται  $\tau a \dot{\sigma} \sigma a$  πόλις ώς εἰπεῖν.
- 17. ως φαμέν. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12 sq.: 3. 1. 1275 b 20 sq.: 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 26.
- ἐὰν δέ τι τυγχάνη τούτων ἐκλείπον κ.τ.λ. Τούτων, sc. τῶν ἔργων. This would be the case in the ἀναγκαιστάτη πόλις of Plato, Rep. 369 C-E, where there are no soldiers or priests or men of judicial or deliberative skill. For τὴν κοινωνίαν ταύτην, 'the society in which this occurs,' see above on 1276 a 14.
- 19. κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν, 'should be composed in accordance with these industries': cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ έκατέρα (i.e. ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία) κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.
- 20. Aristotle forgets that herdsmen, fishermen, and hunters are also providers of food.
- 22. κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων. Lamb., followed by Bekk.² and Sus., reads δικαίων in place of ἀναγκαίων (cp. 14 sq.), but compare the passages collected in vol. i. p. 323, note 2, and also Polyaen. Strateg. 6. I. 5, ὡς συμβούλω χρησόμενος τῶν ἀναγκαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 40, τούτοις οὖν προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ἐὰν ὑμῖν δόξη δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα τῷ κοινῷ, προσθήσω δ' ὅτι καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, συγχωρήσατε ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τυχεῖν ἑκόντες. Judges are probably included under κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, the broad term τὰ ἀναγκαῖα comprising τὰ δίκαια τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
- C. 9. 25. πάντων τούτων, SC. τῶν ἔργων.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for it is possible that the same men should be all of them both cultivators and artisans and the deliberators and judges.' Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq.

- 27. ἢ καθ' ἔκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποθετέον, 'or whether for each of the above-mentioned services we are to assume the existence of a separate class.' For καθ' ἔκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων, not καθ' ἔκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων ἔργων, see note on 1283 b 4, καθ' ἐκάστην πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων.
- 29. οὐκ ἐν πάση δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτεία, 'but the same arrangement does not prevail in every constitution.'

καθάπερ εἴπομεν, in 24-28.

- 31. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these differing arrangements as to participation [besides being different themselves] also make constitutions different.' This proves their possibility. Cp. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sqq.
  - 34. αύτη δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1324 a 23 sqq.
  - 36. εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 1. 1323 b 29 sqq.
- 38. τῆ κεκτημένη δικαίους ἄνδρας ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, 'that which possesses men absolutely just and not merely just relatively to the principle which may happen to be taken as the groundwork of the State': cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.: 2. 9. 1269 a 32 sqq. See also Bon. Ind. 797 a 52 sqq.
- 39. οὖτε βάναυσον βίον οὖτ' ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας. Plato had already forbidden the citizens of the State of the Laws, or even their slaves, to practise a handicraft (846 D), and had forbidden the practice of retail trade with a view to money-making to any one except strangers (847 D: 849 C sq.: 920 A). Thus he goes farther in this matter than Aristotle.
- **40**. ἀγεννὴς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq., and (with Eaton) 1. 11. 1258 b 38, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ (τῶν ἐργασιῶν) ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς.

πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος. Plato (Laws 920 B) had reckoned retail trade among the ἐπιτηδεύματα ἃ προτροπὴν ἔχει τινὰ ἰσχυρὰν πρὸς τὸ προτρέπειν κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι. He has in his mind not only the adulteration practised by retailers (Laws 917 E, 920 C), but also their habit of exacting an excessive profit (Laws 918 D, 920 C).

41. οὐδὲ δή. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 10. 1142 b 6, οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 173 a 33 sqq.

τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι, sc. πολίτας. Omissions of this kind are not rare in the Politics: see vol. ii. p. li, note 4, and note on 1266 b 1.

1329 a. 1. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the connexion of leisure with virtue and capacity for rule, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28, σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν: 2. 11. 1273 a 24, ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν: 2. 9. 1269 a 34 sqq. Compare also Eurip. Suppl. 406 Bothe (420 Dind.),

γαπόνος δ' ἀνὴρ πένης,

εὶ καὶ γένοιτο μὴ ἀμαθής, ἔργων ὕπο οὐκ ἃν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοίν' ἀποβλέπειν.

- 4. καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, 'and evidently are in an especial sense parts of the State, [so that there is no question to be raised as to their citizenship, such as has been raised as to the citizenship of the βάνανσοι and γεωργοί].'
- 5. ἔτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον. Susemihl, following Coray and Bekk.², inserts έτέροις after ἔτερα, but cp. c. 10. 1329 a 41, ὅτι δεῖ διηρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν.

6. ἄμφω, sc. τὰ ἔργα, i. e. τὸ πολεμεῖν and τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν: cp. 8, ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων.

φανερον δε και τοῦτο. It has already (1328 b 37) been said to be φανερόν that the citizens must not be βάνανσοι or ἀγοραῖοι or γεωργοί.

διότι τρόπον μέν τινα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1332 b 41, ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. For καί before ἐτέροις, see above on 1324 a 19.

- 8. ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς, 'a different prime.' Warlike activity suits the prime of the body, which, according to Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sqq., falls between thirty and thirty-five years of age, whereas deliberative and judicial activity suits the prime of the soul and the intelligence, which Aristotle places at forty-nine (ibid.) or fifty (Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 32 sqq.). Plato places the prime both of body and of wisdom for men between thirty and fifty-five years of age; he does not seem to have discriminated the two primes, like Aristotle: cp. Rep. 460 E, ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀκμὴ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως.
- 9. δυνάμεως = ἰσχύος: cp. c. 17. 1336 a 4 and 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων κ.τ.λ. Eaton compares Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 79 and Thuc. 3. 27. Cp. also Plut. Aristid. c. 22.
- 12. For the construction of μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν, cp. Plato, Rep. 429 B, οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, εἶπον, οῖ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ δειλοὶ ἡ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες κύριοι ἃν εἶεν ἡ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἡ τοίαν.
- 13. λείπεται τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., 'the only course left, then, is to assign these constitutional rights' (i.e. those of fighting, judging, and

deliberating) 'to the same men and to both classes' (i.e. both to those who have strength and to those who have wisdom), 'not however simultaneously; but in the natural order of things strength is found in younger men and wisdom in older men; therefore it is advantageous that distribution should be made to both classes in this way' (i. e. so that fighting should fall to the younger men, and deliberating and judging to the older men), 'and it is just that this should be so, for this division of functions has in it conformity to desert. 'Αποδιδόναι takes up τοις αὐτοις ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω, 6. For τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, see note on 1264 a 38. There is, however, just a possibility that πολιτείαν has been repeated from the preceding line by an error on the part of the copyist of the archetype and has taken the place of λειτουργίαν or τάξιν or some such word: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 20, where πολιτείας, repeated from πολιτικόν in the preceding line, has taken the place of Bondeias in T Ms and Vat. Pal. interprets την πολιτείαν ταύτην 'hanc curam in republica' and Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 47 sq.) 'hanc partem reipublicae administrandae.' Sus. would substitute ἀμφότερα for ἀμφοτέροις and ταῦτα for ταύτην (Mr. Welldon follows him in the former change but not in the latter), and would make την πολιτείαν (in the sense of 'the best constitution') the subject of ἀποδιδόναι. But perhaps no change in αμφοτέροιs is necessary. The reading αμφοτέροιs is supported by αμφοίν, 16. For ωσπερ πέφυκεν, cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 11, ή πέφυκεν, and Meteor. 2. 4. 360 b 2. ώς πέφυκεν. For the addition of καὶ δίκαιον είναι (sc. οὖτωs), compare the addition of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον in 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq. and that of καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλείν in 1. 9. 1256 b 40. Welldon, however, may possibly be right in reading δίκαιον έστιν in place of δίκαιον είναι (see critical note). In assigning strength to younger men and wisdom to older, Aristotle perhaps has before him Hom. Il. 13. 727-734, 19. 216-219, and 3. 108 sqq.: cp. also Eurip. Fragm. 293 and 511, and Aeschin. c. Timarch. cc. 24, 139. Wisdom was often ascribed not to πρεσβύτεροι, but to old men (e. g. by Pindar, Fragm. 182, cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 10, and Plato, Laws 653 A: by Sophocles, Fragm. 240, contrast Eurip. Fragm. 25: and by Euripides, Fragm. 622), but Aristotle ascribes it to πρεσβύτεροι. What exact age Aristotle designates by this word, it is difficult to say. In c. 16. 1335 b 29 (see note) those over fifty or even fiftyfive years of age are referred to: on the other hand, in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 23 οί πρεσβύτεροι are contrasted not with οί νεώτεροι, but with

oi νέοι. As the prime of the intelligence is placed by him at fortynine or fifty (see above on 8), perhaps this is the age intended. Alcibiades was probably about thirty-five when he became the advocate of the Syracusan expedition. The saying of Eupolis in his Demi, μὴ παιδὶ τὰ κοινά (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 467: cp. Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 128), was famous. Aristophanes makes the Athenian Demos say of the young men (Eq. 1382 Didot: cp. Isocr. Areop. § 45),

μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ἀναγκάσω κυνηγετεῖν ἐγὼ τούτους ἄπαντας, παυσαμένους ψηφισμάτων.

In the Polity or moderate Democracy which existed at Syracuse before the Athenian attack, the younger men were excluded from office by law (Thuc. 6. 38. 5). We read in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 31, νόμος δὲ ἦν Χαλκιδεῦσι μὴ ἄρξαι μηδὲ πρεσβεῦσαι νεώτερον ἐτῶν πεντήκοντα. A somewhat similar principle underlay the ordo magistratuum at Rome. Alcibiades, on the other hand, contends in Thuc. 6. 18. 6 that deliberation is most likely to be successful when it is carried on by old and young men together: compare the arguments put in the mouth of the young Archidamus by Isocrates (Archid. § 3 sqq.).

- 17. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes on from the γεωργοί, τεχνῖται, τὸ μάχιμον, and the κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων (c. 8. 1328 b 20 sqq.) to τὸ εὔπορον (1328 b 22), and in 1329 a 27 sqq. to οἱ ἱερεῖs. Περὶ τούτους corresponds to τούτων, 25 (Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.). By τούτους Aristotle means soldiers, judges, and deliberators (cp. c. 10. 1329 b 36 sqq.). I add εἶναι with Bekk., Sus., and others, though its omission may possibly be defensible, cp. c. 10. 1330 a 25, where however there is an εἶναι close at hand, and Rhet. 3. 12. 1414 a 18, τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖαν δεῖ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περίεργον, and see Vahlen on Poet. c. 24. 1459 b 7. Εὐπορία must be possessed by the citizens, for otherwise they will not be at leisure to attend to politics.
- 21. τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. This phrase comes from Plato, Rep. 500 D, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ξυμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; It is, however, implied in the saying of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 326 E, τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. Contrast the description of the χρηματιστής in Plato, Gorg. 452 C as πλούτου δημιουργός.

τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but this' (i.e. the fact that βάναυσοι and generally

those who are not producers of virtue ought not to be citizens) is manifest from the principle which forms the basis of our State, for happiness must be forthcoming in it in close alliance with virtue, and we should pronounce a State happy, looking not to a part of it, but to all its citizens, [so that all the citizens must be virtuous, whence it follows that βάνανσοι and their likes must not be citizens]. In requiring that all the citizens shall be happy, Aristotle here goes beyond 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq., and in requiring that they shall all be virtuous beyond 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. For τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, cp. c. 9. 1328 b 35, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται πρότερον, and Plato, Laws 742 E, σχεδὸν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαίμονας ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι.

- 25. φανερὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and this also is evident that the landed properties should belong to these' (i.e. to the soldiers, judges, and deliberators), 'if, as is the case,' etc. The landed properties might have been given to the cultivators (to whom Plato had given them in the Republic, 2. 5. 1264 a 32 sqq.), if it were not necessary that they should be slaves or barbarian serfs.
- 28. οὖτε γὰρ γεωργὸν κ.τ.λ. Compare the regulation as to the purchase of a priesthood in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 369, ἀνείσθω δὲ ὅς [κα ἢι ὁλ]όκλαρος καὶ ὧι δαμοσιοργίας [μέτεστι], and see Haussoullier's note quoted by Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 323, note 5, and also No. 358, μὴ ἐξεῖναι κα[τάρ]χεσθαι εἰς τὸ Ἡραῖ[ον] ξένωι μηδενί, and [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 73.
- 30. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The reasoning is—the gods should be worshipped by citizens, but we have ranged all the active citizens either in the hoplite or in the deliberative class (Aristotle here appears to merge the judicial in the deliberative class: cp. 1328 b 26, τούς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας, and 1329 a 3 sq.), so that we must assign the priesthoods to those of the citizens who are past the age for work. Citizens who are past work are still πως πολίται (3. 1. Aristotle thinks it fitting that the easy and 1275 a 14 sqq.). recreative work of paying honour to the gods should fall, not, as was often the case in Greece, to those whose strength was unimpaired, but to those who had become infirm through age (cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., where easy harmonies are recommended to oi άπειρηκότες διά χρόνου). Plato, on the contrary, had advised (Rep. 498 C sqq.) that in old age, when strength declines and military and political work is over, men who are to be happy should reserve themselves exclusively for philosophy. See also on this subject

vol. i. p. 329 sq. At Sparta men of advanced years were allowed to discharge important public functions (2. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and this Aristotle does not approve. He does not intend to withdraw from the βασιλεῖς, ἄρχοντες, or πρυτάνεις the public sacrifices connected with the common hearth of the State which it was their function to offer (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.). These were not priestly sacrifices, and it is of priests alone that Aristotle is speaking in the passage before us. 'Ανάπανσις is rather 'relaxation' than 'repose': cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. For the connexion of relaxation with the worship of the gods, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς, and Plato, Rep. 364 E (where Stallbaum compares Hdt. 8. 99, ἐν θυσίησί τε καὶ εὐπαθίησι, and 9. 11, 'Υακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε), and Laws 803 D sq.

34. ὧν μεν τοίνυν ... 1329 b 35, ζητείν. I incline to regard this passage as an interpolation and as not being from the pen of Aristotle. As to 40, ἔοικε δὲ ... 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν, I have already spoken in vol. i. Appendix E, and if we reject this passage, as we should probably do, it is difficult to retain the recapitulation, 34, wu μέν τοίνυν . . . 39, κατὰ μέρος. For this recapitulation cannot have been immediately followed by the second recapitulation 1329 b 36, ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . 39, χώραν, and to expunge (with Sus.) this second recapitulation is not advisable, for then the mention of της διανομής in 30 becomes extremely abrupt, inasmuch as the reference to the territory which prepares the way for it in the text as it stands will have disappeared. The passage 40, ἔοικε δὲ . . . 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν appears still more clearly to have been interpolated. It may have been originally an annotation written by some member of the Peripatetic School on the margin of his copy of the Politics, and may have crept from the margin into the text. It is apparently intended to excuse and account for the absence of a special investigation of the question whether the fighting class should be distinct from the cultivating class. Thus we are told at its close (1329 b 33 sqq.) that it is useless to waste time in investigating what is well settled, and that one should investigate only what has been overlooked. It should be noticed that it says nothing of the existence in India both of castes and of a distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes, though Megasthenes, not very long after the time when the Politics was written, testified to this (ap. Strab. p. 703, φησὶ δὴ (ὁ Μεγασθένης) τὸ τῶν Ἰνδῶν πληθος εἰς έπτὰ μέρη

διηρήσθαι κ.τ.λ.), but it would be rash to conclude that, if the passage is an interpolation, its author wrote before the publication of Megasthenes' work. That it stood where it stands in the Politics in the days of the authority followed by Stobaeus in his account (Ecl. 2. 6. 17) of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics is likely, for he says of the distribution of functions between the young, the elders, and the old, ταύτην δ' άρχαίαν είναι πάνυ την διάταξιν, Αίγυπτίων πρώτων καταστησαμένων, πολιτικών δέ καὶ των ἄλλων οὐχ ήττον, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of The late Prof. Chandler and Bojesen, indeed, contented themselves with rejecting only a part of the passage 1329 a 40 . . . b 35; the former rejected 1329 b 3, τά τε περί τὴν Κρήτην . . . 25, Σεσώστριος, and the latter 1329 b 5, ἀρχαία . . . 25, Σεσώστριος. part they reject is certainly the most evidently spurious part, but much suspicion also attaches to the part which they retain, 1329 b 25-35 (see vol. i. Appendix E), and on the whole I incline to reject the entire passage 1329 a 40-b 35, together with the recapitulation which precedes it, 1329 a 34-39.

- 35. γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for cultivators and artisans and the whole class of labourers are a necessary appurtenance of the State' (literally, 'a thing necessary to belong to States'): compare for the construction c. 10. 1330 a 3, περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι (sc. τὰ συσσίτια) ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρ-χειν, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 7, ὁ τούτων οὐδὲν ἦττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 643 C, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι.
- 37. τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν. For the absence of the article before βουλευτικόν, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 8, τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν.
- 38. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For καὶ . . . δή see above on 1253 a 18. Κατὰ μέρος, Vict. 'per vices,' i.e. in such a way that the one succeeds the other.
- 40. "Εοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. As has been pointed out in vol. i. C. 10. Appendix E, Greek writers are always glad to claim the authority of antiquity in support of their suggestions. Reference has already there been made to Demosth. in Lept. c. 89: compare also Lucian, De Saltat. c. 7, καὶ πρῶτόν γε ἐκείνο πάνυ ἡγνοηκέναι μοι δοκεῖς, ὡς οὐ νεώτερον τὸ τῆς ὀρχήσεως ἐπιτήδευμα τοῦτό ἐστιν, οὐδὲ χθὲς καὶ πρώην ἀρξάμενον, οἶον κατὰ τοὺς προπάτορας ἡμῶν ἡ τοὺς ἐκείνων, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Isocrates says (De Antid. § 82) that the most ancient laws were

thought the best. For τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν cp. 3. 1. 1274 b 32, τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι. Διηρῆσθαι χωρίς, 41, appears to take up κεχώρισται, 38. For διηρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη cp. 1329 b 23, ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους. States were also divided κατὰ συσσίτια and κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ φυλάς (2. 5. 1264 a 6 sqq.).

- 1329 b. 2. ἐν Αἰγύπτω τε γάρ κ.τ.λ. In Egypt there was a general distribution of the population into yévn (Hdt. 2. 164, where, however, the γεωργοί are not mentioned as one of the γένη: contrast Diod. 1. 73 sq., where the classes enumerated are priests, kings, warriors, herdsmen, cultivators, and artisans). Herodotus dwells rather on the prohibition of βάναυσοι τέχναι to the warrior class in Egypt than on the prohibition of agriculture (2. 165, καὶ τούτων βαναυσίης οὐδεὶς δεδάηκε οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀνέονται ές τὸ μάχιμον), and so do Isocrates (Busir. § 18) and Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 4 sub fin.), but Plato in Tim. 24 B refers to the separation of the warrior class in Egypt from the herdsmen, hunters, and cultivators. The names of Sesostris and Minos are mentioned in the passage before us to show the antiquity of this institution in Egypt and Crete. The separation of the warriors from those who practise other arts is ascribed by Isocrates (Busir. § 15 sqq.) not to Sesostris, but to Busiris; 'legislation respecting the warrior class,' however, is ascribed by Diodorus (1. 94. 4) to Sesoosis (Sesostris), whom he calls the third lawgiver of Egypt, and Dicaearchus (Fragm. 7: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235) credits him with a law making all arts hereditary. The passage before us evidently implies that the distinction between warriors and cultivators survived in Egypt even in the writer's day, i.e. that the cultivators did not serve as soldiers, nor the soldiers as cultivators.
  - 5. ἀρχαία δὲ κ.τ.λ. With the object of proving that political institutions and laws are of early date (cp. 31 sqq.), the writer instances another institution, that of the syssitia. Compare the similar transition from the subject of the distinction of warriors and cultivators to that of syssitia in 2. 10. 1271 b 41 sqq.
  - 6. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, sc. συσσίτια, in apposition to τῶν συσσιτίων ή τάξις.
  - 7. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. This results from the fact that in Italy syssitia were as old as the introduction of the names 'Italy' and 'Italians' and the conversion of the Italians from nomads into cultivators.

8. φασὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Antiochus of Svracuse is probably referred to, for the facts here related are derived from him: cp. Antioch. Fragm. 3 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 181), "'Αντίοχος Ξενοφάνεος τάδε συνέγραψε περὶ 'Ιταλίας . . . τὴν γῆν ταύτην, ήτις νῦν 'Ιταλία καλεῖται, τὸ παλαιὸν εἶχον Οἰνωτροί." \*Επειτα διεξελθών ον τρόπον ἐπολιτεύοντο καὶ ώς βασιλεύς ἐν αὐτοῖς Ἰταλὸς ἀνὰ χρόνον ἐγένετο, ἀφ' οὖ μετωνομάσθησαν Ἰταλοί, κ.τ.λ.: Fragm. 4, Ἰταλία δὲ ἀνὰ χρόνον ἀνομάσθη ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς δυνατοῦ, ὄνομα 'Ιταλοῦ. Τοῦτον δέ φησιν 'Αντίοχος ὁ Συρακούσιος . . . ἄπασαν ὑφ' έαυτῷ ποιήσασθαι την γην, δση έντος ην των κόλπων του τε Ναπητίνου καὶ του Σκυλλητίνου ἡν δὴ πρώτην κληθηναι Ἰταλίαν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰταλοῦ: and Fragm. 6, ἔτι δ' ἀνώτερον ('apud vetustiores') Οἰνωτρούς τε καὶ Ἰταλούς μόνους έφη καλείσθαι τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ πρὸς τὸν Σικελικὸν κεκλιμένους πορθμόν. Εστι δ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἰσθμὸς έκατὸν καὶ έξήκοντα στάδιοι, μεταξὺ δυοῖν κόλπων, τοῦ τε Ἱππωνιάτου, ον ᾿Αντίοχος Ναπιτίνον εἴρηκε, καὶ τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ. Compare also Virgil, Aen. 1. 532 sq. The origin of syssitia is here traced to the territory in which the Epizephyrian Locri was situated, and not to Crete, in much the same way in which the Locrian Onomacritus was made out by some authorities (2. 12. 1274 a 25 sqq.) to have been the spiritual progenitor of a number of great lawgivers.

11. ἀκτήν, 'peninsula': cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 6. 198 R, περιέχεσθαί τε ὀλίγου πᾶσαν αὐτὴν (i.e. τὴν 'Αττικήν) ὑπὸ τῆς θαλάττης ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τοὕνομα λαβεῖν, οἶον ἀκτήν τινα οὖσαν.

'Ιταλίαν τοὖνομα λαβεῖν. The name taken is put in the acc.: cp. Aristoph. Fragm. 304 Didot, "Αμφοδον έχρῆν αὐτῷ τεθεῖσθαι τοὔνομα.

12. ἐντὸς κ.τ.λ. The peninsula is apparently reckoned from its point, so that the territory lying between the point and the two gulfs is said to be within them, and the territory lying beyond the two gulfs, looking from the point, is implied to be outside them.

τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ. Antiochus called this gulf, the modern gulf of S. Eufemia, by the name Ναπητῖνος or Ναπιτῖνος, a name the origin of which is uncertain; how it comes to be called Λαμητικός in the passage before us, which is based on Antiochus, is not clear. The name Λαμητικός is derived from that of a city called Lametini, probably situated on the shore of the gulf of S. Eufemia and near the stream which still bears the name of Lamato (the ancient Lamêtus). See Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Lametini and art. Napetinus Sinus.

13. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these two gulfs are distant from each other [only] half a day's journey.' For the omission of 'only' see VOL. III.

note on 1282 a 36. The near approach of the two gulfs to each other is mentioned in justification of the description of Italy as lying 'within' them. They were 160 stadia, or about eighteen miles, apart (see above on 8), hence a day's journey is calculated here at thirty-six miles.

14. τοῦτον δὴ κ.τ.λ. Italus is probably regarded as the first lawgiver of the Oenotrians, and if this is so, the introduction of legislation among them is connected with the change from a pastoral to an agricultural life: see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., 1. 21, and cp. Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 13, βασιλεύοντα δ' "Οσιριν Αἰγυπτίους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπόρου βίου καὶ θηριώδους ἀπαλλάξαι, καρπούς τε δείξαντα καὶ νόμους θέμενον αὐτοῖς, καὶ θεοὺς δείξαντα τιμᾶν, and Ovid, Metam. 5. 341,

Prima Ceres unco glebas dimovit aratro, Prima dedit fruges alimentaque mitia terris, Prima dedit leges.

Janus takes the place of Italus in Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 22, ή μάλλον ὅτι τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν αὐτὸς ἀγρίοις καὶ ἀνόμοις χρωμένους ἤθεσιν εἰς ἔτερον βίου σχῆμα, πείσας καὶ γεωργεῖν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, μετέβαλε καὶ μετεκόσμησε; Compare the language of Strabo as to Masinissa (p. 833), καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ οὖτός ἐστιν ὁ τοὺς νομάδας πολιτικοὺς κατασκευάσας καὶ γεωργούς, ἔτι δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ ληστεύειν διδάξας στρατεύειν. Syssitia (σῖτος, 'corn') are probably conceived as connected with agriculture. For τοῦτον δὴ τὸν Ἰταλόν Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 39) compares 1. 6. 1255 a 7, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δίκαιον. Δή introduces in both passages a statement about the person or thing which has been described in what precedes. We expect θεῖναι rather than θέσθαι, but cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 38.

- 16. διδ κ.τ.λ. On the resemblance of this passage to 2. 10. 1271 b 30 sqq., see vol. i. p. 575, note 2. The continued existence of the institution and of certain of the laws of Italus among some of his descendants is apparently mentioned in confirmation of the statement that he introduced the syssitia and was the author of other laws also.
- 18. ἄκουν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It would seem that the whole region from the Lametic Gulf to Tyrrhenia (i.e. Latium Campania and Lucania) is here conceived as inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones. That Aristotle included Latium in Opica we see from Fragm. 567. 1571 a 24 sq. Campania, according to Antiochus of Syracuse, was inhabited by 'Opici, who were also called Ausones' (Fragm. 8:

Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 183). But we do not find that Lucania is elsewhere said to be inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones, or indeed by Opici of any kind. Herodotus regards Elea, which was in the region ultimately known as Lucania, as in Oenotria, not in Opica (1. 167).

20. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Antioch. ap. Strab. p. 255 (Fragm. 6: Müller, 1. 182), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπεκτείνεται, φησί, τοὕνομα καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ τὸ τῶν Οἰνωτρῶν μέχρι τῆς Μεταποντίνης καὶ τῆς Σειρίτιδος οἰκῆσαι γὰρ τοὺς τόπους τούτους Χῶνας, Οἰνωτρικὸν ἔθνος κατακοσμούμενον, καὶ τὴν γῆν ὀνομάσαι Χώνην.

τὸν Ἰόνιον, sc. κόλπον, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 11, and see Liddell and Scott.

- 23. δ δὲ χωρισμὸς κ.τ.λ. The Egyptians, according to Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, claimed that Lycurgus visited Egypt and borrowed there the separation of the warriors from the other classes which he introduced at Sparta, and Isocrates in his Busiris (§ 17 sq.) traces this and other Lacedaemonian institutions to Egypt: cp. Pherecr. \*Αγριοι, Fragm. 5 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 257), where Lycurgus is connected with Egypt. Aristotle, however, in 2. 10. 1271 b 22 sqq., like the Lacedaemonians themselves (see above on 1271 b 22), traces the laws of Lycurgus to Crete.
- 24. πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει κ.τ.λ. According to Dicaearchus, Fragm. 7 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235), Sesostris was king of Egypt immediately after Orus, the son of Osiris and Isis, and lived 2936 years before the first Olympiad. Herodotus, however, would seem to place Sesostris much later. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 298), 'quod quidem nunc ait autor, regnum Sesostris longe superare annis regnum Minois, cum narratione Herodoti non videtur congruere. Hic enim' (2. 112 sqq.) 'Proteum regem Aegypti facit tertium a Sesostri, cuius regnum inciderit in tempus belli Troiani. Et in exercitu Graecorum illius belli fuit secundum Homerum' (Odyss. 19. 178 sqq.) 'Idomeneus et ipse tertius a Minoe, ut paene aequales ita reperiantur Sesostris et Minos; hoc modo, Sesostris, Pheron, Proteus, et Minos, Deucalion, Idomeneus.'
- 25. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The sense is—'So then, just as we have seen that syssitia were invented first in Italy and afterwards in Crete, and the division of the population into different classes first in Egypt and afterwards in Crete, we may take it that all other discoveries have been made over and over again an indefinite number of times—for discovery comes easily to men, need reveal-

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ing discoveries of a necessary kind, and others following in due course—and this holds of political institutions as fully as of anything else; but that all political institutions are ancient. [which is what concerns us now, is proved by the example of Egypt.' The view that everything has been invented over and over again is quite Aristotelian: cp. Metaph. Λ. 8. 1074 b 10, κατά τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εύρημένης είς τὸ δυνατὸν εκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων: De Caelo, 1. 3. 270 b 19, οὐ γὰρ ἄπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς ἀλλ' απειράκις δεί νομίζειν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀφικνείσθαι δόξας εἰς ἡμᾶς: Meteor. I. 3. 339 b 27 sqq. This view may have been suggested by the fact that the inventions which were ascribed in Greece to Palamedes, Orpheus, and others were ascribed in Egypt to far earlier inventors, so that it was natural to suppose that in the interval between the Egyptian inventors and Palamedes and the rest the arts invented by the former had been lost. It is likely enough that arts have been lost and rediscovered. A writer in the Times of Sept. 27, 1886, remarks of some 'glazed bricks' of the time of Rameses II from Tel-el-Jahûdî, now in the British Museum, 'Historians of Italian art speak of the "discovery" of Luca della Robbia; here is the faïence decoration in the highest state of excellence more than 2,700 years before he was born.' For έν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνω, cp. 2.5. 1264 a 1 sqq. Aristotle believed that the human race had existed from everlasting (see note on 1269 a 5). For the contrast of rà αναγκαία and τὰ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν, Camerarius (Interp. p. 298) compares Top. 3. 2. 118 a 6, καὶ τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν αναγκαίων βελτίω, ενίστε δε καὶ αίρετώτερα βέλτιον γὰρ τοῦ ζην τὸ εὖ ζην, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶν ἐκ περιουσίας, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον . . . τὸ δ' ἐκ περιουσίας έστίν, όταν ύπαρχόντων των άναγκαίων άλλα τινά προσκατασκευάζηταί τις τῶν καλῶν: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 2 sqq. For την χρείαν διδάσκειν αὐτήν, cp. Eurip. Fragm. 709 (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 729),

> οὔ τἄρ' 'Οδυσσεύς ἐστιν αἰμύλος μόνος· χρεία διδάσκει, κἃν βραδύς τις η̈́, σοφόν,

and Leutsch and Schneidewin, 2. 203,

πολλών ό λιμός γίνεται διδάσκαλος.

That necessary things are discovered first had already been implied by Democritus (see vol. i. p. 356, note 1).

31. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα κ.τ.λ. The argument is—'we might expect the Egyptians, who are thought to be the most ancient race in the world, to have come into existence before laws and

constitutions were invented, in which case we should find them lacking these still, but the fact is quite otherwise; hence laws and institutions must be of very ancient origin.' Thus the statement with which the passage commences as to the antiquity of the distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes is fully borne out. In the reference to the Egyptians it is evidently assumed with much naïveté that as a race is when it first comes into being, so it will remain. Bernays (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 169) and Susemihl would insert ἀεί after τετυχήκασι, but in my opinion without necessity. We are familiar with the belief that the Egyptian race was the most ancient in the world from the well-known story in Hdt. 2. 2. There was a general agreement as to the fact, though some claimed priority for the Phrygians (ibid.) or the Scythians (Justin, 2. 1. 5 sqq.) and Aristotle himself for the Magi (Diog. Laert. 1. 8), but there was much disagreement as to the cause. For one theory, see Hippys of Rhegium, Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 13), Diod. 1. 10. 1, and Justin, 2. 1. 5 sqq. Aristotle's own theory may be gathered from Meteor. 1. 14. 352 b 20 sqq. The priests of Sais in the Timaeus of Plato (22 C sqq.) assign a different cause.

33. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'hence we should make use of what has been adequately said [without spending time on its further investigation]. and attempt to investigate [only] what has been left untouched': cp. c. 1. 1323 a 21 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 12 sqq.: Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 8, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τό γε ἐπιχείρημα καλῶς ἔχει, τὸ ζητεῖν τὰ παραλελειμμένα και νομοθετείν ταις μοναρχίαις. I follow Sepulveda, Vict., and Lamb. in taking ίκανῶς with τοῖς εἰρημένοις, and not (as do Sus. and Welldon) with χρησθαι: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 3. ίκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν, and Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10. διόπερ εν τη πολιτεία κομψως τοῦτο, οὐχ ίκανως δε εἴρηται. Looking to these passages and to the very similar passage c. 1. 1323 a 21 sqq., I incline on the whole to retain the reading of Γ Π είρημένοις, and not (with Lamb., Bekk.2, and Sus.) to substitute εύρημένοις for it, though c. 11. 1331 a 16 might be quoted in favour of this reading. It is true also that the antithesis to παραλελειμμένα is often εύρημένα (e.g. in Soph. El. 33. 184 b 6 sqq. and Demosth. De Symmor. c. 23: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 15 sqq.), but this is not always the case, as we see from Isocr. Hel. § 67, πολύ δέ πλείω τὰ παραλελειμμένα των είρημένων έστίν. For the suppression of 'only,' see above on 1329 b 13 and 1282 a 36.

- 36. τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων. For the absence of τά before ὅπλα, cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29, περὶ τοῦ ὅπλα κεκτῆσθαι, and see critical note on 1267 b 33. As to the distinction here implied between the hoplites and those who share in the constitution, see vol. i. p. 324 and note 1 on that page.
  - 37. εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.
- 38. αὐτῶν ἐτέρους, 'distinct from them': cp. c. 12. 1331 b 1 and Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 28, ἔτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν (ἡδοναὶ) τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν.
- 40. τίνας καὶ ποίους. The answer to τίνας (given in 1330 a 25 sqq.) is 'slaves or non-Greek serfs,' and to ποίους (ibid.) is 'not of one race nor spirited in character.'
- 41. πρῶτον. Aristotle afterwards deals with the site of the city. φαμεν, in 2. 5. 1263 a 37 sqq. That no citizen should want for food, is implied in 1263 a 21 sqq.: see above on 1263 a 24.
- 1330 a. 1. For the reference here to Plato as  $\tau\iota\nu\acute{\epsilon}s$ , see above on 1327 b 38. Lycurgus (In Leocr. cc. 92 and 132) carries this use of  $\tau\iota\nu\acute{\epsilon}s$  so far as to say that  $\tau\iota\nu\acute{\epsilon}s$  wrote this or that passage of verse which he quotes (Richards).
  - ἀλλὰ τῆ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κοινήν, sc. εἶναι δεῖν. Φιλικῶς qualifies κοινήν, 'common in friendly fashion,' 'common as the goods of friends are common': cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 29, δι' ἀρετήν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Γινομένην = ποιουμένην: cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 37, φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῆ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. For εἶναι γινομένην, cp. Hdt. 1. 146, ταῦτα δὲ ἦν γινόμενα ἐν Μιλήτω, and Plato, Polit. 301 D, and see above on 1259 b 11. Sus. and Welldon adopt Congreve's conjecture of γινομένη for γινομένην (Sus. adding γίνεσθαι after γινομένη), but, as it seems to me, not rightly.
  - 2. οὖτ' ἀπορεῖν κ.τ.λ. As to the importance of this, see Isocr. Areop. §§ 53, 83, and Plato, Laws 735 E.
  - 3. περὶ συσσιτίων τε κ.τ.λ., 'and with regard to common meals, all agree that they are an useful thing to belong to well-constituted States.' For the construction, compare c. 9. 1329 a 35 sqq. Aristotle passes on to the subject of common meals, because, like the friendly community of property which he has just recommended, they are a means of securing the citizens against a want of food. It was also necessary to settle the question of their existence before proceeding to the division of the territory, inasmuch as a portion of the territory is to be set apart for their support. Aristotle

nowhere fulfils, in what we possess of the Politics, the promise which he makes in 4, so that we can only guess why he approved of the institution. He probably valued it as a means of regulating habits of life and of enforcing the 'temperate and liberal' standard which he commends (c. 5. 1326 b 30 sqq.), as a means of making an approach to community of property (2. 5. 1263 b 40 sqq.), and also as a means of developing a high spirit and mutual confidence in his citizens and securing their acquaintance with each other (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 41 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 333 sqq. For an account of the purpose for which, according to Plato, the institution was originally introduced, see Laws 780 B sq.

- 5. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. All the citizens ought to share in the common meals, and not, as at Sparta, that portion only of them which could afford to pay a contribution. See 2. 9. 1271 a 26 sqq. and 2. 10. 1272 a 12 sqq. Aristotle appears here to contemplate the existence of ἄποροι in his 'best State.' Τὸ συντεταγμένον, 'the assessed sum' (Liddell and Scott).
- 7. καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν, 'and to manage the rest of the housekeeping.' For τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν, cp. c. 17. 1336 a 40 sq. and Plato, Rep. 458 D, καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῃ τροφῷ.
- 8. τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα, 'expenses in relation to the gods,' cp. 12, τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, and 2. 8. 1267 b 34 sq.
- 9. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. As Aristotle's principle seems to be that expenses which fall on all the citizens should be provided for by public land set apart for the purpose, we might have expected him to have gone farther in this direction, and (e.g.) to have set apart public land to defray the expenses of the public education which the citizens are to receive (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 21 sqq.). As to the public land in Greek States, see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 63 sq. Aristotle does not, like Hippodamus (2. 8. 1267 b 33 sqq.), divide the territory of his State into three parts—sacred, public, and private—but only into two, public and private. He devotes a part of the public land to expenses connected with the gods, i. e. to the provision of sacrifices, repairs of temples, and perhaps also liturgies connected with festivals.

14. τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Laws 745 C, κλήρους δὲ διελεῖν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τούτων τε αὐ δίχα τεμεῖν εκαστον καὶ ξυγκληρῶσαι δύο τμήματα, τοῦ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ τοῦ πόρρω μετέχοντα ἐκάτερον' τὸ πρὸς τῆ πόλει μέρος τῷ πρὸς τοῖς ἐσχάτοις εἶς κλῆρος καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ πόλεως τῷ ἀπ' ἐσχάτων δευτέρῳ

καὶ τάλλα οὖτω πάντα. (Compare the process by which lots of land are assigned to the peasants of a Russian commune, as described by M. Leroy-Beaulieu in Revue des Deux Mondes, Nov. 15, 1876. 'Chaque paysan reçoit une parcelle d'autant de sortes de terrain qu'il y a de qualités de terre dans la commune.' 'Quand les terres seraient tous de même qualité . . . l'inégale distance du village leur donne encore pour le paysan une inégale valeur.') Aristotle, however, does not approve (2. 6. 1265 b 24 sqq.) Plato's further suggestion (Laws 745 E) of two houses: see above on 1265 b 25. But would not the cultivation of two lots of land at a distance from each other be almost as troublesome as living in two houses? The reason for the arrangement which Aristotle follows Plato in adopting is obvious enough. Land near the city was probably as a rule far more valuable in ancient Greece than land at a distance from it. It was land in this situation that rich men were most likely to buy up (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8 sqq.). Cp. Xen. De Vect. 4. 50, καὶ οί γε χώροι οὐδὲν αν είεν μείονος ἄξιοι τοῖς κεκτημένοις ένταῦθα (at Laurium in Attica) ή τοις περί τὸ ἄστυ, and Hdt. 6. 20, της δὲ Μιλησίης χώρης αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ Πέρσαι εἶχον τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ πεδίον, τὰ δὲ ὑπεράκρια ἔδοσαν Καρσὶ Πηδασεῦσι ἐκτῆσθαι. So on the foundation of the colony of Thurii οἱ προϋπάρχοντες Συβαρῖται . . . τὴν μέν σύνεγγυς τη πόλει χώραν κατεκληρούχουν έαυτοίς, την δὲ πόρρω κειμένην τοις ἐπήλυσι (Diod. 12. 11. 1). The owners of land near the city would not only be better able than others to take an active part in politics and be nearer to the conveniences and the handicraftsmen of the city, but would also command a better market for their produce, and would be less exposed to attack in case of invasion. Frontier-landowners, on the contrary, were the first to suffer in that event. Thus the Lacedaemonian owners of frontier-land suffered so much from the Messenians in Eira during the Second Messenian War that civil trouble resulted (Paus. 4. 18. 1: see note on 1306 b 37). Compare the case of the citizens of Corinth who owned the fertile and extensive frontier-plain between Corinth and Sicyon. This plain 'was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.c.' by the Corinthian War, and though its owners withdrew their servants and cattle to Peiraeum, their loss 'was still so great that two successive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion to the war' (Grote, Hist, of Greece, 9, 455). As to the Acharnians, see Thuc. 2. 21, and the notes of Mr. Congreve and Prof. Jowett on the passage before us. The frontier-landowners

of ancient Greece, unlike those of the English and Scotch Border and of the Welsh Marches of England in the middle ages, seem to have feared more from the loss of their own goods than they hoped from raids on those of the foe.

- 16. For τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 1 sqq.
- 21. συμμετέχειν βουλης τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων. The story about the sufferings of the Lacedaemonian frontier-owners in the Second Messenian War comes from the Εὐνομία of Tyrtaeus (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 37 sqq.), and it is just possible that συμμετέχειν βουλης τῶν ὁμόρων πολέμων was a line in that poem. The Lacedaemonian State may well have been one of those in which the law referred to existed. For the absence of περί before τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37, τὸ βουλευόμενον τῶν κοινῶν.
- 22. διὰ τὸ ἴδιον, 'on account of their private interest': cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 4, αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν. For the thought, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 14 sqq. and 3. 16. 1287 b 2 sq.
- 25. τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας κ.τ.λ. Plato also makes agriculture over to slaves in the State described in the Laws (806 D sq.). Περίοικοι differ from slaves in being only half-enslaved (see above on 1269 a 34). Thus the Mariandynian περίοικοι of the Pontic Heracleia could not be sold for export beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, p. 542), nor could the Helots (Strabo, p. 365).
- εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχήν. For the omission of εἶναι, see above on 1329 a 17 and 1277 a 38. Its omission is facilitated by the nearness of δούλους εἶναι.
- 26. μήτε δμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδών, 'and should consist neither of men all of one kin nor of men spirited in character.' The gen. appears to be partitive, as in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 28. Polybius distinguishes δμόφυλοι from δμοεθνεῖς in 11. 19, ἀστασίαστα διετήρησε τοσαῦτα πλήθη καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καίπερ οὐχ οἷον ὁμοεθνέσιν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενος στρατοπέδοις εἶχε γὰρ Λίβυας "Ιβηρας Λιγυστίνους Κελτοὺς Φοίνικας Ἰταλοὺς Ελληνας, so that, if we take Aristotle to mean the same thing by δμόφυλος as Polybius does in this passage, he would be opposed to the employment of slaves belonging to one and the same great stock (Libyan, Celtic, Italian, or the like), even though they belonged to different ἔθνη, but this is not the sense in which the word is used in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 25 sqq., and Aristotle probably means δμοεθνής by δμόφυλος. In the corresponding passage in Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 18 in fact—καὶ μὴ κτᾶσθαι

όμοεθνείς (δούλους) πολλούς, ώσπερ καὶ έν ταις πόλεσιν—the word όμοεθνής is used, not ὁμόφυλος. Plato had already said in Laws 777 C, δύο δή λείπεσθου μόνω μηχανά, μήτε πατριώτας άλλήλων είναι τούς μέλλοντας ράον δουλεύσειν, ἀσυμφώνους τε (' different in language') είς δύναμιν ο τι μάλιστα, and Aristotle follows in his track. His especial object is to avoid the errors committed by the Lacedaemonian State in its organization of slavery. The Helots were serfs (περίοικοι), not slaves, and Hellenic serfs into the bargain, both δμόφυλοι and θυμοειδείς (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 34 sqq.). But other Greek States also probably had slaves whom he would regard as too nearly akin to each other and too spirited to be submissive. The fugitive slaves who under the name of Bruttians (Βρέττιοι) did much to ruin some of the Greek colonies in South Italy (Diod. 16. 15) were apparently an instance in point. Attic slaves, on the contrary, came from a variety of sources, Lydia, Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Syria, and the Euxine (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 170). Dionysius the Elder wished his mercenaries to be collected έκ πολλῶν ἐθνῶν (Diod. 14. 44. 3). Aristotle would no doubt disapprove of a body of slaves wholly composed of negroes, and the experience of the island of St. Domingo in modern times bears out his view. 'It is always a wise arrangement to have different tribes in a caravan, for in the event of a strike, and there are always strikes, there is less chance of concerted action' (Prof. Drummond, Tropical Africa, p. 90). Some went so far as to advise the actual promotion of discord among slaves (Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 30, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 242 and 5. cclxxii, and Plut. Cato Maior, c. 21, quoted by Meineke), but Aristotle says nothing about this. We notice that he imposes no limit on the number of the slaves in his 'best State,' though we might have expected him to do so.

- 28. δεύτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Non-Greek serfs, unlike the Helots. Aristotle probably has in his mind the Mariandynian serfs of the Pontic Heracleia (see above on 1269 a 34). Serfs of this type would have the drawback of being almost inevitably ὁμόφυλοι.
- 30. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here again Aristotle departs from the Lacedaemonian practice. The Helots employed on private estates did not belong to the owners of those estates (Strabo, p. 365, τρόπον γάρ τινα δημοσίους δούλους εἶχον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τούτους, i.e. τοὺς Εἴλωτας): the owners could not free the Helots employed on their estates or sell them beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, ibid.).

- 31. τίνα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Plato had gone on to deal with this subject in the passage of the Laws (777 C sqq.) which Aristotle has before him here. The difficulty of the question is recognized in 2.9. 1269 b 7 sqq. The promised solution is nowhere given in the Politics as we have it, but we have many suggestions on the subject in Oecon. 1.5.
- 32. καὶ διότι κ.τ.λ. Διότι is here 'why.' This promise also remains unfulfilled in the Politics as we have it, but cp. Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 4, ὅσπερ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅταν μὴ γίγνηται τοῖς βελτίσοι βελτιον μηδὲ ἄθλα ἢ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, γίνονται χείρους, οὕτω καὶ περὶ οἰκέτας, and 14, χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὡρίσθαι πᾶσιν δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἄθλον βούλονται γὰρ πονεῖν, ὅταν ἢ ἄθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὡρισμένος. Xenophon had already said in Oecon. 5. 16, καὶ ἐλπίδων δὲ ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν ῆττον οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν ἐλευθέρων δέονται ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅπως μένειν ἐθέλωσι. Aristotle perhaps merely means by πᾶσι τοῖς δούλοις both public and private slaves. But it is possible that, as the slave often purchased his freedom from his master, emancipation was most within the reach of the slaves who stood highest in their master's service, or who had learnt some lucrative handicraft.
- **34.** Τὴν δὲ πόλιν κ.τ.λ. Τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν, c. 10. 1330 a 23, has C. 11. already been answered by τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας, 1330 a 25, but here it is further answered by τὴν δὲ πόλιν. Εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 5. 1327 a 3-c. 6. 1327 a 40.
- 36. αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ. Various attempts have been made to interpret this passage as it stands. Göttling, Stahr, Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 17 sqq.), and Broughton, in his edition of Pol. 1, 3, and 4 (7), take elval to be used in αὐτῆς πρὸς αύτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν as it is used in such phrases as έκων είναι, κατά τουτο είναι (Plato, Protag. 317 A), είς δύναμιν είναι (Polit. 300 C), and the like, and translate these words 'so far as concerns the position of the city in relation to itself,' but the objection to this view is that no instance is produced of the use of elval in this sense in combination with a similar collection of words. Elvai, when thus used, commonly goes with one word, or two or three, of a simple and closely connected kind. Prof. Jowett, on the other hand (Politics 2. 273), thinks that 'the order of the words is as follows, δεί εύχεσθαι κατατυγχάνειν (τοῦ) τὴν θέσιν είναι,' but Sus.4 (1. p. 519) objects that, if we take the passage thus, we require  $\tau \circ \hat{v}$ την θέσιν, οΐαν δεί, είναι, or something similar, not simply τοῦ την θέσιν

cival. The difficulty of interpreting the passage as it stands being so great, it is not surprising that emendations of the text have been suggested. Coray and Bekk.2 bracket elvar, while Bonitz (Ind. 375 b 8) places a query after κατατυγχάνειν. For Susemihl's view see his note in Sus.4 Richards suggests that κατ' εὐχήν should be read in place of κατατυγχάνειν, translating 'but we should pray that the position of the city in relation to itself may be the best possible,' etc. If, however, κατ' εὐχήν was the original reading, we should expect it to be corrupted into κατατυχείν rather than κατατυγχάνειν, and perhaps also to stand nearer in the sentence to είναι than it does. In defence of κατατυγχάνειν it may be pointed out that κατατυχείν is used in the same sense ('votis potiri') in Demosth. De Cor. c. 178, ἐὰν δ' ἄρα μὴ συμβῆ κατατυχείν: cp. also Plut. Apophth. Lac. Ages. 59. 213 A and De Gen. Socr. c. 9. 580 B. I am myself inclined to suggest that some words may be wanting in the text. The rendering of Vet. Int. is 'ipsius autem ad se ipsam si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem, quattuor utique respicientes.' Sus. thinks that he here renders a gloss, Busse (De praesidiis, etc., p. 18) that he fills up a lacuna in his Greek text by borrowing words from c. 5. 1327 a 3 sq. It is, however, possible that the text of T differed here from that of the MSS. known to us, and that some words have really dropped out in our MSS. of which the rendering of Vet. Int. preserves a trace. The text, in fact, may have originally run, αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν (εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν) εἶναι τὴν θέσιν, εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας. The four things seem to be health, adaptation to the needs of political life, adaptation to those of war, and beauty (κόσμος, 1330 b 31), though Aristotle in his haste omits to mention the last. Less attention seems generally to have been paid by the founders of cities in ancient Greece to the first two points than to the rest: cp. Strabo, p. 235, των γὰρ Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὰς κτίσεις εὐστοχῆσαι μάλιστα δοξάντων ότι κάλλους έστοχάζοντο καὶ έρυμνότητος καὶ λιμένων καὶ χώρας εὐφυοῦς κ.τ.λ. Myscellus, however, the founder of Crotona, had looked to health rather than to wealth (Strabo, p. 269), and in later days Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis had paid great attention to the question what site and aspect are most favourable to the health of a city. Plato also had taken health into consideration (Laws 778 E). For πρὸς τέτταρα δή, cp. Pindar, Pyth. 9. 90,

Αἰγίνα τε γὰρ

φαμὶ Νίσου τ' ἐν λόφω τρὶς δή πόλιν τάνδ' εὐκλείξαι.

 $\Delta \hat{\eta}$  thus used strengthens (Holden, Index to the Oeconomicus of Xenophon s. v.).

38. πρώτον μέν, ώς ἀναγκαίον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν. Sepulveda translates, 'primum ad valetudinem, ut rem necessariam' (and so Lamb.); Vict. 'primum quidem, ut necesse est, ad corporis sanitatem.' But perhaps it is better (with Richards) to supply  $\delta \nu$  with αναγκαίον and to take ως αναγκαίον as=ως αναγκαίον ον βλέπειν προς τοῦτο. A thing may deserve to be looked to first either on account of its excellence (cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11 sq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 5 sq.) or on account of its indispensability (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 29 sq.), and Aristotle is careful to explain that health is to be looked to first for the latter reason. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 29, καίτοι δεί ύγιαίνειν τούς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὥσπερ ζῆν ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, and Plato, Laws 743 Ε, εί δέ τις τῶν προσταττομένων αὐτόθι νόμων σωφροσύνης ἔμπροσθεν ύγίειαν έν τη πόλει φανείται ποιών τιμίαν, ή πλούτον ύγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονείν, ούκ δρθώς ἀναφανείται τιθέμενος. Some had regarded health as the most excellent thing in the world (Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq.: Anaxandrides, Ongavoos, Fragm. 1, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 169, a line of which,

τὸ μὲν ὑγιαίνειν πρῶτον ὡς ἄριστον ὄν,

may be in Aristotle's memory here: Rhet. 2. 21. 1394 b 13 sq.: Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, c. 5 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 1 sqq.).

αι τε γάρ κ.τ.λ. Τε should follow έω, not ai: for other cases in which it is found out of its proper place, see above on 1325 a 19 and 1259 a 13. Πόλεις is omitted as a word which will be readily supplied: for other cases of its omission, see above on 1266 b 1. Hippocrates, as Stahr and others have pointed out, had already pronounced in favour of an Eastern aspect for cities in De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 530 Kühn, δκόσαι μεν (των πόλεων) προς τάς ανατολάς του ήλίου κέονται, ταύτας είκὸς είναι ύγιεινοτέρας των πρὸς τὰς άρκτους ἐστραμμένων καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ θερμά, ἢν καὶ στάδιον τὸ μεταξὺ ἢ. Compare Columella, De Re Rustica, 1. 5. 5, optime autem salubribus locis ad orientem vel meridiem . . . villa convertitur. The climate of Patras, the ancient Patrae, is thought unhealthy for strangers, because the mountains which rise above it close at hand screen it from the East winds (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 440). Cities whose site slopes towards the East are exposed to the wind ἀπηλιώτης (Probl. 26. 12. 941 b 17, καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τὰ ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς κινῶν άπηλιώτας ανέμους ήγειρεν (ὁ ήλιος), οῦτω καὶ τὰ από μεσημβρίας κινῶν

NOTES.

νότους ἐγείρει), a wind which is in a mean between hot and cold winds (Probl. 26. 55. 946 b 24 sq.), and health results when things hot and cold are in due proportion to each other (Anal. Post. 1. 13. 78 b 18 sqq.). The East wind is described as 'warm' in Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 24, and as 'comparatively warm' in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19 sqq. See also vol. i. p. 337, note 4.

40. δεύτερον δε κατά βορέαν, 'and in the second place those which are sheltered from the North wind.' Here Aristotle differs from Hippocrates, who appears to regard cities facing North and sheltered from the South as more favourably situated for health than cities facing South and sheltered from the North (De Aere, Aguis, Locis, vol. i. pp. 525-9 Kühn). For κατά βορέαν, cp. κατάβορρος, Oecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 33. We expect ai κατά βορέαν, but cp. 1330 b 10, δεύτερον δε ύδασιν ύγιεινοις χρησθαι, where έν τῷ ύδασιν ύγιεινοις χρησθαι would have been more regular. See vol. i. p. 337, note 5. Some places suffered much from the North wind, e.g. Ismarus in Thrace: cp. Eustath. on Dionys. Perieg. 27, p. 90 Bernhardy (quoted by Ellis, Commentary on Catullus, p. 384), καθάπερ καὶ Ἰσμαρικὸς ἐν τοῖς έξης ὁ βορρας, ἀπὸ Ἰσμάρου πόλεως Θρακικής, «νθα μάλιστα βορράς καταρρήγνυται. Plataea was exposed to the North wind, though, as it happened, the North wind was gentle there (Theophrast. Fragm. 5. c. 32 Wimmer). Plato had given the plain around the city in the island of Atlantis a Southern aspect sheltered from the North wind (Critias 118 A).

41. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ. Δεῖ should probably be supplied, as in c. 5. 1326 b 30 sqq. The sentence would have been more regularly constructed if καλῶς ἔχειν had not been added, for then πρός τε τάς πολιτικάς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικάς would have depended on βλέποντας, 38, but as a long parenthesis has intervened (αι τε, 38-μαλλον, 41), Aristotle adds καλῶς ἔχειν to make his meaning clear, and might have added δεί also. For πρός τε τάς πολιτικάς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικάς, cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, έκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ, and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 7, πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις. Aristotle does not explain what sort of site would be well adapted for political activity, but he would perhaps regard as such a site which, while fairly level and favourable to easy communication, had within it a spot suitable for the common life of the elder citizens who are to rule the State, and somewhat withdrawn from the turmoil of buying and selling, such a spot as he sketches in c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.

2. πρὸς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by δέ, 8. Similar 1330 b. advice is given as to the territory in c. 5. 1326 b 40, χρη μέν (την χώραν) τοις πολεμίοις είναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοις δ' εὐέξοδον. A city would be (1) 'hard of approach' (δυσπρόσοδος), if it lay, like Sparta, behind mountains penetrable at only a few easily-guarded points (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24). Compare the description of Thalamae in Elis in Polyb. 4. 75. 2, πλείστη δ' αποσκευή και πλείστος όχλος ήθροίσθη σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων εἰς τὸ χωρίον ὁ καλοῦσι Θαλάμας, διὰ τὸ τήν τε χώραν την πέριξ αὐτοῦ στενην είναι καὶ δυσέμβολον τό τε χωρίον ἀπραγμάτευτον καὶ δυσπρόσοδον. So we read of Rome in Plut. Romul. C. 17, ην δε δυσπρόσοδος ή πόλις έχουσα πρόβλημα το νῦν Καπιτώλιον, έν φ φρουρά καθειστήκει. A lake or a river or cliffs would answer the same purpose as a mountain: see as to the site of Oeniadae Thuc. 2. 102. 3, as to the acropolis of Sicyon (the site to which the city was removed by Demetrius Poliorcetes) Diod. 20. 102. 4, and as to the site of Psophis Polyb. 4. 70. 7 sqq. A city would be (2) 'hard to beleaguer' (δυσπερίληπτος), if the ground about it was made difficult by chasms or unfordable rivers or marshes. Pella was surrounded by marshes (Liv. 44. 46, sita est in tumulo vergente in occidentem hibernum: cingunt paludes inexsuperabilis altitudinis aestate et hieme, quas restagnantes faciunt lacus). Looking to the advances that the art of siege-warfare had made (1331 a 1 sq.), a city's best chance of safety in Aristotle's days probably lay in the difficulty of approaching or beleaguering it.

4. ὑδάτων τε καὶ ναμάτων κ.τ.λ., ' and of waters and streams there should, if possible, be forthcoming a native supply.' Οἰκείον, in opposition to δμβρίοις, 6: rain-water is not 'native,' but comes from the clouds. Compare the contrast of ὅμβριον and γηγενες ΰδωρ in Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 25. 939 C, and also the contrast of οἰκείαι and εξωτερικαὶ πράξεις in c. 3. 1325 b 29 sq. Ναμάτων is added to explain and limit δδάτων, which, if it stood by itself, would include ἔμβρια ὕδατα. The term νάματα comprises both spring and river water: cp. Plut. Quaest. Nat. 2. 912 A, τὰ πηγαΐα καὶ ποτάμια νάματα. Aristotle may possibly have in his memory here some lines of Pindar of which Quintilian has preserved a trace: see Pindar, Fragm. 258 Bergk (Quintil. 10. 1. 109), non enim 'pluvias,' ut ait Pindarus, 'aquas colligit,' sed vivo gurgite exundat (Cicero), where Bergk remarks, 'Pindarus συνάγειν ύδατα όμβρια dixisse videtur,' but is not 'vivo gurgite exundat' also probably a translation from Pindar? Many Greek cities were famous for

Peirene (cp. Paus. 2. 3. 5, κρῆναι δὲ πολλαὶ μὲν ἀνὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποίηνται πᾶσαν, ἄτε ἀφθόνου ῥέοντός σφισιν ὕδατος, and see as to Peirene, Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2.529,592); Pherae was famous for its spring Hypereia (Pindar, Pyth. 4. 125: Strabo, p. 439); Cyrene was built round the inexhaustible 'spring of Apollo,' and Hermione also had an inexhaustible spring (Paus. 2.35.3). Compare with Aristotle's recommendations as to water-supply those of Columella, De Re Rustica, 1.5.1 sqq. We see from the passage before us that a city was all the stronger from a military point of view if its water-supply was good and safe from interference in the event of a siege. Athens was ill-supplied with water (see next note), and her weakness in this respect must have been keenly felt when the country-population was cooped up in the city during the Peloponnesian War.

5. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but if a supply of this nature is not forthcoming, a way has been discovered to obtain water by constructing, etc. For εύρηται, cp. 1331 a 15 sqq., and for τουτό γε c. 7. 1327 b 21. Τοῦτό γε εὖρηται means that we need not begin an investigation as to that, inasmuch as the problem has been already solved. 'Ομβρίοιs is placed before ύδασιν because it is meant to be emphatic. Hippocrates has a good opinion of rain-water (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 537 Kühn, τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄμβρια (ὕδατα) κουφότατα καὶ γλυκύτατά έστιν καὶ λεπτότατα καὶ λαμπρότατα). So too Columella (De Re Rustica, 1. 5. 2). Aristotle perhaps intends this hint for Athens. 'There were three or four springs at Athens, but one only, that of Callirrhoe, was drinkable' (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, c. 66, vol. viii. p. 217, note). See also below on 1330 b 25. Cisterns for storing rain-water existed in many Greek cities—at Alexandria (Stuart Poole, Cities of Egypt, p. 181), Cnidus (Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Cnidus), and Termessus (Davis, Anatolica, p. 231). They existed also in the insular part of Tyre (Maspero, Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient, p. 192) and at Jerusalem (Tac. Hist. 5. 12). 'The sky is the only source from which fresh water is obtained in the smaller towns of Dalmatia, and especially on the islands, where there are neither springs nor streams' (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 1. 241). Aristotle does not refer to the possibility of bringing water into the city from a distance, but aqueducts existed in his day both at Samos (Hdt. 3. 60) and at Athens (Athenaeum,

No. 3355, p. 223). He would probably, however, feel that aqueducts lay at the mercy of an invading foe.

- 7. μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας. For the construction, cp. Rhet. 3. 17. 1418 a 34, καὶ ὁ ἔλεγε Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, τοῦτό ἐστιν.
- 8. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι τὸν τόπον κ.τ.λ. For εἶναι ἐν, see Bon. Ind. 245 b 25 sqq., where among other passages c. 1. 1323 b 1, καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, is referred to. Τοῦτο is ὑγίεια. For the use of the neuter in reference to a fem. substantive, cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 1, and see Bon. Ind. 484 a 59 sqq., where Metaph. Z. 10. 1035 b 14, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῷων ψυχή (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) κ.τ.λ. is quoted.
- 9. ἔν τε τοιούτω καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον, 'both in a healthy spot and facing a healthy quarter' (cp. Plato, Rep. 401 C).
- 10. δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι. We expect ἐν τῷ τδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι, but Schneider rightly compares c. 13. 1331 b 27, τούτοιν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἐν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὐρίσκειν: cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 7–10, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 33 sqq. As to the fact, cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 28, διαφέρει δὲ καὶ χώρα χώρας εἰς ταῦτα (i.e. εἰς γένεσιν καὶ ἀγονίαν καὶ ἀρρενογονίαν καὶ θηλυγονίαν) καὶ ὕδωρ ὕδατος διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας ποιὰ γάρ τις ἡ τροφὴ γίνεται μάλιστα καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ διάθεσις διά τε τὴν κρᾶσιν τοῦ περιεστῶτος ἀέρος καὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος τροφήν τοῦτο γὰρ πλεῖστον εἰσφέρονται, καὶ ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστι τροφὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ξηροῖς διὸ καὶ τὰ ἀτέραμνα ὕδατα καὶ ψυχρὰ τὰ μὲν ἀτεκνίαν ποιεῖ τὰ δὲ θηλυτοκίαν (see also Hist. An. 6. 19. 573 b 32 sqq.).

καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ. With ἔχειν supply δεῖ from 8.

11. οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For οἷς πλείστοις χρώμεθα, see Vahlen on Poet.
16. 1454 b 20. For the thought cp. Hippocr. De Natura Hominis vol. i. p. 361 Kühn, αἱ δὲ νοῦσοι γίνονται αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν διαιτημάτων, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος, ὁ ἐσαγόμενοι ζῶμεν. τὴν δὲ διάγνωσιν χρὴ ἐκατέρων ὧδε ποιέεσθαι ὁκόταν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσήματος ἐνὸς πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀλίσκονται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, τὴν αἰτίην χρὴ ἀνατιθέναι τουτέω ὅ τι κοινότατόν ἐστι καὶ μάλιστα αὐτέω πάντες χρεώμεθα ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ὁ ἀναπνέομεν. As to water, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 532 Kühn (a passage which Aristotle seems to have before him), πλείστον γὰρ μέρος ξυμβάλλεται (ὕδωρ) ἐς τὴν ὑγιείην.

Dd

As to air, cp. Philyll. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 864),

έλκειν τὸ βέδυ σωτήριον προσεύχομαι,
 ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ὑγιείας μέρος,
 τὸ τὸν ἀέρ' ἔλκειν καθαρὸν οὐ τεθολωμένον.

Aristotle does not say anything about the importance to health of other kinds of food than water. The Egyptians believed that all maladies arose from food (Hdt. 2. 77: Diod. 1. 82). See on this subject De Part. An. 3. 12. 673 b 25-28.

- 13. ἡ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and water and air possess this kind of nature,' i.e. are of such a nature as to be largely and frequently used by us (so Vict. 'talem naturam habere ut crebro cogamur ad illa confugere'). Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 15. 'Η τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις is little more than a periphrasis for τὰ ὕδατα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα: see Bon. Ind. 206 b 38, 'sed etiam ea res cui aliqua facultas inest δύναμις nominatur, ut interdum δύναμις prope ad paraphrasin videri possit delitescere, cf. φύσις' in such phrases as ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος φύσις, Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 14: Bonitz refers among many other passages to Meteor. 1. 2. 339 a 22, ὥστε πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ (i.e. τοῦ κόσμου) τὴν δύναμιν κυβερνᾶσθαι ἐκεῖθεν. The same usage is traceable in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v. δύναμις sub fin.
- 14. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. 'Εὰν μὴ πάνθ' ὅμοια μήτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ἢ ναμάτων, 'if all the springs are not equally good, and there is not an unlimited supply of wholesome springs.' Πάντα, sc. τὰ νάματα. Τοιούτων, i.e. ὑγιεινῶν. For μή followed by μήτε, see critical note on 1257 b 12. The arrangement recommended by Aristotle had probably already been adopted by some Greek cities when he wrote: thus we read of Pellene in Paus. 7. 27. 4, ϣκοδόμηται δὲ καὶ ἔλυτρον κρήνης ἐν τῆ ἀγορᾶ, καὶ λουτρά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπεί τοι πίνειν πηγαί σφισιν ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν εἰσὶν οὐ πολλαί. It has been adopted in more than one city of modern Europe; for instance, at Nice (Times, Nov. 1, 1883).
- 17. περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμνῶν. Aristotle has been speaking of the τόπος τῆς πόλεως from the point of view of salubrity (9), and now he turns to consider the question of ἐρυμνοὶ τόποι. Τῶν ἐρυμνῶν follows, instead of preceding, τόπων for the sake of emphasis. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 2, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον, and Diod. 13. 111. 3, τινὲς δὲ γονεῖς καὶ τέκνα τὰ νήπια λαβόντες, where stress is laid on 'infant children' as being the most helpless.
  - 19. οίον ἀκρόπολις όλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικόν κ.τ.λ. Plato had

provided the city which he founds in the Laws with an acropolis (Laws 745 B, μετά δὲ ταῦτα μέρη δώδεκα διελέσθαι, θέμενον Εστίας πρώτον καὶ Διὸς καὶ 'Αθηνᾶς ἱερόν, ἀκρόπολιν ὀνομάζοντα), but we seem to gather from 20, αριστοκρατικών δ' οὐδέτερον, αλλά μαλλον ισχυροί τόποι πλείους, that Aristotle's ideal city is to have more strong places than one, and that its chief strong place (c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.) is not an acropolis. For μουαρχικόν, cp. Pollux, 9. 40, τάχα δὲ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ βασίλειον ἄν τις είποι καὶ τυραννείον. The word, however, hints that an acropolis savours rather of Tyranny than of Kingship: cp. Diod. 16. 70, Τιμολέων δε . . . τὰς μεν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον ἀκροπόλεις καὶ τὰ τυραννεία κατέσκαψε, Plut. Timol. c. 24, and Juv. 10. 306 sq. That a level site was congenial to democracies may be inferred from the fact that the cities of Mantineia (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 239: Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 209) and Megalopolis (Curtius, 1.281 sq.: Bursian, 2.244), both of them designed to be democratically ruled, were built on comparatively level sites. Aristotle does not explain why there should be more strong places than one in the central city of an ἀριστοκρατία (see above on 1273 a 19) perhaps he regards an ἀριστοκρατία as giving a share of power to a plurality of social elements (virtue, wealth, and the demos), each of which would have a strong place of its own—but it is a fact that at Sparta, Carthage, and the Epizephyrian Locri, the seats of three famous ἀριστοκρατίαι, there were more strong places than one within the city. As to Sparta, cp. Polyb. 5. 22. 1, της γάρ Σπάρτης τῷ μὲν καθόλου σχήματι περιφεροῦς ὑπαρχούσης καὶ κειμένης ἐν τόποις έπιπέδοις, κατὰ μέρος δὲ περιεχούσης ἐν αύτῆ διαφόρους ἀνωμάλους καὶ βουνώδεις τόπους κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 3. 17. 1, Λακεδαιμονίοις δε ακρόπολις μέν ές ύψος περιφανές έξίσχουσα οὐκ ἔστι, καθὰ δὴ Θηβαίοις τε ἡ Καδμεία καὶ ἡ Λάρισα `Αργείοις' ὄντων δὲ ἐν τῆ πόλει λόφων καὶ ἄλλων, τὸ μάλιστα ές μετέωρον ανήκον ονομάζουσιν ακρόπολιν (see Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Sparta, vol. ii. p. 1026 b). The site of Carthage was 'a peninsula with water on three sides. three hills within this peninsula stood Carthage and its surroundings, its suburbs, and its necropolis' (E. A. Freeman, Contemporary Review, Sept. 1890, p. 368). See also Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 165 sqq. As to Locri, see Liv. 29. 6. 14 sqq. The seven hills of Rome, which was in its best days an apiστοκρατία, are famous.

23. τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, i.e. other than those of war, e.g. ἀναγκαίας (c. 12. 1331 b 13) and πολιτικὰς πράξεις.

κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον. Καί is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. Holm (Griech. Gesch. 2. 324) denies that Hippodamus was the first to lay out cities with straight streets. The Campanian Neapolis, he says, was laid out altogether in this way, and Selinus was laid out with two main streets crossing each other at right angles. 'New cities, therefore, were built in this fashion before the fifth century B.C.,' and all that Hippodamus did was to introduce the method in places of the highest importance. But is this view reconcilable with 2. 8. 1267 b 22 sq.?

- 25. ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον. Like Athens, of which we read in Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 254), ἡ δὲ πόλις ξηρὰ πᾶσα, οὖκ εἴνδρος, κακῶς ἐρρυμοτομημένη διὰ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα, and like Rome till its rebuilding by Nero (Tac. Ann. 15. 43, ceterum urbis quae domui supererant non, ut post Gallica incendia, nulla distinctione nec passim erecta, sed dimensis vicorum ordinibus et latis viarum spatiis cohibitaque aedificiorum altitudine ac patefactis areis). Compare also the contrast between the laying out of Rome and Capua in Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35. 96.
- 26. δυσέξοδος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for that arrangement of private dwellings is hard of exit for foreign troops and hard of exploration for assailants [whether foreign or not].' The fate of the Thebans who were admitted into Plataea in B.C. 431 is probably present to Aristotle's mind. They found much difficulty in escaping from the city when their attempt on it had failed (Thuc. 2. 4. 2, 5). Compare the difficult position in which Xenophon's troops found themselves in assaulting the city of the Drilae not far from Trapezus on the Euxine (Xen. Anab. 5. 2. 7, ὁ δ' ἐλθῶν λέγει ὅτι ἔστι χωρίον χρημάτων πολλῶν μεστόν τοῦτο οὕτε λαβεῖν δυνάμεθα ἱσχυρὸν γάρ ἐστιν' οὕτε ἀπελθεῖν ῥάδιον' μάχονται γὰρ ἐπεξεληλυθότες καὶ ἡ ἄφοδος χαλεπή). An attacking force did not relish assaulting a city which it was at once difficult to explore, and consequently to reduce, and difficult to get out of in case of failure.
- 27. διὸ δεῖ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν, i.e. διὸ δεῖ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσιν μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας χρησίμου (cp. 31, οῦτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον εξει καλῶς). It is not quite clear whether Aristotle adds (in 29) καὶ τὴν μὲν ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὖτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους in explanation of his suggestion that the houses should be arranged in clumps or

quincunces, or as an alternative plan. Perhaps the former is the case. His plan will then be to drive straight wide streets between the clumps or quincunces of houses, but to leave the interior of each quincunx a tangle of narrow lanes. Compare J. R. Green's description of Roman London (Making of England, p. 106); it was 'little more than a mass of brick houses and red-tiled roofs, pierced with a network of the narrow alleys which passed for streets in the Roman world, and cleft throughout its area by two wider roads from the bridge.' Silchester and St. Alban's, however, were laid out with great regularity (Fox and St. John Hope, On the Desirability of the complete Excavation of the Site of Silchester, p. 4).

28. κατασκευάζη, SC. τὴν τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσιν.

καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., sc. κατασκευάζονται, 'as among farmers what some call clumps of vines are arranged.' For των άμπέλων συστάδας, cp. Pollux, 7. 146, καὶ ξυστάς μέν καὶ συστάσεις \* ή άμπελόφυτος γη, ή μη κατὰ στίχον πεφυτευμένη, στοιχάς δὲ ή κατὰ στίχον. Vines were planted in clumps or quincunces, partly because they looked better when thus arranged, and partly because they were more productive (Varro, De Re Rustica, 1. 7. 2 sqq.: Columella, 3. 13. 4: Quintil. 8. 3. 9). The younger Cyrus seems to have planted trees in this way (Xen. Oecon. 4. 20 sqq.: cp. Cic. De Senect. 17. 59). Sus., following Scaliger, reads ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ('in the fields,' or 'farms') in place of έν τοις γεωργοίς, which is the reading of all the MSS., but the word γεώργιον is nowhere else used by Aristotle (is it used by any writer earlier than Philo, Mechan. Synt. p. 96, l. 49 Schoene?), and εν τοις γεωργοίς ('among farmers'), which is retained by Bekk.2, appears to be defensible: cp. Pherecr. Κοριαννώ, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 281),

έν τοίς Μαριανδυνοίς έκείνοις βαρβάροις χύτρας καλοῦσι τὰς μελαίνας ἰσχάδας,

and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 2, à δη νόμιμα ην εν Μήδοις. Έν ταις γεωργίαις, 'in the farms,' would probably be preferable to εν τοις γεωργίοις (cp. Plato, Laws 762 A). But Aristotle often refers to practices prevailing among farmers (e.g. in De Gen. et Corr. 2. 8. 335 a 13: Hist. An. 5. 32. 557 b 29 sqq.).

31. καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον. See critical note.

32. περὶ δὲ τειχῶν κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1330 b 17, περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμνῶν. Aristotle has just pronounced in favour of an old-fashioned arrangement of private houses, and now he passes

on naturally enough to the question whether it is not the best plan to be old-fashioned in the matter of walls, and to dispense with them altogether. He has before him Plato, Laws 778 D,  $\pi\epsilon\rho\lambda$ δὲ τειχῶν, ὧ Μέγιλλε, ἔγωγ' ἄν τῆ Σπάρτη ξυμφεροίμην τὸ καθεύδειν ἐᾶν ἐν τη γη κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη καὶ μη ἐπανιστάναι κ.τ.λ. The State of the Laws was pre-eminently one which laid claim to virtue (696 A: 731 Asqq.). Agesilaus ([Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Ages. 30) had been asked why Sparta had no walls, and had replied, Οὐ λίθοις δεῖ καὶ ξύλοις τετειχίσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ταις δὲ τῶν ἐνοικούντων ἀρεταις, and a similar dictum was ascribed to Lycurgus (Plut. Lycurg. c. 19). Isocrates had spoken of the Lacedaemonians as ἀρετῆς ἀμφισβητοῦντες in Archid. § 91, and had used the expression τοὺς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένους in Panath. § 228 (cp. § 120). For λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 57, ἀρχαϊκὰ φρονείς: ήτοι εὐήθη, where Aristoph. Nub. 821 (Didot) and Plato, Euthydem. 295 C are referred to.

- 34. καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρῶντες κ.τ.λ. This refers to the humiliation (cp. 40, μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι) which Epaminondas' invasions of Laconia inflicted on Sparta. For the sing. ἔργω, cp. Meteor. 1. 13. 349 b 35, δηλοῖ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον, and Plato, Symp. 182 C, ἔργω δὲ τοῦτο ἔμαθον. In 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 15 we have τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται and in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 1 ἐξελέγχεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἔργων.
- 35. ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. So far as this Aristotle agrees with Plato's censure of those who seek safety in walls (Laws 779 A, τείχεσι δὲ καὶ πύλαις διανοεῖσθαι φραχθέντας τε καὶ καθεύδοντας σωτηρίας ὄντως ἔξειν μηχανὰς κ.τ.λ.). Compare Thuc. 1. 32. 5, where the Corcyreans say, τὴν μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους ἐπειδὴ δὲ μείζονι παρασκευῆ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐφ΄ ἡμᾶς ὥρμηνται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες τῆ οἰκεία μόνον δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι κ.τ.λ.
- 37. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Take the case of Plataea or Phlius besieged by the Lacedaemonians and their allies, or of Haarlem besieged by the forces of Spain (Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Part 3, c. 8). For καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται, see above on 1264 b 18.
- 38. καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς. Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26, μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 18, πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἄν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωϊκήν τινα καὶ θείαν, Magn. Mor. 2. 5. 1200 b 11 sqq., and Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 32, οἱ δ' αὖ Ἡλεῖοι . . . ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, τοιοῦτοι γενόμενοι οῖους τὴν ἀρετὴν θεὸς μὲν ἃν ἐμπνεύσας δύναιτο καὶ

έν ήμέρα ἀποδείξαι, ἄνθρωποι δ' οὐδ' ἃν έν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοὺς μὴ ὅντας ἀλκίμους ποιήσειαν.

- 40. τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα κ.τ.λ. So far from strong walls being a sign of effeminacy, as many thought (Plato, Laws 778 E: [Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Agis 6, Ages. 55, and Panthoid. 1), they are really a sign of warlike forethought.
- 1. ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εύρημένων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers among other 1331 a. things to the invention of the catapult made under Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse (Diod. 14. 42. 1, καὶ γὰρ τὸ καταπελτικὸν εὐρέθη κατά τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς αν τῶν κρατίστων τεχνιτῶν πανταχόθεν είς ένα τόπον συνηγμένων . . . διόπερ ανυπέρβλητον φιλοτιμίαν είσφέροντες οἱ τεχνίται πολλά προσεπενοοῦντο βέλη καὶ μηχανήματα ξένα καὶ δυνάμενα παρέχεσθαι μεγάλας χρείας, and 14. 50. 4). The term μηχαναί, however, probably includes not only catapults, but also batteringrams with shelter-sheds for those who worked them, movable wooden towers with drawbridges which could be lowered so as to give the besiegers access to the top of the city-wall, scaling-ladders, etc. (Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterth. p. 209. 1). Of these contrivances, catapults and (apparently) movable wooden towers were introduced into Greek warfare under Dionysius the Elder (Droysen, p. 211). He had to contend against the Carthaginians, who were the first to use battering-rams and towers for sieges in the West, and whose use of them against the Greeks gave them a great superiority in their Sicilian campaigns (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 134). His catapults and wooden towers revolutionized the art of besieging cities. They cleared the walls of their defenders and thus facilitated the use of the battering-ram. Nor did the development of the art stop here. As time went on, the towers became higher and better armed, and the battering-rams longer and better sheltered. new methods of siege-warfare were inherited by Philip of Macedon, whose engines of war were famous (Demosth. Phil. 3. c. 50). on the whole subject Droysen, op. cit. p. 211 sqq. For els ακρίβειαν, cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, είς την ακρίβειαν.
- 3. ὅμοιον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ταῖς πόλεσιν finds its correlative in τὴν χώραν and ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις. If we are to deprive cities of their defence for fear of making the citizens unmanly, why should we stop there? Why should we not deprive the territory and private dwellings of their defences also?
- 4. τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν, 'to seek that the territory shall be easy of invasion,' for εἶναι should be supplied with εὐέμβολον.

Compare for the construction 1. 9. 1257 b 17 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 443 B and 375 E.

περιαιρείν τοὺς ὀρεινοὺς τόπους, 'strip off (from the territory) its mountainous spots,' as one might strip off an outer coating. Περιαιρείν answers to μὴ περιβάλλειν, 3.

- 7. For ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε see note on 1339 a 29.
- 10. ταις δε μή κεκτημέναις. See critical note.

11. οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον. Coray brackets μόνον, but, as Sus.² has already pointed out, quite wrongly: see Stallbaum on Plato, Symp. 179 B, καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γε μόνοι ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες, where he refers to Xen. Mem. 2. 9. 8, ὁ δὲ ᾿Αρχέδημος τῷ Κρίτωνι ἡδέως ἐχαρίζετο, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ.

άλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον κ.τ.λ., 'but attention must also be paid to them to secure that they shall be in a state befitting the city not only with a view to ornament, but also with a view to military procedures, both those already in use and those further ones which have recently been discovered.' The 'military procedures' here referred to are probably those of besiegers, not those of the besieged, but this is not quite certain. For τας πολεμικάς χρείας, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11, 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34, and Plato, Phaedr. 239 D. How were walls to be made proof against recent improvements in siege-methods? By being made higher, for one thing, to resist scaling, and thicker, to resist battering-rams and heavy artillery (see Droysen, op. cit. p. 253). Aristotle's remark is perhaps based on the experience of Athens. The dangerous position in which she found herself after the defeat of Chaeroneia prompted a hasty effort to repair the walls (Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 27, 31), which was continued in the years B. C. 334-326 (Corp. Inscr. Att. 2. 167, referred to by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 239, note 1, and Droysen, op. cit. p. 237. I).

- 12. ὅπως κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words see note on 1327 a 4.
  15. δι' ὧν τρόπων. See note on 1314 a 30 and cp. Diod. 13. 95.
  3, δι' οὖ τρόπου.
- 16. τὰ μὲν εὔρηται. Many of these devices are mentioned in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas Tacticus (τακτικὸν ὑπόμνημα περὶ τοῦ πῶς χρὴ πολιορκουμένους ἀντέχειν), which was written (according to Christ, Gesch. der gr. Litteratur, p. 308) soon after B. c. 360. It is the only part which has come down to us of a larger work

referred to by Polybius (10. 44) under the title of Τὰ περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα. See above on 1326 b 39.

ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 7. § 3, χρὴ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, and De Pace, § 116, φιλοσοφήσετε καὶ σκέψεσθε.

17. ἀρχὴν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Thuc. 1. 93. 8, ἐβούλετο γὰρ (ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς) τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει (τῶν τειχῶν) ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς. The Index Aristotelicus refers to no other passage in which ἀρχήν is similarly used. The use of ἐξ ἀρχῆς in Poet. 24. 1460 a 33 sq., however, approaches that of ἀρχήν here.

19. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. As the citizen-body must be divided into C.12. syssitia, and the walls must be dotted with guard-rooms and towers, it is a natural arrangement to locate some of the syssitia in the guard-rooms. Aristotle appears to intend the guard-rooms to be in the towers, but a common plan was to build city-walls solid only up to a certain height, and to place guard-rooms in them above that height (Droysen, op. cit. p. 251). As to κατά τόπους ἐπικαίρουs (with which Liddell and Scott compare Demosth. De Cor. c. 27, προλαβών τους έπικαίρους των τόπων), towers were often placed along the wall close to a gate which needed guarding, or at an angle where two curtains of wall met which could be commanded by weapons discharged from the tower, or at intervals along the curtain. In times of pressing danger, and especially during a siege, it must have been a common practice for the defenders of the walls to take their meals either on them or close to them (cp. Damon, ap. Athen. Deipn. 442 c, διὸ καὶ πολεμουμένων ποτὲ αὐτῶν (i.e. των Βυζαντίων) καὶ οὐ προσκαρτερούντων τοῖς τείχεσι, Λεωνίδης ὁ στρατηγὸς έκέλευσε τὰ καπηλεία ἐπὶ τῶν τειχῶν σκηνοπηγείν, καὶ μόλις ποτὲ ἐπαύσαντο λιποτακτοῦντες, and Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14), but Aristotle's recommendation refers to times of peace as well as times of war, and it probably went far beyond the practice of most cities. We find, indeed, that the polemarchs of Cynaetha spent the day at the gates of their city (Polyb. 4. 18. 2, πολέμαρχοι τῶν κατεληλυθότων τινès έγεγονεισαν ταύτην δε συμβαίνει την άρχην κλείειν τας πύλας και τον μεταξύ χρόνον κυριεύειν των κλειδών, ποιείσθαι δε καὶ τὸ καθ ήμέραν τὴν δίαιταν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλώνων), but Aristotle does not appear to be speaking here of high magistrates like polemarchs; he seems rather to have in view some part of the military force of the State. For τὰ τείχη διειλήφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις, cp. Diod. 2. 7. 3, τείχος διειλημμένον πύργοις πυκνοίς καὶ μεγάλοις.

21. αὐτά, Lamb. 'eae res': cp. c. 4. 1325 b 33, ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφροι-

μίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Bonitz (Ind. 125 a 34) compares Top. 1. 5. 102 a 10, ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν ἡηθέντα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, δῆλον ἐξ αὐτῶν, and 102 b 20, but would read αὐτό in place of αὐτά.

23. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Ταῦτα, 'these things,' probably refers not to συσσίτια, but to the matters which form the subject of the preceding sentence. Just as some of the syssitia and the guardrooms are to be conjoined, so we must conjoin the temples of the gods and the syssitia of highest authority. As to μὲν δή, Eucken remarks (De Partic. Usu, p. 46), 'diverso modo usurpatur, saepissime quidem ita ut inquisitione quadam finita omnia quae antecedunt comprehendat': he compares Phys. 1. 8. 191 b 27, εἶs μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὖτος, ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and adds 'simili modo μὲν οὖν adhibetur.' See also Bon. Ind. 173 a 38 sqq.

24. τὰς δὲ κ.τ.λ. The suggestion just made as to some minor syssitia leads on to the question where 'the highest syssitia of the magistracies' are to be placed (τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια, not τὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων ἀρχείων συσσίτια, because Aristotle has the contrast of ένια τῶν συσσιτίων still in his mind), and to the general question how the various syssitia are to be distributed over the city, for it is not proposed that all citizens—priests, magistrates lower and higher, and soldiers-should meet for meals at one and the same spot. On the contrary, the soldiers will have their syssitia on the walls, the highest magistrates and the priests on the hill on which the temples stand, and the less dignified magistrates near the commercial agora. For τας τοις θείοις αποδεδομένας οἰκήσεις (contrast αί ίδιαι οἰκήσεις, c. 11. 1330 b 21), cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 21, τὰ πίπτοντα των οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ των ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. Τοῖς  $\theta \epsilon ious = \tau o is \tau \hat{\omega} \nu \theta \epsilon \hat{\omega} \nu$ , 'the things of the gods,' and especially 'religious observances' (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 2, and Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 31, τὰ δαιμόνια): so Lamb. 'rebus divinis,' while Vict. translates 'divinis naturis.' Aristotle takes pains to sever the temples and the highest magistrates from all else, keeping them apart even from the free agora, much more from the commercial agora: contrast Plato, Laws 778 C, τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἱερὰ πᾶσαν πέριξ τήν τε αγοράν χρή κατασκευάζειν . . . προς δε αυτοίς οικήσεις τε αρχόντων και δικαστηρίων, έν οίς τὰς δίκας ώς ἱερωτάτοις οὖσι λήψονταί τε καὶ δώσουσι, τὰ μὲν ὡς ὁσίων πέρι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων θεῶν ἱδρύματα, καὶ ἐν τούτοις (i. e. 'deorum aedibus,' Stallbaum) δικαστήρια, έν οἷς αι τε των φόνων πρέπουσαι δίκαι γίγνοιντ' αν καὶ όσα θανάτων άξια άδικήματα. The agora at Leontini seems to have been arranged on a plan

somewhat resembling that of Plato. Cp. Polyb. 7. 6, ή γὰρ τῶν Λεοντίνων πόλις τω μεν όλω κλίματι τέτραπται πρός τας άρκτους, έστι δέ διὰ μέσης αὐτης αὐλων ἐπίπεδος, ἐν ῷ συμβαίνει τάς τε των ἀρχείων καὶ δικαστηρίων κατασκευάς καὶ καθόλου την άγορὰν ὑπάρχειν. Aristotle does not tell us where he would place the more important law-courts; he would probably place the less important ones at any rate near the commercial agora. His scheme differs from that of Plato in another point. Plato reserves his acropolis in the Laws (745 B) for Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, whereas Aristotle brings all the gods together on the central hill except those whose temples must necessarily be placed elsewhere. He follows Plato, however, in placing the more important magistracies of the State—its stratêgi, treasurers, and auditors (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1300 b o sqq.)—in the immediate neighbourhood of the temples. Their moral influence would thus be strengthened and their sense of responsibility increased. Whether his plan of placing the 'Downing Street' of his State on the top of a hill was a wise one, may well be doubted. At Athens the magistrates lived not on the acropolis, but at its foot. It is true that at Athens the Boulê sometimes met in the acropolis (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 20), and that at Megara the offices of the chief magistracy seem to have been in the acropolis (Plut. Ages. c. 27). The wisdom of separating the offices of the major from those of the minor magistracies seems also questionable. But Aristotle's wish is to gather together in one easily defensible spot the animating forces of his State: cp. De Part, An. 3. 7. 670 a 23, καρδία μέν οὖν καὶ ἡπαρ πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖα τοις ζώοις, ή μεν διὰ τὴν τῆς θερμότητος ἀρχήν (δει γὰρ είναι τινα οίον έστίαν, εν ή κείσεται της φύσεως τὸ ζωπυρούν, καὶ τοῦτο εὐφύλακτον, ώσπερ άκρόπολις οὖσα τοῦ σώματος), τὸ δ' ἦπαρ τῆς πέψεως χάριν.

26. ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare the way in which Plato severs the worship of the gods of the nether world from that of the heavenly gods (Laws 828 C, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν χθονίων καὶ ὅσους αὖ θεοὺς οὐρανίους ἐπονομαστέον καὶ τὸ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων οὐ ξυμμικτέον, ἀλλὰ χωριστέον ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πλούτωνος μηνὶ τῷ δωδεκάτῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδόντας). Among the temples to which Aristotle refers are probably those of Aesculapius, which were often situated outside the city (Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 94, "διὰ τί τοῦ ᾿Ασκληπιοῦ τὸ ἱερὸν ἔξω πόλεως ἐστι;" πότερον ὅτι τὰς ἔξω διατριβὰς ὑγιεινοτέρας ἐνόμιζον εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄστει; καὶ γὰρ Ἔλληνες ἐν τόποις καθαροῖς καὶ ὑψηλοῖς ἐπιεικῶς ἱδρυμένα τὰ ᾿Ασκληπίεια ἔχουσιν ἡ ὅτι τὸν θεὸν ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου μετάπεμπτον

ηκειν νομίζουσιν, Έπιδαυρίοις δ' οὐ κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλὰ πόρρω τὸ ᾿Ασκληπίειόν έστιν). As to other temples, cp. Plutarch περὶ ήσυχίας ap. Stob. Floril. 58. 14, διὰ τοῦτό τοι καὶ τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἱερά, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πάλαι άρχαίου νενόμισται, τοις έρημοτάτοις χωρίοις οι πρώτοι (ένίδρυσαν), μάλιστα δὲ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Πανὸς καὶ Νυμφῶν καὶ ᾿Απόλλωνος καὶ ὅσοι μουσικῆς ήγεμόνες θεοί. The temples of Eileithvia in the Peloponnesus were often outside the gate of the city (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 536); there was, for instance, a temple of Eileithyia outside the gate in the walls of Corinth which led to Tenea (Paus. 2. 5. 4). The same was occasionally the case with the temples of the Chthonian Demeter; thus at Agrigentum 'the place chosen for' the Thesmophoria of Demeter 'was far beyond the walls of the elder city; it is barely within the walls of the enlarged city' (Freeman, Sicily, 2. 80), and at Syracuse the temple of Demeter and Persephonê 'was placed by Gelon outside the bounds of his enlarged city' (ibid. 2. 213: see Diod. 14. 63. 1). For δ νόμος, cp. c. 17. 1336 b 16, εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοίς τοιούτοις οίς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. For an instance of the founding of a temple in a given spot in obedience to the commands of Delphi, cp. Paus. 1. 13. 8, καί σφισιν έστι τοῦ θεοῦ χρήσαντος, ἔνθα ὁ Πύρρος ἐτελεύτησεν, ἱερὸν Δήμητρος, ἐν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ Πύρρος τέθαπται. Obedience was proverbially due to a command from Delphi (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνεῖλε (i.e. Apollo at Delphi) τῷ παντὶ ἄμεινον είναι (πείθεσθαι τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις), τότε ἀπέδωκεν (ὁ Λυκοῦργος), οὐ μόνον ἄνομον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνόσιον θεὶς τὸ πυθοχρήστοις νόμοις μὴ πείθεσθαι: Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 8. 443, οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς Χρυσίππου φωναῖς ὡς πυθοχρήστοις παραγγέλμασιν ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle speaks only of the Delphic oracle, whereas Plato in Laws 738 B sqq. makes a similar reservation in favour of the commands of those of Dodona and Ammon also, and even of τινές παλαιοί λόγοι.

28. εἴη δ' ἀν κ.τ.λ., 'and the place would be suitable which is such as to (ὅστις) possess adequate conspicuousness for the enthronement of virtue and a superiority of strength in relation to the adjacent parts of the city.' For ὁ τόπος ὅστις (not ὅς), cp. Xen. Oecon. c. 21. 10, τοῦ δὲ δεσπότου ἐπιφανέντος . . . ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον, ὅστις δύναται καὶ μέγιστα βλάψαι τὸν κακὸν τῶν ἐργατῶν καὶ μέγιστα τιμῆσαι τὸν πρόθυμον. For the use of the word ἐπιφάνεια in a not very dissimilar sense, see the passages collected in Stallbaum's note on Plato, Alcib. 1. 124 C. Aristotle continues the sentence in καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως as if he had written

not ἐπιφάνειαν ἔχει ἰκανῶς, but ἐπιφανεστέρως ἔχει. For the use of ἔχειν in this double sense (transitive and intransitive), cp. Plato, Rep. 370 E, and Stallbaum's note. The 'virtue' referred to is apparently that of the gods and the supreme magistrates. That virtue should not be hidden, we see from Paroem. Gr. 2. 760, μὴ κρύπτε τὸ κάλλος ὥσπερ τὸ ποηφάγον: ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ δειλίαν κρυπτόντων καὶ ἡν ἔχουσιν ἀρετήν ὁ δὲ ποηφάγος ζῷόν ἐστιν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς (cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 621): Pindar, Nem. 9. 6,

έστι δέ τις λόγος ἀνθρώπων, τετελεσμένον ἐσλὸν μὴ χαμαὶ σιγᾳ καλύψαι:

Hor. Carm. 4. 9. 29,

Paullum sepultae distat inertiae Celata virtus:

and Plut. Pericl. c. 7, τῆς ἀληθινῆς δ' ἀρετῆς κάλλιστα φαίνεται τὰ μάλιστα φαινόμενα, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲν οὕτω θαυμάσιον τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὡς ὁ καθ' ἡμέραν βίος τοῖς συνοῦσιν. Cp. also Simonides, Fragm. 58,

**ἔστι τις λόγος** 

τὰν ἀρετὰν ναίειν δυσαμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις.

Temples especially were wont to be placed on conspicuous sites: see vol. i. p. 338, note 1, and compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10, ναοῖς γε μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἔφη εἶναι πρεπωδεστάτην ἥτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὖσα ἀστιβεστάτη εἴη ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ ἰδόντας προσεύξασθαι, ἡδὺ δὲ ἀγνῶς ἔχοντας προσιέναι, Corp. Inscr. Gr. 2140. 35 (referred to by Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 83. 2), where the temple of Apollo in Aegina is described as situate in the ἐπιφανέστατος τόπος τῆς πόλεως, and Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 1. See also Hom. Hymn. in Aphrod. 100 sq. That the place assigned to the gods should be strong we see from Hdt. 5. 67; there are obvious reasons why the abode of the chief magistrates should be so.

30. πρέπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μέν is answered by δέ in τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀνίων ἀγοράν, 1331 b 1. Κατασκευήν, 'provision' or 'establishment,' cp. 1331 b 10, κατεσκευάσθαι. The agora here referred to is to be below the hill on which the gods and the magistrates dwell, but still on high ground (cp. 1331 b 12, τὴν ἄνω, sc. ἀγοράν). It would be in this agora that the citizens would come together to elect magistrates, for magistracies were to be elective in Aristotle's 'best State' (c. 4. 1326 b 15), and here too the ecclesia would meet, if indeed, which is uncertain, Aristotle intends an ecclesia to exist. But the main function of this agora seems to be to serve as

a place for the enjoyment of leisure (1331 b 12), the highest and best thing in human life (c. 14. 1333 a 30-b 3). The buildings round it would not be the buildings which usually surrounded an agora. They would include no temples, for the temples were to be on the top of the hill above it, and no public offices either, if the public offices were also to be on the top of the hill, with the exception of those which adjoined the commercial agora. The only buildings which we are distinctly told would adjoin the 'free agora' are those of the gymnasium of the elders. These buildings are placed close to it, partly in order that the shady walks and the streams of the gymnasium may add a fresh charm to the agora, partly in order that the elder citizens may obtain recreation without straying from the region which is especially theirs, partly also perhaps in order that they may be encouraged to carry on in their years of maturity the physical training of their earlier years, and may not be tempted to drop it as they probably often did in ancient Greece. There were already cities in which the agora and the gymnasium were close together—e.g. Elis (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 29) and Sparta (ibid. 2. 234)—but it should be noticed that Aristotle brings into the neighbourhood of his 'free agora' only the gymnasium of the elder men; if he had placed the gymnasium of the younger men near it, he would have seriously altered the character of the spot.

31. οίαν κ.τ.λ., '(such an agora) as they call by the name of agora in Thessaly, for example—I mean the agora which they term "free." ' With ονομάζουσιν we should supply ἀγοράν: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 183, τοις άρετης αντιποιουμένοις, μη της έπὶ των τεχνων ονομαζομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, where ὀνομαζομένης means 'called by that name.' The word ayopá was connected in the minds of Greeks with ἀγοράζω, and to use the word as the Thessalians did of a place in which nothing was bought or sold would seem strange to them. Lambinus, followed by Bekk.2, Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51), and Sus., would read νομίζουσιν in place of ὀνομάζουσιν, but it seems to me that this change involves the loss of the point of the passage. For kai in the sense of 'for example,' see above on 1255 a 36. Ἐλευθέραν is evidently interpreted by καθαράν τῶν ὧνίων πάντων in the next line. The word ἐλεύθερος is occasionally used by Aristotle in opposition to avaykaîos (e.g. in 1. 11. 1258 b 11), and we read οf την ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν in 1331 b 11. Camerarius (Interp. p. 305) refers to Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 3 (a passage which Aristotle evidently

remembers), οί δὲ Περσικοί νόμοι προλαβόντες ἐπιμέλονται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν μή τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται οἱ πολίται οἷοι πονηροῦ τινος ἡ αἰσχροῦ ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι. έπιμέλονται δε ωδε. έστιν αὐτοις ελευθέρα ἀγορὰ καλουμένη, ἔνθα τά τε βασίλεια καὶ τάλλα άρχεῖα πεποίηται. ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μεν ἄνια καὶ οἱ ἀγοραῖοι καὶ αἱ τούτων φωναὶ καὶ ἀπειροκαλίαι ἀπελήλανται εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, ὡς μὴ μιγνύηται ή τούτων τύρβη τη των πεπαιδευμένων εύκοσμία διήρηται δε αύτη ή άγορα ή περί τα άρχεία τέτταρα μέρη τούτων δ' έστιν έν μεν παισίν, έν δε έφήβοις, άλλο τελείοις ανδράσιν, άλλο τοις ύπερ τὰ στρατεύσιμα έτη γεγονόσι. At the opposite pole to an agora of this kind stands the γυναικεία άγορά of Menander (Pollux, 10. 18, καὶ μὴν εὶ γυναικείαν άγορὰν τὸν τόπον οὖ τὰ σκεύη τὰ τοιαῦτα πιπράσκουσιν ἐθέλοις καλεῖν, εύροις αν έν ταις Συναριστώσαις Μενάνδρου τὸ όνομα: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 204). According to Holm, Gr. Gesch. 2. 309 (see also Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 361), the agora at Athens was divided into two parts, a Southern part used for political purposes, and a Northern part used for trade and social inter-That Aristotle would not be satisfied with a mere division of one and the same agora into two parts, we see from 1331 b 1, την δε των ωνίων αγοράν ετέραν τε δεί ταύτης είναι καὶ χωρίς. As to Sparta and Rome in relation to this matter, see vol. i. p. 339, note 1. The two kinds of agora are traceable in some Southern cities still. At Zara there is a Piazza dei Signori, and also a Piazza dell' Erbe (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 1. 239, 243). At San Marino the Borgo, which is 'the business centre of the State,' where the market is held, is some little way below the town of San Marino; 'it lies on a small plateau beneath the steep long ridge with its three crags crowned with castles' on which the town is built (E. Armstrong, 'A Political Survival,' in Macmillan's Magazine, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 197).

33. καὶ μήτε βάναυσον κ.τ.λ. Supply εἰς ἦν δεῖ. For παραβάλλειν, 'enter,' see Bon. Ind. s.v., where De Mir. Auscult. 81. 836 a 28, ὅτε . . . εἰς τούτους τοὺς τόπους παρέβαλε, is quoted among other passages.

35. εἴη δ' αν κ.τ.λ. At Athens in Aristotle's day the gymnasia were outside the walls, but Plato had already proposed a change in this respect (see vol. i. p. 338, note 2). One gymnasium at any rate at Thebes was outside the city (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25). At Sparta and Elis, on the other hand, the gymnasium was within the city (see above on 30), and this was the case also at Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 31. 8), and apparently at Pellene (Paus. 7. 27. 5: Curtius, Pelopon-

nesos, 1. 483). The gymnasium built by the grave of Timoleon at Syracuse and called Timoleonteum was in the agora (Plut. Timol. c. 39). The plan of separating the gymnasium of the elder from that of the younger men may be borrowed by Aristotle from Sparta; we read at any rate in Plut. Cimon, c. 16, of the ephebi and the young men  $(\tau \hat{\omega} \nu \hat{\epsilon} \phi \hat{\eta} \beta \omega \nu \kappa \alpha \hat{\iota} \tau \hat{\omega} \nu \nu \epsilon \alpha \nu \hat{\iota} \delta \kappa \omega \nu)$  exercising together in a stoa at Sparta as far back as the time of the great earthquake, when Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, was King. In the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedeia the boys, the ephebi, the full-grown men, and those past the military age have each of them a separate part of the agora for their use (Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 4, quoted above on 31).

38. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον = καὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν, 'this arrangement' (or 'institution') 'also,' i.e. the gymnasia as well as the syssitia: cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὡρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, and for κόσμον, 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 5, ἔως ἃν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον, and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5, τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις.

40. ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here implies that there are two kinds of αἰδώς, one genuine and the other not (cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 273 M, τῆς ἀληθινῆς αἰδοῦς). Phaedra in the Hippolytus of Euripides (363 Bothe: 385 Dindorf) had already said.

αιδώς τε δισσαί δ' είσίν, ή μεν οὐ κακή, ή δ' ἄχθος οἴκων,

but she is distinguishing between the aldis which holds back where there should be no holding back and the aldis which is not Aristotle's distinction, on the contrary, is drawn inopportune. between the aidios which befits freemen and the aidios which does not. The δέος οἰκετῶν πρὸς δεσπότας of which we read in Aristot. Fragm. 178. 1507 b 22, 37 was probably miscalled aldús by some. True aldás was rather to be sought in the respectful awe with which the Spartans regarded the members of the γερουσία (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 180, παρελθών τις των γερόντων, οθς έκεινοι και αισχύνονται καὶ δεδίασι: cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Polydor. 4. 231 F, έρωτηθείς δε δια τί Σπαρτιαται κατά πόλεμον κινδυνεύουσιν ανδρείως, Οτι, έφη, αίδεισθαι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας έμαθον, οὐ φοβείσθαι). The nature of the alδώs which befits freemen may best be learnt from Plato, Laws 671 C sq. (where it is called  $\theta \in \cos \phi \circ \beta \circ s$ ), 647 A, 698 B, and 699 C: we gather that it makes men obedient to law and order and content with their share of speech and silence, and also courageous and

good (699 C: cp. Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 235 Mullach). Compare Soph. Aj. 1073,

οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὕτ' ἄν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς φέροιντ' ἄν, ἔνθα μὴ καθεστήκη δέος, οὕτ' ἄν στρατός γε σωφρόνως ἄρχοιτ' ἔτι μηδὲν φόβου πρόβλημα μηδ' αἰδοῦς ἔχων,

and the language of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 322 D. Sparta the presence of elders was held to be enough, in the absence of magistrates, to produce aidώs (cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 10, δπως δέ μηδ' εὶ ὁ παιδονόμος ἀπέλθοι, ἔρημοί ποτε οἱ παίδες εἶεν ἄρχοντος, έποίησε τον αεί παρόντα των πολιτων κύριον είναι καὶ έπιτάττειν τοίς παισίν, ο τι [αν] αγαθον δοκοίη είναι, καὶ κολάζειν, εί τι αμαρτάνοιεν. τούτο δὲ ποιήσας διέπραξε καὶ αἰδημονεστέρους είναι τούς παίδας οὐδὲν γὰρ ούτως αιδούνται ούτε παίδες ούτε άνδρες ώς τους άρχοντας, and 5. 5: also Plut. Lycurg. c. 17)—indeed, some held that the presence, or even the existence, of epapers produced aldis (Xen. Symp. 8. 33 sq.: Plato, Symp. 178 D sq.)—but Aristotle thinks that nothing produces it so well as the visible presence of magistrates: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 16 and Hell. 7. 3. 6, and on the whole subject Plut. Cleom. c. o, a passage which shows that Aristotle's views were much influenced by those which prevailed at Sparta. A current proverb, however, is also probably present to his memory, alδώs έν οφθαλμοῖς (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 381): cp. Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 34, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον (αἰσχύνονται) ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ. τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα. See Cope's note on this passage.

1. την δὲ τῶν ἀνίων ἀγορὰν κ.τ.λ. This answers to 1331 a 30, 1331 b. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τόπον κ.τ.λ. "Εχουσαν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον κ.τ.λ., 'on a site easily made a meeting-point for all commodities, both those coming from the sea and those coming from the territory.' Compare the use of εὐπαρακόμιστον in c. 5. 1327 a 7 sqq.

4. †πληθος†. See critical note.

eis ίερεις, εis ἄρχοντας. See critical note. Here, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 16 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 17 sqq.), priests are distinguished from magistrates.

5. καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια, i.e. as well as the syssitia of the chief magistracies. For the absence of τά before τῶν ἱερέων, see note on 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις. Vict. 'cum enim frequentes ipsos VOL. III.
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oporteat esse in fanis illis, ut serviant officio suo, quod sine scelere deseri non potest, facilius id praestabunt, si explebunt desideria corporis propinquo in loco.' Aristotle's aim probably is to secure more attention to their duties on the part of the priests than was often forthcoming from them. 'By the lepòs νόμος of Oropus (Ἐφ. ᾿Αρχ. 1885, 94) the priest of Amphiaraus was only required μένειν ἐν τῷ lepῷ μὴ ἔλαττον ἡ δέκα ἡμέρας τοῦ μηνὸς ἐκάστον. He probably spent the remainder of his time in the city, where he had a civil occupation in addition to his sacred office. Compare von Wilamowitz, Hermes, 21. 93' (Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 160. 2).

περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων. Schn. is probably right in supplying τάξιν. Compare the suppression of διανομήν in Plato, Laws 745 D.

- 6. τῶν δ' ἀρχείων κ.τ.λ., 'but all the magistracies which have in their charge contracts and indictments in lawsuits and callings into courts and other administrative work of the kind just mentioned.' Aristotle does not rate these functions highly (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10 sqq.), nor does Plato (Rep. 425 C sqq.). The magistracies which have the supervision of contracts are here marked off from the agoranomi, though in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ἢ δεὶ τινὰ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περί τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν, the functions of the agoranomi are implied to include the supervision of contracts. Aristotle is perhaps here thinking of magistrates with whom contracts were registered: see as to these 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 34 sqq. and note.
- 9. την καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν. Probably the word ἀστυνομία was not familiar everywhere (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 23, καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν). The title, indeed, seems to be too grand for the functions of the office. See note on 1317 a 18. Yet Aristotle adds οἱ καλούμενοι to such simple and everyday words as γεωργοί and βάναυσοι in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 40 sq., so that the addition of τὴν καλουμένην here may need no special explanation.
- 10. πρὸς ἀγορᾳ μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'must be established near indeed to some agora and place of public concourse, but the place adapted for the business done by them is [not the place near the free agora, but] the place near the necessary agora, for,' etc. For σύνοδος, see note on 1319 a 31. For τοιοῦτος, cp. 1331 a 28. For the contrast of ἀναγκαία ἀγορά and ἐλευθέρα ἀγορά, cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 10.
- 12. ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν. For ἐνσχολάζειν, where the infinitive expresses the purpose, see Goodwin, Moods and

Tenses, § 770, who refers among other passages to Plato, Phaedr. 228 Ε, παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου ἐμαυτόν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται, and Thuc. 2. 44. 2. For τὴν ἄνω, cp. Thuc. 1. 93. 9, τόν τε Πειραιᾶ ὡφελιμώτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς ἄνω πόλεως. For τίθεμεν, cp. c. 13. 1332 a 30 sq.

ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις, 'and this for necessary activities, [with the supervision of which these magistracies are concerned].'

13. νενεμήσθαι δε χρή κ.τ.λ., 'and matters in the territory should be distributed on the plan which has been described,' i.e. so that sites shall be allotted for guard-houses and syssitia of magistrates in them and for temples. Aristotle here has before him Plato, Laws 848 C sqq., and especially δώδεκα κώμας είναι χρή, κατὰ μέσον τὸ δωδεκατημόριον εκαστον μίαν, εν τῆ κώμη δὲ εκάστη πρῶτον μεν ίερα καὶ αγοράν έξηρησθαι θεών τε καὶ των έπομένων θεοίς δαιμόνων . . . πρώτον δέ οἰκοδομίας είναι περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ταῦτα, ὅπη ἃν ὁ τόπος ὑψηλότατος η̈, τοῖς Φρουροίς ύποδοχήν ο τι μάλιστα εὐερκή. He also follows the example of Plato (Laws 760 B sqq.) in creating the magistracy of the agronomi to keep watch and ward over the rural districts. We nowhere find a mention of αγρονόμοι except in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, nor of ύλωροί except in the Politics (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 333), though Suidas has an article under the head of δληωροί. See as to these magistrates below on 1321 b Plato had already established syssitia for the agronomi (Laws 762 B, διαιτάσθων δε οί τε άρχοντες οί τε άγρονόμοι τὰ δύο έτη τοιόνδε τινά τρόπον πρώτον μέν δή καθ έκάστους τούς τόπους είναι ξυσσίτια, εν οίς κοινη την δίαιταν ποιητέον απασιν). As to the φυλακή της χώρας, see Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 10 sqq. (where one of its objects is implied to be the protection of property against robbers), and Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 6 sqq. Φυλακτήρια were scattered over Attica (see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 312, note 1; and Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 193); we read in Xen. De Vect. 4. 43 of a reixos at Anaphlystus and of another at Thoricus. A description of the castle at Oenoe will be found in Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterthümer, p. 259. We may perhaps infer from Laws 848 C sqq. (quoted above) that Greek villages often had a fortress on high ground towering over them quite in the style which we associate with the middle ages. These φυλακτήρια furnished quarters for the young citizens of Athens during the year in which they served as περίπολοι ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 42, § 4, with Sandys' note: cp. Eupolis, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56, καὶ τοὺς περιπόλους ἀπιέν' εἰς τὰ φρούρια). How important a part they sometimes played in the defence of the State appears from Diod. 14. 57. 6, where we read that after the city of Messana in Sicily had been captured by the Carthaginians, τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια, in which most of the citizens had taken refuge, offered a successful resistance.

- 17. ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κ.τ.λ., 'and further temples must be marked out all over the territory, some for gods and others for heroes.' Cp. Plato, Laws 848 D, where it is arranged that in each village there shall be temples of the gods καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θεοῖς δαιμόνων: elsewhere also in the Laws he recommends worship to be paid not only to gods and heroes but also to δαίμονες (Laws 717 B, μετά θεούς δὲ τούσδε καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ο γε ἔμφρων ὀργιάζοιτ' ἄν, ῆρωσι δὲ μετὰ τούτους: cp. 738 B and D). As to the position given by Plato to δαίμονες, see the passages from his writings referred to by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 501, note 38. Plutarch says (De Defect. Orac. c. 10: see also c. 17, and De Iside et Osiride, c. 25), Hoíodos de καθαρώς καὶ διωρισμένως πρώτος έξέθηκε τών λογικών τέσσαρα γένη, θεούς, είτα δαίμονας πολλούς κάγαθούς, είτα ήρωας, είτα άνθρώπους, των ήμιθέων είς ήρωας ἀποκριθέντων. Aristotle is acquainted with the distinction between gods and δαίμονες (cp. Περὶ της καθ' υπνον μαντικής, c. 2. 463 b 13 sqq.), and his silence in this passage about δαίμονες is significant. That heroes were believed sometimes to fight for the State which worshipped them, appears from Diod. 15. 53. 4. Attica was full of village-shrines (Liv. 31. 26: see Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 8. 290). We see from the passage before us that the word ίερόν was used of the building dedicated to a hero, though the sacred enclosure round it was properly called not a Témevos, but a σηκός (Pollux, 1. 6).
- 18. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογουμένους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 34, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 29 sqq. Καὶ λέγοντας is added in contradistinction to ποιοῦντας, cp. 20 sqq. Τῶν τοιούτων is repeated in 19 and 22, and in 20 we have τὰ τοιαῦτα. See note on 1284 b 28.
- 20. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπόν κ.τ.λ. There is a designed antithesis between the similarly sounding words νοῆσαι and ποιῆσαι, εὐχή and τύχη. For the contrast of νοῆσαι and ποιῆσαι, cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 15 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 745 B, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ τῆς χώρας ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐν μέσφ,

καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα πρόσφορα πόλει τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχοντα τόπον ἐκλεξάμενον, ἃ νοῆσαί τε καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν χαλεπόν: cp. also Phileb. 16 C, and Philem. Ἐφεδρῖται, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 10),

χαλεπον το ποιείν, το δε κελεύσαι ράδιον.

21. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. Bonitz (Ind. 303 a 54) compares c. 13. 1332 a 29, διὸ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν, ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία. Το pray is easy (Demosth. Ol. 3. 18, εὔξασθαι μὲν γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ῥάδιον). For εὐχῆς ἔργον, cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 68, εὐχῆς, οὐ νόμον, διαπράττοιτ' ἃν ἔργον, and [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 20 sub fin., τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσας τὰς προειρημένας συμπεριλαβεῖν παραινέσεις εὐχῆς ἴσως ἔργον ἐστί. For the use in the same sentence of the pres. infin. λέγειν and the aor. infin. συμβῆναι, cp. c. 13. 1332 a 28 sq. and 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 3 sq. Cp. also 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sq.

24. Περί δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. The contents of the C. 13. thirteenth and following chapters have been sketched in vol. i. p. 340 sqq. The answer given in them to the question here raised is—a State that is to be happy must consist of citizens who are endowed by nature, fortune, and education with the means of making an absolutely, and not merely conditionally, perfect use of virtue, or in other words of citizens who are not only good men (σπουδαίοι), but are also supplied with an adequate amount of bodily and external goods, i.e. of citizens possessed of ἀρετή κεχορηγημένη (1332 a 28 sqq.: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.). Aristotle insists on this because he holds that Plato had starved the life of his guardians in the Republic and robbed it of happiness (2. 5. 1264 b 15 sqq.), and had sought to construct a happy State without making any class of his citizens happy (see vol. i. p. 427 sq.); he probably thought that Plato would not have made this mistake if he had studied the nature of happiness more closely. Aristotle's own ideal of a happy State, which is a sound and noble one, is conceived in direct and designed contrast to that of Plato's Republic and also to the model of the Lacedaemonian State. His ideal State consists of a body of citizens fully supplied with absolute goods and living a life in which work is crowned with leisure, yet unspoilt by their good fortune and enabled by a wisely ordered education to use their leisure aright. For της πολιτείας αὐτης, 'the constitution itself, as distinguished from matters outside it,' see above on 1326 b 35, and cp. Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 12, where αὐτή ή ὀργή is contrasted with τὰ ἐν ὀργῆ ἁμαρτήματα, and Demosth. in

Lept. c. 144, καὶ νυνὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου πᾶς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, τούτ $\varphi$  δ' (i.e. to the proposer of the law) οὐδείς ἐστι κίνδυνος. For ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποίων, cp. c. 10. 1329 b 40, and see above on 1274 b 32. As to the repetition of ἐκ, see critical note.

- 26. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis is introduced by μὲν οὖν, 39, as in c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., where see note. Plato (Laws 962 A) and Isocrates (De Pace, § 28 and Epist. 6. 8) had already dwelt on the importance in any inquiry of ascertaining both the end and the means of attaining it. For τὸ εὖ, see Bon. Ind. 291 b 25 sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 685 a 40) contrasts τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων with 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 14, πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος. See note on the latter passage.
  - 28. ἐν δὲ τὰς κ.τ.λ., not ἐν τῷ τάς: see above on 1330 b 10.
  - 30. ταῦτα, i.e. τὸ τέλος and τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις.
- 31. ἔκκειται καλῶς, 'is proposed well.' Compare (with Liddell and Scott) Megasthenes, ap. Strab. p. 707, τοῖς δ' ὁπλοποιοῖς καὶ ναυπηγοῖς μισθοὶ καὶ τροφαὶ παρὰ βασιλέως ἔκκεινται. In 28 we have κεῖσθαι ὀρθῶς, and in 36 τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὅρον.
- εν τῷ πράττειν, as distinguished from τὸ νοείν, which is a prior stage: cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 6 sqq.
- 33. δτὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The Platonic Socrates in the Republic is charged with this twofold error in 2. 2. 1261 a 11-16.
- 34. οἷον περὶ ἰατρικήν, sc. διαμαρτάνουσιν: cp. Plato, Laws 962 A, ἰατρὸς δὴ τὸ περὶ σῶμα ἀγνοῶν, ὁ προσείπομεν ὑγίειαν νῦν, ἢ νίκην στρατηγὸς ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα δὴ διήλθομεν, ἔσθ ὅπως αν νοῦν περί τι τούτων αν ἔχων φαίνοιτο;
  - 36.  $\delta \rho o \nu$  here =  $\tau \epsilon \lambda o s$ .
- 38. κρατεῖσθαι, 'obtineri' (Bon. Ind. s. v.): see Vahlen on Poet. 18. 1456 a 10, πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εὖ λύουσι κακῶς δεῖ δὲ ἄμφω ἀεὶ κρατεῖσθαι, and cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 21, ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἡ ταύτην μᾶλλον. See vol. i. p. 341, note 1.

τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις. We expect πρός in place of εἰς, but cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, χωρὶς τά τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν, and c. 15. 1334 a 14, τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετάς. Cp. also ᾿Αθ. Πολ. c. 23, τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον.

39. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται πάντες, φανερόν. Here the apodosis begins. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Meno 78 A, ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι; and the argument which follows. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 4, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδία ἐκάστω καὶ κοινῆ πᾶσι σκοπός τις ἐστίν, οὖ στοχα-

ζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν' καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίω εἰπεῖν ἥ τ' εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς.

- 40. ἀλλὰ τούτων κ.τ.λ. As to those who have not the power to attain happiness, cp. c. 8. 1328 a 38 sqq. In some of these there is a defect of φύσις (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 8 sqq.); this is the case with natural slaves (3. 9. 1280 a 33 sq.). In others there is a defect of τύχη (41 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἡ φύσεως δείται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς). Compare Plato, Laws 747 C (quoted in vol. i. p. 341, note 2) and 934 D.
- 41. δεῖται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added in explanation of διά τινα τύχην, for a defect of χορηγία is due to a defect of fortune. Καὶ χορηγίας τινός, as well as of φύσις.
- 1. τούτου δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers a saying of 1332 a. Pelopidas recorded by Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3, τῶν δὲ φίλων νουθετούντων καὶ λεγόντων ὡς ἀναγκαίου πράγματος ὀλιγωρεῖ, τοῦ χρήματα ἔχειν " 'Αναγκαίου, νὴ Δία, Νικοδήμω τούτω," ἔφη, δείξας τινὰ χωλὸν καὶ τυφλόν, and by Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 9. Cp. also Plut. Aristid. et Cato inter se comp. c. 4, ὡς γὰρ σῶμα τὸ καλῶς πρὸς εὐεξίαν κεκραμένον οὕτ ἐσθῆτος οὕτε τροφῆς δεῖται περιττῆς, οὕτω καὶ βίος καὶ οἶκος ὑγιαίνων ἀπὸ τῶν τυχόντων διοικεῖται, and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 32, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσω ἄν σοφώτερος ἢ μᾶλλον.
- 2. οἱ δ' εἰθὺς κ.τ.λ. Εἰθύς, 'from the outset,' because, unlike the others, who start aright but fail later on, they are wrong at starting. So we read in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31 sqq. that there are persons who seek happiness in the pleasures of recreation, mistaking them for the pleasures of the true end of life. Cp. Eurip. Hippol. 360 Bothe (382 Dindorf), where some are said to miss what is good,

ήδουήν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἄλλην τιν',

and Arrian, Epictet. 3. 23. 34.

7. φαμὲν δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the question whether we have here a reference to the Nicomachean Ethics, see vol. i. Appendix F. Aristotle has already given part of this definition in c. 8. 1328 a 37, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος. We find a similar definition of εὐδαιμονία ascribed to the Peripatetics in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, εὐδαιμονίαν δ' εἶναι χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείας ἐν βίω τελείω προηγουμένην . . . προηγουμένην δὲ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν (sc. εἶναι δεῖν) διὰ τὸ πάντως ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθοῖς ὑπάρχειν: compare another Peripatetic definition of εὐδαιμονία there given, χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεμπόδιστον. Speusippus



had defined εὐδαιμονία as ἔξις τελεία ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν οτ ἔξις ἀγαθῶν (Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 579. 62), but Aristotle substitutes χρῆσις for ἔξις. For καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἢθικοῖς, compare the frequent use of καί, when the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are adduced (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 a 22, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις, Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 26 and 6. 4. 1140 a 2 sq., and Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 28), and also Eth. Nic. 6. 3. 1139 b 26, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν. Π¹ add διωρίσμεθα after καί, but probably wrongly; this may be a gloss on φαμέν which has crept into the text.

9. καὶ ταύτην κ.τ.λ., i.e. 'and this perfect use of virtue not an use of virtue conditionally, but absolutely,' or, in other words, not a merely necessary use of virtue, but a noble use of virtue. A conditional use of virtue is an use of virtue which is called for under certain circumstances: for instance, if an offence has been committed, it is under the circumstances an use of virtue to punish the offender, but this is not an absolute use of virtue, because it is an use of virtue dictated by circumstances not desirable in themselves; it is the adoption and acceptance of an evil for the sake of the good which under the circumstances it will ultimately produce, whereas an absolute use of virtue is concerned with absolute goods, not with evils which are under given circumstances goods; it is concerned with the calling into existence of honours and wealth. In depicting the life of the citizens of his 'best State,' Aristotle often has in his mind the model furnished by the life of the gods (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 b 23 sqq. and c. 3. 1325 b 28 sqq.), and here too he probably remembers the θεοί δωτηρες εάων of Homer (Odyss. 8. 325): cp. Isocr. Philip. § 117, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν θεῶν τοὺς μέν των αγαθων αιτίους ήμιν όντας 'Ολυμπίους προσαγορευομένους, τούς δ' έπὶ ταις συμφοραις και ταις τιμωρίαις τεταγμένους δυσχερεστέρας τας έπωνυμίας έχοντας, καὶ τῶν μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ νεὼς καὶ βωμοὺς ίδρυμένους, τοὺς δ' οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις τιμωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀποπομπὰς αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ποιουμένους: Menander, Κόλαξ Fragm. 3, with Meineke's note, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 153: and the remarks of Plutarch on the epithet 'Olympian' conferred on Pericles in Pericl. C. 39, καί μοι δοκεί τὴν μειρακιώδη καὶ σοβαρὰν ἐκείνην προσωνυμίαν ἐν τοῦτο ποιείν ἀνεπίφθονον καὶ πρέπουσαν, οὕτως εὐμενὲς ήθος καὶ βίον ἐν έξουσία καθαρόν καὶ ἀμίαντον 'Ολύμπιον προσαγορεύεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ τῶν θεων γένος άξιουμεν αίτιον μεν άγαθων αναίτιον δε κακών πεφυκός άρχειν καί βασιλεύειν των ὄντων. For the association of τέλειος and άπλως, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 32, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν,

καὶ κακίας ἡ τῆς τελείας καὶ άπλως ἡ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἄπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας).

10. λέγω δ' έξ ὑποθέσεως τἀναγκαῖα, 'and by the term "conditionally" I mean things which are necessary': i.e. things which are necessary if good is to come about, but which are not in themselves desirable. Bonitz (Ind. 797 a 43) explains τἀναγκαῖα here by ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, comparing Metaph. Δ. 5. 1015 b 3, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συναιτίων τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως (sc. ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται) ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχηται ἔνθα μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἄνευ τινῶν, ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἡ αἰτία ἀνάγκη τίς ἐστιν αῦτη. Cp. also Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1238 b 5, καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ (sc. ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τῷ φαύλῳ) ἁπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἡ πενία συμφέρει ἡ νόσος.

11. οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance, if we take just actions' (i. e. uses of the virtue justice), 'just vengeances and punishments proceed indeed from virtue' (i.e. are uses of virtue), 'but they are necessary,' i. e. not desirable in themselves, 'and are noble only in a necessary way.' Aristotle here has before him, and slightly corrects, Plato, Laws 728 C, τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δίκη μεν οὐκ ἔστι-καλὸν γὰρ τό γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη-τιμωρία δέ, ἀδικίας ακόλουθος πάθη, ης δ τε τυχών και μη τυγχάνων άθλιος, δ μέν οὐκ ἰατρευόμενος, δ δέ, ΐνα έτεροι πολλοί σώζωνται, ἀπολλύμενος. In Laws 859 D-860 B the difficulty of classing just punishments either as καλά or as alσχρά is dwelt on, and Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 30, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως (SC. πεπραγμένα) έργα (SC. ἀνάγκη καλὰ εἶναι), πάθη δὲ οὔ: it would seem, however, from the passage before us, that just vengeances and punishments τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν. For the difference between τιμωρία and κόλασις, cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 12, διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις ή μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ενεκά εστιν, ή δε τιμωρία του ποιούντος, ίνα ἀποπληρωθή, Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 26 sqq., and Gell. 6. 14, puniendis peccatis tres esse debere caussas existimatum est. Una est quae νουθεσία vel κόλασις vel παραίνεσις dicitur; cum poena adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratia, ut is qui fortuito deliquit attentior fiat correctiorque. Altera est quam ii qui vocabula ista curiosius diviserunt τιμωρίαν appellant. Ea caussa animadvertendi est, cum dignitas auctoritasque eius in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne praetermissa animadversio contemptum eius pariat et honorem levet; idcircoque id ei vocabulum a conservatione honoris factum putant. For ἀπ' ἀρετης, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 11, πράξεων των ἀπὸ της ἀρετης, and Plut. Pericl. c. I, ἐν τοῖς ἀπ' ἀρετης ἔργοις.

- 14. αἰρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 507 D and 478 C: also Laws 628 C sqq. For μέν solitarium, see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Here the suppressed clause is 'though it is desirable that, if punishments are needed, they should be inflicted.'
- 15. αί δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς κ.τ.λ., 'but actions with a view to [the production of] honours and wealth are the noblest actions in an absolute sense': cp. 18, κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις. For the thought, cp. De Gen. An. 2. 1. 731 b 25, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον αἴτιον ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῦ βελτίονος ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36, ἀρετὴ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις, ὡς δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, and 1. 6. 1362 b 2, καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι' κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικαί. Prodicus, indeed, according to Plato, Charm. 163 D, would give the name of πράξεις only to τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις.
- 16. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτερον κ.τ.λ. Τὸ ἔτερον = αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ As Schneider points out in his Addenda (2. 506), Sepulveda (p. 229: see his note, p. 230 b, which Schneider quotes) translates, 'illud enim est malum tollere,' but, as alpeous can hardly bear this meaning, Schn. would read avaipeous in place of it, and this reading is adopted by Bekk.2 and Sus. The change certainly makes the antithesis neater, for κακοῦ τινὸς ἀναίρεσις answers well to κατασκευαὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ γεννήσεις, and it receives support (which has not hitherto been observed, so far as I have seen) from Plato, Gorg. 478 C sq. and esp. 478 D, ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή ἦν, πονηρίας; ΠΩΛ, ἦν γάρ. ΣΩ, σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεί καὶ ιατρική γίγνεται πονηρίας ή δίκη. Thus Plato at any rate regarded punishment as the 'removal of an evil,' the 'evil' being the wickedness of the offender, but the question is whether Aristotle took this view of punishment. This is very doubtful. He says indeed in Rhet. 1. 14. 1374 b 31, καὶ [ἀδίκημα μείζον έστιν οδ μή έστιν ἴασις χαλεπον γάρ και άδύνατον. και οδ μή έστι δίκην λαβείν τὸν παθόντα ἀνίατον γάρ ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις ἴασις (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 16 sqq. and Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1220 a 35 sqq.). But it is one thing to say that punishment heals the injustice committed, and another to say that it heals and removes the wickedness of the wrong-doer. I incline on the whole to think that the reading of the MSS., κακοῦ τινὸς αίρεσις, is right, and to regard the ζημία as the κακόν τι referred to: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 15, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐναντίως,

τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία, and Rhet. 3. 10. 1411 b 19, ὅτι καὶ αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν ἡ γὰρ εὔθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν (where εἴθυνα means the penalty inflicted as a result of the εἴθυνα properly so called, see Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 16). The meaning of the sentence will then be that just punishments are 'a choice of what is in a degree an evil' (i. e. of βλάβη οτ ζημία). This interpretation harmonizes well with what follows in 19 sqq. (see the next note); it also has the merit of giving the proper force to κακοῦ τινός, where τινός softens κακοῦ and marks the contrast with τὸ ἀπλῶς κακόν (cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 22, ἀντεχόμενοί τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίον τινός, ὁ γὰρ νόμος δίκαιόν τι), and with the φαῦλαι τύχαι mentioned in 20. Evil is not a fit object of choice; men should choose the good (Plato, Protag. 358 C sq.: Gorg. 499 E: Isocr. De Pace § 106: cp. also Plut. Galba, c. 14, κατ' οὐδένα λογισμὸν οὐδὲ αἵρεσιν ἀμεινόνων).

19. χρήσαιτο δ' αν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle continues, 'Yes, and a good man would make an in some sense noble use of virtue in relation not only to evils which are in the particular case goods (such as just punishments), but also to absolute evils like poverty, disease, and other evil contingencies; still beatitude is not to be found in them but in their opposites. For the use which the good man makes of things which are not goods to him-and no things are goods to him which are not absolute goods—is not an absolutely noble use, and therefore happiness is not to be found in it, for we have defined happiness to be an absolutely noble use of virtue.' Aristotle perhaps has before him a saying which Plutarch places in the mouth of Epaminondas in De Gen. Socr. c. 14, ἀλλ' ἀπάγγελλε τοις έκει γνωρίμοις, ότι κάλλιστα μέν αὐτοι πλούτω χρώνται, καλώς δέ πενία χρωμένους αὐτόθι φίλους έχουσι: cp. Isocr. Hel. § 8, τοσοῦτον δ' ἐπιδεδωκέναι πεποιήκασι τὸ ψευδολογείν, ωστ' ήδη τινές, ὁρωντες τούτους έκ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελουμένους, τολμῶσι γράφειν, ὡς ἔστιν ὁ τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος ή ὁ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, and Hor. Carm. 4. 9. 46,

rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui deorum
Muneribus sapienter uti
Duramque callet pauperiem pati.

Φαύλη τύχη is a milder term than δυστυχία: cp. Phys. 2. 5. 197 a 25, τύχη δὲ ἀγαθὴ μὲν λέγεται ὅταν ἀγαθόν τι ἀποβῆ, φαύλη δέ, ὅταν φαῦλόν τι, εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία, ὅταν μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταῦτα, and Metaph. K. 8.

1065 a 35 sq. What Aristotle includes under φαῦλαι τύχαι may be gathered from Eth. Nic. 3. 9. 1115 a 10, φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἶον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον. A reminiscence of the passage before us may be traced in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν κακοῖς ἀρετῆ χρήσαιτ' ἄν καλῶς ὁ σπουδαῖος, οὐ μήν γε μακάριος ἔσται. For the conjunction of πενία and νόσος, cp. Bacchylides 1. 32 sq. and Plato, Protag. 353 D.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reference to ἠθικοὶ λόγοι may be a reference to Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 25, τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν (sc. βουλητὸν φατέον βουλητόν) εἶναι (see Sus.⁴, 1. p. 530), and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 21, τὸ δὲ τῷ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ: in some respects, however, we trace a nearer approach to the definition before us in Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 26, ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ῷ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀγαθά, and in Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 31, ἔστιν οὖν ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ῷ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς καλὰ καλά ἐστιν (both passages referred to by Eaton), but there is nothing in either passage about διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. For τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 8 sqq. For the thought compare Plato, Laws 661 C sq.

- 23. δῆλον δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'and it is evident that [just as absolute goods are absolutely good and noble, so] these uses also' (i.e. the good man's uses of absolute goods) 'are necessarily absolutely good and noble.'
- 25. διὸ κ.τ.λ., 'hence,' i. e. because men see that the uses made by the σπουδαίος of absolute goods are absolutely good and noble and confer happiness on him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, forgetting that the σπουδαίος owes his happiness not to them but to his own virtue, and that even in his case they are only conditions, not causes, of happiness, while in the case of those who are not σπουδαίοι they may be the causes not of happiness, but of unhappiness, inasmuch as they may not be goods at all to them. For ἄνθρωποι, cp. Plato, Symp. 189 C, έμοι γαρ δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι παντάπασι την τοῦ ἔρωτος δύναμιν οὐκ ήσθησθαι, and 205 E, ως οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οδ ἐρωσιν ἄνθρωποι ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, where see Stallbaum's critical note. We have οἱ ἄνθρωποι in 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sq. and in Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 15, just as we sometimes have ἄνθρωπος and sometimes ὁ ἄνθρωπος (see critical note on 1253 a 2). For the fact that men take external goods to be the causes of happiness, cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 6 sqq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq., and Plut. De Virt. et Vit. c. 1.
  - 26. κιθαρίζειν λαμπρόν, cp. Hom. Il. 18. 570, ίμερόεν κιθάριζε.

- 27. αἰτιῷτο. For the absence of τις, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 2, εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρου ήξει, and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.
- 28. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., 'it is necessary, therefore, as a result of what has been said,' etc.: see above on 1267 b 14. Τὰ μέν, i. e. the external goods which are the gifts of Fortune. For ὑπάρ-χειν and παρασκευάσαι see note on 1331 b 21.
- 29. διὸ κ.τ.λ. These words are susceptible of two interpretations: either we may take  $\kappa a \tau$  εὐχήν as adverbial to εὐχόμεθα and translate with Sepulv. 'precibus optamus' (so Vict. and Lamb.), or we may supply εἶναι and translate 'hence in respect of those things over which fortune is supreme we pray that the composition of the State may be all that can be wished.' Perhaps the second interpretation is the better. Compare with the passage before us Soph. Fragm. 731,

τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εύρετὰ ζητῶ, τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ (al. ἔτερα) παρὰ θεῶν ἦτησάμην.

- 31. τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἔργον ἴδιόν ἐστιν. Ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως, because science is not enough by itself: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 1, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην (sc. πολιτείαν πολίτης ἐστὶν) ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. It should be noticed that if, as we are told in 39 sq., φύσις is one of the sources of virtue, it does not entirely depend on the lawgiver whether the citizens are virtuous or not. It is impossible, for instance, to turn barbarians into Greeks: still much may be done by attention to marriage and rearing to secure that the 'nature' of the citizens is what it should be.
- 32. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. It is implied here that a man might be a citizen without sharing in the constitution: see vol. i. p. 229.
- 34. ἡμῖν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but in our State all the citizens share in the constitution, [so that all our citizens must be good].' See as to this vol. i. p. 324 and note 1, and Appendix B sub fin. Here Aristotle seems to use the word πολίται in a sense exclusive of the νεώτεροι, or in other words οἱ ὅπλα κεκτημένοι, for in c. 10. 1329 b 36 it is implied that οἱ ὅπλα κεκτημένοι do not share in the constitution.
- 35. τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος. In some lines of Eupolis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 457) Nicias asks Aristides,

and Aristides answers,

ή μέν φύσις τὸ μέγιστον ἦν, ἔπειτα δὲ κάγὼ προθύμως τῆ φύσει συνελάμβανον.

36. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is more desirable that each individual citizen should be good than that all the citizens collectively should be good but not each individual citizen, because in the former case not only will each citizen be good but all will be good, and a good which includes another is more desirable than the good which it includes (Top. 3. 2. 117 a 16 sqq.). It appears from 2. 5. 1264 b 17, ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην (sc. τὴν πόλιν), μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἡ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἡ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, that a State may be happy if only some of its members are happy.

38. άλλά μην κ.τ.λ. For άγαθοί και σπουδαίοι, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 b 7. Cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 12, αγαθούς καὶ δικαίους. Eaton and Congreve compare Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 20, γίνεσθαι δ' άγαθούς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῆ (= λόγω): cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 9 sqq. The passage before us is perhaps present to the mind of the writer of [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, C. 4. 2 A. ως είς την παντελή δικαιοπραγίαν τρία δεί συνδραμείν, φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔθος καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, ἔθος δὲ τὴν ἄσκησιν (already quoted by Eaton). Theognis (429-438) and Pindar (Olymp. 9. 100 sqq.: Nem. 3. 40 sqq.: see L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 1. 158 sqq.) are already familiar with the contrast of nature and teaching as sources of virtue, and both insist on the importance of nature, but the maxim in the form in which it appears in the passage before us is perhaps found earliest in Protag. Fragm. 8 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 134), φύσεος καὶ ἀσκήσεος διδασκαλία δέεται, words which refer to the teaching not only of virtue, but of other things, and which are all the more remarkable as coming from Protagoras, because there were sophists who promised to teach virtue without dwelling on the necessity of natural aptitude and of practice (Plato, Meno 95 B). Compare (with Camerarius, Interp. p. 309) Hippocr. Lex, vol. i. p. 3 Kühn, if this work is by Hippocrates, χρη γάρ ὅστις μέλλει ἐητρικῆς ξύνεσιν ἀτρεκέως άρμόζεσθαι, τῶνδέ μιν ἐπήβολον γενέσθαι, φύσιος, διδασκαλίης, τρόπου εὐφυέος, παιδομαθίης, φιλοπονίης, χρόνου. The saying reappears in Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 2, Plato, Phaedr. 269 D, and Isocr. De Antid. § 187. See also Wyttenbach's note on the passage of [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis quoted above. "E $\theta$ os is mentioned before  $\lambda$ óyos, because

education through habit precedes education through the reason (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.).

40. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers a saying variously ascribed to Thales, Socrates, and Plato: cp. Diog. Laert.

1. 33, Ἦρμιππος δ' ἐν τοῖς βίοις εἰς τοῦτον (i. e. Thales) ἀναφέρει τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπό τινων περὶ Σωκράτους' ἔφασκε γάρ, φησί, τριῶν τούτων ἕνεκα χάριν ἔχειν τἢ τύχη, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἐγενόμην καὶ οὐ θηρίον, εἶτα ὅτι ἀνὴρ καὶ οὐ γυνή, τρίτον ὅτι Ἦλην καὶ οὐ βάρβαρος, and Plut. Marius, c. 46, Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἤδη πρὸς τῷ τελευτᾶν γενόμενος ὕμνει τὸν αὐτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα Ἦλλην, οὐ βάρβαρος οὐδὲ ἄλογον τἢ φύσει θηρίον γένοιτο, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι τοῖς Σωκράτους χρόνοις ἀπήντησεν ἡ γένεσις αὐτοῦ. See Prof. J. E. B. Mayor in Class. Rev. 10. 191.

41. οὖτω καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, 'so also of a certain quality in body and soul.' For οὖτω see critical note. Aristotle continues with οὖτω as if ὥσπερ, and not πρῶτον, had preceded, for I do not think that οὖτω here means 'then,' as it seems to do in Rhet. 3. 19. 1419 b 15. That a man may be born too faulty to be made good by education, we see from 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 8 sqq.

42. ἔνιά τε κ.τ.λ., 'and in respect of some qualities it is no good to be born this or that, for habits cause them to change; some qualities, in fact, are made by nature to be susceptible of change under the influence of habits in two directions, towards that which is worse and that which is better.' I follow Stahr and Welldon in my rendering of ἔνιά τε οὐδὲν ὄφελος φῦναι: Sepulv. Vict. and Sus.4 less well make ἔνια the subject of φῦναι. In ἔνια Aristotle refers to those elements in man which may be made better or worse by good or bad habituation, for instance the emotions: see note on 1253 a 34, and cp. Plut. Themist. c. 2, έν δὲ ταις πρώταις της νεότητος όρμαις ἀνώμαλος ἢν (ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς) καὶ ἀστάθμητος, ἄτε τῆ φύσει καθ' αὐτὴν χρώμενος ἄνευ λόγου καὶ παιδείας ἐπ' ἀμφότερα μεγάλας ποιουμένη μεταβολάς των έπιτηδευμάτων και πολλάκις έξισταμένη προς το χείρον, ως υστερου αυτός ώμολόγει, και τους τραχυτάτους πώλους αρίστους ιππους γίνεσθαι φάσκων, όταν ης προσήκει τύχωσι παιδείας και καταρτύσεως, Nic. c. 9, οῦτως ἡ ᾿Αλκιβιάδου φύσις ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα πολλή ρυείσα καὶ λαμπρά μεγάλων ένέδωκεν άρχας νεωτερισμών, and Coriolan. c. 1. For ἐπαμφυτερίζοντα ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1197 a 30, ή δε υπόληψίς έστιν, ή υπερ απάντων επαμφοτερίζομεν πρός τὸ καὶ είναι ταῦτα οῦτω καὶ μὴ είναι. For διὰ τῆς φύσεως, cp. διὰ

τριῶν (i. e. φύσις, ἔθος, λόγος), 39. Elsewhere we find ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, as in Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19 sq. and De Part. An. 2. 13. 657 a 31 sq. (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 73).

- 1332 b. 3. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. For τῆ φύσει ζῆ ('live guided by nature'), cp. Metaph. A. 1. 980 b 25, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα (ζῷα) ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῆ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμοῖς, Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 27, τῆ ὀρέξει ζῆ, and Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 35, τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἡ τῷ λογισμῷ (cp. 2. 13. 1390 a 16, καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος). For the implied contrast between φύσις and λόγος, cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 28 sqq., where a contrast between φύσις and προαίρεσις is implied.
  - 4. μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, 'and some to a small extent guided by habits also.' For μικρά, cp. Plato, Rep. 404 A, ἐὰν σμικρὰ ἐκβῶσι τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης, and 527 A, ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι. As to the habituation of animals, cp. [Plut.] De Virtute Morali, c. 4, κύνας καὶ ἵππους καὶ ὅρνιθας οἰκουροὺς ὁρῶντες, ἔθει καὶ τροφῆ καὶ διδασκαλία φωνάς τε συνετὰς καὶ πρὸς λόγον ὑπηκόους κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀποδιδόντας, καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῦν ἐχούσας.
  - 5. μόνον, sc. τῶν ζώων: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 9, λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων.

ωστε δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'and so [in his case] these three things must harmonize with each other, [for it will not do to leave reason out,] since men are led by reason to do many things contrary to habituation and to nature, if they are persuaded that these things are better done otherwise [than as habit and nature dictate].' We learn from c. 15. 1334 b 9 sqq. that the three things must not only harmonize, but harmonize in the best way, i.e. by all being adapted to the best end. Plato speaks of education in Laws 653 B as being the bringing of the child's feelings of pain and pleasure into harmony with reason (cp. Rep. 401 C, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνη εἰς δμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα). I cannot follow Sus. and Welldon in placing ώστε δεί ταῦτα συμφωνείν ἀλλήλοις after βέλτιον, 3, for, if we place these words there, what Aristotle says will be that nature and habit should harmonize, whereas the lesson which he wishes to enforce is surely this, that nature, habit, and reason should harmonize. As to πολλά γάρ—βέλτιον, Laius in the Chrysippus of Euripides (Fragm. 837) had been made to plead,

> λέληθεν οὐδεν τῶνδε μ' ὧν σὰ νουθετεῖς, γνώμην δ' ἔχοντά μ' ἡ φύσις βιάζεται,

but the Chorus in Aristoph. Vesp. 1457 sqq. (Didot) says,

τὸ γὰρ ἀποστῆναι χαλεπὸν φύσεος ἢν ἔχοι τις ἀεί. καίτοι πολλοὶ ταῦτ' ἔπαθον' ἔυνόντες γνώμαις ἐτέρων μετεβάλλοντο τοὺς τρόπους.

Cp. also Rhet. I. II. I370 a 25, μετὰ λόγου δὲ (ἐπιθυμοῦσιν), ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες, and Plato, Rep. 452 D, ἀλλ' ἐπειδή, οἶμαι, χρωμένοις ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου. A reference is given in the Index Aristotelicus for the plural of ἐθισμός to Eth. Nic. 3. I5. III9 a 26, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. The word ἐθισμός does not appear to occur in the writings of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, or Isocrates; it occurs, however, in [Demosth.] Or. 17. c. 27, and it is frequently used by Polybius not only in the singular, but also in the plural (e.g. in I. 17. II and 3. 76. I2).

9. For διωρίσμεθα in a middle sense, cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 192 (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. δρίζω). Διώρισμαι does not appear to be often thus used by Aristotle: Bonitz, however (Ind. 200 a 27), takes διωρίσθαι to be middle in De Caelo, 4. 2. 308 b 1.

πρότερον, in c. 7. 1327 b 19 sqq. Εὐχειρώτους τῷ νομοθέτη in the passage before us takes the place of εὐαγώγους τῷ νομοθέτη πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν in 1327 b 38.

10. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες. 'Ακούοντεν answers to τὸν λόγον, 7. Here μανθάνειν includes both ἐθίζεσθαι and ἀκούειν. Contrast 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 16, μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι. Sus.² refers to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 14, διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὕσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὕξησιν . . . ἡ δ' ἡθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται. Cp. also Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν 1. 437 a 11, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἡ ἀκοὴ πλεῖοτον συμβάλλεται μέρος ὁ γὰρ λόγος αἴτιός ἐστι τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκουστὸς ὥν, οὐ καθ' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 17 sqq., and Metaph. Θ. 5. 1047 b 31, ἀπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἶον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἔθει οἶον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγω, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν

οὐκ ἀνάγκη. Add Philem. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 34: cp. 5. ccxxxii),

ήκουσα τοῦτο καὐτός, οὐδὲ φύεται αὐτόματον ἀνθρώποισιν, ὡ βελτιστε, νοῦς, ὡσπερ ἐν ἀγρῷ θύμος ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ ἑτέρων ἀκούειν καὶ θεωρῆσαι \* \* κατὰ μικρὸν ἀεί, φασί, φύονται φρένες.

C. 14. 13. τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτέον. Cp. c. 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

έτέρους είναι, sc. διὰ βίου.

- 15. δήλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 16, καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς ε΄τέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος. For ἀκολουθεῖν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ εξεις.
- 16. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle has before him Plato, Polit. 301 D, νῦν δέ γε ὁπότε οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενος, ὡς δὴ φαμέν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἶος ἐν σμήνεσιν ἐμφύεται, τό τε σῶμα εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρων εἶς, δεῖ δὴ συνελθόντας ξυγγράμματα γράφειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. also 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and Isocr. Hel. § 56, τοῖς δὲ καλοῖς εὐθὺς ἰδόντες εὖνοι γιγνόμεθα, καὶ μόνους αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἀπαγορεύομεν θεραπεύοντες, ἀλλ' ἥδιον δουλεύομεν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχομεν. The passage before us shows that not only gods (1.5. 1254 b 34 sqq.) but also heroes were credited with surpassing personal beauty, so that we are not surprised to find that Philip of Crotona, who excelled in this respect, was worshipped as a hero at Egesta after his death (Hdt. 5. 47). For ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων (not τῶν ἐτέρων), see Bon. Ind. 34 b 34 sqq., where Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a 28, ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἔτεροι ἡδεῖς, Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 b 7, and Meteor. 2. 6. 365 a 3 sq. are referred to.
- 20. ἄστε κ.τ.λ. Lamb. 'ita ut incontroversa et in promptu posita esset eorum qui imperant prae iis qui sub imperio sunt excellentia': Sus. 'dass diese Ueberlegenheit der Herrschenden für die Beherrschten (selber) unzweifelhaft und einleuchtend wäre.' Thus Lamb. takes τοῖς ἀρχομένοις as in the dat. after ὑπεροχήν (so too Mr. Welldon), Sus. as in the dat. after ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ φανεράν. I have not noticed any passage in which the construction assumed by Lamb. occurs, and I incline to follow Sus., at any rate till a parallel passage is produced.
- 23. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but since it is not easy to light on this highly superior element, and we have not among ourselves anything to

answer to the vast superiority of the kings to their subjects, which Scylax says exists in India.' For λαβείν in this sense, cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 7, Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 a 34, πρώτον μέν ὅτι ἔνα λαβείν καὶ ὀλίγους ράον ή πολλούς εὖ φρονοῦντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν, and Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 17. As to τοῦτο, Aristotle often uses the neuter in referring to persons, e.g. in 2. 5. 1263 a 1 and 3. 13. 1283 b 9. He would seem to have had before him the genuine narrative of Scylax of Carvanda in Caria, as to whom see Hdt. 4. 44. The Periplus which we possess bearing his name is not the genuine work by him, and does not contain the statement here repeated by Aristotle. The testimony of Scylax as to the superiority—both physical and mental, apparently—of the kings in India to their subjects may well have been perfectly true. 'Throughout Polynesia the chiefs and upper classes are taller than the lower orders, and with a finer physical they combine a greater mental development. They are in every respect superior to the people whom they rule. They are as genuine an aristocracy as ever existed in any country. They know every plant, animal, rock, river, and mountain, are familiar with their history, legends, and traditions, and strict in observing every point of their own complicated etiquette. They swim, row, sail, shoot, and fight better than the common people, and excel in house and canoe building' (Seemann, Viti, p. 79). For the form βασιλέας see note on 1284 b 33.

25. φανερὸν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'it is clear that it is for many reasons necessary that all should share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn [and that rulers and ruled should be the same persons], for when the sharers are alike, equality demands that each shall have the same share' (i. e. an identity of political privilege), 'and [the constitution must be just, for] it is difficult for a constitution to last which is framed in contravention of what is just.' For τό τε γὰρ ἴσον ταὐτὸν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 12 sqq. and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 7 sq., and also Thuc. 6. 38. 5, καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;

29. μετὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for together with the ruled [citizens] are forthcoming desirous of revolution all those who are scattered over the territory,' i. e. the cultivators and other residents in the country (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 30, οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν, and 38, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους). Aristotle has arranged in c. 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. that the cultivators shall not be θυμοειδεῖς or

ομόφυλοι, still he takes it for granted here that they will be desirous of revolution, though unable to make a revolution without the help of the ἀρχόμενοι πολίται. Reiz followed by Sus. would read βουλομένων, but βουλόμενοι is probably right, for Aristotle is apt to suspect slave or serf cultivators of a tendency to νεωτερισμός (2. 4. 1262 a 40 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 28).

- 32. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 18 sqq., and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37, ότι μεν οὖν οὖκ ώετο προσήκειν οὐδενὶ ἀρχῆς ὅστις μὴ βελτίων εἴη των ἀρχομένων, καὶ τοις προειρημένοις πασι δήλον καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.
- 34. πως οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'how then this difference is to exist, and how they are to share [in ruling and being ruled by turns], the lawgiver must consider.' Μεθέξουσι takes up κοινωνείν, 26.
  - 35. πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.
- 36. ή γαρ φύσις δέδωκε την διαίρεσιν κ.τ.λ., ' for nature has furnished us with the distinction, having made that which is the same in kind itself of two parts, the one younger and the other older.' For διαίρεσιν, see critical note. For a similar acceptance of the guidance of nature, cp. c. 17. 1337 a 1 and 1. 8. 1256 b 7 sqq.: also De Caelo, I. I. 268 a I3, διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ώσπερ νόμους έκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς άγιστείας χρώμεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ (the number three), and Poet. 24. 1460 a 3, αλλ', ωσπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτή ή φύσις διδάσκει τὸ άρμόττον αὐτῆ διαιρεῖσθαι. By 'that which is the same in kind,' is meant man.
- 37. ων τοις μέν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 600 A, καὶ τρίτον έτι τούτοις ξυνέπεται τὸ πρεσβυτέρους μὲν ἄρχειν δεῖν, νεωτέρους δὲ ἄρχεσθαι, and Rep. 412 C, ότι μεν πρεσβυτέρους τους άρχοντας δεί είναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δηλον; Cp. also 1. 12. 1259 b 10-17.
- 38. ἀγανακτεί δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 6, τοις γάρ έγγὺς καὶ χρόνω καὶ τόπω καὶ ήλικία καὶ δόξη φθονοῦσιν. Aristotle perhaps remembers the words of the aged Nestor to Agamemnon and Achilles (Hom. Il. 1. 259),

άλλα πίθεσθ' άμφω δε νεωτέρω έστον έμειο, and what Agamemnon says of Achilles in Il. 9. 160,

καί μοι ὑποστήτω, ὅσσον βασιλεύτερύς εἰμι

ηδ' δσσον γενεή προγενέστερος εξχομαι είναι.

Plutarch may have the passage before us in his memory in An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 7, καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἄλλαις ὑπεροχαῖς προσμάχονται καὶ διαμφισβητοῦσιν ἀρετής καὶ γένους καὶ φιλοτιμίας, ὡς ἀφαιρούντες αὐτῶν ὅσον ἄλλοις ὑφίενται, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ χρόνου πρωτείον, ὁ καλείται κυρίως πρεσβείον, άζηλοτύπητόν έστι καὶ παραχωρούμενον . . . έτι

τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλούτου δύναμιν ἡ λόγου δεινότητος ἡ σοφίας οὐ πάντες αὐτοῖς γενήσεσθαι προσδοκῶσιν, ἐφ' ἡν δὲ προάγει τὸ γῆρας αἰδῶ καὶ δόξαν, οὐδεὶς ἀπελπίζει τῶν πολιτευομένων. I have questioned this in vol. ii. p. xix, but I had not then remarked the resemblance which exists between An Seni, etc., c. 18. 793 A, ὥσπερ γὰρ . . . ἤθους, and 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20 sqq. A similar calculation to that of Aristotle probably underlay the distinction drawn by Diocletian between the Augusti and the Caesares, the former being 'elder princes' and the latter 'rising in their turn to the first rank' (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 13: vol. ii. p. 168, ed. 1812).

39. οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων, sc. τῶν ἀρχόντων—a step in the direction of discontent (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36, ἄρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλων χειρόνων).

αλλως τε κ.τ.λ., 'especially as he may expect to be repaid this contribution [of obedience], when he has reached the right age.' An έρανος is a contribution of service or money for which in fairness a return should be forthcoming: cp. Eurip. Suppl. 349 Bothe (363 Dindorf),

κάλλιστον ἔρανον δοὺς γὰρ ἀντιλάζυται παίδων παρ' αὐτοῦ τοιάδ' αν τοκεῦσι δῷ,

Isocr. Hel. § 20, νομίζων ὀφείλειν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον, μηδενὸς ἀποστῆναι τῶν ὑπὸ Πειρίθου προσταχθέντων, ἀνθ' ὧν ἐκείνος αὐτῷ συνεκινδύνευσεν, and Isocr. Plat. § 57, where τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον is explained by τὴν αὐτὴν εὐεργεσίαν. It is not quite clear what is meant by τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον (40). Sus., followed by Welldon, takes the words to mean 'den Ehrenvorzug zu befehlen' ('the honourable privilege of ruling'). To me it seems that the ἔρανος referred to is rather the contribution of submission to the rule of others which the young citizen makes in his youth and receives from those younger than himself in years of maturity.

42. ἄστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κ.τ.λ. Rulers and ruled will be the same persons at different ages, so that they will be in a sense the same and in a sense different, and similarly the education given to rulers and ruled will be the same but will be different at different ages, the young learning to be ruled and later on learning through being ruled to rule, so that the education also of rulers and ruled will be in a sense the same and in a sense different. For the late appearance of εἶναι in this sentence, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 29, ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ ἀρμόττει μεγάλας ἔνθα δ' εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτάς, and see note on 1285 b 36.

- 1333 a. 2. τε γάρ here is not taken up by καί or any equivalent to καί, a thing which rarely happens (see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 19 sq.), so rarely that Eucken pronounces the passage before us corrupt. Sus.², however, rightly remarks that we have here 'one of the few cases in which τε γάρ = "etenim." 'English readers may consult Shilleto's critical note to Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 176' (Sus.⁴). Eucken points out that in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 33, αἷ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦντος, the use of τε γάρ is only apparently similar, inasmuch as the last eight words are virtually equivalent to καὶ δ δῆμος βουλήσεται καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονήσει. So again in De Part. An. 3. 10. 673 a 3, γαργαλιζόμενοί τε γὰρ ταχὺ γελῶσι διὰ τὸ τὴν κίνησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι ταχὺ πρὸς τὸν τόπον τοῦτον, we find τε γάρ virtually taken up in συμβαίνειν δέ φασι κ.τ.λ., 673 a 10.
  - 3. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή κ.τ.λ., 'but [we do not mean that he should have been ruled otherwise than a freeman should be ruled, for] rule is, as was shown in the first discussions' (i. e. in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.), 'in one of its forms for the sake of the ruler and in another for the sake of the ruled, and we say that the former of these is rule such as is exercised by a master over slaves and the latter rule such as is exercised over freemen, [so that the latter is the kind of rule to which it is fitting that the young freeman should submit before ruling].'
    - 5. φαμεν, in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.
  - 6. διαφέρει δ' ἔνια κ.τ.λ. This was probably written later than 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq., for we hear nothing there to the same effect. Aristotle had identified δεσποτική ἀρχή in that passage with ή περί τάναγκαία, and had added, θάτερον δε καὶ ἀνδραποδώδες, λέγω δε θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετείν τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις. Now we are told that even service of this kind may become noble if it is rendered for a noble end. What Aristotle would consider a noble end may be gathered from 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sq.). He probably has in his mind among other things the ἄνευ θεραπόντων αὐτοῖς έαυτῶν (αὐτῶν έαυτοῖς?) διακονήσεις of the young Spartans employed in the Crypteia (Plato, Laws 633 B sq.). Plato had already recommended his agronomi and their youthful assistants to do the like (Laws 762 E sqq., cp. especially καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι χρή τῷ καλῶς δουλεῦσαι μᾶλλον ή τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι, πρώτον μεν τοίς νόμοις ... έπειτα τοίς πρεσβυτέροις τε καὶ έντίμως βεβιωκόσι τούς νέους, and 763 A, τὰ δ' ἄλλα αὐτοὶ δι' αύτῶν διανοηθήτωσαν ώς

Βιωσόμενοι διακονοῦντές τε καὶ διακονούμενοι έαυτοῖς). Perhaps the young Athenians who served as περίπολοι had more done for them by slaves than Plato and Aristotle approved. Vict. refers to the story of Favonius and Pompey told in Plut. Pomp. c. 73, ἐπεὶ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν δείπνου καὶ παρεσκεύασεν ὁ ναύκληρος ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ἰδὼν ὁ Φαώνιος οἰκετῶν ἀπορία τὸν Πομπήιον ἀρχόμενον αὐτὸν ὑπολύειν προσέδραμε καὶ ὑπέλυσε καὶ συνήλειψε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτου περιέπων καὶ θεραπεύων ὅσα δεσπότας δοῦλοι, μέχρι νίψεως ποδῶν καὶ δείπνου παρασκευῆς διετέλεσεν, ὥστε τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα τῆς ὑπουργίας ἐκείνης θεασάμενον ἄν τινα καὶ τὸ ἀφελὲς καὶ ἄπλαστον εἰπεῖν

Φεῦ τοίσι γενναίοισιν ώς ἄπαν καλόν (Eurip. Fragm. 953).

Vict. adds, referring to the siege of Florence in 1529, 'Recordor ego, cum premeretur obsidione nostra civitas, hostisque ad portas castra posuisset, universam nostram iuventutem in operibus faciendis muniendaque urbe occupatam fuisse, neque tamen eo tempore quicquam quod nobilitati suae non conveniret gessisse, non enim ob mercedem inde capiendam, sed ob libertatem defendendam id faciebat.'

11. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. If we take Aristotle to refer in πολίτου here, as also in 3. 18. 1288 a 37 sqq., to the full citizen of the 'best State,' who is ex hypothesi capable of ruling, we shall not need to read πολιτικοῦ with Rassow and Susemihl. See vol. i. Appendix B. The argument is—since the virtue of a ruling citizen and the virtue of the best man are the same, and in our State the ruled citizen becomes sooner or later a ruler, so that he will need sooner or later to possess the virtue of a good man, the lawgiver must make this the aim of his labours, that the citizens may become good men, and [must seek to ascertain] by means of what pursuits [they may best be made so] and what is the end of the best life. For πραγματευτέου ὅπως . . . γίγνωνται Bonitz (Ind. 630 a 14) compares Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 b 19, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν. The end of the best life is leisure (c. 15. 1334 a 11 sqq.).

16. διήρηται δὲ κ.τ.λ. In c. 15. 1334 b 17 sqq., as in 1. 13. 1260 a 5 sqq., the two parts of the soul are τὸ λόγον ἔχον and τὸ ἄλογον: here they are τὸ λόγον ἔχον καθ' αὐτό, and τὸ λόγον οὐκ ἔχον καθ' αὐτό, λόγω δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον. Thus here Aristotle adopts the division of the soul which is mentioned as feasible in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 1, εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ

λόγον έχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ώσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἡθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ Φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, έλευθεριότητα δε καὶ σωφροσύνην ήθικάς, a passage which throws much light on that before us, though καθ' αὐτό, 17 ('per se,' in contradistinction to καθ' ἔτερον: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, quoted above on 1323 b 24, and Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 22 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 290 b 34), means more than ἐν αὐτῷ, 1103 a 2. The part of the soul referred to as λόγον οὐκ ἔχον καθ αύτό, λόγω δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν (Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 30), or, as it is occasionally called in the Politics (see above on 1254 b 8), τὸ παθητικόν. Τὸ θρεπτικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς is omitted, as in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 12, ἐπειδή της ἀνθρωπικης ἀρετης ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. Aristotle recalls this division of the soul because he wishes to throw light on the relative worth of the virtues connected with each part of the soul, and to show, in opposition to the eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution, that the virtues of the rational part have more of the character of ends than those of the other part. For the perfect διήρηται, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17 and 2. 9. 1269 b 16. For the participle δυνάμενον, see note on 1254 b 23.

19. πως, 'in any way,' as in Xen. Oecon. 9. 1, ή γυνη έδόκει σοι, ἔφην έγώ, ὧ Ἰσχόμαχε, πώς τι ὑπακούειν ὧν σὰ ἐσπούδαζες διδάσκων;

τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Ως ἡμεῖς φαμέν = ὡς ἡμεῖς διαιροῦμεν, for it is hardly likely that διαιρετέον εἶναι should be supplied. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 32 sq. For the μέν solitarium in τοῖς μὲν οὖτω διαιροῦσιν, see above on 1332 a 14, 1262 a 6, and 1270 a 34.

21. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We learn in what sense the appetitive part of the soul exists for the sake of the rational part from Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12, ἐπειδὴ γάρ τι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔχομεν τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἔνεκέν ἐστιν, ισπερ ἐπὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔνεκεν, καὶ τότ ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καλῶς, ὅταν οῦτως ἔχη ιστε μὴ κωλύειν ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ συμπαρορμῶν πρὸς τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν τῷ βελτίονι. Cp. also M. Antonin. Comm. 5. 16, ἢ οὐκ ἢν ἐναργές, ὅτι τὰ χείρω τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν, τὰ δὲ κρείττω ἀλλήλων; κρείττω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀψύχων τὰ ἔμψυχα, τῶν δὲ ἐμψύχων τὰ λογικά. On the far-reaching principle, αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν, see vol. i. p. 58 sq.

22. καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. When a principle holds good in reference both to art and to nature, Aristotle is often careful

to point out the fact: e.g. in Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 10 sq., De Part. An. 1. 1. 639 b 15 sq., and De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 20 sqq.

**24.** διήρηταί τε διχή. Sepulv., Lamb., Schn., Sus.², Welldon, and others supply ὁ λόγος, but Vict. and Sus.⁴ supply τὸ λόγον ἔχον, and perhaps this is better.

καθ' ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαιρεῖν. Ε.g. in De An. 3. 10. 433 a 14, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἔνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 3 sqq.

**26.** ώσαύτως, in the same way as δ λόγος, i.e. into τὸ λόγον ἔχον πρακτικόν and τὸ λόγον ἔχον θεωρητικόν.

τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, i.e. τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος καθ' αὐτό.

δηλονότι is adverbial, as in c. 2. 1325 a 1: see on this use Bon. Ind. 173 b 30 sqq.

- 27. καὶ τὰς πράξεις δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed we shall say that the activities of the soul stand in a corresponding relation to each other.' Three classes of activities are apparently referred to—
  (1) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον οὐκ ἔχοντος καθ' αὐτό, λόγω δ' ὑπακούειν δυναμένου (e.g. ἐλευθέριοι, σώφρονες πράξεις: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 6 and 3. 3. 1111 b 1 sq.): (2) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος πρακτικόν (φρόνιμοι πράξεις): (3) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος θεωρητικόν (σοφαὶ πράξεις).
- 28. τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν, 'for those who can attain either to all the three activities of the soul or to the two lower ones of the three.' I take the meaning to be, that even if a man can attain only to the activities of the irrational part of the soul and to those of the lower, or practical, section of its rational part, the latter class of activities, being activities of the better part of the two, are more desirable for him than the former. If a man can attain to all three, then of course the activities of the theoretic section of the rational part are the most desirable for him.
- 29. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for that is always most desirable for each man which is the highest to which it is possible for him to attain,' whether it is absolutely the highest or not. See vol. i. p. 60.
- 30. πᾶς ὁ βίος, 'life as a whole': see above on 1253 b 33. In 40 we have τοὺς βίους. By πᾶς ὁ βίος Aristotle means πᾶς ὁ πολιτικὸς βίος: cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 30, χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὖτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἶς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικήν). In 1. 8. 1256 a 30 sqq. we have a classification of human life, so far as it is concerned with getting food. For the association of ἀσχολία and πόλεμος and of εἰρήνη and σχολή, cp. 41 sq., c. 15. 1334 a 38 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4 sqq.

- 32. καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν κ.τ.λ. 'Bonitz brackets εἰς τά in 32 and 33 (Ind. 42 b 26 sqq. and 632 a 29 sq.), but see Vahlen in the Zeitschrift für d. östr. Gymn. 1872, p. 540' (Sus.², p. 453). I have not seen Vahlen's article. The construction, if we supply διήρηται, as we must apparently do, is certainly remarkable. For τῶν πρακτῶν we have τῶν πραγμάτων in 40.
- 34. For αίρεσιν, cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 106, εύρήσετε γὰρ τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τὰς αἰρέσεις τῶν πραγμάτων ἁμαρτάνοντας.
- 35. πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν. Aristotle continues his sentence as if â ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αἰρετὰ εἶναι had preceded in 33, and not περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν αἴρεσιν εἶναι. He here has before him Plato, Laws 628 D sq. (referred to by Eaton) and 803 D. Cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4, δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῆ σχολῆ εἶναι ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν.

ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολής. See last note. There was much to suggest the view that σχολή is a nobler thing than ἀσχολία in the Greek conception of the gods as ρεία ζώοντες, and in Aristotle's own conception of the life of the Deity (see above on 1325 b 28), to say nothing of the close connexion which the Greeks held to exist between σχολή and έλευθερία (Plato, Theaet. 175 D) and between σχολή and culture (Isocr. Busir. § 21 sq.: Metaph. A. 1. 981 b 20 sqq.). As has often been pointed out by others, Aristotle does not mean idleness or recreation by  $\sigma_{\chi} \circ \lambda \dot{\eta}$ .  $\Sigma_{\chi} \circ \lambda \dot{\eta}$  is marked off by him both from ἀσχολία and from παιδιά or ἀνάπαυσις: it is not, like παιδιά and ἀνάπανσις, recreation after toil (5 (8). 3. 1337 b 37 sqq.: 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 36 sqq.), nor is it, like aoxolia, the doing of work which is done not for its own sake, but as a means to something else; it is employment in work desirable for its own sake—the hearing of noble music and no doubt also of noble poetry, intercourse with friends chosen for their worth (Eth. Nic. 9. 11. 1171 b 12 sqg.), and above all the exercise, in company or otherwise, of the speculative faculty. 'Ασχολία and the παιδιά or ἀνάπαυσις which makes ἀσχολία possible must necessarily find a place in human life, for men cannot exist without them, but the noblest element in human life is  $\sigma \chi \circ \lambda \dot{\eta}$ , and it is the end for which work and recreation exist. We hardly know whether Aristotle would class the sight of noble pictures or statues with the hearing of noble music and poetry as a right use of σχολή: he would probably not regard in this light the exercise of an art even for its own sake. Many will differ from him here, and some may ask whether work done as a means to something else is not often as desirable for its own sake as anything which could be brought under the head of  $\sigma\chi o\lambda \dot{\eta}$ . May we not say this of work done in a noble cause, like that of the victors of Marathon and Salamis, or that of Pitt and Stein, when they 'weathered the storm'? It should be noticed that while Aristotle is following in the track of Plato when he exalts peace above war, he is not a borrower from Plato in his exaltation of  $\sigma\chi o\lambda \dot{\eta}$  at the expense of  $\dot{d}\sigma\chi o\lambda \dot{l}a$ . His view of human life as comprising in its best form  $\dot{d}\sigma\chi o\lambda \dot{l}a$ ,  $\pi a \dot{l}\partial \dot{l}a$ , and  $\sigma\chi o\lambda \dot{l}a$  is a remarkable one, and  $\ddot{l}$  am not aware that he owes it to any one.

- 2. καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δέ, 'and indeed things useful': cp. Plato, 1333 b. Theaet. 171 Ε, ἐθελῆσαι ἀν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἰκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὐτὸ γιγνῶσκον έαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν.
- 3. καὶ παίδας ἔτι ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται παιδείας. According to the common view (a different view is ascribed to Pythagoras in Diog. Laert. 8. 10), boyhood ceased at puberty (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 6, ἐγὼ γὰρ παῖς τε ὢν τὰ ἐν παισὶ νομιζόμενα καλὰ δοκῶ κεκαρπῶσθαι, ἐπεί τε ῆβησα, τὰ ἐν νεανίσκοις, τέλειός τε ἀνὴρ γενόμενος τὰ ἐν ἀνδράσι). Παῖς, however, is otherwise used in 3. 1. 1275 a 14. The words τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας ὅσαι δέονται παιδείας seem to imply that education in the 'best State' will extend over more ἡλικίαι than the two represented by boyhood and the years from puberty to twenty-one (see note on 1336 b 37).
- 5. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα κ.τ.λ. The Lacedaemonians and Cretans are especially referred to (cp. 12 sqq. and c. 2. 1324 b 7 sqq.: see also note on 1337 a 31). Plato had said much the same in Laws 628 C sqq. Are we to infer from the use of καί in 11, καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γραψάντων, that Aristotle regarded the Lacedaemonian and Cretan lawgivers as the authors of written constitutions and laws? Aristotle turns aside to censure the Lacedaemonian training in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. also. The Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics are written in a strongly anti-Laconian spirit. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver is more severely criticized in them than he is in the Second. It is true that the Spartans are said in the Second Book (c. 9. 1271 b 9) to prefer external goods to virtue —a strong thing to say of men who prided themselves on their virtue (4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32)—but this fault is not explicitly traced back to the lawgiver. In the Fourth Book, on the other hand (c. 2. 1324 b 27 sq.), the lawgiver is charged with pursuing an

unlawful end; it is also implied in 1325 a 7 sqq. (cp. c. 14. 1333 b 23) that he was not a good lawgiver (contrast 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18-21). Aristotle's criticisms of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver throughout the Fourth and Fifth Books are, in fact, more in the spirit of those of Isocrates (see e.g. Panath. § 210 sqq.) than of those of Plato.

6. ταύτας = τὰς τούτων. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 40, and see note on 1276 a 14.

7. οὖτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες κ.τ.λ., 'evidently have neither framed their constitutional arrangements with a view to the better end,' etc. Πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος answers to πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη, 1333 a 39, and πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, 8, to πρὸς πάντα, 1333 a 36. The 'better end' is leisure and peace and things noble.

9. τους νόμους και την παιδείαν. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 9.

άλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν κ.τ.λ. We have been told in 1333 a 36 that things noble are to be preferred to things necessary and useful. Compare the very similar sentence in De Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 28, έπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ηὐξήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε, προς δε την χρήσιμον αρετήν και την πολιτικήν απέκλιναν οι φιλοσοφούντες: also Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 3, Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31, διὰ τί μάλιστα την ανδρείαν τιμώσιν αι πόλεις, ου βελτίστην ουσαν των αρετών; ή ὅτι διατελούσιν ή πολεμούντες ή πολεμούμενοι, αύτη δε έν άμφοίν χρησιμωτάτη έστίν τιμώσι δε οὐ τὰ βέλτιστα, άλλὰ τὰ αύτοις βέλτιστα, and Rhet. I. 9. 1366 b 3, ανάγκη δε μεγίστας είναι αρετάς τὰς τοις άλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική. Φορτικῶς, for τὸ ζητείν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ήκιστα άρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς έλευθέροις (5 (8), 3, 1338 b 2). The Spartans valued themselves on their έλευθεριότης — compare the proverb έλευθεριώτερος Σπάρτης (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 246: 2. 393)—and when Aristotle hints here that their lawgiver was φορτικός, and in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 32 sqq. that his famous training made them βάναυσοι, he says as severe a thing as it was possible for him to say. In πλεονεκτικωτέρας Aristotle echoes Plato, Laches 182 E, οίς (i.e. Λακεδαιμονίοις) οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ο τι αν μαθόντες και επιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοίεν των άλλων περί τὸν πόλεμον: cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 188 and Plut. Lycurg. c. 28, έν μέν οθν τούτοις οὐδέν έστιν άδικίας ίχνος οὐδὲ πλεονεξίας, ην έγκαλοῦσιν ένιοι τοις Λυκούργου νόμοις, ως ίκανως έχουσι πρὸς ανδρείαν, ενδεως δὲ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.

- 11. παραπλησίως τούτοις. I do not think that Aristotle means by these words φορτικώς. Cp. Meteor. 1. 6. 342 b 35, παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ οἱ περὶ Ἱπποκράτην τὸν Χίον καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν αὐτοῦ Αἰσχύλον ἀπεφήναντο.
  - 14. å, 'which praises.'
- 16. ὅσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for just in the same spirit in which,' etc. Thibron's grounds of praise are those of οἱ πολλοί, and are therefore sordid and easily overthrown by reasoning. Οἱ πολλοί are athirst for εὐτυχήματα: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 3, ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἢς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν. Ζηλοῦσι, as in Isocr. De Pace, § 83, καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες αὐτοί τε τὴν πόλιν εὐδαιμόνιζον καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν νοῦν οὐκ ἐχόντων ἐμακάριζον αὐτήν, τῶν μὲν συμβήσεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα μελλόντων οὐδεμίαν ποιούμενοι πρόνοιαν, τὸν δὲ πλοῦτον θαυμάζοντες καὶ ζηλοῦντες.
- 18. τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. The term εὐτύχημα is applied to τὰ ἐν ὑπεροχη ἀγαθά, such as high birth, wealth, and political power: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sqq.

ἀγάμενος φαίνεται, 'evidently admires.' There is perhaps a reference to Thibron in Isocr. Panath. § 41, τὴν Σπαρτιατῶν (πόλιν), ἢν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ μετρίως ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἔνιοι δέ τινες ὥσπερ τῶν ἡμιθέων ἐκεῖ πεπολιτευμένων μέμνηνται περὶ αὐτῶν. As to the other writers on the Lacedaemonian Constitution, see above on 1269 a 29.

- 20. ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'because it was owing to their having been trained to meet dangers that they ruled over many,' and thus they owed their empire to their lawgiver. Γυμνάζεσθαι is not used exclusively of gymnastic training (cp. for instance 2. 12. 1274 a 26), but the gymnastic training enforced by the Lacedaemonian lawgiver (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 27 sqq.) is probably here referred to, for it was supposed at Sparta to produce courage (1338 b 12 sqq.). The notion that γυμνάσια lead to ἄλλων ἀρχαί occurs also in Plato, Protag. 354 A–B (cp. 342 B–C).
- 23. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The sense is—besides it is not merely that they have lost noble living, but that they have lost it, notwith-standing that (as they claim) they have faithfully observed the laws given them by their lawgiver and there has been nothing to hinder them from doing so; this is indeed strange. Aristotle hints that either the fault must rest with the lawgiver or the Spartans had not really observed his laws. Γελοΐον has much the same meaning here as ἄτοπον (cp. Phys. 7. 3. 246 a 25. ἔτι καὶ ἄλλως ἄτοπον. τὸ γὰρ λέγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡλλοιῶσθαι ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν λαβοῦσαν

τέλος γελοῦον κ.τ.λ.). An oracle given to Lycurgus, according to Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 57 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 390: cp. Diod. 7. 14. 7), ώς εὐδαίμων ἡ πόλις ἔσοιτο εἰ τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοις ἐμμένοι, is probably present to Aristotle's memory. In Isocr. Archid. § 61 the Lacedae-monian King Archidamus claims that the Spartans had abided by the laws which had been given them; there were, however, two views on this subject (see Isocr. De Pace, § 102 and above on 1270 a 19). There may be an allusion in μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις to the fact that the observance of Solon's laws at Athens had been interrupted by the Tyranny ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 22). Μηδενός is neuter, as in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 23, μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός. For ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 6, ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς νότερον πράξεις. For μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 7, ὥστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς τούτων δόγμασιν.

- 26. οὖκ ὀρθῶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Even if these eulogists of the Lacedae-monian lawgiver were right in praising him for making rule over other States his end, the kind of rule—despotic rule—which they praise him for honouring is not the kind of rule which a lawgiver should be seen to honour. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sqq., and for τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι, Plato, Laws 962 A, εἴ τις τὸν σκοπόν, οἶ βλέπειν δεῖ τὸν πολιτικόν, φαίνοιτο ἀγνοῶν κ.τ.λ.
  - 27. τοῦ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1325 a 24 sqq.
- 29. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Further, they praise the lawgiver not only for what brings no permanent happiness, but also for what is positively harmful.
- 30. κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν, 'trained the citizens to conquer with a view to ruling over others.' I have not met with an instance of ἀσκεῖν used with an acc. of the person and an infinitive, unless we except the passage of Photius quoted below on 1337 a 1, but Plutarch has in De Defect. Orac. c. 21 γλώσσαις δὲ πολλαῖς ἤσκητο χρῆσθαι, and in Pyrrh. c. 24, ἄνδρας ἢσκημένους μάχεσθαι. Conquering is the first step to ruling over others: cp. c. 2. 1324 b 27 sq., and 1324 b 7 sqq., and also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 2, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εἰδότας οὐδὲ μελετῶντας ἢ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν πολεμίων.
- 32. δήλον γὰρ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. A shrewd remark and one which, so far as I know, Aristotle was the first to make. There is much in the history of ancient Rome and modern France to illustrate and confirm it. Τῷ δυναμένω, like τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν in c. 3. 1325 a 37.
  - 34. ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσι κ.τ.λ., 'yet this is just what the Laconians

charge Pausanias their king with doing, notwithstanding that he was already the holder of so great an office.' The Lacedaemonians praise their lawgiver for teaching the State to do to other States the very thing which they censure Pausanias for trying to do to his fellow-citizens. Aristotle has usually been taken to refer here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20, καὶ Παυσανίαν τὸν βασιλέα (SC. φασί τινες ἐπιχειρήσαι καταλύσαι) την έφορείαν, to the victor of Plataea, whom he, however, describes in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq. as δ στρατηγήσας κατά τον Μηδικον πόλεμον. This Pausanias was not really king, but only guardian of King Pleistarchus, who was a minor (cp. Hdt. 9. 10 and Thuc. 1. 132, referred to by Eaton), but he is 'often loosely called king in the later writers, e.g. in [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 97: Duris, Fragm. 31 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 477), ap. Athen. Deipn. 535 e: Justin 9. 1' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch. 2. 380. 4, ed. 1), and Aristotle may be guilty of a similar looseness here. In the second edition, however, of his Griechische Geschichte (1. 513 and note 3, and 3. 1. 98. 1) Busolt, following E. Meyer, takes the reference here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20 to be to the king Pausanias who was an opponent of Lysander. This Pausanias was really king, and might well be contrasted as such with δ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον, but see on the other side of the question Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 22. 2. Was the opponent of Lysander quite the man to entertain the hardy design of abolishing the ephorate and making himself master of the State?

35. πολιτικός. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sq.

36.  $\lambda \dot{6} \gamma \omega \nu$ , i. e. praises of the lawgiver for his training his citizens to conquer with a view to empire.

37. ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῆ. Cp. c. 15. 1334 a 11 sq. and c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. The 'best things' to which Aristotle refers appear to be temperance, justice, and wisdom in contradistinction to a capacity to conquer one's neighbours.

38. τήν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν κ.τ.λ. See as to this account of the true aim of war, vol. i. p. 327 sq. Aristotle evidently has before him Isocr. Panath. § 219, οἶμαι γὰρ ἄπαντας ἄν ὁμολογῆσαι κακίστους ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ μεγίστης ζημίας ἀξίους, ὅσοι τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς εὐρημένοις ἐπ' ἀφελεία, τούτοις ἐπὶ βλάβη χρώμενοι τυγχάνουσι, μὴ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς εἶς τὴν αὐτῶν χώραν εἶσβάλλοντας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς οἶκειστάτους καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συγγενείας μετέχοντας ἄπερ ἐποίουν Σπαρτιᾶται.

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- 40. <sup>7</sup>να is here followed by ὅπως. See Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 18 sqq., who gives a long list of passages in Aristotele's writings in which the same thing occurs, among them Pol. 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq., 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 6-17, and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq. Kaissling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 32) compares 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 7 sqq.
- 1334 a. 1. πάντων δεσποτείας, 'despotic rule over all.' Πάντων is an objective genitive: cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 21, προωδοποίηται γὰρ ἔκαστος πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθους, where ἐκάστου = πρὸς ἔκαστον (Bon. Ind. 149 b 10).
  - 2. τρίτον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply ὅπως ζητῶσι.
  - 5. τάξη. See above on 1260 a 36.
  - 6. αί γὰρ πλεῖσται κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 3 sqq.

τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων, i.e. τῶν πολεμικῶν πόλεων, States that make war their end.

8. την γάρ βαφην ἀφιασιν κ.τ.λ. Compare for the metaphor Plato, Rep. 430 A. Ba\(\phi\_{\eta}\) here means the temper which is produced by dipping, rather than the dipping itself. In Plut. De Vitioso Pudore, c. 4. 530 E, we have ώσπερ βαφήν την φυλάττουσαν ἀπιστίαν μαλαχθείσαν αἰσχύνη προέμενος. Aristotle evidently thought (cp. 25 sqq.), with Isocrates (De Pace, § 95 sqq.), that when the Peloponnesian War came to an end and the Lacedaemonians found themselves at the head of an empire, they lost much of the justice and temperance which war had enforced on them and became δβρισταί (28) and ανδραποδώδεις (39). Compare Isocr. De Pace, § 96, αντί γαρ των καθεστώτων παρ' αὐτοῖς (i.e. τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις) ἐπιτηδευμάτων τοὺς μὲν ίδιώτας ενέπλησεν (ή άρχη της θαλάττης) άδικίας, ραθυμίας, ανομίας, φιλαργυρίας, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροψίας μὲν τῶν συμμάχων, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὀλιγωρίας δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν. Isocrates dwells on their insolent treatment of the Chians (§ 98) and of the islands generally (§ 99). He ascribes this change in them to their possession of maritime empire, which had already demoralized Athens, whereas Aristotle ascribes it to defective education and to the effect of leisure. The Lacedaemonian training was a training only for war; it did not impart justice and temperance, still less did it impart intellectual virtue. If this had been otherwise, the Lacedaemonians would have spent their leisure in pursuits which would have prevented the loss of 'temper' to which Aristotle refers. So Plato (Rep. 549 B) says of them that they lacked the

'saviour of virtue'—λόγου μουσική κεκραμένου, δε μόνος έγγενόμενος σωτήρ ἀρετής διὰ βίου ένοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι. Compare what Ephorus says of the Thebans in Fragm. 67 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 254). See above on 1271 b 4.

11. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. and c. 14. 1333 b 37. C. 15. The end is  $\sigma \chi o \lambda \dot{\eta}$ , as is explained in 14 sqq.

12. ὅρον, 'distinctive aim' (= τέλος, 11): cp. c. 2. 1324 b 3 sqq.

14. τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετάς. Cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, τὰ εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα, and c. 13. 1331 b 38, τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις.

ὑπάρχειν, sc.  $\tau \hat{\eta}$  πόλει: cp. 34 sqq. and contrast c. 14. 1334 a 9 sq. That the best man will possess the capacity of using leisure aright, we have seen in c. 14. 1333 a 41 sqq.

15. πολλάκις, e. g. in c. 14. 1333 a 35.

16. τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγήν. Cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 10, τὴν ἐν τŷ διαγωγŷ σχολήν, and 21, τὴν ἐν τŷ σχολŷ διαγωγήν. Διαγωγή is the use of leisure in occupations desirable for their own sake—such occupations as have been described above on 1333 a 35. See as to its nature, Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 735. 5 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 266. 5), and Sus.², Note 921 (Sus.⁴, 1. p. 542). It is closely related to the end of human life (5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29-31), and therefore to happiness (1339 b 17-19), and hence, like happiness, it combines in itself both the pleasurable and the noble.

19. διὸ σώφρονα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 1. 1323 a 40, κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις. Σωφροσύνη is a security for the possession of an abundance of necessaries, because it excludes the spendthrift habits of life which are a common concomitant of its opposite: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 7, διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν ἀσώτων) εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. It is implied that courage and other military virtues are productive of wealth in c. 14. 1333 b 10, 16 sqq.: cp. also Xen. Symp. 4. 13, τὸν μὲν ἰσχυρὸν πονοῦντα δεῖ κτᾶσθαι τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον κινδυνεύοντα, τὸν δέ γε σοφὸν λέγοντα. That they are preservative of wealth is obvious.

20. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις. See Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 765, where a remark of Erasmus is quoted, 'dicitur in eos quibus propter obnoxiam ministeriis sordidioribus conditionem non vacat honestis disciplinis operam dare.'

The proverb seems to be remembered by Euripides in a fragment of the Antiope (Fr. 215),

οὐ χρή ποτ' ἄνδρα δοῦλον ὅντ' ἐλευθέρας γνώμας διώκειν οὐδ' ἐς ἀργίαν βλέπειν,

and probably by Plutarch in Solon, c. 22, είλωτικοῦ πλήθους, ὁ βέλτιον ἢν μὴ σχολάζειν, ἀλλὰ τριβόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ πονοῦν ταπεινοῦσθαι (see note on 1313 b 18). So we read in Plut. Cato Censor, c. 21, of Cato's slaves, ἔδει δὲ ἢ πράττειν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων οἴκοι τὸν δοῦλον ἢ καθεύδειν. Compare also the saying ascribed to Socrates, ἡ ᾿Αργία ἀδελφὴ τῆς Ἑλευθερίας ἐστί (Aelian, Var. Hist. 10. 14).

21. οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6-10, and Isocr. Archid. § 7.

- 23. φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, 'and of intellectual virtue for leisure.' Bonitz (Ind. 821 a 6) rightly explains φιλοσοφία here as = 'virtus intellectualis.' See above on 1263 b 40. In 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 26 we find φρόνησιε used in the sense of 'intellectual virtue' (see Sus.², Note 1023: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 585). We do not learn in the Fifth Book how Aristotle proposes to develope intellectual virtue by his education; yet he keeps its development in view even in his arrangements respecting musical training; thus one reason why he rejects the study of pipe-playing is because it is οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν (5 (8). 6. 1341 b 6).
- 24. σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 5, διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν' ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνη χρήσιμος ἄλλοις. Aristotle hopes to develope temperance by means of the musical element in his education (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.) and possibly justice also (cp. τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν, 1340 a 21). Something, however, would have been done for the promotion of temperance even in childhood by careful attention to children's pastimes and to the tales told them, and by the prohibition of objectionable language in their presence, etc.
- 25. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος κ.τ.λ., 'for war obliges men to be just and temperate,' so that in time of war men act justly and temperately, whether they have these virtues or not. 'Αναγκάζει is emphatic. Compare for the expression Eurip. Fragm. 528, τὸ φῶς δ' ἀνάγκην προστίθησι σωφρονεῖν, and for the thought Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 14, δοκεῖ δέ μοι, ὧ Κῦρε, χαλεπώτερον εἶναι εὐρεῖν ἄνδρα τὰγαθὰ καλῶς φέροντα ἢ τὰ κακά τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὕβριν τοῖς πολλοῖς, τὰ δὲ σωφροσύνην τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐμποιεῖ.
  - 26. ή δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις κ.τ.λ. For the phrase, compare

Diod. 14. 80. 2, εἰς τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν εἰρήνη τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσιν, and for the thought, Eth. Nic: 4. 8. 1124 a 29, ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ (i.e. τὰ εὐτυχήματα) γίγνονται: Thuc. 8. 24. 4, Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὰ ἢσθόμην εὐδαιμονήσαντες ᾶμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν: and the proverb Κολοφωνία ὕβρις, ἐπὶ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ὑβριστῶν, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ Κολοφώνιοι (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 266). See also Justin 8. 1. 4. It would be easy to multiply instances of this familiar saying. For τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης, cp. Plato, Theaet. 172 D, τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνη ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται. For μᾶλλον, see note on 1270 b 33.

28. πολλης οὖν κ.τ.λ. Schn. 'insolentiam structurae annotavit cum Camerario [Interp. p. 319] Victorius; poetarum Atticorum exempla posuit Porson ad Euripidis Orestem versu 659, prosaicorum scriptorum locum praeter hunc adhuc alium similem nondum reperi.' See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 409. 4. Anm. 5, where Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 86, αὐτὸν γὰρ σὲ δεῖ προμηθέως, is referred to among other passages from the poets. It is possible that μετέχειν has dropped out (cp. 35).

30. πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας. Cp. c. 1. 1323 a 25 sqq. and Plato, Laws 631 B. The possession of all possible goods was held to make men insolent and overbearing (Rhet. 2. 16. 1390 b 32 sqq.). Ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς was a familiar Greek expression: cp. Bergk, Fragm. Adesp. Lyr. 18,

ἀνθεῦσαν ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσιν οἶς θάλλει πόλις,

and see Leutsch and Schneidewin's note on Gregor. Cypr. 1. 36 (Paroem. Gr. 2. 58). It is parodied in Aristoph. Acharn. 1025 Didot,

καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι νη Δί' ὅπερ μ' ἐτρεφέτην ἐν πᾶσι βολίτοις,

and Vesp. 709 Didot,

δύο μυριάδες των δημοτικών έζων έν πασι λαγώροις.

points out (Interp. p. 319), speaks of the Elysian plain; it is from Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 170 sqq., that we first hear of the Islands of the Blest. See Liddell and Scott s.v. μάκαρ. Hesiod describes how some favoured heroes of the fourth race did not die like their fellows, but were removed by Zeus far from the haunts of men to the Islands of the Blest in the deep-eddying Ocean. Even in the later Iron Age there were those whose lot was thought to be the same—e.g. Harmodius (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. Scol. 10) and those

who were initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries (Diog. Laert. 6. 39). Some found the μακάρων νῆσοι in Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Cos, and Rhodes, the realm of Macareus (Diod. 5. 82), but they were more commonly believed to lie in the Atlantic Ocean at some distance from the West Coast of Libya (Plut. Sertor. c. 8: cp. Hor. Epod. 16. 41 sqq.).

- 32. φιλοσοφίας is introduced at some cost of trimness, but this is Aristotle's way: see note on 1323 b 35.
- 34. μèν οὖν has no δέ to answer to it, as the text stands. Perhaps it was taken up by another μèν οὖν in the lacuna which, as we shall see, probably exists in 1334 b 4, both being then answered by πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, 5.
  - 35. τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν, i.e. φιλοσοφία σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη.
- 36. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος κ.τ.λ., 'for [if they have them not, they will not be able to use good things in leisure-time, and] while it is disgraceful,' etc. Leisure is the crown of life, and ἡ ἐν τῆ σχολῆ διαγωγή is the διαγωγὴ τῶν ἐλευθέρων (5 (8). 3. 1338 a 21 sqq.), hence it is especially desirable to be able to make a right use of good things in leisure-time. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1105 a 9, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτφ.
- 38. Observe the chiasmus in ἀσχολοῦντας καὶ πολεμοῦντας and εἰρήνην ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας.
- 40. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 2, πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικήν αὖτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. Contrast the language of Xenophon in Rep. Lac. 10. 4, τόδε γε μὴν τοῦ Λυκούργου πῶς οὐ μεγάλως ἄξιον ἀγασθῆναι; ὃς . . . ἐν τῆ Σπάρτη ἠνάγκασε δημοσία πάντας πάσας ἀσκεῖν τὰς ἀρετάς . . . ἐπέθηκε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόστατον ἀνάγκην ἀσκεῖν ἄπασαν πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν.
- 41. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—for they do not differ from other men in their views with regard to the question what are the greatest goods: the common herd think that external goods are the greatest of goods (Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 17, τούτων γάρ—i.e. χρημάτων καὶ τιμῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τῶν σωματικῶν—οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν), and so do the Lacedaemonians (Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 6 sqq.); it is only in this that they differ from the mass of men, that they hold these goods to be won by means of one of the virtues (courage or military virtue). So far we see our way clearly, but there is little

doubt that the sentence which follows, commencing with  $\epsilon \pi \epsilon i \delta \epsilon$ , has reached us in an imperfect state, and that several words have dropped out after τῶν ἀρετῶν, 1334 b 4—how many, it is impossible to say. The lost words may well have ended with the word ἀρετήν, and the omission of them may well have been due to the resemblance of ἀρετήν to ἀρετῶν, 1334 b 4. Many attempts have been made to fill the lacuna (see Sus.3 on the passage), but with indifferent success. If I were to hazard a suggestion, it would be to insert after ἀρετῶν the words νομίζουσι, την πρός ταθτα χρησίμην είναι δοκοθσαν άρετην άσκουσι μόνον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὅλην ἀσκητέον τὴν ἀρετήν. It seems likely at any rate that this filling-up more or less represents the sense of the words which have fallen out. Compare with the passage before us 2. 9. 1271 a 41-b 10. Camerarius (Interp. p. 320) was the first to suggest 'locum mendis non carere.' For οὐ ταύτη διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, cp. Poet. 5. 1449 b 10 sqq. (already compared by Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 327), and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20, άλλ' εἰμὶ ἄπληστος κάγὼ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι χρημάτων τῆδέ γε μέντοι διαφέρειν μοι δοκώ τών πλείστων ότι κ.τ.λ. For ταύτη referring to what follows Bonitz (Ind. 546 b 11) compares Poet. 23. 1459 a 30 sqq. 'Αλλά τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα (1334 b 2) = ἀλλά τῷ νομίζειν γενέσθαι ταῦτα, as Vict. points out. Possibly γίνεσθαι should be read (with Schn. Bekk.<sup>2</sup> and Sus.) in place of γενέσθαι: cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 7, where we have γίνεσθαι. Ταῦτα, 1334 b 2, 3 = τάγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα. For the thought, cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 8.

- 4. καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν. Aristotle does not mean that virtue is not 1334 b. to be practised for the sake of the happiness resulting from it; what he objects to is the practice of virtue for the sake of τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά.
- 5. πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται κ.τ.λ. For πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ δι ἄλλων, 3. 18. 1288 a 39, and Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 22, and for πῶς ἔσται, Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 34, πῶς οὖν ταῦτ ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δεῖ σκέψασθαι τὸν νομοθέτην. The answer to διὰ τίνων is διὰ φύσεως ἔθους λόγου: cp. c. 13. 1332 a 38 sqq. Τοῦτο δή, as in c. 14. 1332 b 13.
- 6. τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον κ.τ.λ. Δή here, as often elsewhere (see note on 1252 a 24), introduces an investigation. Διηρημένοι is middle and used in the sense of διορίζειν (cp. 3. 14. 1284 b 41, διελέσθαι). Πρότερον, in c. 13. 1332 a 38 sqq.
- 7. τούτων, 'of these things,' a partitive genitive: cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν.

8. πρότερον, in c. 7.

9. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. explains why this question must be considered: we must ask whether training through habit should precede training through reason, because these two kinds of training must be so harmonized with each other as to be adjusted to the best end, and we shall be better able to adjust them to the best end when this question has been answered. Aristotle has already said (c. 13. 1332 b 5) that nature, habit, and reason must harmonize with each other; he now adds that they must be so harmonized as to be adjusted to the best end. He follows in the track of Plato, Laws 653 B and 659 D. At Sparta this best kind of harmony had been missed, for in the Lacedaemonian training nature and habit had not been brought into harmony with reason, nor had reason been adjusted to the best end.

11. καί, 'both.'

12. καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίων ἦχθαι, sc. τοὺς παιδευομένους. In Eth. Nic. 1. 2. 1095 b 4 we have τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς. For ὁμοίων (i.e. ὁμοίων τῷ λόγῳ), cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 26, πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιοῦτο τὸν οὰν τὰς Είνοις τοῖς ἀνδράσι παραπλησίας εἴη ξυναρμοστέον, and Rep. 472 C, δς ἄν ἐκείνοις ὅ τι ὁμοιότατος ἦ, τὴν ἐκείνοις μοῦραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἔξειν.

φανερὸν δη κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is about to decide that training through habit must precede training through reason, but that training through habit must be adjusted to and pursued for the sake of reason, which is the end, and he proves the second proposition first (in 12-17) and then the first (in 17-25). late—'this then at any rate is evident, first that as in all other things, [so in the case of the human being,] generation starts from a beginning, and that the end of some beginnings is related to another end, and that reason and thought are the end of man's natural development, so that [reason and thought are the end of generation, and] it is with a view to these ends that we should order generation and our training in custom.' I follow Sepulveda, Vict., Lamb., Stahr, and Welldon in my rendering of ωs ή γένεσις απ' αρχης εστί. Sus.2 (cp. Sus.4, 1. p. 545) translates 'dass die Erzeugung und Geburt den Anfang macht (für den man zu sorgen hat)'-i.e. 'that generation and birth are the beginning (for which we have to care)'-comparing c. 16. 1334 b 29, but the next sentence, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχης ἄλλου τέλους, suggests that ἀπ' ἀρχης ἐστί means 'start from a beginning.' It has not, I think, been noticed that Aristotle has before him Plato, Phaedr. 245 D, έξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πῶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἐξ ένός εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ αν έξ ἀρχης γίγνοιτο, which supports the interpretation adopted by me. With Sepulveda (p. 237 b) I take the 'beginning' from which generation 'starts' to be the union of the parents: cp. Plato, Laws 720 Ε, Αθ.... ἄρ' οὐ κατά φύσιν την περί γενέσεως άρχην πρώτην πόλεων πέρι κατακοσμήσει ταις τάξεσι; ΚΛ. τί μήν; ΑΘ. ἀρχὴ δ' έστὶ τῶν γενέσεων πάσαις πόλεσιν άρ' ούχ ή των γάμων σύμμιξις και κοινωνία; and c. 16. 1334 b 29-31, where it is implied that ή σύζευξις is the ἀρχή της γενέσεως. Compare with the passage before us those quoted in vol. i. p. 348, note 2, and Metaph. O. 8. 1050 a 7 sqq. Aristotle's aim is that in all arrangements connected with the generation of his future citizens and with the training of habit given them the ultimate development of reason and thought shall be kept in view, and we find that he bears this in mind later on (see above on 1334a 23, and cp. c. 16. 1335 b 16 sqq., 29 sqq., and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 24 sq., b 6 sqq.). We expect τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπό τινος ἀρχης in place of τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχης, but cp. c. 16. 1334 b 41, ή χάρις παρά των τέκνων, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 35, τας κρίσεις έκ των δικαστηρίων. See also below on 1336 a 41 and cp. Plato, Laws 715 Α, τά τε πράγματα κατά την πόλιν ούτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφόδρα κ.τ.λ. For άλλου τέλους, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 19, έν χρόνω γάρ πασα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός.

19. καὶ τὰς ἔξεις τὰς τούτων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 6, where the soul is said to consist ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως, and De An. 3. 10. 433 a 9, φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἡ ὅρεξις ἡ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα. That ὅρεξις belongs to the irrational part of the soul and νοῦς to the rational, is implied in 1. 5. 1254 b 5–9, but we are not told elsewhere, so far as I am aware, that ὅρεξις is the ἔξις of the one part of the soul and νοῦς of the other. For the meaning of ἔξεις, cp. Metaph. Δ. 20. 1022 b 10, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἔξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ' ἡν ἡ εὖ ἡ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἡ καθ' αὐτὸ ἡ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἶον ἡ ὑγίεια ἔξις τις διάθεσις γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτη, and see note on 1254 a 39, where an ἔξις has been said to be a more permanent state than a διάθεσις. Thus ὅρεξις is a διάθεσις τοῦ ἀλόγον μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἡν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος ἡ εὖ ἡ κακῶς διάκειται, and νοῦς stands in a similar relation to τὸ λόγον ἔχον. ΤΟρεξις is explained in 22 by θυμός, βούλησις, and ἐπιθυμία, for ὅρεξις is made up of these three things (De

An. 2. 3. 414 b 2, ὅρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, and Eth. Eud. 2. 7. 1223 a 26, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὅρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρείται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν). As Eaton points out, however, 'Aristotle's language is not uniform,' for he connects βούλησις, not with the irrational, but with the rational part of the soul in De An. 3. 9. 432 b 5, ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός. As to the nature of βούλησις, see Eth. Nic. 3. 4. 1111 b 19 sqq. Aristotle evidently regards infants as having wishes which are not ἐπιθυμίαι, and yet which belong wholly to the irrational part of the soul. One difference between ἐπιθυμία and βούλησις is that the former is always felt in relation to that which is possible, and that this is not always the case with the latter (1111 b 22).

22. θυμὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle, as Eaton has already pointed out, follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 441 A, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γ' ἄν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστά ἐστι, λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. Cp. also Rep. 402 A: Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 8 sq.: Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 22: and the fragment of Philemon quoted above on 1332 b 10. Aristotle may perhaps regard θυμός, βούλησις, and ἐπιθυμία as closely connected with the body: cp. Virg. Aen. 6. 730 sqq.

23. καὶ γενομένοις εὐθύς, 'even immediately after they are born': cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 27, καὶ τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς ἀκολουθεῖ γενομένοις, τὰ δὲ προϊούσης τῆς ἡλικίας γίνεται δῆλα καὶ γηρασκόντων: Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 9, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὖτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν: and Meteor. 3. 1. 371 a 6, εὐθὺς γιγνομένην.

24. ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. The expression comes to Aristotle from Plato, Rep. 586 C, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ (cp. 431 C and 524 B, and Laws 897 C). These are the faculties that control ὅρεξις (Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 b 22 sqq.) and bring it within bounds. They are absent in other animals than man (De An. 3. 10. 433 a 11 sq.), and the child has them in an imperfect form (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 13). At what age they develope we are not told. According to Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 22 sqq. νοῦς increases in men as they grow older, and reaches its highest development in old age (ἐπὶ γήρως). Some further light is thrown on the subject by Plato, Symp. 181 D, οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παίδων, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν ἥδη ἄρχωνται νοῦν ἴσχειν' τοῦτο δὲ πλησιάζει τῷ γενειάσκειν. Compare with what Aristotle says here

Polyb. 3. 20. 4, εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ τύχη καὶ τοῦτο προσένειμε 'Ρωμαίοις, τὸ φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθέως ἐκ γενετῆς.

προϊοῦσιν. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De Part. An. 4. 10. 686 b 11, προϊοῦσι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀνθρώποις αὔξεται τὰ κάτωθεν.

25. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. Πρῶτον μέν is answered by ἔπειτα. With ἔπειτα τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως we must apparently supply εἶναι or some such word. See note on 1279 b 7.

27. ἔνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως. The ὄρεξις should be so trained as to obey νοῦς (1. 5. 1254 b 5: see note on 1333 a 21, and cp. Plato, Laws 653 B, 659 D).

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς. Cp. Plato, Rep. 591 C, ἔπειτα δ', εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τῷ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγφ ἡδονῷ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιὴς ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῷ ψυχῷ ἔνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἀρμοττόμενος [φανεῖται]. As to the omission of ἔνεκα with τῆς ψυχῆς Eucken remarks (Praepositionen, p. 20), 'if ἔνεκα belongs to two notions, it is usually expressed only with the first, and must be supplied with the second.'

29 sqq. Cp. Plato, Laws 721 A. But Aristotle is less guided C. 16. by Plato in this chapter than he is in the seventeenth. He raises questions here which Plato had not raised and solves those which Plato had already raised in a different way. Plato had not inquired ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρη ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους την γαμικήν ὁμιλίαν, nor had he discussed the proper season of the year for marriage or the other questions raised in 1335 a 39 sqq. 'Απ' ἀρχης is evidently equivalent to ἀπὸ της συζεύξεως.

30. τῶν τρεφομένων, 'of the children in process of rearing,' for not all that are born are to be reared. So Sepulv., whom Vict. follows.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'attention must first be given to the coupling of man and wife in marriage, [and the question must be considered] when '—i. e. at what age—'and in what condition [of body and mind] they should enter upon matrimonial intercourse with each other.' Critias, following no doubt Lacedaemonian traditions, had already said the same thing (see vol. i. p. 350, note 1). On the other hand, 'Chrysippus is reproached by Posidonius (Galen, Hipp. et Plat. 5. 1) for neglecting the first germs of education in his treatise on the subject, particularly those previous to birth' (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 303, note 2). In

relation to animals other than man nature herself had fixed the age and season of the year at which intercourse was to take place (Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, ωραι δέ καὶ ήλικίαι της όχείας έκάστοις εἰσὶν ώρισμέναι τῶν ζώων), and Aristotle follows in her track. Indeed. Greek custom seems to have prescribed a certain season of the year for marriage (c. 16. 1335 a 36 sqq.), and particular Greek States seem often to have had an age of their own for its celebration (c. 16, 1335 a 15 sqq.). Another point is recognized in 1335 b 26 sqq. as needing consideration, πόσον χρόνον λειτουργείν άρμόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν. It is not likely that regulations on this subject existed in any Greek State. Πρῶτον μέν has nothing strictly answering to it, but it is in effect taken up by c. 17. 1336 a 3, γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ. Ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, as in Plato, Laws 932 B, των περί γάμους γυναικών ἐπιμελουμένων. The question πότε κ.τ.λ. is considered in 1334 b 32-1335 a 35, and the question ποίους τινας όντας κ.τ.λ. is considered, so far as relates to the body, in 1335 b 2-12.

32. δεί δ' ἀποβλέποντα κ.τ.λ., 'and the lawgiver in instituting this union should look both to the persons united [as distinguished from the children to be born and to the [whole] time for which they will live Inot merely to the time at which the union takes place, in order that they may arrive simultaneously in respect of age at the same epoch' (i. e. the epoch at which each of the two loses the power to have children: cp. 1335 a 7, τέλος της γεννήσεως, and for συγκαταβαίνωσι 1335 a 10 sq., 31). If the lawgiver looked merely to the time at which the union takes place, and did not look forward to the time at which the power to have children is lost by husband and wife respectively, he might very well be led to arrange that husband and wife should both be of the same age and young, but to do this would be an error, and the right course for him is to keep in view the whole course of the lives of the wedded pair and to arrange that the husband shall be twenty years or so older than his wife. For του του ζην χρόνον, cp. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 17. 1098 E,

οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μέτρον ὁ τοῦ βίου χρόνος,

·ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐπιδραττόμενον τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ἐξαμιλλᾶται κ.τ.λ.: Euphron, Δίδυμοι Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 490),

ω Ζεῦ, τί ποθ' ἡμῖν δοὺς χρόνον τοῦ ζῆν βραχὺν πλέκειν ἀλύπως τοῦτον ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἐᾶς;

Philemon, "Εφηβος Fragm. 1 (Meineke 4.10),

οὐκ εἰς ἡμέραν χειμάζομαι μίαν γάρ, εἰς τὸ ζῆν δ' ὅλον:

and Dittenberger, Syll. Inser. Gr. No. 444, Πιτύλος Ποσειδίππου τὸν τδιον θρεπτὸν Λυκολέοντα ἀφῆκεν ἐλεύθερον παραμείναντα αὐτῷ τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς χρόνον. Camerarius (Interp. p. 323) rightly translates τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον 'vitae ipsius spacium.' Susemihl's rendering of the sentence, which Mr. Welldon follows, translating 'he should have in view not only the persons themselves who are to marry but their time of life,' needs the support of parallel instances of this use of τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον. Aristotle follows in the track of Euripides (Fragm. 24: cp. Fragm. 906, and contrast Fragm. 319, quoted below on 1335 a 1),

κακὸν γυναῖκα πρὸς νέαν ζεῦξαι νέον, μακρὰ γὰρ ἰσχὺς μᾶλλον ἀρσένων μένει, θήλεια δ' ήβη θᾶσσον ἐκλείπει δέμας.

For νομοθετείν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν, cp. 2. 8. 1267 b 39, ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τὸ κύριον. That ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν refers to τὴν σύζευξιν, we see from 1335 a 35 sqq. The union of man and wife is called a σύζευξις in 1. 3. 1253 b 9 sq. and a κοινωνία in 1. 2. 1252 b 9 sq.

37. καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, εἶτα λανθάνουσιν ἔνδον ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις στάσεις καὶ διαφορὰς αὐτοῖς ἐγκαταλείποντες, and Plut. Amat. c. 2, ἐκ τῆς γενομένης τοῖς γονεῦσιν αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ στάσεως. A 'difference' is less serious and less long-continued than a 'state of discord,' though it may often end in the production of discord: cp. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 37, καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν ὕστερον.

39. των τέκνων includes female as well as male children.

40. τῶν πατέρων might well mean here, as often elsewhere, 'the parents,' but it would seem to mean 'the fathers,' if we compare 1335 a 32-35, for there the father alone must be referred to, inasmuch as he alone would be seventy years of age at the time when the children are approaching their acmê.

ἀνόνητος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for elderly fathers get no good from children's return of service, nor do the children from the assistance given by fathers.' If a man marries (say) at fifty-five, he will probably be in his grave before he gets much assistance from his

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children or is able to start them in life. See also vol. i. p. 184, note 2. For ή χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, not ἡ χάρις ἡ παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, see above on 1334 b 12.

1335 a. 1. οὖτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι. Euripides puts very different advice into the mouth of one of his characters (Fragm. 319),

καὶ νῦν παραινῶ πᾶσι τοῖς νεωτέροις μὴ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τοὺς γάμους ποιουμένοις σχολῆ τεκνοῦσθαι παῖδας οὐ γὰρ ἡδονή, γυναικί τ' ἐχθρὸν χρῆμα πρεσβύτης ἀνήρ ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκτροφαὶ καλαὶ καὶ συννεάζων ἡδὺ παῖς νέω πατρί.

On the un-Attic word πάρεγγυς see Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 120.

- 2. ἥ τε γὰρ αἰδὼς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 5. 5, καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἥλικες ἀλλήλοις σύνεισι, μεθ' ὧνπερ καὶ ἐλαχίστη αἰδὼς παραγίγνεται. Τοῖς τοιούτοις, sc. τέκνοις, 'children of the kind we have just described,' i.e. near in age to their parents. "Ωσπερ ἡλικιώταις, 'as it does also to those of the same age': cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, and 2. 10. 1272 a 41, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις.
- 3. καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 5, φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἶς φθονοῦσιν ἄμα γὰρ εἴρηται τοῖς γὰρ εγγὺς καὶ χρόνω καὶ τόπω καὶ ἡλικία καὶ δόξη φθονοῦσιν ὅθεν εἴρηται "τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται" (Aeschyl. Fragm. 298).
- 4. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. We are apparently intended to supply δεί νομοθετείν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν before ὅπως κ.τ.λ. Θθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο μετέβημεν, cp. 1334 b 29 sqq. Τῶν γεννωμένων, 'of the offspring in process of generation,' whether born or unborn, for τὸ γεννώμενον in De Gen. An. 1. 2. 716 a 22 refers to the latter and τοῖς γεννωμένοις in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 13 to the former. After birth, however, τὰ γιγνόμενα is the usual designation, as in 1335 b 20, 22, and c. 17. 1336 a 16, and τὰ τέκνα is used of a still later stage (1334 b 39). 'Υπάρχη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν, 'be such as to answer to the wish of the lawgiver.' For πρός with the acc. in this sense, cp. Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 16, ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος (νόμος) ἢ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 642 a 40–54: also Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 139, ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται δεῖν τοῖς πάλαι κειμένοις χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ τὰ πάτρια περιστέλλειν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰς βουλήσεις μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς διαδύσεις τῶν ἀδικημάτων νομοθετεῖσθαι.

- 6. σχεδον δη κ.τ.λ., 'now all these things come about in connexion with one arrangement,' or 'one mode of dealing with the subject'-the arrangement being to place the commencement of wedlock at such ages in the case of husband and wife respectively as will enable it to close, so far as the production of children is concerned, at the age of seventy in the case of the husband and fifty in that of the wife, so that at no period of the cohabitation will the power of procreation be wanting to either party. deserves notice that Aristotle himself was about forty years of age when he married the niece and adopted daughter of Hermias (see vol. i. p. 466). That this union was a happy one may be inferred from the direction in Aristotle's will that his wife's bones should be, in accordance with her request, disinterred and buried with his own (Diog. Laert. 5. 16). Πάντα ταῦτα, i.e. τὸ μὴ διαφωνείν τὰς δυνάμεις, τὸ μήτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταις ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων μήτε λίαν πάρεγγυς είναι, and τὸ τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχειν πρός την τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. For συμβαίνειν κατά μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν, cp. Meteor. 1. 1. 338 b 20, δσα συμβαίνει κατά φύσιν, and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 8, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὼ ἄνδρε καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἐγενέσθην φύλακε κατά τὰς πύλας ταύτας. The phrase perhaps contains an allusion to the proverb μία μάστιξ έλαύνει (or μία μάστιξ πάντας έλαύνει, Suidas)· ἐπὶ τοῦ ῥαδίου (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 280): cp. Herodes, Περὶ Πολιτείας, p. 175 (Bekker, Orat. Att., vol. v. p. 659), από μιας οὖν τέχνης όρμώμενος ήμων τε κρατήσειν οἴεται καὶ τούτων ων δι' ήμας οὐκ ἄρξει. Sus. transposes σχεδόν, 6-τούτους, 11, to after 27, πληθύον έτι (ἡ μικρόν), reading σχεδόν δέ in place of σχεδὸν δή, but the result of this transposition is to sever πάντα ταῦτα from the things to which these words refer.
- 8. ὁ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, 'the extreme sum of seventy years' (cp. 35). For the fact, cp. Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b 5 sqq. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 323), 'haec ita se habere putatur esse certum. Etsi pauca quaedam dissentanea memorantur, ut olim de Masinissa, quem Plutarchus in libello quo quaeritur an senibus capessenda sit respublica' (c. 15) 'ex Polybio' (37. 10. 5, 11 sq.) 'narrat, mortuum annos habentem nonaginta, reliquisse superstitem puerum annorum quatuor. Et de Constantia, quae nupsit Friderico Secundo, traditur peperisse eam filium grandiorem annis quinquaginta.' See also Plin. Nat. Hist. 7. 61 sq. Bonitz (Ind. 289 b 16) couples with the passage before us Hist. An. 8. 15. 599 b 10, καὶ ἄρχονται θηρεύεσθαι (οἱ θύννοι) ἀπὸ Πλειάδος ἀνατολῆς μέχρι

'Αρκτούρου δύσεως τὸ ἔσχατον. For the order of the words, which is quite regular, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 27, ἡ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος: see Sandys' note on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 51. l. 10, ὁ ἐν ἀγορᾳ σῖτος ἀργός.

9. For πεντήκοντα, cp. 29, έπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα.

10. δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., 'the commencement of the union, so far as age is concerned, should reach down at its close to these epochs' (i.e. the close of the union should arrive for the wife at the age of fifty and for the husband at the age of seventy, so that the husband should be twenty years older than the wife at the time of marriage). For κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, 'in respect of age' as contrasted with time of year (τοῖς περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις, 36), cp. De Gen. An. 5. 3. 784 a 17, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν γίνεται χειμὼν καὶ θέρος καὶ ἔαρ καὶ μετόπωρον. For the use of καταβαίνειν, cp. Plut. Demetr. c. 53, κατέβη δὲ ταῖς διαδοχαῖς τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ βασιλεῦον εἰς Περσέα τελευταῖον, ἐφ' οῦ 'Ρωμαῖοι Μακεδονίαν ὑπηγάγοντο.

11. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς κ.τ.λ. Partly in support of the conclusion at which he has just arrived, which implies that the bridegroom will be twenty years older than the bride at the time of marriage, and therefore will not be young, and partly in order to settle the age of the bride, which has not yet been settled, Aristotle recalls the fact that the union of young persons is a bad thing. The substantive συνδυασμός is not used elsewhere in the Politics in the sense of 'coitus,' though it is often thus used in the zoological writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), but we have συνδυασθέντων in this sense in 1335 b 24 (cp. also συνδυάζεσθαι in 1. 2. 1252 a 26, so far as it refers to the union of male and female). With the passage 1335 a 11-28 should be compared Plato, Rep. 459 B: Aristot. Hist. An. 5. 14. 544 b 14, τὸ γὰρ τῶν νέων (sc. σπέρμα) ἐν πασι τοις ζώοις τὸ μὲν πρωτον ἄγονον, γονίμων δ' ὄντων ἀσθενέστερα καὶ έλάττω τὰ ἔκγονα· τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα δῆλον ἐπί τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ζωοτόκων τετραπόδων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρνίθων, τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἔκγονα ἐλάττω, των δὲ τὰ ψά, and 7. 1. 582 a 16, μέχρι μὲν οὖν τῶν τρὶς έπτὰ ἐτῶν τὸ μέν πρωτον άγονα τὰ σπέρματά έστιν ἔπειτα γόνιμα μέν μικρὰ δὲ καὶ ἀτελῆ γεννῶσι καὶ οἱ νέοι καὶ αἱ νέαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν πλείστων. συλλαμβάνουσι μεν οὖν αἱ νέαι θᾶττον ἐὰν δὲ συλλάβωσιν, ἐν τοῖς τόκοις πονοῦσι μάλλον. καὶ τὰ σώματα δ' αὐτῶν ἀτελέστερα γίνεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ γηράσκει θαττον, των τ' άφροδισιαστικών άρρενων καὶ των γυναικών των τοις τόκοις χρωμένων πλείοσιν δοκεί γάρ οὐδ' ή αὔξησις ἔτι γίνεσθαι μετά τούς τρείς τόκους, and De Gen. An. 4. 2. 766 b 29, τά τε γάρ νέα θηλυτόκα μαλλον των ακμαζόντων και γηράσκοντα μαλλον (τὰ πρεσβύτερα μάλλον P, i.e. Vat. 1339) τοις μέν γάρ ούπω τέλειον τὸ θερμόν, τοις δ' απολείπει. Aubert and Wimmer, in their edition of the De Generatione Animalium, remark on this passage, 'this appears from statistical investigations to be correct'; among other authorities they refer to 'the very precise and interesting investigations of Quetelet, Sur l'Homme': see also below on 1335 a 15. According to Aristox. Fragm. 20 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), Pythagoras recommended (he probably referred to males only) complete abstinence till twenty, ὅταν δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀφίκηται, σπανίοις εἶναι χρηστέον τοις άφροδισίοις τουτο γάρ πρός τε την των γεννώντων και γεννησομένων εὐεξίαν πολύ συμβάλλεσθαι: see also below on 1335 b 37, ύγιείας χάριν. At Sparta, care was taken that both bridegroom and bride should be in their bodily prime (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1.6: Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, cp. Num. et Lycurg. inter se comp. c. 4, where the custom at Rome is contrasted with the Lacedaemonian custom). It is evident from 28 sq. that Aristotle does not class a girl of eighteen among the νέαι, at all events so far as fitness for marriage is concerned.

13. ἀτελῆ, 'imperfect,' i.e. lacking some limb or organ, or with some limb or organ imperfectly developed, or lacking some sense, for instance the sense of sight or hearing (De An. 3. 1. 425 a 9 sqq.), or some power, for instance the power of movement (De An. 3. 9. 432 b 21-26) or speech, or the power to procreate (cp. Hist. An. 7. 1. 581 b 21 sqq., and De An. 2. 4. 415 a 26 sqq. and 3. 9. 432 b 21 sqq.), or possibly imperfect in mind (cp. 1335 b 29 sqq.), idiotic or the like. As infants born imperfect are not to be reared in Aristotle's 'best State' (1335 b 20), and the offspring of the overyoung is often imperfect, much destruction of infant life would be saved by the prohibition of the marriage of those who are over-young.

μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, 'small in figure': cp. Pindar, Isthm. 4. 53, μορφὰν βραχύς. In 17 we have μικροὶ τὰ σώματα. To be small in person was to lack beauty (Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1123 b 6 sqq.). 'Ο μικροίς was 'a term of reproach at Athens' (Liddell and Scott s.v.: Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 280, note: cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 3).

15. ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'hoc autem vulgo de plebe Gallorum dicitur, apud quos mala haec consuetudo increbruit; unde notantur etiam voce ostendente erratum hoc ipsorum irridenteque brevitatem corporis eorundem et deformitatem.' Among the States

other than Troezen to which Aristotle here refers, Crete should probably be included. Cp. Ephor. Fragm. 64 (Strabo, p. 482: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 251), γαμείν μέν αμα πάντες ἀναγκάζονται παρ' αὐτοῖς οἱ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐκ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀγέλης ἐκκριθέντες. The age referred to would be the expiration of the eighteenth year according to Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, p. 408. The bride in Crete might be no more than twelve years of age (ibid. p. 407). The early age at which daughters were given in marriage at Troezen is probably an indication of material prosperity, for the father no doubt had to provide his daughter with a dowry. In Crete the bridegroom did not take his bride home till she was old enough to manage a household (Strabo, p. 482), and the actual provision of a dowry by the father may have been delayed till then. 'In a meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, M. Joseph Körösi, Director of the Buda-Pest Statistical Bureau, read a paper on the "Influence of Parents' Ages on the Vitality of Children." . . . M. Körösi has collected about 30,000 data, and has come to the following conclusions:-Mothers under twenty years of age and fathers under twenty-four have children more weakly than parents of riper age. Their children are more subject to pulmonary diseases. healthiest children are those whose fathers are from twenty-five to forty years of age, and whose mothers are from twenty to thirty years old' (Times, Jan. 14, 1889).

16. ἐπιχωριάζεται. Ἐπιχωριάζει would be more usual, but Liddell and Scott refer to Nymphis, ap. Athen. Deipn. 619 f, κατά τινα ἐπιχωριαζομένην παρ' αὐτοῖς συνήθειαν. See critical note.

18. διαφθείρονται, 'die.' Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares De Gen. An. 4. 4. 773 a 18 sqq.

διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν κ.τ.λ., 'the well-known oracle also' (in addition to other things). For τὸν χρησμόν, cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 30, ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις. P¹ and P² have preserved this oracle for us in their margins—τὸ μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα (see Sus.¹). The literal meaning of these words was 'let fallow land remain fallow, do not plough up uncultivated land,' or in other words 'let the land rest.' The verb νεᾶν and the substantive νεατός (Xen. Oecon. 7. 20) were used of the ploughing-up of fallow land (see Liddell and Scott). Cp. also Anth. Pal. 6. 41,

χαλκὸν ἀροτρητήν, κλασιβώλακα, νειοτομῆα.

As, however, the land which had been left for a time fallow was the land which would naturally be used for ploughing, the advice of the oracle came in effect to this, that ploughing should cease for a time and that crops should not be raised. No wonder that men rejected this interpretation of the oracle and cast about for another—that given in the text. A third interpretation was, indeed, possible. The oracle might be understood as a warning against rash innovation: cp. Athen. Deipn. 461 e, καὶ κατακλιθέντων, ἀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Πλούταρχος ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν Φλιάσιον ποιητὴν Πρατίναν, οὐ γᾶν αὐλακισμέναν ἀρῶν, ἀλλὰ σκύφον ματεύων, κυλικηγορήσων ἔρχομαι κ.τ.λ. For διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, see above on 1284 a 23.

20. διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας. Sepulv. 'propterea quod adolescentulae nuptui traderentur' (γαμίσκεσθαι being taken as passive: so Lamb. and Sus.), or 'because the custom was to take the younger women to wife' (γαμίσκεσθαι being taken as middle: so Liddell and Scott). Perhaps the words which follow, τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις, where the act of the father, not the bridegroom, is referred to, make rather in favour of the former interpretation. Γαμίσκειν is a rare word.

22. καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, as well as πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν (12).

τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις, 'to give away their daughters in marriage, when they are older' (literally 'to make their givings-away in marriage for girls when older').

23. ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Aeschyl. Fragm. 239.

24. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and the bodies of the males also are thought to suffer injury in respect of growth, if they have intercourse with females while the seed is still increasing, for the seed also [as well as the body, the increase of which has just been referred to is subject to a fixed limit of time, which it does not overpass in its increase, or overpasses only slightly, so that it is not an indifferent matter whether intercourse occurs at an earlier or later age].' The editors from Vict. downward, so far as I have observed, with the exceptions of Reiz and Göttling, read σώματος in place of σπέρματος, and there is much doubt as to the correct reading. The words σωμα and σπέρμα are occasionally interchanged in the MSS.—e.g. in De Gen. An. 2. 3. 737 a 11 we should probably read σῶμα with Aubert and Wimmer in place of σπέρμα, and in Chaeremon, Fragm. 13, I would read 'Ωρῶν σπέρματ' in place of 'Ωρῶν σώματ'. It is therefore not without hesitation that I retain σπέρματος in the passage before us. I do so for the following reasons: (1) It is the reading of all the better MSS., for even in  $P^2$ , which now has  $\sigma \omega \mu \alpha \tau \sigma \sigma$ ,  $\sigma \pi \epsilon \rho \mu \alpha \tau \sigma \sigma$  was the original reading;

P¹ has ἄλλως σώματος in its margin. Vet. Int. has 'corpore,' but whether he found σώματος in the Greek text used by him is doubtful, for he may well have translated a marginal reading. Susemihl ascribes the reading σώματος to Leonardus Aretinus, but Schneider says (Politica, vol. ii. p. 436), 'Aldinum et plurium Victorii codicum scripturam σπέρματος reddidit Aretinus, and a manuscript of his Latin Translation belonging to Balliol College, Oxford (MS. Ball. 242)—I have not consulted any others—has 'ac masculorum corpora crescere impediuntur si adhuc augente semine consuetudinem ineant.' (2) If we read σώματος, it is not easy to see, as Schneider has already pointed out in his note on the passage, why Aristotle did not simply write καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεί προς την αθέησιν, έαν έτι αθξανομένων (and not αθξανομένου τοῦ σώματος) ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν: Sepulveda, in fact (p. 240), found αὐξανομένου (not αὐξανομένου τοῦ σώματος or σπέρματος) in some MSS. and prefers this reading. Besides, the added remark καὶ γὰρ - ਵੱਸ seems rather otiose, if it refers to the body, for every one knows that the growth of the body ceases after a certain age. (3) The difficulty has been raised by Schneider that we nowhere read in Aristotle of a 'certus temporis terminus seminis augmento atque incremento definitus, ultra quem progrediatur nunquam, quoque intercepto corporis incrementum impediatur.' 'Corporis incrementum,' he adds, 'intra vigesimum fere annum aetatis consistere solet, seminis vero incrementum et copia pro natura alimentorum aliasque per causas variatur usque ad annum sexagesimum.' The question is one for thorough students of Aristotle's physiology to decide, and I cannot pretend to be one of them, but it should be noticed that the expression φθίνοντος τοῦ σπέρματος occurs in De Gen. An. 3. 1. 750 a 34, ώς εξαναλισκομένου τοῦ περιττώματος καὶ αμα της ήλικίας ληγούσης φθίνοντος του σπέρματος, in reference to the old age not indeed of a man, but of an animal, and if he believed in a decrease of the secretion after a certain age, he may well have believed in an increase of it up to a certain age. Some indications of his having done so are traceable, if we can trust the Seventh Book of the History of Animals, c. 5. 585 a 36, πλην οὖτ' ἀρχομένων (SC. τοῦ σπέρματος καὶ τῶν καταμηνίων) γόνιμα εὐθὺς οὔτ' ἔτι ὀλίγων γιγνομένων καὶ ἀσθενῶν, and Probl. 20. 7. 923 a 35, ή ἄπαντα μὲν μέχρι τούτου ακμάζει, εως αν κατά τὸ σπέρμα ακμάζη; ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι μέχρι τριάκοντα έτων έπιδιδύασιν, ότε μεν τῷ πλήθει ότε δε τῆ παχύτητι. Compare what we read in Hist. An. 7. 1. 581 b 2 sqq. of the

effect on bodily growth of a discharge of τὰ λευκά in early child-hood, for the catamenia in the female answer to the seed in the male (De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 2 sqq.)—τὰ δὲ λευκὰ καὶ παιδίοις γίνεται νέοις οὖσι πάμπαν, μᾶλλον δ' ἂν ὑγρᾳ χρῶνται τροφῆ καὶ καλύει τὴν αὕξην καὶ τὰ σώματα ἰσχναίνει τῶν παιδίων. For ὡρισμένος χρόνος, cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 22 and 3. 14. 1285 a 34. As to (ἢ μικρόν), see critical note.

- 28. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Διό is explained by ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 30. We should have expected from Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16–29 (quoted in part above on 11) that Aristotle would have delayed the age of marriage for women till twenty-one, but this would have involved a shortening of the duration of wedlock, as it is to close before the wife is fifty years of age. The male reaches the acmê of his physical development between thirty and thirty-five (see vol. i. p. 186, note 2, and cp. 1335 a 32 sq.), so that Aristotle might well have placed the age of marriage for the male a little earlier than he does, but he probably wishes to make the duration of wedlock the same for husband and wife (about thirty-two years). As to the ages recommended by Plato, see vol. i. p. 183.
  - 29. As to [η μικρόν], see critical note.
  - 30. ἐν τοσούτω, sc. χρόνω, 'at an age no greater than this.'

ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται, 'coupling will take place while their bodies are in their prime.' For the importance of this, cp. Plato, Rep. 459 B and Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23.

- 31. συγκαταβήσεται, sc. σύζευξις, cp. 10.
- 32. τοις μέν, the children, answering to τοις δέ, 34, the fathers.
- 33. ἀρχομένοις της άκμης, cp. 1335 b 27, ἄρχεσθαι της συζεύξεως.
- 34. ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας, 'their period of vigour having now been brought to a close' (cp. De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 8, καὶ παύεται τῆς ἡλικίας ληγούσης τοῖς μὲν τὸ δύνασθαι γεννᾶν, ταῖς δὲ τὰ καταμήνια, and Demosth. in Apatur. c. 4, οὔπω δ' ἔτη ἐστὶν ἑπτὰ ἀφ' οὖ τὸ μὲν πλεῖν καταλέλυκα), or possibly 'having now been wrecked.' For πρός, 'towards,' see Bon. Ind. 641 b 9, where we find a reference among other passages to De Gen. An. 5. 1.778 a 25, τὰ μὲν γὰρ (τῶν ζῷων) οὐ πολιοῦται πρὸς τὸ γῆρας ἐπιδήλως.
- 36. τοις δε περί την ώραν χρόνοις κ.τ.λ. Cp. Philo, Mechan. Synt. p. 99. 11, δει δε και ταις ύπορύξεσι των τειχων λαθραίως χρωσθαι καθάπερ και νῦν χρωνται μεταλλεύοντες. Τοις περί την ώραν χρόνοις, 'time in connexion with season,' in contradistinction to οί περί την ήλικίαν χρώνοι: cp. c. 5. 1327 a 8, της περί ξύλα ύλης, and for the distinction

Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, ώραι δὲ καὶ ἡλικίαι τῆς ὀχείας έκάστοις εἰσὶν ώρισμέναι τῶν ζώων.

37. οίς οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a tacit antithesis between οἱ πολλοί and οἱ ἰατροί and οἱ φυσικοί, 40. In reference to the question of season, which is a very simple one, we need not have recourse to the opinion of learned men; the verdict of the many will suffice: cp. Top. 2. 2. 110 a 19, οἷον ύγιεινον μεν ρητέον το ποιητικον ύγιείας, ώς οί πολλοί λέγουσιν' πότερον δε το προκείμενον ποιητικον ύγιείας ή ού, οὐκέτι ώς οί πολλοι κλητέον άλλ' ώς ό ιατρός. See vol. i. p. 187, note 1. The mention of οἱ πολλοί would seem to show that it was usual to marry in the winter throughout Greece and not merely in Attica. In δρίσαντες Aristotle probably refers to a custom or unwritten law. Pythagoras went further (Diog. Laert. 8. 9, καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δέ φησιν ούτως "άφροδίσια χειμώνος ποιέεσθαι, μή θέρεος φθινοπώρου δέ καὶ ἦρος κουφότερα, βαρέα δὲ πᾶσαν ώρην καὶ ἐς ὑγείην οὐκ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι": cp. Alcaeus, Fragm. 13, 39 with Bergk's notes, and Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 32). 'In 1876 Dr. Kulischer, in a paper in the Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, collected details of human pairing-seasons, as marked by festivals of plainly matrimonial intent, and brought forward still more distinct evidence from the statistics of births, which show maxima and minima pointing to two especial pairingtimes, about New Year and in late spring. Dr. Westermarck' [in his history of Human Marriage, Macmillan, 1891] 'brings new evidence to bear on the subject' (Prof. E. B. Tylor, Academy, Oct. 3, 1891).

- 38. την συναυλίαν ταύτην, 'this kind of dwelling together.' Συναυλία in this sense is connected with αὐλή, not αὐλός, and is a very rare word, but Bekk.² is no doubt wrong in following Lamb., who reads συνουσίαν. The word ὁμαυλία occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 599, ξυζύγους δ' ὁμαυλίας ('wedded unions,' Liddell and Scott), and Schn. points out that Plato (Laws 721 D) 'caelibatum eodem modo μοναυλίαν νος αντί.' There were other kinds of συναυλία, e.g. those of ὁμέστιοι and ὁμοτράπεζοι, not ὁμόλεκτροι.
- 39. δεὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'and the married couple also in turn' (as well as the lawgiver, cp. 1334 b 33 and 1335 b 14) 'should study the teaching of physicians and that of physical philosophers.' For ἤδη see note on 1258 b 18: ἤδη here lends emphasis to a pronoun, as in that passage and often elsewhere (e.g. in 2.8. 1268 b 21: 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 14: 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10). For θεωρεῖν τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα, cp. Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 12,

πρῶτον τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα θεωρητέον, and Meteor. 2. 9. 370 a 21, τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ βροντῆς καὶ ἀστραπῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτ' ἐστί, and see note on 1324 a 25.

41. οἴ τε γὰρ ἰατροὶ κ.τ.λ., 'for physicians state in an adequate way the favourable moments of the body [for the procreation of children].' Hesiod had recommended the time after a sacrificial feast (Op. et Dies 735,

μηδ' ἀπὸ δυσφήμοιο τάφου ἀπονοστήσαντα σπερμαίνειν γενεήν, ἀλλ' ἀθανάτων ἀπὸ δαιτός),

but some were wholly against the time after a feast of any kind, even the ordinary δείπνον, and among them was Epicurus (Plut. Sympos. 3. 6: Usener, Epicurea, Fragm. 61, p. 117 sq.). Cp. Plato, Laws 674 B, Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, and Diog. Laert. 7. 18. We learn the opinion of the Athenian physician Mnesitheus (B. c. 400–350?) from Athen. Deipn. 357 c, τὸ δὲ τῶν μαλακίων γένος, οἶα πουλυπόδων τε καὶ σηπιῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, τὴν μὲν σάρκα δύσπεπτον ἔχει διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδισιασμοὺς ἀρμόττουσιν. αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ εἶσι πνευματώδεις, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισιασμῶν καιρὸς πνευματώδους προσδεῖται διαθέσεως (cp. De Part. An. 4. 10. 689 a 29 sqq.). As to the dawn of day, see Aristoph. Lysistr. 966 Didot.

1. καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 766 b 1335 b. 34, καὶ τὸ βορείοις ἀρρενοτοκεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ νοτίοις ὅστε καὶ περιττωματικώτερα. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον περίττωμα δυσπεπτότερον διὸ τοῖς μὲν ἄρρεσιν ὑγρότερον τὸ σπέρμα, ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶν ἡ τῶν καταμηνίων ἔκκρισις (cp. 767 a 8 sqq.): Hist. An. 6. 19. 574 a 1: Probl. 1. 24. 862 a 30, ἔτι δὲ ἡ δύναμις ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις ἐστί, ταῦτα δὲ ἀνίεται ὑπὸ τῶν νοτίων: Probl. 26. 43. 945 a 18 sq. Plato recognizes the influence of winds on generation in Laws 747 D.

2. ποίων δέ τινων κ.τ.λ. Here the question announced for consideration in 1334 b 31 is taken up, so far at least as relates to the body. Plato had already said something on the subject in Laws 775 B sqq.: cp. 779 D sqq. The view which prevailed at Sparta may be gathered from Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 4, ταίε δ' έλευθέραις μέγιστον νομίσας (ὁ Λυκοῦργος) εἶναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν πρῶτον μὲν σωμασκεῖν ἔταξεν οὐδὲν ἢττον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος φύλου ἔπειτα δὲ δρόμου καὶ ἰσχύος, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς θηλείαις ἀγῶνας πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐποίησε, νομίζων ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἰσχυρῶν καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἐρρωμενέστερα γίγνεσθαι, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 14: compare the fragment of Critias quoted in vol. i. p. 350, note 1.

- 3. ἐπιστήσασι μὲν κ.τ.λ. For the case of ἐπιστήσασι, see note on 1275 a 16. Subjects often receive only a hasty consideration in the Fourth Book, a fuller treatment of them later on being promised: see vol. i. p. 296. What Aristotle means by ἐπιστήσασι μάλλον (sc. τὸν λόγον, cp. Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου 6. 470 b 5), we see from c. 17. 1336 b 25, υστερον δ' επιστήσαντας δεί διορίσαι μάλλον, είτε μή δεί πρώτον είτε δεί διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πώς δεί. Έν τοίς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας, perhaps 'in the inquiries respecting the management of children,' rather than 'in the inquiries respecting the education of children,' which is the rendering of Sepulv., Vict., Lamb., and Liddell and Scott. Παιδονομία is used in a different sense in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 39 and 1323 a 4. It seems strange that Aristotle should intend to treat the question ποίων τινῶν κ.τ.λ. in an inquiry respecting the management of children. He apparently designed to include a discussion of the subject in the Politics; no such discussion, however, finds a place in the work as we have it (for other cases of the same thing, see vol. ii. p. xxvii).
- 5. τύπφ δὲ ἰκανὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν, 'but one should now also say what is adequate in outline.' Sus. inserts δεῖ after ἰκανόν, but, as he himself suggests in Sus.¹, Addenda, p. lxiv, it seems likely that δεῖ is to be supplied here from λεκτέον, 4: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3 sqq., where δεῖν must apparently be supplied with ὑπάρχειν and δεῖ with τάττειν. Bonitz does not refer to the passage before us in Ind. 168 a 54 sqq., where he considers one or two other cases in which δεῖ may be thought to be omitted. Aristotle inherits the expression τύπφ from Plato, in whose writings it occurs frequently. Α τύπος is the outline or περιγραφή (cp. Laws 876 D, περιγραφήν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωριῶν εἰπόντας) which an artist draws before filling in his picture: see note on 1263 a 31.

οὖτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 26, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. As to ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἔξις, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν, Xenophanes, Fragm. 2 Bergk, Eurip. Fragm. 284, and Plato, Rep. 403 E-407 E, where Stallbaum compares Plut. Philopoemen c. 3. What Plato objects to in athletes, however, is their sleepiness and inability to stand the rapid changes of diet which are inseparable from a soldier's life, whereas Aristotle rather objects to the tendencies impressed on their constitution by severe toil of one monotonous kind. For the order of the words in 5-8, see note on 1327 a 4.

6. πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὖεξίαν, 'with a view to the kind of bodily fitness that is useful to a citizen': cp. Xen. Oecon. 11.13. Εὖεξία differs from strength, and it also differs from health; it is the business of a gymnastic trainer to produce εὖεξία, just as it is the business of a physician to produce health (Top. 5. 7. 137 a 3 sqq.). But the εὖεξία which Aristotle speaks of here is not gymnastic εὖεξία, but the εὖεξία which makes a man an efficient citizen, fit in body to bear the labours which fall to the lot of soldiers and citizens.

πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τεκνοποιίαν. As to the ill-effect of the training of athletes on health, cp. Plato, Rep. 403 E sq., and as to its ill-effect on τεκνοποιία, cp. De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 35, ἀναλίσκει γὰρ ὁ πόνος τὰ περιττώματα, and Hist. An. 6. 20. 574 b 28, ἴδιον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν Λακωνικῶν (κυνῶν) συμβαίνει πάθος πονήσαντες γὰρ μᾶλλον δύνανται ὀχεύειν ἡ ἀργοῦντες.

- 7. κακοπονητική, 'unfit for labour,' 'labouring ill,' like κακόπνους, 'breathing ill,' or κακοθάνατος, 'dying ill.'
- 8. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οὖν here contains an inference from what precedes, as in 1. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note on that passage). Πόνος is the source of εὐεξία (Phys. 2. 3. 195 a 8 sqq.: Metaph. Δ. 2. 1013 b 9 sq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 23 sqq.). Compare what Atalanta is made to say in Eurip. Fragm. 529,

εὶ δ' εἰς γάμους ἔλθοιμ', δ μὴ τύχοι, ποτέ, τῶν ἐν δόμοισιν ἡμερευουσῶν ἀεὶ βελτίον ἀν τέκοιμι δώμασιν τέκνα ἐκ γὰρ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ὅστις ἐκπονεῖ σκληρὰς διαίτας οἱ γόνοι βελτίονες.

But Atalanta's training had been that of a huntress, not that of an athlete. The toils which Aristotle would recommend to married women would, however, rather be the light and varied toils of the mistress of a household, as to which we learn much from the advice given by Ischomachus to his wife in Xen. Oecon. c. 10. 10 sq. For πόνοις μὴ βιαίοις, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους.

- 9. πρὸς ἔνα μόνον, sc. πόνον (Ridgeway and Sus.4).
- 11. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and these physical characteristics should be possessed alike by men and women,' so that women no less than men should ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων. (Ταῦτα is in the plural because the characteristics are many.) Aristotle's language is very similar to that of Plato in Laws 804 D, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλειῶν ὁ μὲν

έμὸς νόμος ἃν εἶποι πάντα, ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἴσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν, but Plato goes much further both in Rep. 451 C-457 B and in Laws 804 C-806 C than Aristotle does here.

12. χρὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Pregnant women also,' as well as those marrying. 'Εγκύμων is the Attic word rather than ἔγκυος. Aristotle here follows in the track of Lycurgus and Plato: cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 3, αὐτίκα γὰρ περὶ τεκνοποιίας, ἵνα ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρξωμαι, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὰς μελλούσας τίκτειν καὶ καλῶς δοκούσας κόρας παιδεύεσθαι καὶ σίτω ἢ ἀνυστὸν μετριωτάτω τρέφουσι καὶ ὄψω ἢ δυνατὸν μικροτάτω οἴνον γε μὴν ἡ πάμπαν ἀπεχομένας ἡ ὑδαρεῖ χρωμένας διάγουσιν, whereas Lycurgus ordered a different course, and Plato, Laws 788 D sqq. and 789 D, βούλεσθε ἄμα γέλωτι φράζωμεν, τιθέντες νόμους, τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάττειν τε οἶον κήρινον, ἔως ὑγρόν, καὶ μέχρι δυοῖν ἐτοῖν σπαργανᾶν. Not only would the unborn child profit by the exercise taken by the mother, but the mother herself would secure an easier delivery (De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 30 sqq.).

14. τοῦτο δὲ ῥάδιον τῷ νομοθέτη ποιῆσαι, i. e. to secure that pregnant women shall not take little food and exercise.

προστάξαντι κ.τ.λ. Tivá is of course to be taken with πορείαν. Aristotle here perhaps takes a hint from Plato, who in Laws 833 B had made a temple the goal of a foot-race: cp. also Laws 789 E. For  $\theta \epsilon \hat{\omega} \nu \tau \hat{\omega} \nu \epsilon i \lambda \eta \chi \acute{\sigma} \tau \omega \nu \tau \dot{\eta} \nu \tau \epsilon \rho i \tau \dot{\eta} s \gamma \epsilon \nu \acute{\epsilon} \sigma \epsilon \omega s \tau \iota \mu \dot{\eta} \nu$ , where  $\dot{\eta} \gamma \acute{\epsilon} \nu \epsilon \sigma \iota s =$ 'partus' (Bon. Ind. 149 a 3 sqq.), cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 B, ette Διόνυσος είτε "Ηφαιστος είθ' όστις θεών ταύτην την τιμην είληχε της συγκράσεως. Notwithstanding the gender of τῶν εἰληχότων, the gods referred to are no doubt Eileithyia (Hom. Il. 11. 270 sq.: Paus. 8. 32. 4: Theocr. 17. 60 sqq.) and Artemis (Plato, Theaet. 149 B, altiav δέ γε τούτου φασὶν είναι τὴν Αρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε): perhaps also Demeter Calligeneia (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 56. 19) and at Athens the Τριτοπάτορες (Phanodem. Fragm. 4: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 367). The temples of Eileithyia in the Peloponnesus were often just outside the city-gate (see note on 1331 a 26). 'Αποθεραπείαν, from ἀποθεραπεύειν, 'to honour zealously' or 'completely': cp. ἀποβάπτειν (c. 17. 1336 a 16), ἀφιλάσκεσθαι (Plato, Laws 873 A), ἀποδύρεσθαι, and ἀποθρηνείν. A daily offering at a temple would be an indication of zealous worship: cp. Plut. Nic. c. 4, σφόδρα γὰρ ἦν (ὁ Νικίας) τῶν ἐκπεπληγμένων τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ θειασμώ προσκείμενος, ως φησι Θουκυδίδης, εν δέ τινι των Πασιφώντος διαλόγων γέγραπται, ὅτι καθ' ἡμέραν ἔθυε τοῖς θεοῖς.

16. την μέντοι διάνοιαν κ.τ.λ. What is the construction of την

διάνοιαν? Is it in the acc. after διάγειν, the subject of διάγειν being τας έγκύους understood and διάγειν itself being here used in the sense of 'to keep,' as in Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, καίτοι χρή τούς ὀρθῶς βασιλεύοντας μη μόνον τὰς πόλεις ἐν ὁμονοία πειρασθαι διάγειν, ὧν αν ἄρχωσιν, άλλά και τους οίκους τους ίδίους? Or is τάς εγκύους the subject of διάγειν used intransitively, and the proper rendering of την διάνοιαν 'in respect of the mind'? Or is την διάνοιαν the subject of διάγειν used intransitively? Sepulveda, who translates, 'mentem autem contra quam corpus tranquillam securamque gerere convenit, appears to adopt the first of these interpretations, Victorius, who translates, 'mente autem contra atque corpore sedatius remissiusque degere convenit,' the second (so Stahr and Sus.), Mr. Welldon, who translates, 'their mind unlike their bodies should at such a time be comparatively indolent,' the third. I incline to the second interpretation: no instance of διάγειν being used in the sense of 'to keep' is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 32 sq. the word is used intransitively. The reason why Aristotle advises the avoidance of mental labour appears to be because it would 'be a hindrance to the body' (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.) and he wishes the bodily state of the mother to be as good as possible. Compare the advice given by Plato in Laws 792 E, where however he counsels the avoidance of an excess of pleasures and pains rather than of mental labour. We expect τοῦ σώματος in 17 rather than τῶν σωμάτων.

18. ἀπολαύοντα . . . φαίνεται, 'evidently are influenced by.'

τῆς ἐχούσης, i.e. τῆς μητρός: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 38, where De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 26, 37, and 3. 3. 754 b 1 are referred to.

19. ὅσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. Cp. De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 24, ἐπεὶ δὲ δυνάμει μὲν ἤδη ζῷον ἀτελὲς δέ, ἄλλοθεν ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν τὴν τροφήν διὸ χρῆται τῷ ὑστέρα καὶ τῷ ἐχούση, ὅσπερ γῷ φυτόν, τοῦ λαμβάνειν τροφήν, εως ἄν τελεωθῷ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἤδη ζῷον δυνάμει πορευτικόν. In this passage and also in that before us Aristotle seems to have in his memory Hippocr. De Natura Pueri, 1. 414 Kühn, φημὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷ γῷ φυόμενα πάντα ζῆν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἰκμάδος, καὶ ὅκως ἄν ἡ γῆ ἔχη ἰκμάδος ἐν έωυτῷ, οὖτω καὶ τὰ φυόμενα ἔχειν. οὖτω καὶ παιδίον ζῷ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἐν τῷσι μήτρησι καὶ ὅκως ᾶν ἡ μήτηρ ὑγιείης ἔχῃ, οὖτω καὶ τὸ παιδίον ἔχει.

περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως κ.τ.λ., 'and with respect to the exposure or rearing of children, let there be a law that defective offspring shall not be reared, but that offspring shall not be exposed on the ground

of an excessive number of children [as distinguished from that of imperfection], in case the customs of the State, as regulated by the lawgiver' (literally, 'the ordering of the customs'), 'are opposed to an excessive number, for the amount of reproductive intercourse should be fixed, and if any parents have offspring in consequence of intercourse taking place beyond that limit, abortion should be produced before sensation and life develope in the embryo, for that which is holy in this matter will be marked off from that which is not by the absence or presence of sensation and life.' See on this passage vol. i. p. 187 and notes 2 and 3. In Greece the poor were often unwilling to rear children, especially daughters: cp. Plut. De Amore Prolis c. 5, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πένητες οὐ τρέφουσι τέκνα, φοβούμενοι μὴ κ.τ.λ., and Poseidipp. Ἑρμαφρόδιτος Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 516),

υίον τρέφει πᾶς κᾶν πένης τις ὧν τύχη, θυγατέρα δ' ἐκτίθησι κᾶν ἦ πλούσιος.

The Greeks noticed with surprise that in Egypt all children born were reared (Aristot. Fragm. 258. 1525 a 37 sqq.: Strabo, p. 824). In Aristotle's 'best State' exposure would be resorted to only in the case of imperfectly developed offspring, or rather of offspring the imperfection of which was obvious at the moment of birth, for not all the kinds of imperfection noticed above on 1335 a 13 would be traceable at birth. The rule at Sparta was not to rear anything άγεννες καὶ ἄμορφον (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Seneca says of Rome (De Ira 1. 15), liberos quoque, si debiles monstrosique editi sunt, mergimus. I know not whether ἀπόθεσις in the sense of the 'exposing of children' occurs elsewhere. For ή τάξις των έθων, cp. τήν τάξιν τῶν νόμων, 2. 10. 1271 b 29, 32. Κωλύη, Sc. πληθος τέκνων (so Vict. 'in illis locis ubi lege interdictum est ne quis pater alat plures liberos quam lex patiatur'): cp. c. 17. 1336 a 35, οἱ κωλύοντες έν τοις νόμοις. 'Ωρίσθαι γὰρ δεί κ.τ.λ., cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq. and 2. 7. 1266 b 8 sqq. In έὰν δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, supply τέκνα with γίγνηται from what precedes, and take παρὰ ταῦτα (sc. τὰ ώρισμένα) with συνδυασθέντων, 'in consequence of intercourse in excess of the legal limit' (so Vict. and Stahr), or possibly 'in contravention of the legal limit' (cp. Plato, Polit. 300 D, where παρὰ ταῦτα = παρὰ τοὺς νόμους). For the use of ταῦτα here see note on 1252 a 33. For the case of συνδυασθέντων (one might expect συνδυασθείσι), Reiz (quoted by Schn.) compares Hom. Il. 16. 531, όττι οἱ ὧκ' ήκουσε μέγας θεὸς εὐξαμένοιο, and Odyss. 9. 256, ἡμῖν δ'

αὖτε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ Δεισάντων κ.τ.λ. Richards adds a reference to Thuc. 3. 13. 9 and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 4. 2. See also notes on 1281b 4 and 13.

- 24. πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν. Cp. De Gen. An. 5. I. 778 b 32, εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τότε πρῶτόν ἐστι ζῷον, ὅταν αἴσθησις γένηται πρῶτον κ.τ.λ., and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. I 170 a 16, τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῷοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἡ νοήσεως. Contrast the view of Democritus, De An. I. 2. 404 a 9, διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν, which was also that of Diogenes of Apollonia (Fragm. 5: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. I. 254). Aristotle is here speaking not of life in general, but of animal life, for plants also live, and in their case ζωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὕξησιν καὶ φθίσιν (De An. 2. I. 412 a I4): cp. De An. 3. 12. 434 a 27.
- 25. ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν. Bonitz (Ind. 243 b 17) takes ἐμποιεῖσθαι here as middle, but the verb seems to be rarely used in this sense in the middle voice, and perhaps Sus. is right in taking it as passive. In the 'oath of Hippocrates' which was sworn by aspirants to medical practice one of the promises made is that the taker of the oath will not produce abortion. The thing, however, was no doubt occasionally done not only by physicians but by midwives (Plato, Theaet. 149 D).
- τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον κ.τ.λ. As to the use of οὐχ ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος of violations of duty to near relatives, see note on 1262 a 28. The abortion of an embryo in which sensation and life had already developed would involve a violation of this nature.
- 26.  $\frac{2}{6}\pi\epsilon i$   $\delta \epsilon$   $\kappa.\tau.\lambda$ ., 'but since the commencement of the fit age for marriage for man and wife has been defined' (in 1335 a 28 sqq.), 'and it has been settled at what age they should begin their union.' As to the  $\mu \epsilon \nu$  solitarium in  $\dot{\eta}$   $\mu \epsilon \nu$   $\dot{\alpha} \rho \chi \dot{\eta}$ , see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. The suppressed clause here is 'but the end of it has not.'
- 28. λειτουργείν πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν, 'to serve the State' in relation to the begetting of children, according to Liddell and Scott (so also Mr. Welldon): Sus., on the other hand, translates 'sich diesem Geschäfte zu widmen' ('to devote themselves to this task'), and Stahr 'dem Kinderzeugen obzuliegen,' following in the track of Lamb., 'liberis procreandis operam dare.' Perhaps, as Plato speaks in Rep. 460 E of τίκτειν τῆ πόλει and γεννᾶν τῆ πόλει, the first of these two interpretations is to be preferred. For πρός, cp. 6 (4). 4.

1291 a 35, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν. 'Αρμόττει is used in association with  $\chi \rho \dot{\eta}$  here as with δεῖ in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 14.

- 29. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔκγονα κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23 and Plato, Rep. 459 B. By οἱ πρεσβύτεροι Aristotle here means οἱ παρηκμακότες, i. e. those over fifty or perhaps fifty-five: cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 13, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες. In Probl. 38. 9. 967 b 13 sqq. οἱ πρεσβύτεροι are apparently identified with οἱ γηράσκοντες. See notes on 1329 a 13 and 1321 a 22. By οἱ γεγηρακότες Aristotle may probably mean men over sixty, or sixty-five. Membership of the Lacedaemonian γερουσία was confined to men who had passed their sixtieth year. When Aristotle says that the children of aged fathers are ἀσθενεῖς, he perhaps means more than that they are weak in body. Οἱ ἀσθενεῖς are specially subject to emotion (see note on 1342 a 11).
- 32. διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν, sc. ὡρίσθω ὁ χρόνος τῆς τεκνοποιίας: so Lamb. 'quare id tempus praefiniatur, in quo mens maxime viget ac floret,' Coray, and others. Aristotle is speaking of the mental prime of the husband, not the wife. The bodily prime of a man falls between thirty and thirty-five (see above on 1335 a 28).
- 33. τῶν ποιητῶν τινές. Solon (Fragm. 27) is referred to. He however places the mental prime between forty-two and fifty-six. There is a further reference to these poets in c. 17. 1336 b 40 sqq.
- 35. ὥστε τέτταρσιν κ.τ.λ. Plato also in the Republic (460 E) closes the period of τεκνοποιία for the man at fifty-five, adding that in his case the mental and bodily prime lies between twenty-five and fifty-five. Sir Nicholas Bacon (born in 1509) was fifty-two years of age when his famous son Francis was born to him in 1561. Lord Chatham was fifty-one when William Pitt was born to him. Sir John Herschel (born in 1792) was born when his father Sir William Herschel (born in 1738) was fifty-four years of age. How many other great men have had fathers over fifty at the time of their birth, I am unable to say. For τῆs εἰs τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως, cp. Plato, Rep. 461 C, μηδ' εἰs φῶs ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέ γ' ἔν.
- 37. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν κ.τ.λ. Compare Plato, Rep. 461 B sq., where Plato does not impose this restriction on the intercourse of those over the legal age, if only they take care that no offspring shall see the light or, supposing it does, shall live.

ύγιείας χάριν. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8 sqq., 726 a 22, and 5. 3. 783 b 29 sq., and Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 22 sqq. See also

Plin. Nat. Hist. 28. 58, and the case of Timochares in Hippocr. De Morbis Vulgaribus 5, vol. iii. p. 574 Kühn. Pythagoras probably would not have admitted that health could ever be thus promoted (cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 9).

ἤ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτίας, such as εὐεξία, which is often mentioned in conjunction with ὑγίεια, e. g. in Phys. 7. 3. 246 b 4: Plato, Rep. 559 A, Protag. 354 B. Cp. Laws 708 B, τισὶν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις παθήμασιν.

28. φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν, 'ought manifestly to resort to the intercourse.'

περί δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, sc. δμιλίας, 'but with respect to the intercourse of a husband with another woman than his wife, or of a wife with another man than her husband.' Aristotle has before him here Plato, Laws 784 E, ὅταν δὲ δὴ παίδας γεννήσωνται κατά νόμους, έὰν ἀλλοτρία τις περί τὰ τοιαῦτα κοινωνή γυναικί ή γυνή ἀνδρί, έὰν μὲν παιδοποιουμένοις ἔτι, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιζήμια αὐτοῖς ἔστω, καθάπερ τοῖς ἔτι γεννωμένοις είρηται μετά δε ταῦτα δ μεν σωφρονών καὶ σωφρονοῦσα είς τὰ τοιαθτα έστω πάντα εθδόκιμος, δ δε τοθναντίον εναντίως τιμάσθω, μάλλον δε ατιμαζέσθω, and 841 C sqq. Both Aristotle and Plato (in Laws 841 C sqq. at any rate, μή λανθάνων ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναίκας πάσας) seem to confine themselves to the prohibition of unconcealed adultery. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 40. The writer of the First Book of the Oeconomics (c. 4. 1344 a 8-13) appears to go further. Contrast with all this the occasional permission to Spartan wives of intercourse with other men than their husbands (Plut. Lycurg. c. 15).

39. ἀπλῶς, 'broadly,' 'at any time,' in contradistinction to περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας: cp. Anal. Pr. 1. 15. 34 b 7, δεῖ δὲ λαμ-βάνειν τὸ παντὶ ὑπάρχον μὴ κατὰ χρόνον ὁρίσαντας, οἶον νῦν ἡ ἐν τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς.

40. ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι, 'openly to touch': cp. Plato, Laws 816 E, μηδέ τινα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων. Plato had already used the word ἄπτεσθαι in Laws 841 D, μηδενὸς ἄπτεσθαι τῶν γενναίων ἄμα καὶ ἐλευθέρων, and this is no doubt one of the passages which Aristotle has before him here. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 28 sq.

μηδαμή μηδαμώς occurs in Plato, Laws 777 E, and μηδαμώς μηδαμή in Laws 820 B, but I know not whether μηδαμή μηδαμώς occurs elsewhere in Aristotle's writings. The Index Aristotelicus omits the phrase, and indeed by some error the word μηδαμώς. Πάντη

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πάντως is a phrase frequently employed by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v. πάντη).

οταν ἢ καὶ προσαγορευθῆ πόσις. Kai here probably means 'or,' as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8 (see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1303 a 20). The word πόσις is used here and in 1. 3. 1253 b 6 by Aristotle, but it is a poetical word, seldom used in prose. On προσαγορευθῆ, see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. ἀγορεύω.

3 sqq. Aristotle says little in this chapter which had not C. 17. 1336 a. already been said by Plato, and throughout the whole of it he seems to write with the Seventh Book of the Laws before him, but he brings together, and thus makes more effective, what Plato had said in a scattered and often an incidental way. He sometimes differs from Plato; thus he is for rearing children under seven to a greater extent at home than Plato had proposed to do, he will not have their crying restrained, etc. In recommending, again, that children should be habituated from their earliest infancy to bear heat and cold, he goes beyond anything contemplated by Plato or practised at Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4) or in Crete (Ephor. Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250), for neither the Spartans nor the Cretans seem to have begun this habituation in babyhood, and Plato speaks of ἐκ παίδων (Rep. 403 C), not, like Aristotle, of ἐκ μικρῶν παίδων, when he refers to the subject (Rep. 404 A); it is rather from some barbarian races, such as the Celts, that Aristotle learns this lesson, as indeed he himself tells us. He keeps the same end in view in his rules as to the rearing of children as he does in his rules as to marriage; he seeks in both to secure that the children shall be well-grown in body and sound in mind and likely to make good soldiers and citizens in afteryears. Rearing comes first, covering the whole period up to seven vears of age, and then comes education (c. 17. 1336 b 37 sqq.). Aristotle confines himself during the first two or three years of life to studying the physical development of the child in accordance with the principle laid down in c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq., but after that age he pays attention to the development not only of the body, but of the opeges and character. Till seven the children must necessarily in his opinion be reared at home, and consequently must be more or less in the company of slaves, and he evidently fears that if they are much in the company of slaves at this impressible time —the age at which permanent tastes are acquired, πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον (1336 b 33)—they may acquire a taint of illiberal feeling and indecency of which it will not be easy to rid them in later life. This leads him to pay special attention to the years from two or three to seven.

Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle reproduces the turn of the opening sentences of the Seventh Book of the Laws (788 A, γενομένων δὲ παίδων ἀρρένων καὶ θηλειῶν τροφὴν μέν που καὶ παιδείαν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ὀρθότατ' ἄν γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν). Δεῖ must be supplied with οἴεσθαι: Aristotle forgets that he has not used the word since c. 16. 1335 b 38, and that the imperatives ἔστω (39) and ζημιούσθω (1336 a 1), which however contain in them much of the force of δεῖ, have intervened. Μεγάλην εἶναι διαφοράν, ' is a highly important determining influence one way or the other': we expect rather μέγα διαφέρειν (cp. I. I3. 1260 b 16 sqq.) οτ μεγάλην ποιεῖν διαφοράν (cp. De Part. An. 2. 4. 651 a 15) οτ μεγάλην ἔχειν διαφοράν (Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 22), but that which produces a difference is often termed a διαφορά, just as that which produces fear is sometimes termed φόβος. Compare the construction noticed in the note on 1264 a 39.

5. φαίνεταί τε κ.τ.λ., 'and evidently, if we investigate the question by a reference to the lower animals and to the barbarian nations which make it their aim to introduce the habit of body suitable for war, food abounding in milk is most congenial to the bodies [of infants], and with little wine in it on account of the diseases which wine produces.' With τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔξιν contrast 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν. For ἄγειν see critical note. Φαίνεσθαι without an infinitive or a participle may mean either 'to appear' or 'evidently to be' (Bon. Ind. 808 b 52 sqq.); here it probably means the latter. The nom. to φαίνεται is ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα (οτ πληθύουσα) τροφὴ ἀοινοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. For διά, see note on 1328 a 19. The nations referred to are no doubt those mentioned in c. 2. 1324 b 9 sqq., and especially the Scythians: cp. Antiphanes, Μισοπόνηρος (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85),

εἶτ' οὐ σοφοὶ δῆτ' εἰσὶν οἱ Σκύθαι σφόδρα, οἱ γενομένοισιν εὐθέως τοῖς παιδίοις διδόασιν ἵππων καὶ βοῶν πίνειν γάλα;

We read of the milk-drinking Hippemolgi in Hom. II. 13. 5. The Greeks, however, mostly used goats' milk (Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 313); they used ewes' milk but little (ibid.), and they regarded the milk of cows (Plut. Pelop. c. 30) and asses (Plut. Demosth. c. 27) as food for invalids. It was on goats' milk that Jupiter was reared as an infant (Manil. Astron. 1. 364 sqq.).

Compare the rearing of the infant Camilla (Virg. Aen. 11. 570 sqq.). But Aristotle is recommending the use of milk not merely in the case of sucklings, who indeed must use it, but in the case of children generally, or at any rate of children under three or thereabouts. The great physical strength of the Suebi was due in part to their use of milk (Caesar, Bell. Gall. 4. 1. 8 sq.). In the early days of ancient Greece infants were sometimes given honey, not milk (Schol. Aristoph. Thesm. 506). Phoenix gave the infant Achilles wine (Hom. Il. 9. 489), and it was probably commonly given to infants (Dio Chrys. Or. 4. 155 R, ή σὺ οἴει λέγειν αὐτὸν ύπὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοὺς βασιλέας τρέφεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τίτθης γάλακτι καὶ οίνω καὶ σιτίοις;), but Hippocrates (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 542 Kühn) advises, καὶ φημὶ ἄμεινον είναι τοῖς παιδίοισιν τὸν οίνον ώς ύδαρέστατον διδόναι ήσσον γαρ τας φλέβας ξυγκαίει και συναυαίνει: one source of stone in the bladder was thus removed. According to Hist. An. 7. 12. 588 a 3 sqq., wine sometimes produced convulsions in infants (βλαβερον δὲ πρὸς τὸ πάθος καὶ ὁ οἶνος ὁ μέλας μᾶλλον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ ὁ μὴ ύδαρής, καὶ τὰ πλείστα τῶν φυσωδῶν: cp. De Somno, 3. 457 a 14, διὸ τοῖς παιδίοις οὐ συμφέρουσιν οἱ οἶνοι οὐδὲ ταῖς τίτθαις (διαφέρει γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτὰ πίνειν ἢ τὰς τίτθας), ἀλλὰ δεῖ πίνειν ύδαρη καὶ ὀλίγου πνευματῶδες γὰρ ὁ οἶνος, καὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ὁ μέλας). Compare also Plato, Laws 666 A and 672 B (together with Aristot. Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19), and Athen. Deipn. 429 b.

8. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further it is of advantage to have all the movements made [of the bodies of infants] that it is possible to have made in the case of creatures so young.' Τηλικούτων I take to be in the genitive after ὅσας κινήσεις. Ποιεῖσθαι is to be supplied with συμφέρει. Aristotle has before him Plato, Theaet. 153 A, and 153 B, τί δέ, ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ σώζεται; and also Laws 789 E, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς τροφοὺς ἀναγκάζωμεν νόμω ζημιοῦντες τὰ παιδία ἡ πρὸς ἀγροὺς ἡ πρὸς ἱερὰ ἡ πρὸς οἰκείους ἀεί πη φέρειν, μέχριπερ ἄν ἱκανῶς ἵστασθαι δυνατὰ γίγνηται, καὶ τότε διευλαβουμένας, ἔτι νέων ὄντων μή πη βία ἐπερειδομένων στρέφηται τὰ κῶλα, ἐπιπονεῖν φερούσας, ἕως ἄν τριέτες ἀποτελεσθῆ τὸ γενόμενον; Συμφέρει, not merely πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν, as in 4, but probably also πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν (cp. 34 sqq.); perhaps indeed in other ways too (cp. Plato, Laws 790 C sqq.).

10. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 8, διὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι θραύεται μᾶλλον εἔθραυστον γὰρ τὸ νέον διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν. Plato was so much alive to this danger that he

recommended the use of swathing-bands, it would seem, during the whole of the first two years of life (Laws 789 E), though at Sparta they were not used at all (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16) and the general Greek custom (according to Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 80 sq.) probably was to drop them at the end of the fourth month. Plato had also advised with the same object in view that the unfortunate nurse should carry the child in her arms till he was three years old (see above on 8). Aristotle is silent as to all this; he apparently hopes to secure the same result by adopting from barbarian nations the use of certain "pyava μηχανικά, which kept the body of the infant from being twisted. What these instruments were, it is difficult to say. Vict. compares the 'serperastra' of Varro, Ling. Lat. 9. 5, which were knee-splints or knee-bandages for straightening the crooked legs of children. As to the swaddling-clothes used, see Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 79 sq.

12. των τοιούτων, i.e. τηλικούτων.

συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ. The Spartans and Cretans sought to make their youth indifferent to heat and cold, but they do not seem to have begun their discipline in this respect as early in life as Aristotle recommends (see above on 1336 a 3 sqq.). As to its importance, see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 22 sqq. and Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adesp. 461 (Nauck).

15. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς κ.τ.λ. See Göttling's note, and that of Eaton, who adds references to Galen Περὶ Ύγιεινῶν, 1. 10 (vol. vi. p. 51 Kühn), Strabo, p. 165, where we read of the Iberian women, ἔν τε τοῖς ἔργοις πολλάκις αὐταὶ καὶ λούουσι καὶ σπαργανοῦσιν ἀποκλίνασαι πρός τι ῥεῖθρον, and Virg. Aen. 9. 603,

Durum ab stirpe genus, natos ad flumina primum Deferimus, saevoque gelu duramus et undis.

See also the note of Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. p. 569, on the Greek proverb, 'O 'Pηνος ἐλέγχει τὸν νόθον, who quote Julian, Epist. 16. p. 383 D (cp. Or. 2. p. 81 D sq.), whence it appears that the dipping of the new-born babe in the Rhine was used as a test of its legitimacy, spurious offspring being held to sink and legitimate offspring to swim. They also refer to Valerius Flaccus, Argonaut. 6. 335, where we read of the Scythians on the Phasis,

Nunquam has hiemes, haec saxa relinquam, Martis agros, ubi iam saevo duravimus amne Progeniem natosque rudes. They remark that neither Aristotle, who was, so far as they know, the first to refer to the custom, nor Galen says a word as to the use of the practice as a test of legitimacy. A few other references to a similar custom may be noted. Zeus was believed to have been dipped at his birth in the river Lusius, which flows through the Arcadian Gortyna and is the coldest of rivers (Paus. 8. 28). Thetis sought to make Achilles immortal by dipping him as an infant in the Styx, and the Styx was very cold (Hes. Theog. 785 sq.). 'The modern Beloochees plunge the new-born infant into a tub of snow-water' (Prof. Ridgeway, Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc. 2. 147). Compare also the proverb (Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1189),

ev Παρίω ψυχρὸν μὲν ὕδωρ, καλαὶ δὲ γυναῖκες.

The Lacedaemonian practice was to bathe the infant after birth not in water, but in wine; this was held to be strengthening to healthy children (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Were all these customs connected with the wide-spread custom of infant baptism, which Mr. Whitley Stokes (Academy, Feb. 15, 1896) traces 'among the heathen Norsemen, the heathen Celts, two unconverted West African tribes, and lastly the Mexicans before the arrival of the Spaniards,' referring also to 'the cases mentioned by Prof. Tylor in his Primitive Culture, third edition, vol. ii. pp. 430–433'? 'Αποβάπτειν, 'to dip completely': see above on 1335 b 14, ἀποθεραπείαν.

- 17. τοῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. A σκέπασμα is a mere protection against cold, something much less elaborate than an ἱμάτιον. The Spartan youth were allowed an ἱμάτιον, though only one (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4). Some modern physicians give very different advice. 'In infancy parents above all should not make the mistake of letting their infants be too thinly clad. . . . It was a monstrous mistake for parents to send out their children with bare necks and heads and bare legs. Children ought to be clothed from head to foot winter and summer' (Dr. Corfield, Address to Sanitary Institute, Times, Sept. 30, 1889).
- 18. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Two interpretations of these words are possible. Lamb. translates, 'omnibus enim rebus quibus assuefieri possunt, statim ab ineunte aetate eos assuefacere melius est, dummodo sensim ac paulatim'; thus he takes πάντα to refer not to the beings which are to be habituated, but to the things to which they are to be habituated; and so Sus. 'zu Allem, wozu man Kinder überhaupt gewöhnen kann.' But it is also possible, and perhaps

simpler, to translate πάντα ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν 'all things that are susceptible of habituation.' I am not sure whether I am right in inferring from the passages with which Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ¿θίζειν) groups that before us that he takes the words in this sense. refers, however, in the preceding line to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 19-23 and Eth. Eud. 2. 2. 1220 b 1, where we learn that not all things are susceptible of habituation. The bodily habit of children, Aristotle goes on in 20 to tell us, is susceptible of habituation to Mέν here, as often elsewhere (Bon. Ind. s. v.), 'non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur'; it should have followed εὐθὺς ἀρχομένων, not βέλτιον. Έκ προσαγωγής is 'frequent in Hippocrates' (Liddell and Scott) and a favourite expression with Aristotle, but it is apparently not used by Thucydides, or Xenophon, or Plato, or (in the sense at least in which it is used here) by the Attic Orators. Compare for the thought Hist. An. 6. 12. 567 a 5 sqq. and Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 29, and for the turn of the sentence De Part. An. 3. 14. 675 a 6, ωστε διελείν μεν δύνανται, φαύλως δέ διελείν.

20. διὰ θερμότητα. Cp. Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὖτω διάθερμοὶ εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, and Probl. 3. 7. 872 a 6, οἱ δὲ παῖδες ὑγροὶ καὶ θερμοί: also Plato, Laws 664 E and 666 A. This view is inherited from Hippocrates: cp. Hippocr. Aphor., vol. iii. p. 710 Kühn, τὰ αὐξανόμενα πλεῖστον ἔχει τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμόν. Τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν, like τὴν τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν, c. 14. 1333 b 38.

21. τὴν πρώτην, sc. ἡλικίαν, which must be supplied from 23. See note on 1281 a 26. The phrase occurs in Pindar, Nem. 9. 42 (ἐν ἀλικία πρώτα), and in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 19, ἔτι οὐκ ἐνυπάρ-χει σπέρμα οὕτ' ἐν τῆ πρώτη ἡλικία οὕτ' ἐν τῷ γήρα οὕτ' ἐν ταῖs ἀρρωστίαιs, but in a wider sense than in the passage before us, where it appears to refer to the first two or three years of life.

23. τὴν δ' ἐχομένην κ.τ.λ. Aristotle intended to say that the next period of life till five should be dealt with in a different manner, the child being now encouraged to play games, but his sentence breaks down in course of utterance, for Π¹ P⁴.⁵ Bekk. are probably wrong in omitting δέ, 26, which is needed to contrast δεῖ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως with what immediately precedes. The accusative τὴν ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν is thus left without anything to govern it: compare the position of the nominative ὑπομνηστευσάμενός τις in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 14 sqq. For the thought, cp. Plato, Laws 793 E,

τριέτει δέ δή και τετραέτει και πενταέτει και έτι έξέτει ήθει ψυχής παιδιών δέον αν είη. For the child of six, however, Aristotle finds other occupation in 1336 b 35 sqq. Children under five are regarded by him as too young to be put to any study; it is not till seven that under his scheme of education children begin to learn what the gymnastic trainer and the παιδοτρίβης can teach them (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.), nor till after puberty apparently that they learn their letters (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.); among ourselves, on the contrary, to say nothing of the Kindergarten, children are taught their letters before five. The effect of hard physical labour in injuring growth is referred to in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10 sq. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 377 A, οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δ' έγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που, ως τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθη. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἡ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα. Aristotle does not quite agree with the last sentence; he thinks that from two or three to five children should have nothing to do with γυμνάσια involving ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι, but he does not agree that they should have no γυμνάσια at that age, but only stories. He provides a kind of gymnastic training for them in their pastimes and also in their διατάσεις καὶ κλαυθμοί. He excludes γυμνάσια involving ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι because they check physical growth (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.), and any checking of physical growth is especially out of place in the first five years of life, inasmuch as physical growth is the main business of these years; in fact, according to Plato, Laws 788 D, the human being grows in height during them as much as he does in the twenty succeeding years (ή πρώτη βλάστη παντὸς ζώου μεγίστη καὶ πλείστη Φύεται, ώστε καὶ ἔριν πολλοίς παρέσχηκε μὴ γίγνεσθαι τά γ' ανθρώπινα μήκη διπλάσια από πέντε έτων έν τοις λοιποις είκοσιν έτεσιν αὐξανόμενα: cp. Aristot. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 23, ἐν ἔτεσι γὰρ πέντε σχεδον επί γε των ανθρώπων ημισυ λαμβάνειν δοκεί το σώμα τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ χρόνω γιγνομένου ἄπαντος). For ώστε διαφεύγειν τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων, cp. Plato, Theaet. 153 B (quoted above on 1336 a 8).

27. ην, sc. κίνησιν.

28. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and the pastimes also' (no less than the ἄλλαι πράξεις) 'should be neither unbefitting for freemen nor laborious nor relaxed and effeminate.' Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 558 B, εἰ μή τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι, οὖποτ' ὰν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὧν εὐθὺς παίζοι ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοι τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα. The pastimes of little boys in ancient

Greece were no doubt often faulty in the ways referred to by Aristotle. He has hitherto been concerned almost, if not quite, exclusively with the training of the body, which precedes that of the ὅρεξις (c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq.), but now he begins to provide for the training of the ὅρεξις, and here, as in 1336 b 2 sqq., he seeks to exclude ἀνελευθερία. Cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 19 sqq. Μήτε ἐπιπόνους, because toilsome games will check the growth of the body (cp. 25). Μήτε ἀνειμένας, Vict. 'neque remissas nimis atque enervatas': for the contrast of ἐπιπόνους and ἀνειμένας, cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 33 sq.

30. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said by implication that the nature of the games which children over three should play is a matter to be attended to by those in authority, and now he adds the remark, 'Yes, and with regard to tales true and fictitious also,' etc. He here has before him Plato, Rep. 376 Ε, λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ' ἔτερον; Ναί. Παιδευτέον δ' έν αμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' έν τοις ψευδέσιν; Οὐ μανθάνω, έφη, πως λέγεις. Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἢν δ' έγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που, ώς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ: cp. Phaedo 61 B, where Stallbaum remarks, 'tenendum est λόγον esse vocabulum generis atque significare quamcunque orationem et narrationem, sive veram sive fictam; sed interdum, ubi opponitur  $\mu\hat{\nu}\theta$ os, de narratione vera usurpari solet.' Aóyos is thus used in opposition to μῦθος in Laws 872 D, Gorg. 523 A, Protag. 320 C, Tim. 26 E. It is probable therefore that περὶ λόγων καὶ μύθων in the passage before us means 'with regard to tales true and fictitious' (Sus. 'Erzählungen und Märchen'), though it should be noted that Vahlen (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 1. 34) does not take this view and regards λόγοι and μῦθοι here as synonymous, no less than in Poet. 5. 1449 b 8, where he interprets 'λόγους id est μύθους.' Aristotle is as careful as Plato (Rep. 377 B sq., 381 E) not to leave it to the uncontrolled discretion of mothers and nurses what tales are told to children, but his object seems to be to exclude tales which do not prepare the way for the pursuits of after-lifetales simply frivolous and amusing, for instance, or unsuitable to future soldiers and citizens—rather than tales giving a false impression of the gods, which were those specially objected to by Plato. Does Aristotle intend any kind of religious instruction to be conveyed through these λόγοι καὶ μῦθοι? If not, he does not seem to provide for any religious element in the education of youth.

32. πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'all the things we have mentioned,' παιδιαί, λόγοι, μῦθοι.

33. διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς κ.τ.λ. This is based on Plato, Laws 643 B, a passage which is probably present to Aristotle's mind in Poet. 4. 1448 b 5, τό τε γάρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ τούτω διαφέρουσι των άλλων ζώων ότι μιμητικώτατόν έστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιείται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας: cp. also Rep. 395 C. The Cretan lawgiver had already studied this (Ephor. Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250, ὖστερον δὲ καὶ συντάξαντα τὴν κληθεῖσαν ύπ' αὐτοῦ πυρρίχην, ώστε μηδέ την παιδιάν ἄμοιρον εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον χρησίμων), and a saying was ascribed to Anacharsis, παίζειν δεί, ὅπως σπουδάσης (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 233: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 33). Achilles as a child of six years had according to Pindar (Nem. 3. 43 sqq.) 'made mighty deeds his play.' The Tencteri learnt in the sports of childhood to become the formidable cavalry they proved themselves (Tac. Germ. c. 32). See also vol. i. p. 350, note 3, and cp. Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2 init. Aristotle wishes the pastimes even of infancy to be a preparation for the life of the soldier and the citizen. Many of the games played by Greek children were 'games of imitation': on this class of games see Becq de Fouquières, Jeux des Anciens, p. 63 sqq., where the games of 'the King,' 'the Judge,' and 'the Architect' are described. Children's mimicries of riding, driving, building, and nursing are familiar enough to ourselves. The ways of Themistocles and of Cato of Utica as children in the matter of games may be studied in Plut, Themist. c. 2 and Cato c. I. The late Rev. C. Kingsley is said to have preached to an audience of chairs at four years old. Even the games to which the little Chinese are addicted are always impregnated with the mercantile spirit; they amuse themselves with keeping shop and opening little pawnbroking establishments, and familiarize themselves with the jargon, the tricks, and the frauds of tradesmen' (Huc's Chinese Empire, Eng. Trans., 2. 149). These are exactly the sort of games which Aristotle would wish his infant citizen not to play.

34. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes naturally enough from παιδιαί, one means of producing movement, to διατάσεις καὶ κλαυθμοί, another and a more involuntary means of doing so. He had said in 25 that ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι must be avoided in the years from two or three to five because they interfere with the growth of the body, and now he tells us that the διατάσεις καὶ

κλαυθμοί which he declines to follow others in checking are not open to this objection, for they contribute to the growth of the body. Thus they are in place at this age, while the ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι are not. Plato is referred to in the words οί κωλύοντες έν τοις νόμοις: cp. Laws 791 Esqq., where he follows a Spartan tradition, for the nurses at Sparta sought to check fretfulness and crying in infants (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Plato is apparently speaking of new-born babes (701 D), and this might tempt us to transpose (with Sus. and Welldon) τὰς δὲ διατάσεις, 34-διατεινομένοις, 39, to after 20, τὴν τῶν ψυχρων ἄσκησιν, so as to group 34-39 with the part of the chapter which deals with infants (though even there the paragraph would not be in place, for it ought to follow the discussion of κινήσεις and to come after either συμφέρει, 10, or ἀστραβές, 12), but the transition from παιδιαί to διατάσεις is natural and easy, and, as I have pointed out, there is an evident reference in 34-39 to 25, οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὔξησιν ἐμποδίζωσιν. I am therefore against any transposition. For the thought, cp. Plut. Sympos. 6. 1. 1, αὐτόν τε έκαστον αὐτοῦ γυμνάσια καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ ὅσα τῷ κινεῖν αὕξει τὸ θερμόν, ήδιον φαγείν ποιεί καὶ προθυμότερον. The word used by Plato in Laws 792 A is κλαυθμοναί, not κλαυθμοί: κλαυθμός is a poetic word, 'rare in Attic Prose' (Liddell and Scott).

37. γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they come to be in a way exercise for the body [and exercise makes the body grow]': cp. Probl. 21. 14. 928 b 28, αὶ μὲν οὖν ἔξεις γυμναζόμεναι αὔξονται καὶ ἐπιδιδόασιν. Γίνεται is in the sing. by attraction to γυμνασία: cp. Thuc. 8. 9. 3, αἴτιον δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ξυνειδότες τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.

ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις κ.τ.λ., 'for it is the holding of the breath [which accompanies exertion] that produces strength in those who labour [and therefore serves the same end as exercise], and this ' (i. e. the holding of the breath) 'happens to children also when they exert themselves in crying [no less than to men taking exercise].' With Bonitz (Ind. 190 a 31) I take ő to refer to ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις only, and not to the whole of the preceding sentence. For the use of διατείνεσθαι here of straining which involves the holding of the breath, Bonitz compares Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 14, ἡ ὅτι οἱ μὲν νόμοι ἀγωνιστῶν ἦσαν, ὧν ἤδη μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένων καὶ διατείνεσθαι ἡ ϣδὴ ἐγίνετο μακρὰ καὶ πολυειδής; Cp. also Plut. Timol. C. 27, where διατεινάμενος is used of one who shouts ὑπερφυεῖ φωνῆ

καὶ μείζονι τῆς συνήθους. As to the effect of holding the breath in increasing strength, cp. De Somno 2. 456 a 16, ἰσχὺν δὲ ποιεῖ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 606 a 45), De Gen. An. 2. 4. 737 b 35 sqq., and 4. 6. 775 a 37 sqq. Τὴν ἰσχύν, not simply ἰσχύν, cp. Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 25, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδουὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον, and De Part. An. 2. 7. 653 a 10, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν ὕπνον τοῖς ζώοις τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἐγκέφαλον.

**40**. την τούτων διαγωγήν, 'the way in which these children pass their time.'  $\Delta \iota a \gamma \omega \gamma \eta$  is here used in a wider sense than the special one in which (in 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29) it is denied to children.

τήν τ' άλλην, καὶ όπως ότι ήκιστα μετά δούλων ἔσται. sentence looks as if it was intended to run τήν τ' ἄλλην καὶ τὴν μετὰ δούλων and was only finished as it stands by an afterthought. For the thought, compare the saying of Isocrates ([Plut.,] Decem Oratorum Vitae, 838 A), πρὸς δὲ τὸν εἰπόντα πατέρα, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ή ἀνδράποδον συνέπεμψε τῷ παιδίῳ. Τοιγαροῦν (ἔφη) ἄπιθι δύο γὰρ ἀνθ ένδι έξεις ἀνδράποδα, and Antiphanes, Μισοπόνηρος (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85). At Sparta παιδαγωγοί were dispensed with (see Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 16, and vol. i. p. 351, note 2). But Aristotle is speaking here of an earlier age than that at which boys were commonly provided with παιδαγωγοί—they would hardly have παιδαγωγοί till they went to school at seven—and he must be thinking rather of slave-nurses and of the slaves, male and female, about the house with whom the child was likely to come in contact. At Rome in its early days, according to Tac. Dial. de Orat. c. 28, 'suus cuique filius, ex casta parente natus, non in cella emptae nutricis sed gremio ac sinu matris educabatur.' The mother of Leopardi kept her children as much as possible out of the company of servants (see Macmillan's Magazine, vol. 56, p. 90). Aristotle is evidently afraid that children under seven may pick up ἀνελευθερία and αἰσχρολογία from the slaves about them, male and female. It must have taken imported slaves generally some little time to learn to speak Greek: even those employed as nurses and παιδαγωγοί, though they would commonly speak better Greek than most slaves, probably often spoke the language imperfectly (cp. Plato, Lysis 223 A): still they would speak it well enough to be occasionally guilty of αἰσχρολογία.

41. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλικίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. Sus. understands τήν before μέχρι referring to Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq., where among other passages Eth. Nic.

10. 2. 1174 a 10, ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς (ἡδοναὶ) διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἡ ἀφ' ὧν, is quoted. See notes on 1330 b 10 and 1334 b 12 for other cases of the omission of the article. It was not till the age of seven that the Spartan boy was placed in an ἀγέλη (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16), and this was the age at which the Athenian boy began to resort to a γραμματιστής and a παιδοτρίβης ([Plato,] Axioch. 366 D sq.), and the Persian boy to a riding-master (Alcib. 1. 121 E), though Herodotus (1. 136) makes Persian education begin at five. Plato, on the other hand, in the Laws (794) had brought children from three to six years old together for games at the village-temples.

2. εὖλογον οὖν κ.τ.λ. The meaning is that, as children under 1336 b. seven must be reared at home, where there are slaves and where illiberality of mind may easily be learnt, it is reasonable to expect that even at that early age they may acquire a taint of illiberality from what they see and hear. ᾿Ανελευθερία is used here in a wide and popular sense, not in the narrow and technical sense of ἀνελευ-θερία περὶ χρήματα in which it is discussed in Eth. Nic. 4. 1–3.

3. ὅλως μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is taken up by ἐὰν δέ, 8, the sense being, 'we banish indecent language altogether from the State, but if we do not entirely succeed in accomplishing that, and any person should be found saying or doing anything that we prohibit, then' etc. For the intervening μάλιστα μέν οὖν, 6, occurring by way of correction in the middle of a sentence, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 32, καὶ τὸν ήττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητείν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 540 b 55) ' δλως μέν οὖν—μάλιστα μέν οὖν—έὰν δέ non debebat tentare Susemihl.' Όλως goes with έξορίζει, as it probably also does in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 9, τους δ' ανιάτους όλως έξορίζειν. For the distance at which it stands from έξορίζειν see note on 1255 a 21. For ωσπερ άλλο τι ('more than anything else'), cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 31. Aristotle passes on from ἀνελευθερία to αἰσχρολογία, because he regards αἰσχρολογία as a form of ἀνελευθερία (cp. 12, ἀνδραποδωδίας χάρω). In ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν κ.τ.λ. he probably has before him a saying of Democritus recorded in [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 14, καὶ μέντοι καὶ τῆς αἰσχρολογίας ἀπακτέον τοὺς υίεις, λόγος γὰρ ἔργου σκιή κατὰ Δημόκριτου. Compare what we read of the Persians in Hdt. 1. 138, ασσα δέ σφι ποιέειν οὐκ έξεστι, ταῦτα οὐδὲ λέγειν ἔξεστι, and of Archytas in Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 19. The sons of the ὁμότιμοι of Cyrus in the Cyropaedeia of Xenophon are described as brought up at his court αἰσχρον μεν μηδεν μήτε όρωντες μήτε ἀκούοντες (Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 86). Some may ask why Aristotle

does not banish comedy, in which aloxpología was common, from the State. That he does not do so, we see from 1336 b 20. The reason is that those below a certain age will be forbidden to witness comedy, and that those above it will be protected from injury by the education they have received (1336 b 20 sqq.).

- 6. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 729 B.
- 9. As to ἀπηγορευμένων, see Liddell and Scott, and Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. ἀγορεύω.

τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἠξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις. As to the age at which the young freeman was allowed to recline, instead of sitting, at meals, cp. 21 sqq. The age intended may be twenty-one (cp. 1336 b 37 sqq.). It was probably at this age that the young Spartan became a member of one of the φιδίτια (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 66. 2). Sus.² (Note 966: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 558), however, regards the change as occurring in the seventeenth year, when the youths, as he believes (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.), begin to have syssitia of their own, though he allows that, as they remain outside the general syssitia till twenty-one, κατάκλισις will not commence for them there till that age. Κατάκλισις is associated in 21 sq. with μέθη, and Plato in Laws 666 B will not allow any of his citizens to share in μέθη till forty, but it is not likely that Aristotle intended to be equally strict.

- 10. ἀτιμίαις κολάζειν καὶ πληγαίς. Not with blows only, like a slave, but with indignities and blows combined—the former because the offender is a freeman (cp. Demosth. De Chersoneso, C. 51, ότι έστιν έλευθέρω μεν ανθρώπω μεγίστη ανάγκη ή ύπερ των γιγνομένων αισχύνη, και μείζω ταύτης ούκ οίδ' ήντιν αν είποι τις δούλω δὲ πληγαί και δ τοῦ σώματος αἰκισμός, and c. Androt. c. 55), and the latter because he is under age (cp. Plato, Laws 700 C, παισὶ δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοίς και τῷ πλείστω ὄχλω, ῥάβδου κοσμούσης, ἡ νουθέτησις ἐγίγνετο). We read in Laws 721 B of offenders who are to be mulcted χρήμασί τε καὶ ἀτιμία. Freemen of full age, on the other hand, were to be punished ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις, i.e. with indignities usually inflicted not on freemen but on slaves. There were ἀτιμίαι not ανελεύθεροι, such as the withdrawal of political rights. In Laws 946 C we read of βάσανοι ἐλεύθεραι. Charondas had made use of humiliating punishments (Diod. 12. 16. 1). See on the subject Prof. Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, ed. 1, p. 116.
  - 14. ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας, 'or indecent speeches from the stage.'

Iambi and comedy are evidently referred to (cp. 20 sqq.). Prof. W. Christ (Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 167. 4) takes λόγοι here to mean 'dialogue,' comparing the expression λόγοι Σωκρατικοί for Socratic Dialogues (see also Bon. Ind. 433 b 3 sqq.), but Aristotle must have objected to indecent monologue as much as to indecent dialogue. In speaking of the class of mimes called παίγνια, Plutarch (Sympos. 7. 8. 4) remarks, οὶ δὲ πολλοί (i.e. most of those who introduce παίγνια at banquets), καὶ γυναικῶν συγκατακειμένων καὶ παίδων ἀνήβων, ἐπιδείκνυνται μιμήματα πραγμάτων καὶ λόγων ἃ πάσης μέθης ταραχωδέστερον τὰς ψυχὰς διατίθησιν.

ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οὖν here contains an inference, as in c. 16. 1335 b 8 and in 1. 1. 1252 a 7.

τοῖς ἄρχουσι, not the paedonomi probably, but rather the astynomi and agronomi (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 18 sqq.).

15. μηδὲν μήτε ἄγαλμα κ.τ.λ., 'that there is no image or picture representing indecent scenes' (Welldon).

τοιούτων, i.e. ἀσχημόνων. Pictures and statues representing indecent acts or scenes must evidently have been visible in Greek cities, especially, it would seem, in connexion with the gods in whose worship τωθασμός was used. It is not probably to the familiar Hermae that Aristotle objects, but rather to pictures and statues representing such subjects as the drunkenness of Dionysus: as to these cp. Athen. Deipn. 428 e, οὐ καλῶς δὲ οἱ πλάττοντες καὶ γράφοντες τὸν Διόνυσον, ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ τῆς ἁμάξης διὰ μέσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς οἰνωμένον ἐπιδείκνυνται γὰρ τοῖς θεαταῖς ὅτι καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττων ἐστὶν ὁ οἶνος καίτοι γ' οὐδ' ἄν, οἶμαι, ἄνθρωπος σπουδαῖος τοῦθ' ὑπομείνειεν. Others perhaps represented the amours of Zeus.

16. εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς κ.τ.λ. As to this 'consecrated scurrility,' see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 4. 108, note (Part 2, c. 29): C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 29. 3 (who refers to Paus. 7. 27. 10), 2. § 56. 14, and 2. § 57. 20: Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 93 foot. Compare also Athen. Deipn. 622 a-d, and the unfavourable view expressed by Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, of the gods in whose worship τωθασμός was resorted to (Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 26, δ δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὰς ἀποφράδας καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν ὅσαι πληγάς τινας ἡ κοπετοὺς ἡ νηστείας ἡ δυσφημίας ἡ αἰσχρολογίαν ἔχουσιν, οὕτε θεῶν τιμαῖς οὕτε δαιμόνων οἵεται προσήκειν χρηστῶν, ἀλλὰ εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυράς, δυστρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπάς, αὶ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τυγχάνουσαι πρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο χεῖρον τρέπονται: cp. Plut. De Defect.

Orac. c. 14. 417 C). Among the gods to whom Aristotle here refers are Dionysus, Demeter, and Corê (C. F. Hermann ibid.). But other gods also were thus worshipped, for instance Apollo Aeglêtês in Anaphê (Conon, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 141 b 27 sqq. Bekk., ἐν ἀνάφη τῆ νήσφ . . . ἱερὸν ἀπόλλωνος αἰγλήτου ἴδρυται, ἐν ῷ σὺν τωθασμῷ οἱ ἐπιχώριοι θύουσι δι αἰτίαν τοιαύτην κ.τ.λ.). Here the τωθασμός was addressed by the worshippers to each other in commemoration of the jests exchanged between Medea and her attendant women on the one side and the Argonauts on the other, when the Argo was driven by a tempest to Anaphê. Καὶ τὸν τωθασμόν, 'scurrilous jeering also,' as well as indecent statues and pictures. 'Ο νόμος, probably an unwritten law, like that referred to in c. 12. 1331 a 26 sqq.

17. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ., 'and in addition to this the law allows them to do honour to the gods on behalf both of themselves and of their wives and children.' Cp. Cato, De Re Rustica, c. 143, rem divinam (villica) ne faciat, neve mandet qui pro ea faciat, iniussu domini aut dominae. Scito dominum pro tota familia rem divinam facere. A saying of Pythagoras recorded in Diod. 10. 9. 7 is in a somewhat similar spirit, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς (i.e. Πυθαγόρας) ἀπεφαίνετο τοῖς θεοῖς εὕχεσθαι δεῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς φρονίμους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφρόνων τοὺς γὰρ ἀσυνέτους ἀγνοεῖν τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ βίω κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν. In Laws 909 D Plato goes farther and confines sacrificing, as distinguished from prayer, to priests and priestesses, οἶς ἀγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής. Τιμαλφεῖν (a poetical word, 'rare in Prose,' see Liddell and Scott) refers probably especially to sacrifices. For καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν, see critical note on 1330 b 31.

20. τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle goes on to protect the young against λόγους ἀσχήμονας (cp. 14). As to iambi, see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 935 E, ποιητῆ δὴ κωμωδίας ἤ τινος ἐάμβων κ.τ.λ. Iambi are iambic verses, often abusive and indecent (cp. 35, ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμένειαν), declaimed by actors at festivals of Dionysus in which the phallus was introduced (Poet. 4. 1449 a 9–13). It was from iambi of this kind that comedy took its rise (Poet. 4. 1448 b 24–1449 a 15, and esp. 24 sqq. and 1449 a 2 sqq.). Iambi, however, did not pass away on the rise of comedy; we hear, in fact, that they were particularly popular at Syracuse (Athen. Deipn. 181 c). Iambi and comedy had this in common that they dealt in ψόγος (cp. Hor. Carm. 1. 16. 2, criminosis iambis), hence they are often named together, e.g. in Plato, Laws 935 E.

Whether Aristotle includes under iambi mimes written in iambic verse, like those of Herondas, it is difficult to say. As to comedy, compare Plato's views in Laws 816 D sqq. The satyr-play which was added at the close of a tragic trilogy often contained indecent passages, but it does not seem to have been open to as much objection as comedy (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 447), and it probably savoured less of ψόγος and δυσμένεια. It appears to be certain that boys were present at representations both of tragedy and of comedy at Athens (A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalt. p. 292. 1). The bigger boys were very fond of comedy and older lads of tragedy (Plato, Laws 658 D). As to νομοθετητέον see critical note. If it is the correct reading, οὖτ' ὶάμβων οὖτε κωμφδίας θεατὰς νομοθετητέον must apparently mean 'we must not legislate that the young shall be [admissible as] spectators of either iambi or comedy.'

- 21. πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν κ.τ.λ. See above on 9. For πρὶν ἢ with the aor. subj. without ἄν, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 633 a 2 sqq. Kaissling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 54) points out that πρὶν ἢ with the aorist subjunctive is not here preceded by οὐ πρότερον, as it is in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 17 sqq.
  - 22. τῶν τοιούτων, i. e. iambi and comedy.
- 24. The Index Aristotelicus (608 b 30) gives no other instance of ποιείσθαι τὸν λόγον followed by a genitive (we expect περὶ τούτων, but compare for the absence of περί c. 10. 1330 a 22, 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 33 sq., and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 36, αὶ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι τῶν κοινῶν), nor does it give any other instance of παραδρομή or ἐν παραδρομή (245 b 36). Ἐν παραδρομή seems to be a rare expression.
- 25. εἶτε μὴ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., sc. νομοθετεῖν τοὺς νεωτέρους εἶναι θεατὰς ἰάμβων καὶ κωμῷδίας. Διαπορήσαντας here = διελθόντας τὰς ἀπορίας, like διαποροῦντας in 3. 4. 1276 b 36 (Bon. Ind. 187 b 11). Πῶς δεῖ, sc. τοῦτο νομοθετεῖν, i. e. by what provisions of law the exclusion of the νεώτεροι will best be effected.
- 26. κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν κ.τ.λ., 'but in relation to the present occasion we have touched on it only in the way in which it was necessary to touch on it.' For the suppression of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36. Compare also Meteor. 3. 4. 374 b 17, νῦν δ' ὅσον ἀνάγκη, τοσοῦτον περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν, and for κατὰ τὸν παρόντα

καιρόν, Rhet. ad Alex. 1. 1421 a 24, ταυτὶ μέν οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια παραλιπεῖν νομίζω καλῶς ἡμῖν ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν ὑπάρχοντα καιρόν.

27. ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ' for perhaps Theodorus, the actor of tragedy, said not ill that which has just been said.' Γάρ introduces an explanation why it is not necessary for Aristotle to say more; Theodorus, in fact, had by his remark done much to solve the problem and to indicate the true course. Camerarius, however, asks, not without reason (Interp. p. 332), 'Quod vero hoc dictum est? Factum enim magis exponitur histrionis. Nisi aliquis coniecturam de eo capere dicto posse videatur. Aut libeat suspicari ista esse mutila.' Coray's note is, 'ξλεγε τὸ παραπλήσιον τούτω τῷ περὶ τῶν παίδων. Τί δὲ ἔλεγε; τὸ οἰκειοῦσθαι τοὺς θεατὰς ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαις, ὡς φαίνεται ἐκ τῶν ἐξῆς.' If ἔλεγε is to be retained, the passage should probably be explained as Coray explains it, but, as Sus.3 says, ' ἔλεγε haud sine causa offendit Camerarium.' The only substitute for it which has occurred to me is ἔλυε ('gave not ill a practical solution of the question which has just been mentioned'). For ὁ τῆς τραγωδίας ὑποκριτής, which is added to distinguish this Theodorus from others of the same name, cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 417, ὑποκριτὴς τραγ[ωιδίας], Athen. Deipn. 407 d. Τιμοκλής ό της κωμωδίας ποιητής (ην δε και τραγωδίας), and Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 40, Θεοδώρου τοῦ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητοῦ ὑποκρινομένου τὴν 'Αερόπην. As to Theodorus, see Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 523, and Sus.2, Note 968 (Sus.4, 1. p. 558), and cp. Rhet. 3. 2. 1404 b 22 sqq., where the naturalness and charm of his voice are dwelt upon. He was one of the best tragic actors of the time immediately before that of Aristotle. How could Theodorus avoid being preceded by other actors on the stage, if he did not always take the part, perhaps an insignificant one, to which the first speech of the tragedy was assigned? Richards asks, 'Did he insist, when plays were competing, on being protagonist in the first, so that no other protagonist might win over the audience before him? Or does the statement about him refer to occasions when actors only (not plays or choruses) were competing, and when perhaps only scenes or single speeches were recited? See Haigh's Attic Theatre, p. 58.' Demosthenes acted in much the same way as Theodorus did, when he insisted on being heard by Philip of Macedon first of the Athenian envoys (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. C. 108, φάσκων γὰρ νεώτατος εἶναι πάντων τὴν τάξιν τοῦ πρῶτος λέγειν οὐκ αν έφη παραλιπείν, οὐδ' ἐπιτρέψειν τινί (αινιττόμενος εἰς ἐμέ) προκαταλαβόντα τὰ Φιλίππου ὧτα τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγον μὴ καταλιπεῖν). Cp. also (with Richards) Demosth. Prooem. 34. p. 1443, εἴητε δ' ὥσπερ τὰ θέατρα τῶν προκαταλαμβανόντων.

- 29. οὐδενὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Εἰσάγειν is commonly used of the poet or chorêgus bringing the chorus on the stage (as in Aristoph. Acharn. 11, εἴσαγ', ὧ Θέογνι, τὸν χορόν), but here προεισάγειν is used with some freedom of the actors bringing on the stage the parts represented by them (W. Christ, Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 171. 2).
- 30. ὡς οἰκειουμένων κ.τ.λ., 'holding that the audience is made friendly to' (or 'won to the side of') 'what it hears first.' Liddell and Scott compare Thuc. 1. 36, ὁ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν οἰκειοῦταί τε καὶ πολεμοῦται. Οἰκειουμένων is interpreted by στέργομεν, 33.
- 31. συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and this same thing happens both in relation to dealings with men, [which is what Theodorus had in view,] and in relation to dealings with things.' For πρός, cp. 38, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 3. For τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμιλίας, cp. Eurip. Phoen. 1329 Bothe (1408 Dindorf), ὁμιλία χθονός.
- 33. πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον, 'for whatever we first have to do with, we like better than anything else,' so that if iambi and comedy are witnessed in youth, they will be among the things liked best. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 378 D, ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἶός τε κρίνειν ὅ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὁ μή, ἀλλ' ἃ ἃν τηλικοῦτος ὧν λάβη ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅ τι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν. Compare Hor. Epist. 1. 2. 69 and familiar sayings like 'on revient toujours à ses premiers amours' and 'the child is father of the man.' 'The Jesuits used to say, "Give me a child till he is seven years old, and I will make him what no one will unmake"' (Miss E. Welldon in the Cheltenham Ladies' College Magazine, No. 18, p. 179). We may also explain in this way the tendency of men, as they grow old, to become 'laudatores temporis acti.' On the other hand, there is truth in Hom. Odyss. 1. 351,

την γὰρ ἀοιδην μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ' ἄνθρωποι, ητις ἀκουόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται.

διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Ποιεῖν ξένα, 'to make strange and unknown,' in opposition to οἰκειουμένων, 30. Pythagoras (ap. Aristox. Fragm. 20: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) shows a similar desire to keep the young from all knowledge of evil. It was in a somewhat different sense that Antisthenes said (Diog. Laert. 6. 12), τὰ πουηρὰ πάντα νόμιζε ξενικά.

34. μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ὅσα ἔχει ἢ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν. As αὐτῶν = τῶν φαύλων, it is clear that in Aristotle's view a thing might be φαῦλον without possessing μοχθηρία. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 2, μοχθηρία μεν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αίρετων εκαστόν έστι δι' αύτό φαῦλαι δε καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτων είσὶν αί ὑπερβολαί. We see from Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 34, διαστρέφει γάρ ή μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεί περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς, what a strong term μοχθηρία is. Aristotle probably regards iambi and comedy as not free from elements of depravity and malignity. Δυσμένειαν, the reading of II Bekk. (as to the rendering of Vet. Int. see critical note on 1336 b 35), seems to be perfectly right, though Sus. would read δυσγένειαν in place of it. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Laws 934 D-936 A, where iambi and comedy are connected with ἔχθρα, βλασφημία, and κακηγορία, and Phileb. 48 A-50 A, where envy is implied to be an ingredient in comedy, for envy is nearly related to δυσμένεια, the words φθόνος and δυσμένεια being conjoined in Plato, Rep. 500 C, Phaedr. 253 B, and Protag. 316 D. Compare also Rep. 395 E, κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμωδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας, and Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22, ὀργή δὲ χάριτος καὶ χόλος εὐμενείας καὶ τοῦ φιλανθρώπου καὶ φιλόφρονος τὸ δυσμενες καὶ ταρακτικὸν ἀπωτάτω τῆ φύσει τέτακται τὰ μεν γαρ αρετής και δυνάμεως, τα δ' ασθενείας έστι και φαυλότητος. Plato does his best in the Laws (792 B, D, E) to secure that the child shall be εὔθυμος, ίλεως, and εὐμενής, and it is in the same mood (Rep. 496 E) that he wishes men to close their life. This is the mood of the Olympian Gods (see above on 1332 a 9), and according to Plutarch (Pericl. c. 39) it was the εὐμενὲς ἦθος of Pericles that justified the application to him of the epithet 'Olympian.'

35. διελθόντων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Θεωρούς means 'spectators,' not 'auditores,' as Sus.³ explains the word in this passage (Ind. s.v.). Aristotle gets the hint of what he here suggests from Plato, Rep. 466 E, ὅτι κοινἢ στρατεύσονται, καὶ πρός γε ἄξουσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅσοι ἀδροί, τν' ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶνται ταῦτα, ἀ τελεωθέντας δεήσει δημιουργεῖν . . . ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἶον τοὺς τῶν κεραμέων παίδας, ὡς πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦσι, πρὶν ἄπτεσθαι τοῦ κεραμεύειν; Plato, however, is speaking here of older boys than those whom Aristotle has in view, and war would of course not be one of the μαθήσεις to which Aristotle refers. These μαθήσεις include probably gymnastic and music, especially the former. Plato in the Laws (794 C) had sent boys of six to

teachers of riding and of the use of the bow, the javelin, and the sling; Aristotle sends boys at seven to the gymnastic trainer and the παιδοτρίβης (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.); of riding he says nothing.

37. δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι κ.τ.λ. At this point we pass from τροφή, or rearing, to παιδεία, or education strictly so called, which is evidently conceived as beginning at seven years of age. We shall find in the sequel that, in accordance with the announcement made here, puberty forms a turning-point in the educational course, for till puberty no studies find a place in it but gymnastic, and that of the less laborious type (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40), whereas after puberty other studies are to be taken in hand for three years, and then the severe kind of gymnastic is to be commenced (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqg.). That the age of twenty-one, like puberty, marks a crisis in the physiological development of the human being, we see from Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16-33. The meaning of μετά in 38, 39, is by no means clear, yet the commentators say nothing about it. Is Aristotle's meaning this, that a break is to occur in the education at two epochs—at the close of the period from seven years of age to puberty and at the close of the period from puberty to twenty-one, or in other words at puberty and at twenty-one? If this is so, it is manifest that Aristotle did not intend his education to cease at twenty-one, a conclusion to which other considerations also point (see vol. i. p. 370 and p. 358, note 2, and note on 1333 b 3). He apparently devotes the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one to the severer kind of gymnastic training (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.). At Athens things were arranged quite differently. Young Athenians were enrolled in the ληξιαρχικον γραμματείον and became citizens on the completion of the eighteenth year ('At. IIo), c. 42: the seventeenth according to Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 197, 310, but see Mr. R. W. Macan in Class. Rev. 10. 199 sq.), though they spent the two following years in military training, garrison-duty, and field-service as περίπολοι, and therefore did not discharge any strictly political functions till two years later. Aristotle does not arrange for the performance of any military service before the age of twenty-one. For πρὸς ας, 'in relation to which, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, διήρηται μέν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τάς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. In 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 37, on the other hand, we have πρέπει γὰρ διηρησθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, and in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ώρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις.

40. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάσι κ.τ.λ. See above on 1335 b 33.

1. δεῖ δὲ τῆ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν. Cp. De Caelo 1. 1. 268 a 19, ταῦτα δ', ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν οὕτως ἐπάγειν ἀκολουθοῦμεν, and Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 36. The phrase ἀκολουθεῖν τῆ φύσει occurs in Plato, Laws 836 C. Plato in the Laws (809 E sq.) had arranged his curriculum of study without reference to puberty by periods of three years from ten to sixteen. Aristotle follows the Lacedaemonian practice: cp. Phot. συνέφηβος (quoted by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 63), Σπαρτιᾶται δὲ σιδεύνας (sc. τοὺς ἐφήβους καλοῦσι) διέκρινον δὲ αὐτοὺς ἄρα (ἄμα?) τῆ ῆβη, τουτέστιν περὶ πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ ἐκκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότας, τῶν νεωτέρων παίδων, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἤσκουν ἀνδροῦσθαι.

πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία κ.τ.λ. As art and education seek to complete nature, they should follow nature as far as she goes. Art seeks to complete nature because she takes the raw material furnished by nature—wool, or bricks, or human beings—and by completing what is deficient produces a garment, or a house, or a State: see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 118 sq., and compare (with Eaton) Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15, δλως τε ή τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ α ή φύσις άδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται, and (with Congreve) Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1007 a 5 sq. The same thing is true of education, for education starts with that which is furnished by nature (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sq.), and completes it. Τέχνη and παιδεία go together here, as τέχνη and μάθησις in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 9, where see note. For πασα παιδεία, 'every kind of education,' compare the use of παιδεία in the plural in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 7 sq., Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 26 sq., and Thuc. 2. 30. 2. The word προσλείπειν appears to be a rare one: Liddell and Scott compare C. I. G. 3935, τὰ προσλείψαντα τοῦ ἔργου.

3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has now reached the subject—that of education—to reach which he has been hastening forward so fast, postponing the full consideration of not a few questions, and he here resumes the use of the aporetic method, which he had laid aside since the commencement of the Fourth Book (vol. i. p. 352). The first two of the questions here raised are easily answered, the first in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11-21, and the second in 1337 a 21-33, but the third question requires far fuller treatment; the consideration of it is not completed in what we possess of the Fifth Book.

4. κοιν η . . . η κατ ίδιον τρόπον, 'on a public footing or individually' (cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24 sqq.). Aristotle has already said in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 29, κράτιστον μέν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινην ἐπιμέλειαν (sc. τροφης τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων) καὶ ὀρθήν. For ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν, cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 21 sq.

6. καὶ νῦν, 'even now' (cp. c. 16. 1335 b 5). Even in Aristotle's day not many Greek States made the superintendence of education the concern of the State.

7. ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην, sc. τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. This is explained by 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 34, τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία, καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.

## BOOK V (VIII).

11. <sup>9</sup>Οτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Two reasons are given for this conclu- C. 1. sion—(1) attention to the education of youth is demanded in the <sup>1337</sup> a. interest of the constitution (12-18), and (2) it is demanded because some training is required before men can act virtuously (18-21).

12. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12–36 and 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.

14. δεί γάρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι. See critical note.

τὸ γὰρ ήθος κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 544 D, οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τοσαῦτα ανάγκη τρόπων είναι οσαπερ καὶ πολιτειών; ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἢθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, å αν ωσπερ ρέψαντα τάλλα έφελκύσηται; Aristotle insists in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. that the safety of constitutions is not secured by the mere making of laws, however excellent they may be; it is necessary to produce in the citizens the type of character which is favourable to the maintenance of the particular constitution. We read in Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 12 of τὰ ήθη τῶν πολιτειῶν έκάστης: cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 39. As to the δημοκρατικον ήθος see Demosth. Ol. 3. 25 sq., where it is implied that one feature of it is a willingness on the part of the leading men of the State to be content with a mode of life not more splendid than that of their neighbours and a desire that not private buildings, but public should be magnificent. Aristotle, however, would probably find the δημοκρατικόν and όλιγαρχικὸν ήθος in the kind of character which makes in favour of the existence and continuance of a democracy and an oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 2 sqq. and see note on 1310 a 12.

17. ἀεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., so that not only does the presence in the citizens of the type of character appropriate to a constitution generate that constitution, but a superior quality in the type generates a superior quality of constitution. For the form of the sentence cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25 sq. and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 28 sq. For βέλτιστον see critical note on 1337 a 18.

18. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Euripides had placed a different sentiment in the mouth of one of the characters of his Augê: cp. Diog. Laert.
2. 33, Εὐριπίδου δ' ἐν τῆ Αὕγη εἰπόντος περὶ ἀρετῆς,

κράτιστον είκη ταῦτ' έαν ἀφειμένα,

αναστας έξηλθε (Σωκράτης), φήσας γελοίον είναι ανδράποδον μεν μη εύρισκόμενον άξιουν ζητείν, άρετην δ' ούτω έαν απολωλέναι. See also Plut. Virtutem doceri posse, c. 3. Not only is it necessary in the interest of the constitution that training likely to produce the required ηθος should be given in youth, but training in youth is also necessary with a view to the practice of virtue. For previous training is desirable with a view to the practice of all δυνάμεις καὶ τέχναι, and virtue is a δύναμις (Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36 sqq.: contrast Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 6 sqq.). Or the argument may be an a fortiori one. If previous training is necessary for the practice of an art, a fortiori it is necessary for action in accordance with virtue, for the successful practice of an art implies the fulfilment of fewer conditions than action in accordance with virtue (Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 26 sqq.). For δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας see note on 1268 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq., where Metaph. O. 2. 1046 b 2, διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ [καὶ] ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλω ή ἄλλο, is quoted, and reference is made to Rhet. 1. 2. 1358 a 6 and other passages. For προπαιδεύεσθαι καὶ προεθίζεσθαι, cp. Pol. 3. 18. 1288 b 1, καὶ παιδεία καὶ έθη, and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, είθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq., on the other hand, παιδεία seems to include τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι. For πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, 'with a view to the operations of each of them, cp. Plato, Symp. 205 B, ωστε καὶ αἰ ύπὸ πάσαις ταις τέχναις έργασίαι ποιήσεις είσί, and Gorg. 450 C.

21. τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 9, τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle passes to the second question, whether education should be in the hands of the State or in those

of the private individual (i.e. the father, cp. 25, τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων). Two reasons are given why it should be in the hands of the State: (1) as the whole State (i. e. all the citizens) has one and the same end before it, the education given will be the same for all, hence its management should be in the hands of the State, and not in the hands of parents, as at present, training their children privately and in whatever subjects they please; (2) the individual should regard himself as part of the State, and the management of the part should be adjusted to the management of the whole [so that it should be in the hands which manage the whole, i.e. the hands of the State]. The first of these two arguments is hardly conclusive. The education given to all might be identical without being placed in the hands of the State. Against the second it may be urged that the welfare of the whole might be kept in view in the training of the part, even if education were not placed in the hands of the State. Compare with Aristotle's view that of Plutarch in Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4. We learn from 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq. that Aristotle looks to education to make the State one, and this is another reason why the State should take the charge of it into its own hands.

- 23. καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Laws 804 C–D and 810 A. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq., and Plut. Camill. c. 10, κοινῷ γὰρ ἐχρῶντο τῷ διδασκάλῳ, ὥσπερ ελληνες, οἱ Φαλέριοι, βουλόμενοι συντρέφεσθαι καὶ συναγελάζεσθαι μετ ἀλλήλων εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοὺς παῖδας. Κατ ἰδίαν recurs in Hist. An. 1. 11. 492 b 15 (Eucken, Beobachtungen über die Praepositionen, p. 45).
- 26. δεὶ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν ποιείσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν. Cp. Plato, Laws 942 B sq. Τῶν κοινῶν, education for instance. Τὴν ἄσκησιν as well as the things themselves. Aristotle's language recalls the contention of the Lacedaemonians in Diod. 11. 55. 4, καὶ δεῖν ἔφασαν τῶν κοινῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀδικημάτων εἶναι τὴν κρίσιν οὐκ ἰδίᾳ παρὰ τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων.
- 27. ἄμα δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and at the same time [so far from its being right to think that the individual citizen can justly claim to educate his children as he pleases], it is not even right to think that he belongs to himself; the true creed is that all the citizens belong to the State.' Aristotle inherits this view from others. Thus we read of the Spartans in Plut. Lycurg. c. 24, ὅλως νομίζοντες οὐχ αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι διετέλουν, and in c. 25, τὸ δὲ ὅλον εἴθιζεν (ὁ Λυκοῦργος)

τούς πολίτας μη βούλεσθαι μηδε επίστασθαι κατ' ιδίαν ζην, άλλ' . . . δλους είναι της πατρίδος, and of the Athenians of the time of the Persian War in Demosth. De Cor. c. 205, ήγειτο γάρ αὐτῶν εκαστος οὐχὶ τῷ πατρί καὶ τῆ μητρὶ μόνον γεγενησθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆ πατρίδι. Much the same thing, indeed, is said by the Corinthian envoys in Thuc. 1. 70. 6 of the Athenians at the outset of the Peloponnesian War. But what Aristotle has especially before him is the language of Plato in Laws 923 Α, έγωγ' οὖν νομοθέτης ὧν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ὑμῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι τίθημι οὔτε τὴν οὐσίαν ταύτην, ξύμπαντος δὲ τοῦ γένους ὑμῶν τοῦ τε ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα ἐσομένου, καὶ ἔτι μαλλον τῆς πόλεως είναι τό τε γένος πῶν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Cp. Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 45, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur, and De Offic. 1. 25. 85. To none of these authorities does it occur for a moment that the Greek citizen belonged to Hellas as well as to his own State. Isocrates may perhaps have remembered this (Jebb, Attic Orators 2. 44). Aristotle does not consider how far the citizen should carry his sense of belonging to his πόλις. Clearly he thinks that the citizen should subordinate his private preferences to those of his πόλις, but should he suppress conscientious convictions and sink his conscience in the will of the πόλις? Suppose the πόλις is under a tyranny or extreme oligarchy or extreme democracy? If the virtue of a citizen is relative to the preservation of the constitution (3. 4. 1276 b 27 sqq.), a good citizen must apparently do what tends to preserve the constitution, however bad the constitution may be, but what would Aristotle say that a good man ought to do in such a case? Subordinate his conscience to the maintenance of the constitution? If so, contrast the view of the Platonic Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 512 E sq.

- 29. μόριον γὰρ ἔκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and that which is a part of the State belongs to the State: cp. 1. 4. 1254 a 9, τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἄλλου.
- ή δ' ἐπιμέλεια κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 14, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετήν. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 903 B, πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῷ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα . . . ὧν ἐν καὶ τὸ σόν, ὧ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεί, καίπερ πάνσμικρον ὄν, and Charmides 156 E, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἴη τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ὅτι τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν, οὖ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὖ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον

εἴη τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν: compare the teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Phaedrus 270 C, and see Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 7.

31. καὶ τοῦτο, 'in this matter also,' i.e. for attending to the education of youth and making it a matter of State-concern: cp. c. 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. The Lacedaemonians were praised for many other things (6 (4). 1. 1288 b 40 sqq.). It will be noticed that nothing is here said of the Cretans, and that the compliment paid to the Lacedaemonians is not extended to them: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq. and contrast Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 10 sqq., where the Cretan lawgiver, no less than the Lacedaemonian, is said to seek to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.

34. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, 'how one should have them taught,' C. 2. cp. c. 3. 1338 a 38, and for πῶς c. 3. 1338 a 33, c. 4. 1338 b 38, ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῆ γυμναστικῆ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν, and c. 6. 1340 b 20, πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἡ μή . . . νῦν λεκτέον.

36. περὶ τῶν ἔργων, 'sc. τῆς παιδείας, i.e. de iis rebus quas doceri iuvenes oporteat, opp. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι' (Bon. Ind. 286 a 33). For τῶν ἔργων in this sense cp. 1337 b 5 sqq. Π¹ Sus. read διὰ τῶν ἔργων, which Sus.² translates 'thatsächlich' (does this mean 'practically'?), but it is difficult to believe that διά is the true reading.

37. οὖτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὖτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον. For the distinction, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 a 24, πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον, and Top. 3. 1. 116 b 23, καὶ ὅλως τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίον τέλος αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἶον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεῖνον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν. The study of music, we learn in the sequel, is of value both with a view to virtue and with a view to τὴν ἐν τῷ σχολῷ διαγωγήν, or in other words τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον, but the two ends are not to be confounded. Education in the 'best State' will naturally be adjusted to both, and hence the mention of them here. Aristotle points out that there was no agreement as to the training conducive to either. The Spartans, for instance, would say that gymnastic training was the road both to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 26 sq.) and to the life of empire, which they regarded as the best life (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 20 sqq.), but others would think differently.

38. οὐδὲ φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. As to this see vol. i. p. 354, note 2. For the distinction of διάνοια and τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 3. 11. 1281 b 7, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν: cp. also 1337 b 11, ἡ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ τὴν διάνοιαν, and Plato, Laws

798 A, καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διανοίας τε ἄμα καὶ τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν φύσεις. For τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθος, cp. c. 5.1340 a 11, b 11, De Part. An. 4.11.692 a 22, τὸ ἦθος τοῦ ζώου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, and Plato, Lysis 222 A, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατά τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος, and Laws 793 E, έξέτει ἤθει ψυχῆς. Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος is the disposition or character of the soul; the phrase is used not only by Plato, but also by Xenophon (Mem. 3. 10. 3), and there is nothing technical about it. Sus.³ (Ind. s. v. ψυχή) explains it as synonymous with τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, but does it not rather mean the diathesis of τὸ ὀρεκτικόν?

39. ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμποδων παιδείας κ.τ.λ., 'and if we take as the starting-point of our inquiry the education with which we are daily in contact, the inquiry proves perplexing.' For ¿κ, cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 25, καὶ γὰρ έξ ὧν ἄν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν . . . παντελώς έστιν όλίγα, and for έμποδών, cp. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 6. 323 a 26, καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινούμενα πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ έμποδών (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 243 a 61, who explains τὰ ἐμποδών as=τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν). Light is thrown on Aristotle's meaning by 1337 b 21 sqq. Actual education had four branches—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—and of these reading, writing, and drawing were studied for their utility, and gymnastic as contributing to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 25 sqq.), while the study of music included the practice of τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων (c. 6. 1341 a 11 sqq.), and was commonly pursued with a view to pleasure (1337 b 28). Some authorities favoured studies useful for life, others those contributing to virtue, and others those of an out-ofthe-way kind. Aristotle's own aim in planning the education of his 'best State' is to make his citizens men of complete virtue, fit in body, mind, and character to live in the practice of all the virtues and to rule and be ruled with a view to the most desirable life, the life in which work is crowned with leisure. Others had solved the question otherwise. Isocrates is on the whole in favour of useful studies, though he has something to say in defence of Eristic and Geometry and Astronomy, studies belonging to the out-of-the-way class (De Antid. § 261 sqq.: Hel. § 5). Of the Cynic Diogenes we read (Diog. Laert, 6, 73), μουσικής τε καὶ γεωμετρικής και αστρολογίας και των τοιούτων αμελείν, ως αχρήστων και ούκ άναγκαίων. For the views of Polybius see Polyb. 9. 20. 6 sqq. On the other hand, Lacedaemonian education was designed to develope virtue, though no doubt a one-sided kind of virtue (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 16, γράμματα μέν οὖν ενεκα της χρείας

εμάνθανον, ή δ' άλλη πασα παιδεία προς το άρχεσθαι καλως εγίνετο καὶ καρτερείν πονούντα καὶ νικάν μαχόμενον). As to the studies falling under the head of τὰ περιττά, see vol. i. p. 354, note 3. To the studies there enumerated should be added the wonderful feats of horsemanship which Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, learnt by his father's wish to perform (Plato, Meno 93 D). Aristotle, however, probably refers especially to the study of Geometry, Astronomy, and Eristic Argument, subjects which had found their way in Isocrates' day into the curriculum at Athens (Isocr. Panath. § 26: cp. Plato, Protag. 318 E, where Protagoras is made to sneer at λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικήν as studies which Hippias of Elis taught and he himself did not, the wisdom which he taught being εὐβουλία περί τε τῶν οἰκείων καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως). Both τὰ περιττά and τὰ χρήσιμα are here distinguished from τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, but many advocates of the study of τὰ περιττά at any rate would claim that it aided the development of virtue. Cp. Isocr. Busir. § 23, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους ἀμελήσαντας τῶν ἡδονῶν έπ' ἀστρολογία καὶ λογισμοίς καὶ γεωμετρία διατρίβειν ἔπεισαν, ὧν τὰς δυνάμεις οἱ μὲν ὡς πρὸς ἔτερα χρησίμους ἐπαινοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ὡς πλεῖστα πρὸς άρετην συμβαλλομένας αποφαίνειν έπιχειρούσιν. Pericles had studied τὰ περιττά under Anaxagoras and is thought by Plato and Plutarch to have owed much of his greatness of soul to these studies (Plato, Phaedr. 269 Esq.: Plut. Pericl. cc. 4-8). The virtuous Epaminondas had had a περιπτή παιδεία (Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 3). It is with a view to virtue that Plato recommends the study of Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy (Rep. 525-530: Laws 818-822), and at a later age of Dialectic (Rep. 531 sqq.: Laws 965). For the contrast between τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον and τὰ περιττά, cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 25, οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, and for the phrase τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον, Diog. Laert. 2. 25, καὶ συνεχὲς ἐκείνα ἀνεφθέγγετο (ὁ Σωκράτης) τὰ ἰαμβεία,

τὰ δ' ἀργυρώματ' ἐστὶν ἥ τε πορφύρα εἰς τοὺς τραγωδοὺς χρήσιμ', οἰκ εἰς τὸν βίον,

3. 98, χρημάτων καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον χρησίμων, and Hyperid. Or. Fun.
 3. 10. For δῆλον οὐδέν ('nothing is clear'), cp. Plato, Theaet.
 201 A, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν ('manentibus vero—nec amplius quaerentibus—nihil erit perspicuum,' Stallbaum).

42. πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας. Cp. Metaph. A. 8. 989 a 6, τῶν δὲ τριῶν στοιχείων ἔκαστον εἴληφε κριτήν τινα, and De An.

- 1. 2. 405 b 8, πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς. 'Quid significet his locis formula εἰληφέναι κριτήν apertum est, quomodo eam vim possit habere dubium videtur . . . Equidem nomine κριτής, quoniam coniunctum est cum λαμβάνειν, significari putaverim suffragium iudicis: unumquodque ex tribus illis elementis unius tulit iudicis suffragium' (Bonitz on Metaph. A. 8. 988 b 22-989 a 19). See also Bon. Ind. s.v. κριτής.
- 1337 b. 2. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ. Thus the Spartans identified virtue with military virtue, which is only a part of it (2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.), and naturally erred in their ἄσκησις of virtue (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40). Aristotle's remark is perhaps suggested by that of Socrates in Plato, Laches 190 B, ἆρ' οὖν τοῦτό γ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τί ποτ ἔστιν ἀρετή; εὶ γάρ που μηδ ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίνα τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα ὁτφοῦν, ὅπως ἄν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο;
  - 3. mpós, cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 31 and 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 33.
  - **4.** ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 818 A, τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν (i. e. Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy) ἀναγκαῖα . . . μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρὸν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to reading and writing and a certain amount of arithmetic and geometry as necessary. At Sparta these necessary subjects were evidently insufficiently studied (c. 4. 1338 b 33).
  - 5. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα κ.τ.λ. Πάντα, sc. τὰ χρήσιμα, not τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. For instance, cookery should not be studied (c. 5. 1339 a 39 sqq.). The parenthetic clause, διηρημένων—ἀνελευθέρων, causes Aristotle to forget that he has begun his sentence with ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, and he proceeds in 6, φανερὸν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., as if these words had not preceded. Bonitz (Ind. 538 b 38) compares De Interp. 14. 24 a 6 sqq., referring to Waitz' note on this passage. In De Interp. 14, however, we have merely a pleonasm of ὅτι, whereas in the passage before us there is a surplusage of an entire clause introduced by ὅτι. Still irregularities in connexion with ὅτι are common in Aristotle's writings (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), and I think, on the whole, that Bekker, Bonitz, Sus., and the rest are right in leaving this awkward sentence as it stands. But a suggestion of Mr. Richards deserves mention, that καί should be added after φανερόν.
  - 6. τῶν τοιούτων, sc. ἔργων. Here ὁ τοιοῦτος does not, as it usually does (Bernays, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotel. Theorie des Drama, p. 27), refer back to something preceding; on the contrary it refers forward to ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων κ.τ.λ. Compare its use in 12,

in c. 6. 1341 a 22 sq., in 3. 17. 1288 a 8, in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 18, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.

8. βάναυσον δ' ἔργον κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 5 sqq. and see vol. i. p. 111 sqq. Here and in c. 7. 1342 a 22, είσὶ δ' ωσπερ αὐτῶν (i. e. Βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν) αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν έξεως, Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 495 D, οδ δή έφιέμενοι πολλοί ἀτελείς μεν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, οῦτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διά τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν: cp. Laws 831 C, and Xen. Oecon. 4. 2 and 6. 5. As the term μισθαρνικαὶ έργασίαι (13) must include the work of the this or day-labourer (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 25 sqq., where he is classed among οἱ μισθαρνοῦντες), his work is here described as βάναυσος in addition to that of δ βάναυσος τεχνίτης, to which the epithet is more commonly applied. In general, however, the θήs and the βάναυσος are distinguished (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 12, βάναυσοι καὶ θητες: 17, τὸν βάναυσον καὶ τὸν θητα: 21, βίον βάναυσον ή θητικόν: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 25: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 27 sq.: and 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 29, where we have τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαρνούντων  $\pi\lambda\hat{\eta}\theta$ os). Indeed, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the distinction reappears in this very Book, for in 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 20 we have βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν (cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 13, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν καὶ βαναύσους δή συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, where a difference is implied between θητικός and βάναυσος). Aristotle's feeling probably was that though the work of οἱ μισθαρνοῦντες deserved to be called Bávavoos on account of its effect on the mind, the work of the βάναυσος τεχνίτης merited the epithet still better, because it injured the body (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 37, βαναυσόταται δ' (είσὶ τῶν ἐργασιῶν) ἐν αίς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα). Καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν i.e. καὶ βάναυσον τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν είναι ταύτην. For τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν, cp. 18, πράττει τις ή μανθάνει, and 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, πασα τέχνη καὶ παιδεία. Μάθησις is the wider term, for though in one kind of μάθησις the aim is the acquisition of an art (Metaph. Θ. 3. 1046 b 36), in another it is the acquisition of an extent of knowledge falling short of that possessed by the master of an art (c. 5. 1339 a 36-38: Plato, Protag. 312 B). For τας χρήσεις και τας πράξεις τας της άρετης (where τως χρήσεις = τως ένεργείας, as in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 38), cp. De An. 2. 4. 415 a 18, πρότερον γάρ είσι των δυνάμεων αί ένεργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τὸν λόγον, and Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1197 a 8, έπι δε των πρακτικών οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐδεν τέλος παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν πράξιν,

οἷον παρὰ τὸ κιθαρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὐδέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πράξις. The χρήσεις καὶ πράξεις τῆς ἀρετῆς to which Aristotle refers are probably those of the soldier and citizen (cp. c. 6. 1341 a 7). For τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς cp. c. 1. 1337 a 21.

- 12. τὰς τοιαύτας τέχνας. See note on 6.
- 13. τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. Ἐργασία is a wider term than τέχνη: it is used, for instance, of such occupations as brothel-keeping in Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 33. It is not certain what occupations in addition to that of the day-labourer Aristotle intends to include under αὶ μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι. Does he include the work of a teacher of rhetoric like Isocrates, when done for hire? In Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 25 sqq. μισθαρνία is made to comprise both the μισθαρνία of the βάναυσοι τέχναι and the μισθαρνία of the unskilled θής: here, however, the phrase αὶ μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι is used in a sense exclusive of the βάναυσοι τέχναι. The form μισθαρνικός occurs also in Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 a 31 and Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 29, but Plato uses the form μισθαρνητικός in Rep. 346 B, D, and (if the MSS. are right) μισθαρνευτικός in Soph. 222 D. See critical note on 1255 b 26.
- 14. ἄσχολον καὶ ταπεινήν. Leisure was held to give self-confidence (c. 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), and its absence to make men poorspirited, because it made them like slaves, who have no leisure (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20). The epithets θητικός and ταπεινός are interchanged in Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.
- 15. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and as to some liberal sciences also, while it is not illiberal to study them up to a certain point, to devote oneself to the study of them in an overaccurate way is bound up with the injurious results already mentioned,' i.e. unfits the body for the pursuits of a soldier and citizen and makes the mind abject. For ἔνοχος in this sense see Liddell and Scott. For the view that there is something illiberal in too close a study of a subject compare the passage from the Erastae ascribed to Plato quoted on 1338 b 32. The study of music has an ill effect when carried too far (c. 6. 1340 b 40 sqq. and 1341 b 10 sqq.: compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν νίὸν ἐπιτερπῶς ἔν τινι πότω ψήλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν, Οὐκ αἰσχύνη καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλων;), and also that of gymnastic (c. 4. 1338 b 32 sqq.). Socrates had said that the study of geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, and medicine should not be carried beyond a certain

point by the ordinary citizen (Xen. Mem. 4. 7), and Isocrates says the same thing of astronomy and geometry (De Antid. § 264: cp. [Demosth.] Erot. c. 44), and Plato of γράμματα (Laws 810 B). There were those who said this of philosophy (Plato, Gorg. 487 C), but Aristotle would hardly agree. The Cynics probably inherited the feeling of Socrates on this subject: see as to the Cynic Onesicritus vol. i. p. 112, note 1. Plato, on the other hand, had recommended in the case of a few the advanced study of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy (Laws 818 A: cp. 967 D); it is not clear whether Aristotle would object to this. The term ἐλευθέριοι ἐπιστῆμαι in its Latin rendering 'liberales artes' had a long subsequent history (see Mr. H. Parker in Eng. Hist. Rev. vol. v. p. 417 sqq.). The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings.

- 17. ἔχει δὲ κ.τ.λ. This repeats with added details 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 6 sqq. Aristotle is preparing the way for his recommendation that boys shall be taught to sing and play: many regarded playing as χειρουργία (c. 6. 1340 b 20) and as fraught with βαναυσία (1340 b 40 sqq.: cp. Plato, Symp. 203 A). But the singing and playing which Aristotle enjoins will be αὐτῶν χάριν and δι' ἀρετήν (c. 6. 1341 b 8 sqq. and 1340 b 42).
- 19. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αύτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον. As to αὐτοῦ χάριν see note on 1277 b 5, and cp. Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 b 7 sqq., and Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25, ώσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ελεύθερος δ αύτου ενεκα και μη ἄλλου ὤν, ούτω και αύτη μόνη ελευθέρα οὖσα τῶν έπιστημών μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἔνεκέν ἐστιν. When Odysseus builds a ship (Hom. Odyss. 5. 243 sqq.), it is for himself. As to φίλων, cp. Plato, Laws 919 D, Μαγνήτων . . . μήτε κάπηλος έκων μηδ' ἄκων μηδείς γιγνέσθω μήτ' "μπορος μήτε διακονίαν μηδ' ήντινα κεκτημένος ίδιώταις τοις μή έξ ίσου έαυτώ, πλήν πατρί και μητρί και τοις έτι τούτων είς τὸ ἄνω γένεσι καὶ πᾶσι τοις αύτου πρεσβυτέροις, οσοι ελεύθεροι ελευθέρως, and Symp. 184 B-C: cp. also Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31, καὶ (μεγαλοψύχου) πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον δουλικὸν γάρ. See also the story told by Plutarch of Favonius and Pompey (quoted above on 1333 a 6). For δι' ἀρετήν, cp. c. 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (which also illustrates δι' άλλους, 20), and Plato, Symp. 185 A sq.
- 20. As to αὐτὸ τοῦτο and as to the displacement of πολλάκις, which belongs to δόξειεν ἄν, see critical note, and cp. Plato, Rep. 358 D, περὶ γὰρ τίνος ᾶν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ

ἀκούων; where πολλάκις belongs to λέγων καὶ ἀκούων. For the conjunction of θητικόν and δουλικόν, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

21. αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις κ.τ.λ., 'the studies now commonly known and in use' (literally 'made public property'), 'as has been said before' (in c. 2. 1337 a 39), 'point in two directions,' i.e. they may be used in support of the view that useful subjects should be studied, or in support of the view that subjects tending to promote virtue should be studied (see note on 1337 a 39). For αἱ καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, cp. c. 3. 1338 a 36 and Plato, Soph. 232 D, τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, ὰ δεῖ πρὸς ἔκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν ('publice deposita sunt,' Stallbaum, who adds 'verbum καταβάλλειν proprie dicitur de iis quae deponuntur in tabulario publico, veluti leges, testimonia, alia monumenta litteris consignata'). For ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν, see note on 1332 a 42.

- C. 3. 23. ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν κ.τ.λ. 'Usually three, γραφική being omitted,' as Eaton remarks, who refers to Plato, Protag. 325 D-326 C (where children are described as going successively to teachers of γράμματα, teachers of harp-playing, and παιδοτρίβαι), and Theag. 122 E. We see from Protag. 325 E sqq. that in learning γράμματα children learnt passages of epic poetry by heart, and that in learning harp-playing they learnt to sing to the harp passages of lyrical poetry, so that the study of poetry entered into the study both of γράμματα and of harp-playing. That the study of γράμματα included learning to write, we see from Laws 810 B. It is remarkable that arithmetic is not mentioned: Sus.4 takes the elements of arithmetic to be included under γράμματα, but does not give any passage in support of this view. According to Blümner (Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 111), arithmetical instruction at Athens was given at home, not at school; this may possibly be the reason why nothing is said about it.
  - 24. καὶ τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικήν. Plato had learnt drawing (Diog. Laert. 3. 5) long before Pamphilus of Amphipolis (the teacher of Apelles, who was a contemporary of Philip and Alexander) had made the study fashionable first at Sicyon and then throughout Greece (Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 76 sq.: see Overbeck, Ant. Schriftquellen, p. 330, and Brunn, Gesch. der griech. Künstler 2. 134 sqq.). Γραφική probably includes painting as well as drawing. Aristotle says nothing of sculpture.

- 25. τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν κ.τ.λ. Charondas had insisted on the many uses served by γραμματική: cp. Diod. 12. 13. 1, τὴν γὰρ γραμματικὴν παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας μαθήσεις προέκρινεν ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ μάλα προσηκόντως διὰ γὰρ ταύτης τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ χρησιμώτατα τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, ψήφους, ἐπιστολάς, διαθήκας, νόμους, τἄλλα τὰ τὸν βίον μάλιστα ἐπανορθοῦντα, and Eurip. Fragm. 582, which is so similar in effect to the passage of Diodorus that one is inclined to ask whether Euripides had the words of Charondas before him. Cp. also 1338 a 15 sqq.
- 26. τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν κ.τ.λ. So thought the Lacedaemonians (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), and also Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 91).
- 27. τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, i. e. as to the object with which it is taught. Here διαπορείν takes an acc. of the thing which causes perplexity, as ἀπορείν does in Meteor. I. I. 339 a 2, ἐν οἶς τὰ μὲν ἀποροῦμεν, τῶν δ' ἐφαπτόμεθά τινα τρόπον. That Plato gives a wider meaning to μουσική than Aristotle does, we have seen in vol. i. p. 405. Both agree that μουσική is concerned with μελοποιία (c. 7. I34I b 23 sqq.: Gorg. 449 D), but while to Plato (Rep. 398 D) a μέλος consists of λόγος ἀρμονία and ῥυθμός, Aristotle distinguishes μελοποιία and λέξις (Poet. 6. I449 b 33 sqq., I450 a 13 sqq.).
- 28. ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν, sc. οὔσης: cp. 1338 a 13, ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων (sc. οὔσας). For the fact cp. Plato, Laws 655 C, καίτοι λέγουσί γε οἱ πλεῖστοι μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν δύναμιν, and Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία . . . τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχρωμένῳ Μούσαις οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ἄλογον, καθάπερ νῦν, εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμος κ.τ.λ.
- 29. μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς, 'learn it,' cp. c. 2. 1337 b 6 sqq., and see note on 1339 a 14.
- οί έξ ἀρχῆς, cp. 1338 a 14, οί πρότερον, and Probl. 30. 11. 956 b 16, διὰ τί οἱ έξ ἀρχῆς τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγωνίας ἆθλόν τι προὔταξαν, σοφίας δὲ οὐδὲν ἔθηκαν;

έταξαν εν παιδεία, cp. 1338 a 14, είς παιδείαν εταξαν.

30. τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 a 25, ἡ γὰρ φύσις αὐτὴ ζητεῖ τὸ πρόσφορον, and Eth. Nic. 8. 6. 1157 b 16. Aristotle has not said before that Nature aims at this, but he has implied it in 2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq. and 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq., passages in which he points out the disastrous consequences to the Lacedaemonian State of a forgetfulness of this.

- 31. For the place of δύνασθαι cp. c. 5. 1339 b 1, and see note on 1281 a 26.
- 32. αὖτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, Lamb. 'hoc enim omnium rerum agendarum principium est.' With Sus. I take Aristotle to refer in αὖτη to σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶs, not to Nature (as Vict., Schn., and others). For the attraction of the pronoun into the gender of the predicate, cp. (with Sus.4) 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 41. For the phrase, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 237 B, περὶ παντός, ὧ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μελλουσι καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὖ ἂν ἢ ἡ βουλή, ἡ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη.

πάλιν, for the lesson has already been taught in 4 (7). 14. 1334 a sqq.

- 33. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ introduces a justification of τνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. With δεῖ supply ἔχειν. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sqq. The answer which is gradually given to the question in what activities leisure should be spent is, as we shall see, 'in activities desirable for their own sake.'
- 34. καὶ τέλος, 'and is its end': cp. 4. (7). 15. 1334 a 14 sqq. Mr. Welldon has anticipated me in retaining τέλος and placing a comma after it.
- 35. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας, 'for surely not in playing.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 27 sqq. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Laws 803 D, τίς οὖν ὀρθότης; παίζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον; τίνας δὴ παιδιάς; θύοντα καὶ ἄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον.

τέλος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for then, [as leisure is the end of life,] play would necessarily be to us the end of life.' Sus. would read in place of ἀναγκαῖον either ᾶν ἀναγκαῖον (Schn. had proposed ᾶν ἦν ἀναγκαῖον, vol. ii. p. 452) or ἀναγκαῖον ἦν (with Spengel), but perhaps ᾶν εἴη may be supplied with ἀναγκαῖον: cp. Xen. Oecon. 3. 13 and 4. 15. It seems to me more natural to supply ᾶν εἴη than ἐστι. Many made play the end of life: cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31 sqq., and Ephor. Fragm. 82 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 259), "Εφορος ἐν πέμπτφ φησὶν ὅτι Τιβαρηνοὶ καὶ τὸ παίζειν καὶ τὸ γελᾶν εἰσιν ἐζηλωκότες καὶ μεγίστην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦτο νομίζουσιν. A graffito on a pavement-slab of the forum of Thannyas or Timegad in Algeria runs 'venari lavari ludere ridere—oc est vivere' (Prof. Sayce, Algerian Notes, Academy, No. 780, April 16, 1887, p. 279).

38. ή δὲ παιδιὰ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Phileb. 30 Ε, ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, δ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίστε ἡ παιδιά.

39. τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας. Cp. Rhet. I. II. 1370a II, τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς.

41. καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρῆσιν. Pastime should be used ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις, as a relief after toil (cp. 37).

ώς προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν. A drug differs from an article of daily food, in that it is only for occasional use: cp. Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 10, προσθεωροῦντας ὅτι ἡ τροφὴ οὐ φάρμακον διὰ τὸ συνεχές, and Τορ. 2. 11. 115 b 26, πάλιν ποτὲ μὲν συμφέρει φαρμακεύεσθαι, οἶον ὅταν νοσῷ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὔ. For the medical use of the word προσάγειν cp. Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 28, ὁ δὲ παρρησίαν καὶ δηγμὸν ἀνθρώπῳ δυστυχοῦντι προσάγων, ὥσπερ ὀξυδορκικὸν ὄμματι ταρασσομένω καὶ φλεγμαίνοντι, θεραπεύει μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖ τοῦ λυποῦντος, ὀργὴν δὲ τῷ λύπῃ προστίθησι καὶ παροξύνει τὸν ἀνιώμενον.

**42.** ἄνεσις γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the movement of the soul to which we have referred' (that involved in play) 'is [remedial in character, for it is] a relaxation of strain and a remission because of the pleasure which accompanies it, [and only in place at times when there is strain].' For κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, cp. Rhet. I. II. I369 b 33, ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ. and Plato, Laws 896 E sq.

1. τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν κ.τ.λ., 'but taking leisure [unlike working] is 1338 a. thought to have in itself pleasure and happiness and blissful life, [so that it does not need to be helped out with play, and we should not spend leisure in play].'

3. τοῦτο δ' οὐ κ.τ.λ., 'and this' (i.e. happiness) 'does not belong to those who work, but [only] to those who are at leisure, for he who works works for the sake of some end as having it not, but happiness is an end, inasmuch as all think that it is conjoined not with pain but with pleasure, [and therefore, as he has not the end, he has not happiness].' That things conjoined with pleasure were commonly regarded as ends, we see from Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 23-25. Aristotle's object in adding this remark is to point out that not only does leisure bring happiness with it, but that work does not; he thus prepares the way for the distinction which he proceeds to draw in 11 sqq. between studies which are preparatory for work and studies which are preparatory for leisure, the former being, like work, a means to an end, and the latter, like leisure, desirable for their own sake and an end in themselves. Sus. reads τοῦτο γάρ in place of τοῦτο δέ, but in this Mr. Welldon does not follow him, and rightly, for τοῦτο δ' οὐ κ.τ.λ. does not contain the proof that leisure is thought to have in it pleasure and happiness, but an added

statement carrying matters further. For ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολῶν ἔνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ τέλους ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 17, αὖται δ' (i. e. αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ πράξεις) ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐψίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταί εἰσιν.

- 7. ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν κ.τ.λ., 'but [here their agreement ceases, for] all do not find the pleasure which accompanies happiness in the same pleasure.' Cp. Plato, Laws 658 E (quoted below on 1339 b 33), and Gorg. 448 C, ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι.
- 8. For καθ' έαυτοὺς εκαστος καὶ τὴν εξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, where we expect έαυτόν and αὐτοῦ, cp. Plato, Gorg. 503 Ε, ωσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εκαστος οὐκ εἰκῆ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.
- 9. Wote parepor k.t.l., 'and so, [as leisure is the end], it is evident, etc. Καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῆ διαγωγῆ σχολήν, with a view to leisure spent in noble enjoyment also,' as well as with a view to work. For την έν τη διαγωγή σχολήν, cp. c. 7. 1342 a 31, της έν φιλοσοφία διατριβής. It is obviously strange that we should have την έν τη διαγωγή σχολήν here and την έν τη σχολή διαγωγήν in 21, and it is possible that την έν τη διαγωγή σχολήν is a simple blunder, and that we should read την έν τη σχολή διαγωγήν (with Cor.) in place of it. But Sus., following Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 15), leaves the text as it stands, and I incline on the whole to do so too, though Bonitz adds a query to the words (Ind. 741 a 40) and Jackson would omit σχολήν as an interpolation and understand ήδονήν (Sus. ad loc.). For looking to 1337 b 31, σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλώς, and 1338 a 1, τὸ σχολάζειν (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 9), we expect that the conclusion drawn in 1338 a 9 sqq. will be that it is well to study with a view to taking leisure, or taking leisure nobly, and τὴν έν τη διαγωγή σχολήν, 'leisure spent nobly in diagogê,' comes nearer to this than την έν τη σχολή διαγωγήν. Not leisure spent anyhow, but leisure spent in diagogê is the end with a view to which Aristotle claims that study should be especially pursued. The words τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν (12) also, as Postgate points out, require προς την σχολήν, and not προς την διαγωγήν, as their antithesis. For μανθάνειν άττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, cp. Theophil. Κιθαρωδός Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 628),

μέγας

θησαυρός έστι καὶ βέβαιος μουσική ἄπασι τοῖς μαθοῦσι παιδευθεῖσί τε.

Μανθάνειν is to learn, παιδεύεσθαι to be trained by another.

- 11. For the repetition of the pronoun in ταῦτα ...ταύτας see note on 1317 b 5.
- 12. τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν κ.τ.λ., 'and that studies preparatory for work are pursued as necessary and as being for the sake of other things.'
- 13. 8.6, 'hence,' i.e. because it is right that studies which contribute to the enjoyment of leisure should find a place in education.
  - 15. ώσπερ τὰ γράμματα κ.τ.λ. See note on 1337 b 25.
- 16. καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν, 'and for the acquisition of knowledge': cp. 39 sq. and Isocr. Panath. § 209, ὥστ' οὐδὲ γράμματα μανθάνουσιν, ἃ τηλικαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν ὥστε τοὺς ἐπισταμένους καὶ χρωμένους αὐτοῖς μὴ μόνον ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡλικίας τῆς αὑτῶν πραχθέντων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πώποτε γενομένων.
- 17. δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Learning to draw was evidently held by many to make men skilful in the purchase of works of art, furniture, and equipments of all kinds (1338 a 40 sqq.).
- 19. πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν, 'for health and prowess in battle.' Not every one would agree with Aristotle that learning music does not produce military prowess in the learner: cp. Plut. Lycurg. C. 21, μουσικωτάτους γὰρ ἄμα καὶ πολεμικωτάτους ἀποφαίνουσιν αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ.: Athen. Deipn. 626 f, τὸ δ' ἀρχαῖον ἡ μουσικὴ ἐπ' ἀνδρείαν προτροπὴ ἦν κ.τ.λ.: Plut. De Musica c. 26. And if the study of music does not produce health, listening to music was thought by Theophrastus to cure some diseases (Athen. Deipn. 624 a); indeed, a plague was thought to have been stayed at one time at Sparta by the Cretan musician Thaletas (Plut. De Mus. c. 42).
- 21. λείπεται τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., 'it remains therefore that music is useful for rational enjoyment in leisure.' Aristotle has shown that the study of music is not useful for purposes connected with work, like learning to read and write and to draw, nor productive of bodily advantages useful for work, like gymnastic; hence he concludes that it is useful for leisure. He omits to inquire at present whether it is not productive of moral and intellectual virtues useful for work; we shall find later on that it is (c.5. 1340 a 18 sqq.). This somewhat invalidates the conclusion which he arrives at here.
- 22. εἰς ὅπερ κ.τ.λ., 'into which they do in fact evidently introduce it.' Καὶ φαίνονται, i.e. not only may be inferred to introduce it, but manifestly do so: cp. καὶ συμβαίνειν in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sq.

For ὅπερ, not ἣνπερ, see Bon. Ind. 484 b 5, where Hist. An. 2. 17. 508 b 13, ἀναδίπλωσιν ἔχει, ὁ ἀναλύεται εἰς ἕν, is referred to, and Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 24 ('Aristotelem nemo nescit usum neutrius valde adamasse') and 4. 1449 a 7. Aristotle takes no notice of the use of music in the worship of the gods.

ἢν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they give it a place in that which they think is the form of rational enjoyment appropriate to the free' (i. e. feasting), and therefore appropriate to those who are at leisure, for leisure belongs to freemen: cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις. Aristotle would hardly agree with their view that banqueting is ἡ ἐν τῆ σχολῆ διαγωγή (see note on 1333 a 35). In c. 5. 1339 a 16 sqq. he treats conviviality (μέθη) as a means of relaxation, not as διαγωγή.

24. διόπερ Όμηρος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Hom. Odyss. 17. 382,

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθών ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οῦ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασι, μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπησιν ἀείδων;

but the line first quoted by him,  $\partial \lambda \lambda' \circ \partial \nu \kappa.\tau.\lambda$ , finds no place in our text, any more than it does, as Sus.<sup>4</sup> points out, in Plato, Rep. 389 D. 'A $\epsilon i \delta \omega \nu$  also takes the place of  $\delta \pi a \nu \tau a s$  in our texts (Sus.<sup>2</sup>, Note 997). Probably we should read  $\mu \delta \nu \nu \nu$  in place of  $\mu \epsilon \nu$  in  $\partial \lambda \lambda'$   $\partial \partial \nu \kappa.\tau.\lambda$ . I take Aristotle's text to have been—

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθών, ἀλλ' οἷον μόνον ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην, μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, οῖ καλέουσιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπησιν ἄπαντας;

It is just possible that of in 26 is a false reading for κal, but there is no absolute necessity for any change. Spengel, followed by Sus., reads οθε καλοῦσιν οτ οῦ καλοῦνται in place of οῦ καλέουσιν, and regards these words as not forming part of the quotation, but the form of the word καλέουσιν seems to show that it is quoted from Homer. As to the differences between our text of Homer and Aristotle's quotations, see note on 1285 a 12. For the use of music at banquets, cp. Hom. Odyss. 1. 152. Aristoxenus gave a fanciful reason for it, quite different to that given here (Plut. De Musica, c. 43: Aristox. Fragm. 91 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291: cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D).

27. καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ κ.τ.λ. Hom. Odyss. 9. 5 sqq. For (δ) Οδυσσεύς see critical note.

32. πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This promise is not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it: see vol. ii. p. xxviii sq.

33.  $\kappa \alpha \hat{i} \pi \hat{\omega} s$ , 'and how they are to be studied': cp. c. 2. 1337 a 34 sq.

34. For the needless addition of  $\pi$ ερὶ αὐτῶν, cp.  $\pi$ ερὶ αὐτῆς, c. 5. 1339 a 15.

νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμιν είναι πρὸ όδοῦ γέγονεν. Two different views have been taken of the construction of this sentence. Some have regarded τοσοῦτον είναι πρὸ όδοῦ as an accusative and infinitive dependent on γέγονεν, as in Luke 16. 22, έγένετο, δὲ ἀποθανείν τὸν πτωχόν, and Acts 21. 1 and 22. 17 (referred to by Hermann ad Viger. p. 231 note, cp. p. 749); the translation will then be, 'but now it has happened that thus much profit has accrued to us.' Others have taken τοσούτον είναι together in the sense of 'to this extent at least, είναι being used as in such phrases as κατὰ τοῦτο elva (Plato, Protag. 317 A, where Stallbaum renders 'quantum quidem ad hoc attinet': see his note and Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 625). Göttling, who refers to Lobeck, Phryn. p. 275, Stahr in his edition of the Politics, and Sus.4 appear to understand the passage thus. The translation will then be, 'but now to this extent at least we have profited.' I should prefer the second of these two interpretations if είναι followed τοσοῦτον immediately without the interposition of  $\eta \mu \hat{\nu}$ . In support of the first interpretation it may be noted that in Plato, Rep. 397 B we have γίγνεται λέγειν (Richards), and in Xen. Oecon. 17. 3, γίγνεται όμονοεῖν (sc. πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους): see also Xen. Cyrop. 5. 2. 12. There is a further difference as to the meaning of πρὸ ὁδοῦ, Sus.2 translating the sentence 'für jetzt steht uns vorläufig nur so viel fest,' and Welldon, 'at present however we have advanced so far as to see that,' etc., where 'vorläufig' and 'advanced' seem to represent πρὸ όδοῦ. My own rendering has been suggested by the meaning assigned to the word by Liddell and Scott.

35. ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων κ.τ.λ., 'that from the ancients also' (cp. 1337 b 29, οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς) 'we have a testimony derived from the established studies [that there are subjects which should be taught the young not as necessary but as liberal and noble].' The ancients are regarded by Aristotle as the authors of the established curriculum.

37. τοῦτο, 'this fact,' i.e. that we have the testimony of the ancients to this effect.

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Supply again τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν. Οἶον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν is added in illustration of τῶν χρησίμων τινά. Παιδεύεσθαι is middle, as in c. 2. 1337 a 35. Τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸν βίον is contrasted with τὸ πρὸς μάθησιν συντεῖνον: compare the contrast in Plato, Rep. 527 A between studies pursued πράξεως ἔνεκα and γνώσεως ἔνεκα. As to ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησις cp. Menand. Monost. 657,

διπλοῦν δρῶσιν οἱ μαθόντες γράμματα.

40. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 525 B, ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθάπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ἔως ἄν ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῆ νοήσει αὐτῆ, οὐκ ἀνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἡ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα πολέμου τε κ.τ.λ. For the contemptuous reference to σκεύη, cp. Plato, Rep. 428 C, οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην βουλευομένην ὡς ἄν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις. Buying σκεύη was work for women (Pollux 10. 18, γυναικείαν ἀγοράν, τὸν τόπον οὖ τὰ σκεύη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πιπράσκουσιν).

1338 b. 1. We expect ἀλλά or ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον in place of ἡ μᾶλλον, but ἡ μᾶλλον is substituted as less dogmatic, and partly also perhaps because ἀλλά has been used in the preceding line. "H 'modeste affirmantis est' (Bon. Ind. 312 b 57 sqq.: cp. Trendelenburg on De An. 1. 1. 403 b.8). In 3. 1. 1275 a 25 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 ἤ takes the place of δέ.

ποιεῖ θεωρητικόν, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 26, βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἢ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. We expect θεωρητικούς rather than θεωρητικόν, but compare the change from the singular to the plural in c. 6. 1341 b 10–15 (ὁ πράττων, βαναύσους). Θεωρητικόν, 'a scientific observer' (Welldon).

τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. Cp. Plato, Symp. 210 B, τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τοῦς σώμασι κάλλος, and Critias 112 E, οὖτοι μὲν οὖν δὴ . . . ἐπὶ πᾶσαν Εὐρώπην καὶ ᾿Ασίαν κατά τε σωμάτων κάλλη καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν παντοίαν ἀρετὴν ἐλλόγιμοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ὀνομαστότατοι πάντων τῶν τότε. Aristotle probably would not go so far as Diotima in Plato, Symp. 210 sq., as to the results of studying τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῦς σώμασι κάλλος, but he apparently holds that the study of drawing helps to make men capable of diagogê. We note that he says nothing of landscape beauty, or of the use of drawing in cultivating a perception of it. In τὰ σώματα he no doubt refers mainly to the bodies of animals,

and especially of human beings (cp. τῶν σωμάτων in c. 4. 1338 b 11). As to Aristotle's value for beauty, cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 70, κάλλους δὲ προνοῶν καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀρχήμασιν εὐμορφίας, τί ἄλλο ἢ τὸ τοῦ ᾿Αριστοτέλους ἐπαληθεύει, τὸ κάλλος ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ μέρος τρίτον ἡγουμένου τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι; (I do not notice that this dictum is included in Rose's collection of the Fragments of Aristotle, ed. 2, 1886.) For the phrase τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους, cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας, and 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, and see note in Sus.<sup>4</sup>

- 3. τοις μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοις ἐλευθέροις. Cp. Plut. De Amicorum Multitudine, c. 6 sub fin., τοις ἐλευθέροις καὶ γενναίοις, and Isocr. Areop. § 43, τους ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους καὶ μεγαλοφρονείν εἰθισμένους. These passages show that there is no occasion to change ἐλευθέροις into ἐλευθερίοις, as Sus. is half inclined to do. As to the μεγαλόψυχος, cp. (with Eaton and Congreve) Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 11 sq.
  - 4. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 8-28.
- 6. δήλον ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ. In beginning the study of γυμναστική and παιδοτριβική at seven, Aristotle follows with some variation in the track of Plato, Laws 794 C, πρὸς δὲ τὰ μαθήματα τρέπεσθαι χρεών έκατέρους (after the completion of the sixth year), τοὺς μὲν ἄρρενας ἐφ' ίππων διδασκάλους καὶ τόξων καὶ ἀκοντίων καὶ σφενδονήσεως κ.τ.λ. In the Republic, on the other hand, μουσική seems to precede γυμναστική (403 C, μετὰ δή μουσικήν γυμναστική θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανίαι: see Stallbaum on Protag. 326 B). At Athens boys began their studies by learning to read and write (aet. 7-11); at about eleven they were sent to a harp-player to learn the harp; how early their gymnastic studies began is uncertain (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans. pp. 111-115). Aristotle postpones learning to read and write and learning to sing and play till puberty (c. 4. 1339 a 4 sq.) and puts the boys in charge of gymnastic trainers and παιδοτρίβαι from seven till puberty. Till puberty they are to receive no literary training. His scheme of training resembles the Lacedaemonian more than the Athenian, but it avoids imposing on boys the severe physical toil imposed on them at Sparta, and it gives up three years after puberty to the exclusive study of subjects other than gymnastic. We may be quite sure that no young Spartan was permitted to drop gymnastic for three years.
- 7. τούτων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 16 sqq., where it is implied that γυμναστική imparts a certain bodily έξις and that παιδοτριβική imparts ἐπιστήμην τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 5.

15. 1138 a 31, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῆ, and Isocr. De Antid. § 183, οἱ μὲν παιδοτρίβαι τὰ σχήματα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀγωνίαν εὐρημένα τοὺς φοιτῶντας διδάσκουσιν: also 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 42, χειρο[τονεί] δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους [οῖ]τινες ὁπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν κ[αὶ] καταπέλτην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν, and Plato, Gorg. 456 E, τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι. But of course the παιδοτρίβης would teach boys of seven only easy accomplishments, such as shooting with the bow and throwing the dart. In Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq. and 452 B, however (cp. 504 A), the business of the παιδοτρίβης is said to be to produce physical beauty and strength.

- C. 4. 9. Nῶν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν has apparently nothing to answer to it in the sequel; the answering clause would have run, if it had not been suppressed, 'but we must take quite a different course.' Little is said by Aristotle in confutation of the first of the two errors here referred to, probably because it was generally felt to be an error, but the second is dealt with at some length, because the Lacedaemonian training still stood high in common opinion. Phocion, for instance, sent his son to Sparta to undergo the training (Plut. Phoc. c. 20). The late Mr. Mark Pattison notes in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics on 1338 b 9–19, 'Respicit hic locus ad Plat. Rep. libr. iii. et speciatim ad pag. 410 D.'
  - 10. αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι. The Thebans are referred to (vol. i. p. 357, note 2: cp. also Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2, ἀθισμοῖς τε χρῆσθαι καὶ περιτροπαῖς ἀλλήλων, ῷ δὴ μάλιστά φασιν ἐν Λεύκτροις τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παλαιστρικῶν ὅντων καταβιβασθῆναι), and also probably the Argives: cp. Aristophon, Ἰατρός (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 357),

δει τιν' ἄρασθαι μέσον

τῶν παροινούντων, παλαιστὴν νόμισον 'Αργεῖόν μ' όρᾶν,

and see Meineke's note. The Cynic Diogenes agreed with Aristotle in objecting to this kind of training (Diog. Laert. 6. 30, ἔπειτα ἐν τῆ παλαίστρα οὐκ ἐπέτρεπε τῷ παιδοτρίβη ἀθλητικῶς ἄγειν (τοὺς παίδας τοῦ Ξενιάδον), ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἐρνθήματος χάριν καὶ εὐεξίας). Cp. also Julian, Or. 1. 10 D sq. It is to the habit of body characteristic of athletes that Aristotle objects, not to the practice of athletic exercises; the Spartan training included the latter, for instance boxing (cp. Plato, Protag. 342 B sq.), but it did not produce ἡ ἀθλητικὴ ἔξις. In 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6 we have τὴν πολεμικὴν ἕξιν. 'Αθλητικήν, being placed before ἔξιν, is emphatic.

Αωβώμεναι τά τε είδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 29, οἶον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν πολυφαγίαν. διὰ πλῆθος γὰρ τροφῆς οὐ δυναμένης τῆς φύσεως κρατεῖν, ὥστ᾽ ἀνάλογον αὔξειν καὶ διαμένειν δμοίαν τὴν μορφήν, ἀλλοῖα γίνεται τὰ μέρη, καὶ σχεδὸν ἐνίοθ᾽ οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἐοικέναι τῷ πρότερον, and Plutarch's language about Aratus, ἐπιφαίνεται δ᾽ ἀμέλει καὶ ταῖς εἰκόσιν ἀθλητική τις ἰδέα, καὶ τὸ συνετὸν τοῦ προσώπου καὶ βασιλικὸν οὐ παντάπασιν ἀρνεῖται τὴν ἀδηφαγίαν καὶ τὸ σκαφεῖον (Arat. c. 3). The excessive labour exacted from athletes would also tell on their physical growth, no less than the excessive amount of food they took: cp. Isocr. Ad Demon. § 12, τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὔξεσθαι πέφυκε.

12. θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. Τοῦτο = τὸ θηριώδεις ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῖς πόνοις. So Pericles says of the Spartans (Thuc. 2. 39. 2), καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, and Ephorus of the Cretans (Fragm. 64 Müller, ap. Strab. p. 480), πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ δειλίαν ἀλλ' ἀνδρείαν κρατεῖν, ἐκ παίδων ὅπλοις καὶ πόνοις συντρέφειν: cp. Eurip. Suppl. 858 Bothe (884 Dindorf),

άγροὺς δὲ ναίων σκληρὰ τῆ φύσει διδούς ἔχαιρε πρὸς τἀνδρεῖον.

Hippocrates shared the view that hard physical labour produces courage (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 565 Kühn), καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ἡσυχίης καὶ ῥαθυμίης ἡ δειλίη αὔξεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ταλαιπωρίης καὶ τῶν πόνων αἱ ἀνδρεῖαι, and p. 566, ἐνταῦθα εἰκὸς εἴδεα μεγάλα εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαίπωρον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εὖ πεφυκότα καὶ τό τε ἄγριον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες αἱ τοιαῦται φύσιες οὐχ ῆκιστα ἔχουσιν. Ephorus regarded the Spartans as the reverse of θηριώδεις, for he says of Dercyllidas (Fragm. 130 Müller), ἢν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ Λακωνικὸν οὐδὲ ἀπλοῦν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανοῦργον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες. Διὸ καὶ Σκύθον αὐτὸν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσηγόρευον.

14. καίτοι κ.τ.λ. Here we have οὔτε taken up by οὔτε and in 16 by τε ('nay more'): see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 536. 3 a, and note on 1272 b 19.

πολλάκις, in 2. 9. 1271 a 41-b6: 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq., and 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40 sqq.

15. πρὸς μίαν, sc. ταύτην (Ridgeway). 'The extraordinary position of μάλιστα is probably due to the position of μίαν' (Richards). The sentence, if completed, would run, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν ταύτην οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 452. I a.

16. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ πρὸς ταύτην.

17. οὖτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It has not been noticed, so far as I am aware, that Aristotle here tacitly corrects a saying ascribed to Anacharsis in Diod. 9. 26. 3, ὁ δὲ Κροῖσος . . . ἠρώτησεν 'Ανάχαρσιν . . . τίνα νομίζει τῶν ὄντων ἀνδρειότατον ὁ δὲ τὰ ἀγριώτατα τῶν ζώων ἔφησε, μόνα γὰρ προθύμως ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Does Aeschylus refer to this view of Anacharsis in Suppl. 760,

άλλ' ἔστι φήμη τοὺς λύκους κρείσσους κυνῶν εἶναι βύβλου δὲ καρπὸς οὐ κρατεῖ στάχυν?

Plato had already said in Rep. 430 B, δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, τήν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Brave and formidable men, however, were commonly likened to wild animals (Deinon ap. Athen. Deipn. 633 d sq.: Plut. Aristid. c. 18).

19. τοις ήμερωτέροις και λεοντώδεσιν ήθεσιν. Heracles is called by Homer θυμολέων in Il. 5. 639 and Odyss. 11. 267 (cp. Hymn. Homer. 15, εἰς Ἡρακλέα λεοντόθυμον, and see Liddell and Scott, s. ν. θυμολέων). Among the lower animals the dog is probably referred to: cp. Plato, Soph. 231 A, και γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτω. For the gentleness ascribed to the lion cp. Hist. An. 9. 44. 629 b 8, καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέων ἐν τῆ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατός ἐστι, μὴ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρωκὼς πραότατος: Anal. Pr. 2. 27. 70 b 26, ὁ λέων ἀνδρείον καὶ μεταδοτικόν: and Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 16, τὰ δὲ ἐλευθέρια καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὐγενῆ, οἶον λέων. Plato also has a favourable opinion of the lion (Rep. 589 B). Yet Homer says of Achilles (Il. 24. 41), λέων δ' ὧς ἄγρια οἶδεν.

The authorities followed by Pliny ascribed clemency to the lion (Nat. Hist. 8. 48, leoni tantum ex feris clementia in supplices: prostratis parcit et, ubi saevit, in viros potius quam in feminas fremit, in infantes non nisi magna fame).

πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. The sense is—and, so far from courage being the offspring of savageness, there are many very savage races which are wholly devoid of courage. The Achaei and Heniochi dwelt on the East coast of the Euxine. The Heniochi were believed to be an offshoot of the Lacedaemonians (Strabo, p. 496, Λάκωνας δὲ (οἰκίσαι) τὴν Ἡνιοχίαν, ὧν ἦρχον Κρέκας καὶ ᾿Αμφίστρατος οἱ τῶν Διοσκούρων ἡνίοχοι, καὶ τοὺς Ἡνιόχους ἀπὸ τούτων εἰκὸς ἀνομάσθαι); there is therefore some appropriateness in the reference to them here in an argument directed against Lacedaemonian customs. The wild races on the Euxine are described as θηριώδεις in Eth.

Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 21 sqq. also. Cannibalism is a sign of αγριότης (Ephor. Fragm. 76, τοὺς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι χαλεπούς, ὥστε καὶ ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν: Aristot. Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 b 1, ἄγριον καὶ ἀνθρωποφάγον).

- 22. τῶν ἦπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν, 'continental nations,' as distinguished from nations inhabiting islands (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12, μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας, ἀλλ' ἢπειρωτικὰ ἔθνη καρπουμένους). Asiatic nations are probably especially referred to: cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 187, εἰ τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν νῦν ὅντα περὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τοὺς ἢπειρώτας ποιησαίμεθα, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ἐκ τῆς 'Ασίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην διακομίσαιμεν, and Philip. § 119, where we read of Jason of Pherae, ἐποιεῖτο γὰρ τοὺς λόγους ὡς εἰς τὴν ἤπειρον διαβησόμενος καὶ βασιλεῖ πολεμήσων. Continental races were perhaps regarded as wilder than island races; they were less in the way of intercourse with others.
- 23. ληστρικά. Aristotle will not allow that these nations are πολεμικά: he slips in the word ληστρικά instead: cp. Demosth. Phil. 1. 23, ἀλλὰ ληστεύειν ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτω τῷ τρόπω τοῦ πολέμου χρῆσθαι τὴν πρώτην, and Strabo, p. 833, where we read of Masinissa, ἀντὶ τοῦ ληστεύειν διδάξας (τοὺς νομάδας) στρατεύειν. In Strabo, p. 508, certain ἔθνη are described as ληστρικὰ καὶ μάχιμα.

ἐστιν-μετειλήφασιν. For the use in the same passage of a singular and a plural verb after a neut. plur. nominative see Bon. Ind. 490 a 56 sqq.

- 24. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας κ.τ.λ. The sense is—besides, we need not go so far afield as to the races of the Euxine to prove that the Lacedaemonian system of gymnastic training is not the true means of producing courage, for the experience of the Lacedaemonian State has proved this.
- 25. ἔως μὲν αὐτοὶ κ.τ.λ. Αὐτοί, 'alone': see notes on 1252 a 14 and 1278 b 24, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 8. 748 b 5. That the Spartans were thought to be φιλόπονοι, we see from Isocr. Archid. § 56, where Archidamus says, ὁ δὲ πάντων σχετλιώτατον, εἰ φιλοπονώτατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ῥαθυμότερον τῶν ἄλλων βουλευσόμεθα περὶτούτων.
- 26. νῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt has before him in his reference to athletic contests the story told of Epaminondas by Plutarch, Pelop. c. 7, Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ τοὺς νέους πάλαι φρονήματος ἦν ἐμπεπληκώς ἐκέλευε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ παλαίειν, εἶτα ὁρῶν ἐπὶ τῷ κρατεῖν καὶ περιείναι γαυρουμένους ἐπέπληττεν, ὡς αἰσχύνεσθαι μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς προσῆκον, εἶ δουλεύουσι δι' ἀνανδρίαν ὧν τοσοῦτον ταῖς ῥώμαις διαφέρουσιν. As to the superiority of the Thebans in battle, cp. Diod. 15. 87. 1. For the absence of ἐν

before τοις γυμνικοις ἀγῶσι καὶ τοις πολεμικοις, cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 33, ήττηθέντες τῆ περὶ Έρετρίαν ναυμαχία, and c. 34. l. 4.

- 27. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Lord Macaulay says the same thing in his note, History of England, c. 23 (Cabinet Edition, vol. viii. p. 13), though he does not refer to the Politics. That at Athens there was no public training for war, we see from Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5. Τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν = τῷ μόνον πρὸς μη ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν, according to Bonitz (Ind. 539 a 42), who remarks, 'interdum negatio universo enunciato vel enunciati membro praeponitur, cum pertineat ad unum quoddam eius vocabulum,' and gives many other instances.
  - 28. For τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον see note on 1281 a 21.
- 30. οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 357, note 3, and cp. Eth. Eud. 3. I. 1229 a 25, διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι θῆρες ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὅντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. It would seem from Plato, Laches 196 E sq. that everybody regarded wild animals as courageous (cp. Laws 963 E). Gryllus is made to argue to this effect in Plut. Gryllus, c. 4. 988 C sq.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων. For the gen. see note on 1259 b 24.

- 31. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. Cp. Plato, Laws 641 B, γενόμενοι δὲ τοιοῦτοι (i.e. ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί) τά τε ἄλλα πράττοιεν καλῶς, ἔτι δὲ κἃν νικῷεν τοὺς πολεμίους μαχόμενοι.
- 32. οί δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but those who throw boys too much into these hard physical exercises and leave them untrained in necessary things make them in truth [not good men, but] sordid, for they make them useful to political science only for one task, and for this, as our inquiry tells us' (cp. 27, λειπομένους έτέρων), 'less well than others do.' Cp. [Plato,] Erastae 136 A, καλῶς γέ μοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, φαίνει ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλω έστι γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἶος μή δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι μηδ' είς την ακρίβειαν μηδέν διαπεπονηκέναι, ώστε διά την τοῦ ένὸς τούτου έπιμέλειαν των άλλων άπάντων ἀπολελειφθαι, ωσπερ οι δημιουργοί, άλλα πάντων μετρίως έφηφθαι. Cp. also Plato, Laws 644 A, την δε είς χρήματα τείνουσαν (παιδείαν) ή τινα πρός ισχύν ή και πρός άλλην τινά σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης βάναυσόν τ' είναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλείσθαι. Ιη τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγώγους ποιήσαντες Aristotle appears to imply that the Lacedaemonian State did not oblige the young Spartan to learn to read and write (see Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 100 sq.). Has

he in his mind the language used by Archidamus (Thuc. 1. 84) not without reference to his own countrymen, πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται? For εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες cp. Hdt. 2. 165, ἀνέονται ἐς τὸ μάχιμον, and 167, τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνειμένους.

- 35. ώς φησὶν ὁ λόγος, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 274 A, ώς ὁ λόγος φησίν, and Soph. 259 C, ώς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. 'Formula ὁ λόγος σημαίνει apud Platonem creberrimi usus est' (see Stallbaum on Plato, Polit. 275 E). In Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 21 we have σημαίνει ὁ λόγος οῦτος: cp. also Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 34, ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον κ.τ.λ.
- 36. δεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and we ought to judge [whether they train them worse than others do]' etc. This remark may probably have reference to a reply of the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans, when the latter bade them fight or acknowledge their inferiority to the Thebans; the Lacedaemonians answered, περὶ μὲν τοῦ πότεροι βελτίους τὰς πράξεις κρίνειν τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐκατέροις πεπραγμένας κ.τ.λ. (Aristid. Or. in Platon. 4. ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 248. 425 a 21 sqq. Bekker).
- 37. ἀνταγωνιστὰς τῆς παιδείας, 'rivals in gymnastic education' (Sepulv. 'concertatores et aemulos disciplinae').
- 40. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle would no doubt exclude at this age the pancration and the pentathlon, which were among the βαρύτερα ἆθλα (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 179: Paus. 6. 24. 1), and would probably desire that contests even in running and leaping should be made as little exacting as possible. In the Panathenaea at one time boys contended in the pentathlon, but later on this was dropped (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 373). See vol. i. p. 358, note 1, and cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 24 sq. In Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 26 sub fin. it is implied that ἀναγκαῖα ἆθλα are not suitable for a boy of fifteen.

την βίαιον τροφήν, 'the constrained diet of athletes': see Liddell and Scott s.v. ἀναγκοτροφέω, and cp. Hippocr. De Diaet. 1. vol. i. p. 664 Kühn, γυμνασίων τῶν ἀπὸ βίης γινομένων.

- 41. τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους. Cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 16, οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων.
- 1. δύνανται, sc. ή βίαιος τροφή καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνοι. If with 1339 a. P<sup>2.3.4</sup> Bekk. we read δύναται, we must supply τὰ ἀναγκαῖα γυμνάσια (cp. 4).

- έν γὰρ τοῖς δλυμπιονίκαις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle would seem to have had a list of Olympic victors before him, and possibly not merely the list inscribed on stone at Olympia, but a list in the form of a book. 'With the year B. C. 776 began the list of Olympic victors used by the Alexandrian writers on chronology. A list of this kind was first published by the sophist Hippias of Elis, a contemporary of Socrates (Plut. Numa, c. 1: cp. Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 61 and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 958. 1). The list was later dealt with by Aristotle and others' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1.585). See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 109. I (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 1. 104. 1): V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 545 sqq.: Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 254. Milo of Crotona was one of the exceptions; he won in the wrestling-match for boys at Olympia, and also won in the wrestling-match for men at six Olympic festivals between B.C. 532 and 512 (Holm, Gr. Gesch. 1. 439). In Herondas 1. 50 sqq. Gryllus, the hero of the piece, is said to have achieved almost as much.
- 3. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 a 15, τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν.
- 4. ὅταν δ' ἀφ' ήβης κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 358, note 2. The 'other studies' are reading and writing, music and drawing. Plato, on the other hand (Laws 800 E sqq.), allots three years (aet. 10-13) to reading and writing, and three more (aet. 13-16) to lessons on the harp. Aristotle evidently thinks it better to postpone these studies till after the attainment of puberty. His view is that mental work is not favourable to the body (1339 a 7 sqq.), and he desires that the important physical change involved in the attainment of puberty should have been safely and well achieved before any mental training begins. By ηβη Aristotle evidently means (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1337 a I,  $\tau \hat{\eta}$  διαιρέσει  $\tau \hat{\eta} s$  φύσεωs) not the attainment of the age at which youths arrived at  $\eta \beta \eta$  in the eye of the law, but the advent of physical puberty, which seems to be placed in the fourteenth year in Hippocr. Coacae Praenotiones, vol. i. p. 321 Kühn. Aristotle appears to devote to the more exacting kind of gymnastic training all the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one. He makes no provision for the military duties which occupied the young Athenian during his nineteenth and twentieth years (see note on

1336 b 37). We do not learn when the youth of Aristotle's 'best State' were to begin their military training, but they would not do so apparently till after twenty-one. Plato in the Laws (833 D, 834 A) abolishes the heavier kind of gymnastic contests at festivals, such as wrestling and the pancration, but this is perhaps in part because he is legislating for Cretans.

7. ἄμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 359, note 1. This rule does not seem to be observed among ourselves. Much hard work is done on the river and in the football-field by youths who are preparing for difficult examinations. In a lecture before the Sanitary Congress at Brighton in 1890 the late Sir B. Richardson pointed out that in those occupations in which 'mental and bodily work was combined, the strain was most intense, and that those sorts of work should never be carried into weariness' (Times, Sept. 1. 1890).

12. καὶ πρότερον, in c. 3. 1337 b 27 sqq.

C. 5.

13. For ἐνδόσιμον see Bon. Ind. s. v., where the passage before us is grouped with Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 a 5 sqq., in which passage ἐνδόσιμον = προοίμιον.

14. οὖτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Μετέχειν αὐτῆς, 16, is a vague expression, but probably means 'study it' (cp. παιδεύειν, 27, and see note on 1337 b 29). This question must be settled in order that we may ascertain how music is to be studied, for if it is to be studied for the sake of recreation, the tunes and rhythms to be practised by the pupil will be quite other than those which will be practised by him if it is to be studied for the sake of virtue or intellectual enjoyment. A classification of studies into αὶ ἢθοποιοί, αὶ πρὸς ἡδονήν τινα καὶ χάριν ἐλευθέριον σπουδαζόμεναι, and αὶ εἰς σύνεσιν ἡ πρᾶξιν λεγόμεναι is implied in Plut. Themist. c. 2—a classification which recalls to some extent that in the passage before us. Compare also the witticism of Dorion, a musician and bon vivant of Aristotle's day, about a kind of lobster, τοὺς δὲ καράβους ἔφη τρία ἔχειν, διατριβὴν καὶ εὐωχίαν καὶ θεωρίαν (Athen. Deipn. 337 e).

17. καθάπερ ὖπνου καὶ μέθης. As to sleep, cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 11, τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς . . . τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἡδέα' διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὖπνος τῶν ἡδέων, and De Somno et Vigilia 2. 455 b 20 sqq.

ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these things are not in themselves connected with virtue, but are pleasurable and at the same time "bid care to

cease," as Euripides says, [and therefore they are used with a view to relaxation]. For των σπουδαίων, cp. Theogn. 115,

πολλοί τοι πόσιος καὶ βρώσιός εἰσιν έταῖροι, ἐν δὲ σπουδαίω πρήγματι παυρότεροι,

and Plato, Symp. 181 A, οἶον ὁ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν, ἡ πίνειν ἡ ἄδειν ἡ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῆ πράξει, ώς ἄν πραχθῆ, τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη, and see vol. i. p. 359, note 2. For οὔτε followed by ἀλλά, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 11 sqq., Magn. Mor. 2. 6. 1203 b 10, 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 8, and with Kaibel (Stil und Text der Πολιτεία 'Αθηναίων, p. 158), Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 7 sqq. and 2. 21. 1394 a 22, where Roemer reads οὖ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ κ.τ.λ. In Metaph. Θ. 3. 1046 b 33–36 οὔτε is taken up by ὁμοίως δέ (see Bonitz' note on the passage in his edition of the Metaphysics). Aristotle has Eurip. Bacch. 332 Bothe (377 Dindorf) before him, where we read of Bromius,

δς τάδ' ἔχει

θιασεύειν τε χοροίς, μετά τ' αὐλοῦ γελάσαι ἀποπαῦσαί τε μερίμνας, ὁπόταν βότρυος ἔλθη γάνος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν, κισσοφόροις δ' ἐν θαλίαις ἀνδράσι κρατὴρ ὕπνον ἀμφιβάλλη.

Here, as he says in 19-21,  $\tilde{v}\pi\nu\sigma s$   $\mu\epsilon\theta\eta$   $\mu\sigma\nu\sigma\kappa\eta$  and  $\tilde{\sigma}\rho\chi\eta\sigma\kappa s$  are all grouped together. The same is the case in Hom. II. 13. 636 (cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 23),

πάντων μεν κόρος εστί, καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότητος μολπῆς τε γλυκερῆς καὶ ἀμύμονος ὀρχηθμοῖο,

and Odyss. 8. 248,

αἰεὶ δ' ἡμῖν δαίς τε φίλη κίθαρίς τε χοροί τε εῖματά τ' ἐξημοιβὰ λοετρά τε θερμὰ καὶ εὐναί.

Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 40 a.

- 19. διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν κ.τ.λ. Supply μετὰ πάντων τούτων from; what follows. Cp. 1339 b 14, εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν (sc. πάντων), c. 7. 1342 a 14, where πάντας must be supplied with κουφίζεσθαι, 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 37, καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινῶσιν ἀλλ' ἀκολουθῶσι (sc. τῷ νόμῳ), and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 31, where εἰς τὴν σύνοδον ταύτην is suppressed after ἀπαντῶσιν.
- 21. τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις. This view implied that dancing is a cure for care. The sight of dancing must apparently be meant. Lucian says (De Saltat. c. 79), οὖτω δὲ θέλγει ὄρχησις, ὥστε . . . λύπη ἐχόμενός (τις) ἐξέρχεται τοῦ θεάτρου φαιδρότερος ὥσπερ τι φάρμακον ληθεδανὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν νηπενθές τε καὶ ἄχολον

πιών. He goes further in c. 81, and claims that it has a good ethical effect on the spectator.

ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν κ.τ.λ. This is answered in 1340 b 10 sqq. 'Αρετήν, 'moral virtue,' is represented by παιδείαν in c. 5. 1339 b 13 (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 38), for education is commonly connected by Aristotle with the production of moral virtue: cp. c. 7. 1342 a 2, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις (ἀρμονίαις χρηστέον).

26. φρόνησιν, 'intellectual culture': see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 772. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 309. 3), and Sus.², Note 1023 (Sus.⁴, 1. p. 585), who rightly defend the words καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν against those who would expunge them or change φρόνησιν into εὐφροσύνην. That the study of music may contribute to intellectual virtue is implied in c. 6. 1341 b 6 sq., and that intellectual virtue is the ultimate end of education we see from 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 14 sqq. For the use of φρόνησις in this sense, see Bon. Ind. 831 b 4 sqq.

τρίτον τῶν εἰρημένων, 'third among the aims which have been enumerated': see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.

ότι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἀλλὰ μήν, 29. Stallbaum on Plato, Protag. 326 A, compares Xen. Cyrop. 2. 2. 14, κλαύμασι μέν γε καὶ πατέρες νίοις σωφροσύνην μηχανῶνται καὶ διδάσκαλοι παισὶν ἀγαθὰ μαθήματα. Is Aristotle here tacitly correcting Plato, Laws 819 B, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοὺς ἀτεχνῶς παισὶν ἐξευρημένα μαθήματα, μετὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μανθάνειν, and 820 D, ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐγὼ μέν, ὡ Κλεινία, φημὶ τοὺς νέους δεῖν μανθάνειν καὶ γὰρ οὕτε βλαβερὰ οὕτε χαλεπά ἐστι, μετὰ δὲ παιδιᾶς ἅμα μανθανόμενα ἀφελήσει μέν, βλάψει δὲ ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐδέν ?

29. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγήν γε παισὶν κ.τ.λ. For ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ... γε, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 30, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου, and 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 7. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 15) has anticipated me in comparing these passages.

30. οὐδενὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 b 7, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὕδαιμον οὐ γὰρ ὅλον: Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 12, καὶ τὸ ἐν βίω δὲ τελείω προσέθεσαν, ἐνδείξασθαι βουληθέντες ὅτι περὶ τοὺς ἤδη προήκοντας ἄνδρας ἡ εὐδαιμονία γίγνεται τὸ γὰρ μειράκιον ἀτελὲς καὶ ὁ τούτου βίος, δί ὁ οὐκ ἀν γενέσθαι περὶ τοῦτ εὐδαιμονίαν. Cp. also Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 186, αἰξ οὔπω τέτοκεν, ἔριφος δ' ἐπὶ δώματι παίζει: ἐπὶ τῶν οὔπω τεχθέντων ἡ γεγονότων, ἀλλ' ἀτελῶν ὄντων καὶ τὰ τῶν τελείων θελόντων ποιεῖν.

- 31. ἀλλ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. The sense is—but perhaps the toils of boyhood in learning to play may, notwithstanding what has been said, be for the sake of pastime, not indeed for the sake of pastime in youth, but for the sake of pastime in manhood. The Lacedae-monian Leotychidas, the first in the royal line to bear this name at Sparta, in answer to the question, Τί δεῖ μάλιστα μανθάνειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους παῖδας; said, Ταῦτα, ὅσ' ἀν αὐτοὺς ἀφελήσειεν ἄνδρας γενομένους (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Leotych. 3), and Aristippus replied to a similar question, Οἷς ἄνδρες γενόμενοι χρήσονται (Diog. Laert. 2. 80).
- 33. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ., i.e. εἰ ἡ τῶν παίδων σπουδή ἐστι παιδιᾶς χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. The supposition is somewhat of a paradox: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 32, σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἢλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζη, κατ' 'Ανάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. The Persian kings had μουσουργοί attached to their court (Xen. Cyrop. 4. 6. 11). Compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιτερπῶς ἔν τινι πότω ψήλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν, "Οὐκ αἰσχύνη καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλων;" ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ἃν βασιλεὺς ἀκροᾶσθαι ψαλλόντων σχολάζη, καὶ πολὺ νέμει ταῖς Μούσαις, ἐτέρων ἀγωνιζομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεατὴς γιγνόμενος. Αὐτὸ ποιούντων, i.e. χειρουργούντων, which is implied in μανθάνειν αὐτούς (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 3). So we have in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 30, δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι, and in Plato, Rep. 498 A, ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων.
- 38. ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. Cp. Plato, Laws 794 C, ἐὰν δέ πη ξυγχωρῶσι, μέχρι γε μαθήσεως καὶ τὰ θήλεα, and Protag. 312 B, τούτων γὰρ σὰ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνη ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδεία, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει, and Isocr. De Antid. § 264, ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀπηκριβωμένους οὐδὲν ἃν εὐεργετήσειε, πλὴν τοὺς ἐντεῦθεν ζῆν προηρημένους, τοὺς δὲ μανθάνοντας ὀνίνησι.
- 39. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'things such as have been mentioned,' but what things are meant? 'Things which will be a source of pleasure in after-years' (so Vict.), or 'things which afford pleasure' (Sus.4), or 'musical performances' (Welldon)? The question is not free from doubt, but I incline to the third interpretation, as ταῦτα in 42 seems to mean 'musical performances,' and not τὰ δυνάμενα τὰ ἤθη βελτίω ποιεῖν.

καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄψων πραγματείαν κ.τ.λ. Richards is probably right in adding τά before περί (see critical note), though we expect τὰ ὄψα with παρασκευάζειν rather than the cumbrous periphrasis τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄψων πραγματείαν. If the reading of the MSS. is retained, ὄψα or some such word must be supplied with παρασκευάζειν. Bonitz

(Ind. s.v.) explains πραγματεία as 'rei alicuius tractatio via ac ratione instituta.' Παρασκευάζειν is especially used of cooks: cp. Plato, Gorg. 518 B, οὖτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. Cookery no less than music is a source of refreshment and pleasure to grown-up men. But it was regarded by the Greeks as work for slaves (1. 7. 1255 b 23–27: Plut. Lycurg. et Num. comp. c. 2, ἀλλ' ἦν ἡ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευὴ δεδομένη δούλοις καὶ Εἴλωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ περὶ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ ὄψον διακονία: Pomp. c. 73, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτου περιέπων καὶ θεραπεύων ὅσα δεσπότας δοῦλοι μέχρι νίψεως ποδῶν καὶ δείπνου παρασκευῆς). Has Sextus Empiricus this passage of the Politics before him in Adv. Math. 6. 33, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μή ποτε, δν τρόπον χωρὶς ὀψαρτυτικῆς καὶ οἰνογευστικῆς ἡδόμεθα ὄψου ἡ οἴνου γευσάμενοι, ὧδε καὶ χωρὶς μουσικῆς ἡσθείημεν ἄν τερπνοῦ μέλους ἀκούσαντες?

- 41. ἔχει, SC. ή μουσική.
- 42. ταῦτα, i.e. musical performances.
- 1. ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, i.e. μανθάνειν δύνασθαι 1339 b. ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ ὀρθῶς κρίνειν, or in other words to learn to become better in character: cp. 1340 a 15, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν. For the place of δύνασθαι cp. c. 3. 1337 b 31, and see note on 1281 a 26.
- 2. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Athenaeus may have this passage before him in Deipn. 628 b, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ', εἰ μὲν ἐμάνθανον τὴν μουσικήν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν ὅτι δὲ κρίνειν δύνανται καλῶς τὴν τέχνην ὁμολογεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν, καί φασι τρὶς ἤδη σεσωκέναι διαφθειρομένην αὐτήν. The Spartans learnt to sing (Plut. Lycurg. c. 21), and we read in c. 6. 1341 a 33 of one Spartan at any rate who had learned to play on the αὐλός—indeed, the Peripatetic Chamaeleon, a pupil of Aristotle, asserted that at one time they commonly learnt to play on the αὐλός (Athen. Deipn. 184 d)—but it would seem that in Aristotle's day they did not commonly learn to play on any instrument.
- 7. οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς κ.τ.λ. It is Apollo, not Zeus, whom the poets represent as singing and playing on the harp (Eurip. Ion 827 Bothe, 905 Dindorf, σὐ δὲ κιθάρα κλάζεις παιᾶνας μέλπων). In the older poetic descriptions, however, according to Preller, Griech. Mythologie 1. 215, Apollo does not sing but only plays, while the Muses sing to his playing (e.g. in Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 201 sqq.). For τοῖς ποιηταῖς, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 423. 3, where Plato, Rep. 389 E, 'Ομήρω, and Laws 706 D, αὐτῷ, are compared. Vahlen (Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 417) compares Poet. 18.

1456 a 25, τὸν χορὸν δεί . . . συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδη ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεί. Aristotle elsewhere uses the form ἄδειν: he may possibly use ἀείδειν here because he is quoting from a poet.

9. τοὺς τοιούτους, i.e. τοὺς ἀείδοντας καὶ κιθαρίζοντας. In Hom. Odyss. 17. 382 sqq. the ἀοιδός is counted among δημιουργοί. Compare Croesus' advice to Cyrus as to the Lydians (Hdt. 1. 155), πρόειπε δ' αὐτοῖσι κιθαρίζειν τε καὶ ψάλλειν καὶ καπηλεύειν παιδεύειν τοὺς παίδας καὶ ταχέως σφέας, ὁ βασιλεῦ, γυναῖκας ἀντ' ἀνδρῶν ὄψεαι γεγονότας, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεινοί τοι ἔσονται μὴ ἀποστέωσι.

καὶ τὸ πράττειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hom. Odyss. 14. 463,

οίνος γάρ ἀνώγει

ἢλεός, ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ μάλ' ἀεῖσαι καί θ' ἀπαλὸν γελάσαι καί τ' ὀρχήσασθαι ἀνῆκεν, καί τι ἔπος προέηκεν, ὅπερ τ' ἄρρητον ἄμεινον.

13. παιδείαν. See above on 1339 a 21. Παιδείαν corresponds to τὰ ἤθη βελτίω ποιείν, 1339 a 41.

14. εἰς πάντα τάττεται. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 7, ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆ εὐδαιμονία.

15. μετέχειν, sc. πάντων. See above on 1339 a 19.

ἥ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ κ.τ.λ., ' for pastime [must be pleasurable, since it] is for the sake of relaxation and relaxation must be pleasurable, for it is a cure for the pain which is produced by toil, [and things are cured by their contraries].' For the famous principle that things are cured by their contraries, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 17, λατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ λατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι (see Stewart), and 4. 11. 1126 a 21 sq. Aristotle inherits this principle from Hippocrates: cp. Hippocr. Aphorism. vol. iii. p. 714 Kühn, ἀπὸ πλησμονῆς δκόσα ἄν νοσήματα γένηται, κένωσις λῆται, καὶ δκόσα ἀπὸ κενώσεως, πλησμονή, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡ ὑπεναντίωσις, and De Natura Hominis, vol. i. p. 361 Kühn. Compare with τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν κ.τ.λ. Pindar, Nem. 4. 1,

ἄριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκριμένων laτρός.

In the passage before us and in c. 3. 1337 b 36 sqq. we get a glimpse of Aristotle's Theory of Relaxation, if he can be said to have one. The essential thing about relaxation is that it must be pleasurable. Toil causes pain and pain is cured by its opposite; hence if the pain of toil is cured by relaxation, relaxation must be pleasurable. Play is a means of relaxation, but there are other means also—sleep and conviviality (1339 a 16 sqq.). Sleep and conviviality heal care as well as the pain of toil (ibid.); whether

play does so we are not told. Play, unlike sleep, involves movement (4 (7). 17. 1336 a 26 sqq.); it may even be toilsome, though it is a cure for toil (1336 a 28 sqq.). Unlike sleep, again, it may be of a right or a wrong kind ethically; it may, for instance, be illiberal (1336 a 29: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.); hence it may affect the character for good or ill. In infancy no toil is undergone, so that the play of infancy does not come as a relaxation after toil. Aristotle distinguishes diagogê from relaxation, for though diagogê is pleasurable, it has in it an element of τὸ καλόν which relaxation has not (1339 b 17 sqq.). We may probably infer that diagogê will not serve as relaxation. Does it need to be followed by relaxation as ἀσχολία does? Aristotle does not consider this question, but the answer to it is probably in the negative. It is true that the activities called into play in diagogê are activities of so high a kind (see note on 1333 a 35) that they may well cause fatigue needing to be removed by relaxation, but we must remember on the other hand that Aristotle regards them as pleasurable (c. 5. 1339 b 17 sqq.) and desirable for their own sake. 'Ασχολία is accompanied by pain (c. 3. 1337 b 39), and hence the need that it should be followed by relaxation.

- 19. τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'for happiness, [which is an accompaniment of diagogê,] consists of both these things.' See vol. i. p. 296, note 1, and cp. Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 12, ἢδιστον γάρ τι καὶ κάλλιστον εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. That happiness is an accompaniment of diagogê, we see from c. 3. 1338 a 1 sqq.
- 20. καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν. Plato (Laws 669 D sqq.) objects to ψιλὴ, μουσική. 'Fuit autem ψιλοκιθαριστικῆς auctor Aristonicus, aequalis fere Archilochi' (cp. Athen. Deipn. 637 f), 'atque ψιλὴν αὖλησιν sub initium Pythiadum exercuit Sacadas' (Stallbaum on Laws 669 D).
  - 21. Mougaios. See note in Sus.4.
- 22. καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγάς. See critical note on 1330 b 31.
- 24. ὤστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ. Ἐντεῦθεν, i. e. from the fact of its pleasantness. Παιδεύεσθαι is probably middle: cp. 1340 b 13.
- 25. ὄσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for things harmlessly pleasant, [of which music is one,] are suitable not only for the end' (i.e. happiness), 'but also for relaxation.' That the pleasure derived from music is harmless had already been said by Plato (Laws 670 D, ἵνα . . . ἄδοντες αὐτοί τε ἡδονὰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀσινεῖς ἦδωνται κ.τ.λ.). Plato had also connected harmless pleasure with pastime in Laws 667 E,

ΚΛ. ἀβλαβη λέγεις ήδουην μόνου. ΑΘ. ναί, καὶ παιδιάν γε εἶναι την αὐτην ταύτην λέγω τότε, ὅταν μήτε τι βλάπτη μήτε ἀφελη σπουδης ή λόγου ἄξιου. For άρμόττειν πρός, cp. 8 (6). I. 1317 a 10, ποία μεν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν άρμόττει πόλιν, and Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 34.

27. For ἐν τῷ τέλει γίνεσθαι cp. Plato, Laws 635 C, γιγνόμενοι ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ('dum versantur in voluptatibus,' Stallbaum), and 841 C,

γεγονδε έν έπιθυμία, and Phileb. 35 E.

- 29. οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον, apparently 'not merely with a view to a further end' (Vict. 'non ut plus inde capiant'). I have not happened to meet with a parallel to this use of ἐπὶ πλέον. For οὐχ ὅσον in the sense of 'not only,' cp. Thuc. 4. 62. 2 (Liddell and Scott).
  - 30. διαναπαύειν, 'to let them rest awhile' (Liddell and Scott).
- 31. συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—but men are not content with using pastime as a means of obtaining the relaxation and pleasure of which they often stand in need; they fall into the error of confounding it with the end of life, and seek happiness in the pleasures arising from it. Pastime is χρήσιμον (1339 b 30), or in other words a means to the end (Eth. Nic. 8. 2. 1155 b 19 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρήσιμον καὶ ἄλλον χάριν), but instead of regarding it thus, they take it to be the end of life.
- 33. ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, 'but not any chance kind of pleasure.' Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 211), compares Poet. 14. 1453 b 10, οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγωδίας, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν, and 26. 1462 b 13, δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς (i.e. tragedy and epic poetry) ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην. Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Laws 658 E, συγχωρῶ δὴ τό γε τοσοῦτον καὶ ἐγὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονῆ κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μέντοι τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην, ῆτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει.

ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην κ.τ.λ., 'and seeking this' (i.e. the pleasure of the end) 'they take the other' (i.e. the pleasure of pastime) 'as being this.' Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 2, οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης, and see note on that passage.

- 36. αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν, 'the pleasures we have mentioned,' i.e. the pleasures of pastime. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 9, καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι (sc. καθ' αὐτάς εἰσιν αἰρεταί)' οὐ γὰρ δι' ἔτερα αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται, and 34, ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. See note in Sus.4.
  - 38. For the needless addition of airiar in the relative sentence,

cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3, ὁπόσαι μὲν σωτηρίαν φέρουσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, χρησταὶ οὖσαι καὶ μὴ χρησταί, ἡ κίνδυνον τῷ δήμῳ ἄπαντι, τούτων μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν οὐδὲν δεῖται ὁ δῆμος μετεῖναι: Aristot. Hist. An. 2. 11. 503 a 23 sqq.: Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23 sqq. and 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7 sqq.: 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 32–34: 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 10: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19 sqq.

- 40. περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν κ.τ.λ. Compare the similarly anacoluthic sentence, 3. 16. 1287 a 8, περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἡν ἄρχει πάντα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς—δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν. Sus.⁴ would supply (after ἔοικεν) εἰκότως ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ζητεῖσθαι (or γίνεσθαι). Perhaps, however, it is simpler to supply ζητητέον, which comes to the surface, as it were, in the next sentence. Κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, 'have recourse to music': cp. c. 6. 1341 a 1, ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ρυθμῶν κοινωνητέον. Οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, Sc. τὴν αἰτίαν.
- 42. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Probl. 10. 42. 895 a 33, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκεν, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ταῖε γυναιξὶν ὅτι ἡ θερμότης κάτω ὁρμᾳ. A contrast is here drawn between the accidents of a thing and its nature or essence (φύσις = οὐσία, see Bon. Ind. 545 b 23 sqq., where Metaph. Δ. 4. 1014 b 35, ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν φύσει ὄντων οὐσία, is referred to among other passages). For the contrast of οὐσία and συμβεβηκός, see Metaph. Γ. 4. 1007 a 31 sqq.
- 2. καὶ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 15 sqq. and Probl. 28. 7. 1340 a. 950 a 5, ħ διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἡδονὰς κοινὰς εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώροις; ἄτε οὖν οὖσαι κοιναὶ ἀτιμόταταί εἰσι καὶ μάλιστα ἡ μόναι ἐπονείδιστοι. The many know not what true pleasure is (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 15). For τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς ῆς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν, cp. Metaph. B. 2. 996 b 28, τὰς κοινὰς δόξας ἐξ ὧν ἄπαντες δεικνύουσιν. Aristotle implies that this κοινὴ ἡδονή does not affect the character or the soul; he probably regards it as pleasure of a merely physical kind. For the view that pleasure which comes by nature is common to all, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 8, τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι' οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς ψυσική πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἡ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δ' ἀμφοῦν, Phys. 8. 7. 261 b 25 sq., and Plato, Laws 963 E. Cp. also Diphilus, Πολυπράγμων Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 407),

τόδε δ', ως ἔοικε, τὸ γένος ωσπερ θηρίον ἐπίβουλόν ἐστι τῆ φύσει καὶ πανταχοῦ.

5. ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. 'sed etiam videre numquid ad mores quoque animamque pertineat.' For συντείνειν πρός, cp. Περὶ νεότητος

καὶ γήρως, 3. 460 a 20, διὰ τί δ' αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθήσεων φανερῶς συντείνουσι πρὸς την καρδίαν, αί δ' εἰσὶν έν τῆ κεφαλή . . . τὸ αἴτιον τούτων έν έτέροις είρηται χωρίς. For προς το ήθος και προς την ψυχήν, cp. 11, του περί την ψυχην ήθους, and see note on 1337 a 38: cp. also Plato, Symp. 195 Ε, έν γὰρ ἤθεσι καὶ ψυχαίς θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν οἴκησιν ίδρυται (Έρως). For συντείνει cp. De Part. An. 3. 4. 667 a 11, αί δε διαφοραί της καρδίας κατά μέγεθός τε καὶ μικρότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ μαλακότητα τείνουσί πη καὶ πρὸς τὰ ήθη. For the repetition of the preposition see critical note on 1331 b 24. Plato had already said in Rep. 401 D, ᾶρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῆ τροφή, οτι μάλιστα καταδύεται είς τὸ εντὸς της ψυχης ο τε ρυθμός καὶ άρμονία καὶ έρρωμενέστατα απτεται αυτής φέροντα την ευσχημοσύνην, και ποιεί ευσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφη, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον; (cp. Laws 673 A), and in Tim. 47 D, ή δὲ άρμονία, ξυγγενεῖς έχουσα φορὰς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχής περιόδοις, τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχρωμένω Μούσαις οὐκ ἐφ' ήδονὴν ἄλογον, καθάπερ νῦν, εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάρμοστον ψυχής περίοδον είς κατακόσμησιν καὶ συμφωνίαν έαυτή ξύμμαχος ύπο Μουσών Both these passages are probably present to Aristotle's δέδοται. mind here.

- 9. διὰ τῶν 'Ολύμπου μελῶν. Eaton refers to Plato, Symp. 215 C, τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου (i.e. 'Ολύμπου), ἐάν τε ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς αὐλῆ ἐάν τε φαύλη αὐλητρίς, μόνα κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι. Bernays (Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, Note 5) uses the passage before us to show that, when in c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. Aristotle describes the effect of τὰ ἷερὰ μέλη, it is to these melodies of Olympus that he mainly refers. See as to them Sus.⁴, 1. 621 sq.
- 11. δ δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has to prove that music affects τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, therefore he has to prove that the ἐνθουσιασμός which it admittedly produces is an affection of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος. Some may have regarded it as a σωματικὸν πάθος, like the πάθη referred to in Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 8 sqq., and others as a special condition of the νοῦς (cp. Plato, Ion 534 B, κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστι καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἶός τε ποιεῖν, πρὶν ἄν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῆ, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 66, περὶ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τὸν ἐνθουσιασμὸν ἑώρων), but Aristotle regards it as connected with an impulse to action (Magn. Mor. 2. 8. 1207 b 4, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ἄνεν λόγου δρμὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τι: cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 20. 1190 b 35 sqq.),

and this is perhaps the reason why he here traces it to τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος. For other πάθη τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθους, Bonitz (Ind. 557 b 9) compares Rhet. 2. 9. 1386 b 12, where τὸ ἐλεεῖν and τὸ νεμεσᾶν are said to be καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ. Some of the external symptoms of ἐνθουσιασμός may be gathered from Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 62 R, ταῦτα δὲ ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνθέων ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, ἀσθμαίνουσα καὶ περιδινοῦσα τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ πειρωμένη δεινὸν ἐμβλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ σωφρόνως.

- 12. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι κ.τ.λ. Even mere imitative sounds without the aid of melody or rhythm call forth in every one the feelings which they imitate (see vol. i. p. 362, note 3). Thus a single note from the pitch-pipe of a slave was enough to restore calmness and gentleness to the tones of C. Gracchus' oratory when they became harsh and angry (Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 6). Aristotle has just been dwelling on the effect of the melodies of Olympus, and he now adds this remark in order to guard against the supposition that the effect produced by music on τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος is due not to its power of imitating ethical states, but to its accompaniments of melody and rhythm. Plato had spoken in Rep. 401 D (see note on 5) as if this was so. Aristotle appears to imply here that the musical imitation of ethical states is possible without the use of rhythm and melody; hence, when in c. 7. 1341 b 23 he speaks as if music was confined to μελοποιία and ρυθμός, we must suppose that he refers to music in a somewhat narrower sense.
- 14. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν κ.τ.λ., 'but since it happens that music belongs to the class of pleasant things, [so that it calls forth feelings of pleasure, and pleasure may be called forth by the right or the wrong objects,] and virtue is concerned with taking pleasure aright and loving and hating aright, it is evident that we ought to learn and to be habituated to nothing so much as to judging aright and taking pleasure in good characters and noble actions, [because it is thus that men learn virtue].' Aristotle proceeds in what follows to show that music is capable of teaching men to take pleasure in noble characters and actions, or in other words to be virtuous (cp. 1340 b 10 sqq.). Μανθάνειν is distinguished from συνεθίζεσθαι in 16, whereas in 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες, the word μανθάνειν includes both ἐθίζεσθαι and ἀκούειν.
- 18. ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα κ.τ.λ., 'and in rhythms and melodies there are images, most nearly approaching the reality, of anger and

gentleness,' etc. It is thus that Sepulveda ('proxime ad veras naturas accedunt'), Vict. ('maxime secundum veras naturas'), Stahr, and Sus. interpret μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις: cp. Top. 8. 14. 164 b 19, ἐκ τῶν παρὰ πόδας, 'things close to the feet.' Compare Alcidamas, De Sophistis, p. 88, μιμήματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων, and for φύσεις (with Bon. Ind. 838 b 55), Phys. 4. 6. 213 b 24, δ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις (i.e. τὰ ὄντα, τὰ σώματα). Aristotle, who here has before him Plato, Rep. 399 A sqq. (where however only ἀνδρία and σωφροσύνη are referred to, not πραότης), and Laws 654 E, 655 B, and 798 D, appears to imply that the images of emotions and ethical states conveyed in melody and rhythm approach nearer to the original than those conveyed for instance in poetry, except so far as poetry is associated with melody and rhythm. The question might be asked why the young should not be taught to take pleasure in good characters and good acts by a training concerning itself directly with that subject-matter and not merely with images of it, but Aristotle would probably reply that there would not be the same pleasurableness in a training of that kind as there is in a musical training, and that it would not fulfil the end of accustoming the young to take pleasure in the right things.

20. καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις. Aristotle implies that musical imitations not only of cowardice but also of ἀκολασία, the opposite of σωφροσύνη, are possible. Music can certainly at any rate imitate ὕβρις.

21. τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν, sc. παθῶν καὶ ἔξεων τοῦ ἤθους (Sus.3 Ind. s. v. ἠθικός).

22. μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχήν, i. e. we experience emotional change: cp. (with Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 336) Rhet. 2. 1. 1378 a 20, ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἶς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία.

23. τοιούτων, S.C. ρυθμῶν καὶ μελῶν.

25. οἷον εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 10 sqq.

μὴ δι ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν is added, because if a man took pleasure in an image (for example) on account of the beauty or costliness of its material, he might not take equal pleasure in the thing of which it is an image. Cp. Poet. 4. 1448 b 15, διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν

καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί εκαστον, οἶον ὅτι οὖτος ἐκεῖνος, ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, οὐ διὰ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἡ τὴν χροιὰν ἡ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.

- 27. αὐτὴν ἐκείνην. Bekk.² adopts the emendation of Lambinus and Scaliger, αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, perhaps rightly. If we retain αὐτὴν ἐκείνην, we must supply τούτου as the antecedent to οδ.
- 28. συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eaton and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 132 sq.) compare Problem 19. 27. 919 b 26, διὰ τί τὸ ἀκουστὸν μόνον ἦθος ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ἢ ἄνευ λόγου μέλος, ὅμως ἔχει ἦθος ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐδὲ ὁ χυμὸς ἔχει ἡ ὅτι κίνησιν ἔχει μόνον... αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὖται πρακτικαί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἤθους σημασία ἐστίν, and Probl. 19. 29. 920 a 3 sqq. Prof. Butcher points out that these passages exaggerate the true Aristotelian view, as they deny all ethical suggestiveness to sight as well as to taste and smell. Ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν (' other sensible things than things audible') is taken up not by ἀλλά, 30, but by ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς, 38.
- 31. σχήματα γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ., ' for there are forms that have this power' (i.e. the power of imitating emotions and ethical states), 'but only to a small extent, and all, [even children and worthless men,] share in the perception just referred to.' The painter Parrhasius denied in a conversation with Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3, 10, 3) that painting can imitate the character of the soul ( $\tau \hat{o} \tau \hat{\eta} \hat{s} \psi v \chi \hat{\eta} \hat{s} \hat{\eta} \theta o \hat{s}$ ), but was led on by Socrates to a different conclusion (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 5, ἀλλά μήν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ τὸ σωφρονικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειρόκαλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐστώτων καὶ κινουμένων ανθρώπων διαφαίνει. 'Αληθη λέγεις, έφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα μιμητά; Kai μάλα, ἔφη). Plato went further (Rep. 400 Esq.) and found not only painting, but also weaving, embroidery, building, and the forms of vessels and of animals and plants, full of ethical suggestiveness, but Aristotle rates the ethical suggestiveness of forms and colours lower and finds such suggestiveness, it would seem, only in the human body under the influence of emotion (compare the passage of Xenophon quoted above), or in representations of it. See vol. i. p. 363, note 5. As to καὶ πάντες της τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν, see note on 1340 a 2, and vol. i. p. 363, note 3. Spengel and Sus. transpose ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν to after κοινωνοῦσιν, 32, while E. Müller inserts οὐ before πάντες, 31. If any change in the text is necessary, of which I do not feel certain, I prefer the former change

to the latter, but it would also be possible to add a second ἐπὶ μικρόν after πάντες, 31. Forms and colours are mentioned as examples of τὰ ὁρατά: cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 a 3, τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὕψεως, οἶον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῆ.

- 32. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the distinction between copies and symbolic representations of an original, see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 124, who refers to Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen, 2. 145-154, where the subject is fully discussed. 'A sign or symbol has no essential resemblance, no natural connexion, with the thing signified.' Aristotle does not say that painting and sculpture can give only symbolic representations of all that they imitate, but that it is only in this way that they can reproduce character. In τὰ γιγνόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα Aristotle seems to refer to forms and colours in pictures and statues (for we read of painters in Poet. 1. 1447 a 18 as μιμούμενοι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι, cp. Plato, Rep. 373 B), not to attitudes and colours in living The words τὰ γιγνόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα are added by an afterthought in explanation of ταῦτα very much as ή περὶ τὴν τροφήν is added in 1. 9. 1258 a 16 sqq.: cp. also [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 19, άλλὰ ταῦτά γε νὴ τὴν 'Αθηνᾶν ὄνειδός ἐστιν, ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὰ γιγνόμενα τη πόλει έπὶ τοῦ βήματος. As to the repetition of τῶν ἡθῶν in 33 and 34 see critical notes on 1276 a 21 and 1319 a 33, and explanatory note on 1284 b 28.
- 34. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. I now take this to mean, 'and these indications of character occur [only] in the case of the body under the influence of emotions, [so that it is not forms in general, but only a particular kind of forms, that are even indications of character].' I explained this obscure clause otherwise, though with much hesitation, in vol. i. p. 363. For the suppression of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36. For ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος cp. Plut. Sympos. 9. 15. 2. 747 C, ὅταν ᾿Απόλλωνος ἡ Πανὸς ἡ τινος Βάκχης σχῆμα διαθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικῶς τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐπιμένωσι. For the fact, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 14, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν. Το many modern minds, however, there seems to be ethical suggestiveness in architecture.
- 35. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ., 'not but that, so far as it makes a difference in relation to the contemplation of these things also [whether we contemplate one thing or another],' etc. By 'these things' Aristotle means forms and colours.

36. δεί μη τὰ Παύσωνος κ.τ.λ. Cp. Poet. 2. 1448 a I, ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοθυται οί μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ανάγκη δε τούτους ή σπουδαίους ή φαύλους είναι . . . ήτοι βελτίονας ή καθ ήμας ή χείρονας ή και τοιούτους, ωσπερ οί γραφείς, Πολύγνωτος μέν γάρ κρείττους, Παύσων δέ χείρους, Διονύσιος δέ όμοίους εἴκαζεν. In this, we learn from what follows, Polygnotus found a parallel in Homer and Pauson in poets far inferior to Homer. In the passage before us it is implied that Pauson was not ηθικός, and according to Sus.4, 1. p. 624, Aristotle means by 'an artist "full of character" (ηθικός)' one who 'represents noble characters.' The word ηθικός appears to bear this meaning here and in c. 7. 1342 a 3, 28, but in c. 6. 1341 a 21, ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν δ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, it evidently means simply 'expressive of ethical character' as distinguished from 'emotional.' In Poet. 6. 1450 a 26 we read of Polygnotus, οἶον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἡθογράφος, ή δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφή οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος. Lysippus may be among the sculptors referred to as ηθικοί: cp. Plut. De Alex. seu Virtute seu Fortuna 2. 2, διὸ καὶ μόνον 'Αλέξανδρος ἐκέλευε Λύσιππον εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ δημιουργεῖν' μόνος γὰρ οὖτος, ὡς ἔοικε, κατεμήνυε τῷ χαλκῷ τὸ ἦθος αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεξέφερε τῆ μορφη την ἀρετήν. As to the skill of Polygnotus in portraying character, see Brunn, Gesch. der gr. Künstler 2. 40. There were paintings by Polygnotus at Athens in the Stoa Poecilê, in the Anaceium, in a chamber of the Propylaea, and elsewhere, so that his work must have been familiar to Aristotle's hearers. As to Pauson, see Brunn 2. 49 sqq. and Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 212, both of whom take Aristophanes to refer to him in Acharn. 854, Thesmoph. 948 sq., and Plut. 602. If they are right in this, Pauson would seem to have been a contemporary of Aristophanes.

38. ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς, 'in melodies taken by themselves' apart from anything else, apart from the person of the singer and from the words sung. Forms and colours, on the other hand, are suggestive of character only in the case of the body under the influence of emotion.

40. εὐθὺς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for, to begin with, the nature of harmonies, [which are elements in melody,] is different.' Aristotle goes on to show in 1340 b 7 sqq. that the same thing holds of rhythms, and probably he regarded a melody as made up of harmony and rhythm, just as Plato, who, unlike Aristotle (c. 5. 1339 b 20), did not approve of ψιλὴ μουσική (Laws 669 D sq.), regarded it as made up of words, harmony, and rhythm (Rep. 398 D). If harmonies

affect the ἢθος of the hearer differently, it follows that they differ in ἢθος and are μιμήματα τῶν ἢθῶν. The word ἀρμονία had more meanings than one (Monro, The Modes of Ancient Greek Music, p. 56), but it is evidently used here of the Dorian, Phrygian, and other 'modes,' whatever we take their nature to have been. On this disputed question see (in addition to Sus.⁴, 1. p. 624 sqq.) the work of Mr. Monro just referred to, Mr. H. Stuart Jones' review of it in Class. Rev. 8. 448 sqq., and Mr. Monro's reply (ibid. 9.79 sqq.).

- 41. ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον. For the pleonasm cp. Poet. I. 1447 a 17, τῷ έτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, and see Vahlen on this passage. For the fact cp. Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 6. 48 (p. 757. 29 sqq. Bekker), οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁν τρόπον ἄπαν διάστημα κατὰ μουσικὴν ἐν φθόγγοις ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὕτω καὶ πῶν ἦθος. τὸ δ' ἔστι τι γένος μελφδίας. καθὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἦθῶν τινὰ μέν ἐστι σκυθρωπὰ καὶ στιβαρώτερα, ὁποῖα τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἱστοροῦσιν, τὰ δὲ εὐένδοτα πρὸς ἔρωτας καὶ οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ ὀδυρμοὺς καὶ οἰμωγάς, οὕτω τὶς μὲν μελφδία σεμνά τινα καὶ ἀστεῖα ἐμποιεῖ τῷ ψυχῷ κινήματα, τὶς δὲ ταπεινότερα καὶ ἀγεννῆ.
- 42. ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 398 D, ἀλλὰ μέντοι θρήνων τε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις άρμονίαι; λέγε μοι σὰ γὰρ μουσικός. Μιξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαῦται τινές. Οὐκοῦν αὖται, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξίν, ἀς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν (possibly a hit at Sappho, who is credited with the invention of the mixo-Lydian mode by Aristoxenus ap. Plut. De Mus. c. 16), and Laws 800 D, πᾶσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν καταχέουσι, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ γοωδεστάταις ἀρμονίαις συντείνοντες τὰς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ψυχάς, καὶ δς ᾶν δακρῦσαι μάλιστα τὴν θύσασαν παραχρῆμα ποιήση πόλιν, οῦτος τὰ νικητήρια φέρει. He also has before him Pratinas ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 f (Pratinas, Fragm. 5),

μήτε σύντονον δίωκε μήτε τὰν ἀνειμέναν ἰαστὶ μοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰν μέσαν . . νεῶν ἄρουραν αἰόλιζε τῷ μέλει,

where, as Sus. points out, the Aeolian mode is described as intermediate between 'high-pitched Ionian' and 'low Ionian.' Pratinas, however, declares in favour, not of the Dorian mode, as Aristotle, but of the Aeolian, later called the hypo-Dorian according to Athen. Deipn. 625 a.

όδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον. Grief was believed to compress and joy to expand the mind: cp. Eurip. Alcest. 771

Bothe (707 Dindorf), τοῦ νῦν σκυθρωποῦ καὶ ξυνεστώτος φρενών, and Hippol. 937 Bothe (983 Dindorf), μένος μεν ξύστασίς τε σων φρενών, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4. 31. 66, eodem enim vitio est effusio animi in laetitia quo in dolore contractio. So the Stoics defined λύπη as συστολή άλογος and explained ήδονή as έπαρσις (Diog. Laert. 7. 111, 114: see Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 180). In Laws 800 D (quoted above) Plato had spoken of the ψυχή generally, but Aristotle here speaks more particularly of the διάνοια as affected by the various musical modes (cp. 1340 b 2); he regards it as susceptible of compression and relaxation, two extreme states, and also of a mean state of calm. He was led by a false etymology of the Greek word ἐπιστήμη to connect wisdom and knowledge with a calm state of mind (Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 10, τῷ γὰρ ἦρεμῆσαι καὶ στηναι την διάνοιαν επίστασθαι καὶ φρονείν λέγομεν, and 18 sqq.), and this is perhaps one reason why he selects the composed and collected Dorian mode for use in education. He feels that anything which calms is useful both morally and intellectually. In Aesch. Suppl. 69,

> τως καὶ έγω φιλόδυρτος Ἰαονίοισι νόμοισι δάπτω τὰν ἁπαλὰν νειλοθερῆ παρειάν,

the high-pitched variety of the Ionian mode is probably referred to. This variety, which some identify with the mixo-Lydian (see Sus.<sup>4</sup>, 1. 625 sqq.), appears to have been expressive of lamentation.

2. πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἶον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας. 1340 b. Aristotle probably refers to the softer varieties of the Ionian and Lydian modes: cp. Plato, Rep. 398 E, where these varieties (if we follow Mr. H. Stuart Jones' interpretation of the passage in Class. Rev. 8. 449, note) are said to be μαλακαὶ καὶ συμποτικαί.

3. μέσως καὶ καθεστηκότως, 'in a midway state of collectedness and composure': cp. c. 7. 1342 a 10, καθισταμένους, and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 32, καθεστηκότα, and for the conjunction of μέσως and καθεστηκότως, Eth. Eud. 7. 5. 1239 b 35, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, and 1240 a 2 sq. Καθίστασθαι is conjoined with σωφρονίζεσθαι in Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 25. As to the Dorian mode, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 12 sqq. Plutarch describes the songs sung by the Spartans as πολὺ τὸ κόσμιον ἔχοντα καὶ καταστατικόν (Lycurg. c. 4), and Heracleides Ponticus (ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 d) says of the Dorian mode, ἡ μὲν οὖν δώριος ἀρμονία τὸ ἀνδρῶδες ἐμφαίνει καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ οὐ διακεχυμένον οὐδ ἱλαρόν, ἀλλὰ σκυθρωπὸν καὶ σφοδρόν, οὔτε δὲ ποικίλον οὔτε πολύτροπον: cp. Plut. De Mus. c. 16, ἡ μὲν (δωριστὶ) τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ἀξιωματικὸν ἀποδίδωσιν.

- 4. ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς δ' ἡ φρυγιστί, sc. δοκεῖ ποιεῖν. Cp. 1340 a 10 and c. 7. 1342 b 1 sqq.
- 5. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently takes his account of the mental effect of each of the harmonies from οί περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες, 'those who had studied musical education.' Some musicians (Damon, for instance, as Sus.4, 1. p. 596, points out, referring to Plato, Rep. 400 B and 424 C) had probably done this, and also some philosophers (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 27 sqq. and 1342 a 30 sqq.). Among the philosophers would be Plato (Rep. 398 E-399 A and elsewhere) and some of his disciples (Plut. De Mus. c. 3 init.), e.g. Heracleides Ponticus, and perhaps, as Eaton says, some Pythagoreans (cp. Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3. 441 E). It has been suggested by Mr. H. Stuart Jones (Class. Rev. 8. 450) that Aristotle's view of the mental effect of the various modes rests on a verbal basis, the word ανειμένος meaning both 'loosely strung' (or 'low-pitched') and 'soft, relaxed,' and the word σύντονος both 'highly strung' (or 'high-pitched') and the reverse of 'soft' and 'relaxed'; it appears, however, from the passage before us that his view comes to him from other authorities, so that the verbal confusion supposed to exist would be theirs rather than his. But indeed the emphatic statement in 6, λαμβάνουσι τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων έξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, suggests that these authorities arrived at their conclusion inductively by watching the effect of the different modes on individual hearers.
- 6. λαμβάνουσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Thus they adopt the best method of inquiry: cp. De Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 30, οὐ μὴν εἴληπταί γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἰκανῶς, ἀλλ' ἐάν ποτε ληφθῆ, τότε τῆ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον τῶν λόγων πιστευτέον, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν ὁμολογούμενα δεικνύωσι τοῖς φαινομένοις.
- 8. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 3. 8. 1408 b 32, τῶν δὲ ρυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς άρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ταμβος αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ λέξις τῶν πολλῶν...ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα, ἔστι γὰρ τροχερὸς ρυθμὸς τὰ τετράμετρα λείπεται δὲ παιάν: Poet. 24. 1459 b 34, τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν... τὸ δὲ ἰαμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικά, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. As the trochee is κορδακικώτερος, it is probably regarded by Aristotle as φορτικωτέρας ἔχων τὰς κινήσεις: cp. Athen. Deipn. 631 d, ὁ μὲν κόρδαξ παρ' Ἑλλησι φορτικὸς ἡ δ' ἐμμέλεια σπουδαία, and 629 b sq. Compare the striking picture in Plut. Sympos. 7. 5. 1 of the effect produced by a skilful αὐλωδός on the guests at a banquet—οὐδὲ γὰρ κατακειμένοις ἔτι βοᾶν ἐξήρκει καὶ κροτεῖν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶντες ἀνεπήδων οἱ πολλοί, καὶ

συνεκινοῦντο κινήσεις ἀνελευθέρους, πρεπούσας δὲ τοῖς κρούμασιν ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν. We read in Plato, Rep. 400 B, of ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἡ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, and in Laws 669 C of ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων: cp. also 815 E.

- 10. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle says nothing about the question raised in c. 5. 1339 a 25, whether music contributes to διαγωγή and φρόνησις.
- 12. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. The reason for which Pythagoras employed music in education, according to Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3. 441 E, was akin to this, but not quite the same. Plutarch there says that he ἐπηγάγετο τὴν μουσικὴν τῷ ψυχῷ κηλήσεως ἔνεκα καὶ παραμυθίας, ὡς οὐ πῶν ἐχούση διδασκαλία καὶ μαθήμασιν ὑπήκοον, οὐδὲ λόγῳ μεταβλητὸν ἐκ κακίας, ἀλλά τινος ἑτέρας πειθοῦς συνεργοῦ καὶ πλάσεως καὶ τιθασσεύσεως δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι μέλλοι φιλοσοφία δυσμεταχείριστον εἶναι καὶ ἀπειθές.
- 15. οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119b 5 sqq., Plato, Laws 659 E, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς παιδιαί τε καὶ ῷδαὶ καλεῖσθαι (sc. δοκοῦσι) καὶ πράττεσθαι, and Isocr. Areop. § 43, ἐώρων γὰρ... τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν νεωτέρων) μάλιστα παιδευθῆναι δεομένας ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πόνοις ἡδονὰς ἔχουσιν ἐν μόνοις γὰρ ἄν τούτοις ἐμμεῖναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους καὶ μεγαλοφρονεῖν εἰθισμένους. Isocrates here (like Plato in Rep. 536 E, ψυχῆ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα) adopts the Pythagorean view (Aristox. Fragm. 22: Muller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) that study, if it is to come to anything, must be willingly pursued. Aristotle seems to think so too.
- 16. ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. Ἡ μουσική (sc. τέχνη οτ ἐπιστήμη) is ἡδυσμένη because rhythm and harmony and melody go with it (Poet. 6. 1449 b 28 sqq.). In Poet. 6. 1450 b 15 we read τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πέντε ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, and Prof. Bywater (Journal of Philology, xiv. 1885, p. 42) would read ἡδυσμάτων here. ᾿Ανήδυντον, however, finds a better antithesis in ἡδυσμένων than in ἡδυσμάτων.
- 17. καί τις ἔοικε συγγένεια κ.τ.λ. Supply πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν (see Vol. ii., p. li., note 4). The sense is—and not only is music τῶν ἡδυσμένων, but it is also akin to the soul (which is not the case with all ἡδυσμένα), and therefore still more congenial to it than those ἡδυσμένα which are not akin to it. I cannot follow Sus. in transposing 17–19 to after ἐλευθεριωτέρας, 10. Cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία, ξυγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φορὰς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδοις, κ.τ.λ.,

and Probl. 19. 38. 920 b 33, ρυθμῷ δὲ χαίρομεν διὰ τὸ γνώριμον καὶ τεταγμένον ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν καὶ κινεῖν ἡμᾶς τεταγμένως οἰκειοτέρα γὰρ ἡ τεταγμένη κίνησις φύσει τῆς ἀτάκτου, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον. That which is akin to the soul is likely to be suitable to it (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 25: Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1178 a 5, τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῷ τῆ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῷ: Plato, Lysis 214 B, 221 Esq.).

- 18. διὸ πολλοί κ.τ.λ. The Pythagoreans held that the soul is a harmony, and two of Aristotle's disciples, Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, followed them in this opinion (see Sus.4, 1. 597, who refers to Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 444 and 2. 2. 888, 890 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, vol. ii. p. 436 sqq.): cp. De An. 1. 4. 407 b 27 sqq.). The view that the soul has harmony is that of Plato (Phaedo 93: see Sus.4, ibid.). For the two views cp. De Caelo 1. 1. 268 a 4, τῶν γὰρ φύσει συνεστώτων τὰ μέν ἐστι σώματα καὶ μεγέθη, τὰ δ' ἔχει σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, τὰ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἐχόντων εἰσίν, and Plut. Camill. c. 20, κίνησις δέ τις ἡ σύν τινι κινήσει πάντως ἡ γένεσις.
- C. 6. 20. χειρουργοῦντας takes the place of κιθαρίζοντας (c. 5. 1339 b 8), partly because Aristotle does not wish to prejudge the question of the αὐλός, partly because the use of the word χειρουργεῖν serves to place in a strong light the doubtfulness of the point, the Greeks being prejudiced against χειρουργία. We shall find in the sequel that Aristotle seeks to confine χειρουργία within as narrow limits as possible (cp. 1340 b 35 sqq. and 1341 b 1). He nowhere considers the possible alternative of teaching the young to sing but not to play. The two things usually went together in ancient Greece, so far at any rate as solo-singers were concerned; the singer was expected to be able to accompany himself on the lyre.
  - **21.** πρότερον, in c. 5. 1339 a 33 sqq.
  - 22. οὐκ ἄδηλον κ.τ.λ. This takes up 10 sqq., ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων κ.τ.λ. For ποιούς τινας cp. c. 5. 1339 a 22, ὡς δυναμένην . . . καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς. Το become ποιοί τινες is to acquire a certain ἔξις (Categ. 8. 8 b 25, ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ ἡν ποιοί τινες εἶναι λέγονται ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἔξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν), and it is by acquiring the appropriate δύναμις οτ ἔξις that we become able to judge of things (De An. 3. 3. 428 a 3). But the ἔξις is acquired by practice (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31, τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle's language here seems hardly consistent with his language in Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 7 sqq. He does not speak there as if it was

necessary to have learnt to sing and play in order to judge of music aright. We are told, again, in 3. 11. 1282 a 17 sqq. that there are arts in which the user is a better judge than the master of the art. Are we to infer that music is not one of these? Besides. Aristotle's teaching in the passage before us appears to imply that we ought to practise in youth all kinds of music-not merely the ethical kind, which he alone recommends for use in the education of the young (c. 7. 1342 a 2), but also practical and enthusiastic airs, for otherwise how can we judge of these aright?—and indeed all arts of the products of which we desire to become good judges (e.g. poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture, to say nothing of the useful arts). This he does not seem to have observed. experience as to music evidently was that those who did not practise the art up to a certain point were apt to rest content with music possessing merely a physical charm—the music which pleased slaves and children—and did not acquire a liking for noble music. By 'good judges' Aristotle clearly means not good judges of music from a technical point of view, but men capable of taking pleasure in ethically good music (cp. c. 5. 1340 a 17 and 1339 a 24). The difference between γίγνεσθαι, 22, and γενέσθαι, 25, may be illustrated by Plato, Theaet. 155 C, ανέν γάρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι άδύνατον (sc. ἐμὲ ἐλάττω): see also Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, \$ 97.

25. ἄμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν. The value of education in keeping boys out of mischief is recognized by Isocrates in Panath. § 27 and Areop. § 45: cp. Plato, Protag. 326 A. 'Children are sent to school as much to keep them out of harm's way as to prepare them for after-life,' observes a writer in the Academy for Nov. 9, 1895, who probably remembers and extends to all children a remark as to little children which has been pointed out to me in Spectator, No. 330 (March 19, 1712), 'as little children are sent to school before they are capable of improvement, only to be out of harm's way.'

26. τὴν ᾿Αρχύτου πλαταγήν. As to the rattle of Archytas, cp. Plut. Sympos. 7. 10. 1, εἰ δὲ μή, δοτέον ὥσπερ παισὶν ἀτρεμεῖν μὴ δυναμένοις, οὐ δόρυ καὶ ξίφος, ἀλλὰ πλαταγὴν καὶ σφαῖραν (cp. Anthol. Pal. 6. 309), ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς τὸν νάρθηκα τοῖς μεθύουσιν ἐνεχείρισε κουφότατον βέλος καὶ μαλακώτατον ἀμυντήριον, ὅπως, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα παίουσιν, ῆκιστα βλάπτωσι: Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 213 (where however the invention is ascribed to an Archytas who was a τέκτων):

Lucr. 5. 229. Archytas was fond of playing with children (Aelian, Var. Hist. 12. 15: Athen. Deipn. 519 b). Πλαταγαί, however, appear to have existed before the time of Archytas, for they were known to Hellanicus and to Pherecydes of Athens (see Göttling's note on the passage before us, and Hellan. Fragm. 61, Pherecyd. Fragm. 32 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 53, 78). As to the form 'Αρχύτου see critical note.

- 29. οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. Sus. compares Plato, Laws 653 D, φησὶ δὲ τὸ νέον ἄπαν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Laws 664 E, Aristot. Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 18, διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία οὕτε μανθάνειν δύναται οὕτε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁμοίως κρίνειν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ταραχὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις, and Plut. Sympos. 7. 10. 1, quoted above on 26.
- 30. ή δὲ παιδεία πλαταγή τοις μείζοσι τῶν νέων. Are these words present to the mind of the writer of Virg. Catal. 7,

Et vos, Stiloque Tarquitique Varroque, Scholasticorum natio madens pingui, Ite hinc, inane cymbalon iuventutis?

- 33. τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις κ.τ.λ. Here the difficulty raised in c. 5. 1339 b 8, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἡ παίζοντος, is taken up and answered.
  - 34. λῦσαι, sc. τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν: cp. 40 sqq.
- 35. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for first, since it is [only] for the sake of judging of music that they are to practise playing [and not for the sake of perfect mastery of execution, on account of this they should indeed practise playing in youth, but as they become older, they should be released from playing, and yet be able to distinguish noble airs and to take pleasure in music aright, thanks to the training which they have received in youth.' Though it is provided here that, as men cease to be youthful, they shall be excused playing on an instrument, singing is apparently contemplated even in the case of aged men in c. 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., if this passage is genuine. Aristotle would seem to be less favourable to playing in the case of adult citizens than many were: not a few Pythagoreans played on the harp (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 39. 113: Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 23), and on the αὐλός (Athen. Deipn. 184 e), and so did Epaminondas (Athen. ibid.: Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4). Socrates learnt the harp in old age (Diog. Laert. 2. 32: Val. Max. 8. 7. Ext. 8).

42. μέχρι τε πόσου κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 15 sqq., and see note. This question receives an answer in 1341 a 5-17. Τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν, 'those who are being educated with a view to excellence as citizens,' and not with a view to excellence as musical executants. Πολιτικήν is emphasized by its position in the sentence. So in De Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 29 sqq. a contrast is implied between ή πολιτική ἀρετή (including perhaps ἡθική ἀρετή and φρόνησις) and ή τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀρετή. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 183, τοῖς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένοις, μὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὀνομαζομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῖς καλοῖς κὰγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς μετ' εὐσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐγγιγνομένης, and see note on 1280 b 5.

1. καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ρυθμῶν κοινωνητέον. The question 1341 a. as to the melodies is answered in 1341 a 9 sqq. and in c. 7. 1341 b 19 sqq., but the question as to the rhythms is not answered in what we possess of the Politics (see vol. i, p. 367, and vol. ii, p. xxviii sq.). We may probably infer, however, from c. 5. 1340 b 7 sqq. that the rhythms used in education will be οἱ ἔχοντες ἢθος στασιμώτερον.

2. ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὀργάνοις κ.τ.λ. Answered in 1341 a 17-b 8. Ἐν is used here of the 'medium' of instruction, as it is often used in the Poetics (e.g. in Poet. 1. 1447 b 29) of the medium of imitation (see Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 24: Bon. Ind. 245 b 42 sqq.): cp. Plato, Laches, 182 A, οἱ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὀργάνοις γυμναζόμενοι.

4. τρόπους τινὰς τῆς μουσικῆς, 'some kinds of music' (for the use of τρόποι in the sense of εἴδη see Bon. Ind. 772 b 30 sqq.). Οἱ τεχνικοὶ τρόποι τῆς μουσικῆς, οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας (1341 b 10), are referred to: cp. 1341 b 14 sqq.

6. μήτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις. It is implied that the study of music might stand in the way of a citizen's work in after-life without harming the body. It might do so if it lowered the character or enfeebled the intelligence (c. 2. 1337 b 8–11), and this result might well follow if music were studied as festival-performers study it.

7. μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάναυσον καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἦδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὖστερον. By τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις Aristotle probably means 'military and civic training,' 'training designed to develope military and civic virtue': cp. 2. 9. 127 1 b 5, μηδὲ ἦσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς, 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 42, τοῖς

ποὸς ἀρετήν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8-11. The words πρὸς μέν τὰς χρήσεις ήδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὕστερον appear to be added in explanation and limitation of ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, but their meaning is by no means clear. Coray's note on them is "οὐκ ἔρρωται τὸ χωρίον." Some explain Tas yongers (in the sense of doing the thing studied) as one form of the military and civic training referred to and τὰς μαθήσεις as another, and regard χρήσεις as preceding μαθήσεις, because in any training designed to produce good soldiers and citizens practice comes first and instruction in the theory afterwards (cp. c. 3. 1338 b 4, Metaph. 0. 5. 1047 b 31 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31 sqq. and 10. 10. 1170 b 23 sqq.). But what χρήσεις πολεμικαί και πολιτικαί can the boys to whom Aristotle refers be said to perform? Bojesen, on the other hand, followed by Sus., interchanges χρήσεις and μαθήσεις, reading πρός μέν τὰς μαθήσεις ήδη, πρός δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὕστερον. Sus.2 appears from the translation which he gives of the passage to supply των πολεμικών καὶ πολιτικών ἀσκήσεων with μαθήσεις and χρήσεις, but the expressions τὰς χρήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων and τας μαθήσεις των πολεμικών και πολιτικών ασκήσεων seem rather strange. And, whether we supply these words or not, the question remains, to what μαθήσεις πολεμικαί καὶ πολιτικαί pursued in boyhood and youth does Aristotle refer? He must apparently refer to the ordinary education in gymnastic, music, etc., for we know of no other which he provides for the young. I am inclined, however, to suggest a different interpretation of the passage before us. Should we not supply τοῦ σώματος with τὰς χρήσεις (as Schneider appears to do, for he says, 'χρήσεις sunt cum quis corpore vario modo utitur'), and explain the passage thus, 'the study of music in youth must not render the body unfit for military and civic training either by rendering it unfit for such training in a purely physical way' (literally, 'unfit for the uses of the body') 'or by rendering it an unfit assistant for the mind in studies later on'? That the body may be a help or a hindrance to the use of the mind in study we see from Plato, Rep. 498 B and 536 B, and Protag. 326 B sq.: cp. also Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12 sqq., quoted on 1333 a 21. For τας τοῦ σώματος χρήσεις cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 38.

10. τὴν μάθησιν, 'the study of music': cp. 6, τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς. τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συντείνοντα. Supply τῶν ἔργων from 12: cp. 1341 b 9, τῆς ἐργασίας. Does Aristotle refer to the same kind of performances which Plato rejects in Laws 812 D sq.?

11. τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων κ.τ.λ. Compare a fragment of Anaxilas (Athen. Deipn. 623 e, f: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 352), ή μουσικὴ δ' ὥσπερ Διβύη πρὸς τῶν θεῶν ἀεί τι καινὸν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν θηρίον τίκτει,

where Anaxilas has perhaps before him Plato, Laws 660 B, καινὰ δὲ ἄττα ἀεὶ γιγνόμενα περί τε τὰς ὀρχήσεις καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν κ.τ.λ. These feats of execution in singing and playing are distinguished here from ordinary 'agonistic' performances; the nature of 'agonistic' music may be divined from Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 20 sqq. and Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 22 sqq. Does Aristotle refer to the musical innovations of Timotheus among others, as to which see Pherecr. Χείρων Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 326 sqq.)? Cp. also Plato, Laws 812 D–E.

- 13. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ., 'but practise even such music as we have mentioned' (i.e. music that is neither agonistic nor of extraordinary difficulty) 'only to the point at which' etc. For this limitation cp. Plato, Laws 812 B-E.
- 15. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνια ζώων. See vol. i. p. 365, note 1, and cp. Plato, Polit. 268 B, where Plato refers to the effect of music on herds and flocks, and Rep. 620 A, where he speaks of 'swans and other musical animals.' Cp. also Pindar, Fragm. 220, and Athen. Deipn. 328 f. For the conjunction of ζῷα and παιδία, cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1371 a 14, ὧν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 29 and 7. 2. 1236 a 2, and Plato, Theaet. 171 E, πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δέ, and Clitophon 409 D, τὰς δὲ τῶν παίδων φιλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων κ.τ.λ.
- 17. δηλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρηστέον. They must not be instruments which serve for festival-competitions or in wonderful feats of execution (10 sqq.).
- 18. οὖτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς κ.τ.λ. Τεχνικὰ ὅργανα are instruments designed for use at festival-competitions (1341 b 10). It is implied here that learning to play on them would tend to make boys ill recipients of musical and other training. Why is this? Probably because learning to play on them trained the hand rather than the mind (1341 b 1, 6 sqq.). The cithara must have come by Aristotle's time to differ a good deal from the lyre; still Plato retains (Rep. 399 D) both lyre and cithara. Αὐτῶν, 20, i.e. τῶν ὀργάνων.
- 21. ἔτι δὲ οὖκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This is a second argument against the use of the αὐλός in education. It is not an instrument expressive of

ethical character (see above on 1340 a 36), but rather one for employment in orgiastic rites (compare the use of the word Bakxela in c. 7. 1342 b 4 in connexion with δργιαστικά καὶ παθητικά), one which produces that modification of emotion which orginstic rites produce. For παθητικόν is a wider term than δργιαστικόν: not all things that are παθητικά are δργιαστικά. The use of the αὐλός in the worship of Dionysus (Virg. Aen. 11. 737, ubi curva choros indixit tibia Bacchi) and of Cybele (Hor. Carm. 4. 1. 22, Berecyntiae tibiae) is well known. Cp. also Strabo, pp. 466, 468, and Plato, Crito 54 D. 'One who listens to the remarkable music of the flute and cymbals at the dances of dervishes in Konia or Kara Hissar of Phrygia can understand the intoxicating influence which it had over the devotees and populace of antiquity' (Prof. W. M. Ramsay in Journal of Hellenic Studies, 8. 510). Some light is thrown on the effect of the αὐλός in orgiastic worship by Plut. Sympos. 3. 8. 2, ωσπερ ή θρηνωδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῆ πάθος κινεί καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει, προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον, οὕτω κατὰ μικρου έξαίρει και αναλίσκει το λυπητικόν. As to κάθαρσιν cp. c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. and see note on this passage. Compare also Plut. Pelopid. c. 19 (quoted above on 1274 a 32), where however the αὐλόs is regarded, not as a means of stirring, and so carrying off, emotion, but as a means of softening the untempered strength of the spirited element in the Theban character.

22. ώστε πρός τους τοιούτους κ.τ.λ. For τους τοιούτους καιρούς έν ois κ.τ.λ. see note on 1337 b 6. Bonitz (Ind. 329 a 43) appears to give  $\dot{\eta}$   $\theta \epsilon \omega \rho i a$  here the sense of 'spectaculum,' to judge by the passages with which he groups the passage before us, as do also Sepulveda and some others, but it probably means much the same thing as ή ἀκρόασις (Sus. Ind. s. v.); we must, however, remember that αὖλησις was accompanied with certain bodily movements on the part of the performer (1341 b 18), so that there was something to be seen as well as heard. For the contrast between κάθαρσις and μάθησις here compare the contrast between παθείν and μαθείν in Aristot. Fragm. 15 in Rose's second edition of the Fragments (Fragm. 45. 1483 a 19 in the first), καθάπερ 'Αριστοτέλης άξιοί τους τελουμένους οὐ μαθείν τι δείν αλλά παθείν καὶ διατεθήναι, δηλονότι γενομένους ἐπιτηδείουs (Synes. Dion, c. 10). That μάθησις may be derived by persons of mature age from listening to music (and it is persons of mature age, not boys, that Aristotle has in view here) appears from c. 5. 1339 a 34 sqq.

24. προσθώμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. In interfering with the use of language the use of the αὐλός interferes with a means of education, for the air and the words sung exercise an educating influence on the singer. Cp. also De Part. An. 2. 16. 659 b 30, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι μαλακὰ καὶ σαρκώδη καὶ δυνάμενα χωρίζεσθαι (sc. τὰ χείλη ἔχουσι), φυλακῆς τε ενεκα τῶν οδόντων ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι διὰ τὸ εὖ πρὸς γὰρ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ταῦτα.

26. διὸ καλῶς κ.τ.λ. ᾿Αποδοκιμάζειν τὴν χρῆσιν τοῦ αὐλοῦ ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων is a rugged expression, and I have not happened to meet with any parallel to it. There is less ruggedness in the language of Plutarch in Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἀφεῖλε τῶν παιδευομένων νέων τὴν ἁρμονίαν τὴν Λύδιον καὶ τὴν Φρύγιον κ.τ.λ.

27. καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρώτον αὐτώ. We read of poets at a very early date who were also performers on the αὐλός— Mimnermus of Colophon and Smyrna at the end of the seventh century B.C. (Strabo, p. 643) and Sacadas of Argos at the beginning of the sixth (Plut. De Musica, c. 9). Compare Athen. Deipn. 184 C, ἔμελε δὲ τοῖς πάλαι πᾶσιν Ελλησι μουσικης διόπερ καὶ ἡ αὐλητική περισπούδαστος ήν. Χαμαιλέων γοῦν ὁ Ἡρακλεώτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Προτρεπτικώ Λακεδαιμονίους φησί καὶ Θηβαίους πάντας αὐλεῖν μανθάνειν, Ήρακλεώτας τε τους έν τῷ Πόντω καθ' έαυτον έτι, Αθηναίων τε τους έπιφανεστάτους, Καλλίαν τε τὸν Ἱππονίκου καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχρου. Athenaeus shows by quotations from the Δαυταλείς of Aristophanes (Fragm. 17: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1037) and from the Ephialtes of Phrynichus (Fragm. 3: Meineke 2. 581), that the αὐλός was commonly taught to boys in the days when these plays were performed. A reaction set in at Athens against the study of the aὐλόs, aided perhaps by the increased hostility to Thebes which must have resulted from the Athenian defeat at Delium (B.C. 424), and certainly by the influence of Alcibiades (vol. i. p. 365, note 3), but Archytas at Tarentum, among other Pythagoreans, and Epaminondas at Thebes are said to have played on the αὐλός (Athen. Deipn. 184e: see above on 1340 b 35), and we have already seen that at the Pontic Heracleia, a city in the population of which a Boeotian element was included (Paus. 5. 26. 7), the custom of learning to play on it still prevailed in the time of Chamaeleon (a little later than Aristotle), so that when Aristotle speaks of the study of the aillos as 'rejected,' we may take him to refer to the general rule.

- 28. σχολαστικώτεροι γάρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle appears to be speaking of the Hellenes of Greece Proper, for they alone took part in the repulse of the Persian invasion in B.C. 480 and 470, and it is of this that the expression τὰ Μηδικά is commonly used (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 614. 1). When Aristotle looks back to an increase of wealth and leisure and a consequent widening of study at a date even prior to the invasion of Xerxes, he may be referring to the time of Anacharsis and to the story about him which Herodotus (4. 77) rejects, ώς . . . οπίσω ἀπονοστήσας φαίη προς του ἀποπέμψαντα Έλληνας πάντας ἀσχόλους είναι ες πασαν σοφίην πλην Λακεδαιμονίων, τούτοισι δὲ εἶναι μούνοισι σωφρόνως δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. After the repulse of Xerxes the Greeks of Greece Proper threw themselves with vigour into the study of painting sculpture and architecture; the dramatic art made a great advance, and many States began for the first time to strike coins. Cp. Diod. 12. 1. 4. A similar spirit shows itself, though less happily, in the determination of Themistocles and Thucydides, son of Melesias, that their sons should be made marvellous horsemen and wrestlers (Plato, Meno 93-94). Compare with Aristotle's picture of Greece after the Persian Wars what we read of the intellectual and artistic progress of the United Provinces after the War of Independence. M. Lefèvre-Pontalis remarks in his Life of John de Witt (Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 12) that 'prosperity and freedom combined had been for the United Provinces the signal for a sudden blossoming of arts, sciences, and letters,' and illustrates his remark by enumerating the painters, jurists, philosophers, scholars, soldiers, and men of science who flourished in the United Provinces at this epoch. That leisure was thought to be favourable to high aims we see from c. 2. 1337 b 14 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 1 sqq.
- 31. οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιζητοῦντες, 'making no distinction between things, but seeking out fresh studies.' Cp. Hdt. 3. 39, ἔφερε δὲ καὶ ἦγε πάντας διακρίνων οὐδένα, Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 535 Kühn, ὅστις μὲν ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ ἔρρωται μηδὲν διακρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πίνειν αἰεὶ τὸ παρεόν, and Antiphanes, Ἦρχων (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 22), μηδ' ἔτερ' ἐπιζήτει καλά.
- 32. ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις. Vict. 'adduxerunt in ordinem eorum quae discerentur.' Cp. 18, εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον.
- 33. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί κ.τ.λ. The ordinary practice was that an aulêtês was allotted to the chorêgus to accompany the chorus, the aulêtês being commonly a man of inferior social

position (cp. Athen. Deipn. 624 b, διὸ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἦλησιν αὐλητὰς φρυγίους καὶ δουλοπρεπεῖς τὰς προσηγορίας ἔχειν οἶός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ ᾿Αλκμᾶνι Σάμβας καὶ Ἦλος καὶ Τῆλος, παρὰ δὲ Ἱππώνακτι Κίων καὶ Κώδαλος καὶ Βάβυς), while the chorêgus was a man of wealth and rank, but in this instance the chorêgus himself acted as aulêtês. We learn from this passage that chorêgi existed in the Lacedaemonian State; their existence at Athens is a familiar fact, and they can be shown to have existed in other States also (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 372. 1). As Sus. 4 (1. 603) points out, the chorus at Lacedaemon here mentioned was probably not a dramatic but a lyrical chorus.

34. ἐπεχωρίασεν, sc. ἡ αὐλητική.

οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, 'most of the gentlefolks.' Οἱ ἐλεύθεροι are contrasted with θῆτες in 1341 b 13 sq., and with βάναυσοι and θῆτες in c. 7. 1342 a 18 sqq., where ἐλεύθερος is conjoined with πεπαιδευμένος.

35. δηλον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Chorêgi sometimes dedicated to Dionysus a tablet recording the victory of the poet whose play they had brought out: so we read of Themistocles in Plut. Themist. c. 5, ἐνίκησε δὲ καὶ χορηγῶν τραγφδοῖς . . . καὶ πίνακα τῆς νίκης ἀνέθηκε, τοιαύτην ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχοντα, "Θεμιστοκλῆς Φρεάρριος ἐχορήγει, Φρύνιχος ἐδίδασκεν, 'Αδείμαντος ἦρχεν" (cp. Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 108). See A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalterth., p. 418, who follows Bergk in comparing Theophrast. Char. 22, ὁ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος νικήσας τραγφδοῖς ταινίαν ξυλίνην ἀναθεῖναι τῷ Διονύσῳ, ἐπιγράψας μὲν (μόνον?) αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄνομα κ.τ.λ. The tablet mentioned by Aristotle here cannot of course have shown that most Athenians of respectability were able to play on the αὐλός: it can only have recorded the name of one such Athenian as having acted as aulêtês on this particular occasion. As to Ecphantides, one of the earliest comic poets at Athens, see Sus.4, and Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 35 sqq.

37. υστερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη κ.τ.λ. Supply δ αὐλός. 'But afterwards it was rejected [as an instrument for the young and for gentlefolks] simply by force of experience.'

39. ὁμοίως δέ, sc. ἀπεδοκιμάσθη. It is evident that at one time not only the αὐλός, but also the five instruments mentioned here, together with others which, like them, required manual dexterity and skill, were used by the young and by gentlefolks, but that they were afterwards discarded, so far as these classes were concerned, because they were thought not to contribute to virtue. They were probably regarded as training the hand rather than the mind or

character, and of three of them-sambucae and triangular and septangular harps—we read that their strength lay in pleasing the ear of the listener, not in anything ennobling. Music, however, that is merely for pleasure is said to be no better than a 'plaything' by Plato (Polit. 288 C: cp. Gorg. 501 E and Laws 700 D sqq.); the best type of music leads on to the love of τὸ καλόν (Rep. 403 C). As to the instruments here named see Sus.4, I. p. 632 sqq., and Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., pp. 312-314. The sambuca was high-pitched and piercing in tone (Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 101, την δέ σαμβύκην πρώς θηλύτητα (ἀναλογοῦσαν), ἀγεννη τε οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ πολλης ὀξύτητος διὰ τὴν μικρότητα τῶν χορδῶν εἰς ἔκλυσιν περιάγουσαν: cp. Athen. Deipn. 633 f), whereas the lyre was deeper in tone (Aristid. Quint. ibid). Trigona and pectides (which were a kind of harp) had already been rejected by Plato in Rep. 399 C as being 'manystringed and many-toned,' but the number of strings in the pectis seems to have varied (Sus.4, r. p. 632 sq.), and Aristotle does not name this ground for rejecting them. Opinion at Mytilene was probably favourable to the sambuca, for we read in Euphorion ap. Athen. Deipn. 182 f of a statue of one of the Muses there, who was represented holding a sambuca.

1341 b. 2. εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ. For this myth see Ovid, Fasti 6. 695 sqq.: Hygin. Fab. 165 (quoted in Bull. de Corr. Hellénique 12. 107): Paus. 1. 24. 1: Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109. As Schneider points out, Aristotle evidently has before him the lines of Melanippides (Fragm. 2 Bergk) and the reply of Telestes (Fragm. 1 Bergk): see for both Athen. Deipn. 616 sq. Some, however, ascribed the invention of the αὐλός to Apollo (Plut. De Mus. c. 14). Τῶν αὐλῶν and τοὺς αὐλούς, because two pipes and not one were commonly used for playing in Greece.

4. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. According to Melanippides (Fragm. 2) Athena had said, when casting away the αὐλοί,

ἔρρετ' αἴσχεα, σώματι λύμα,οὔ με τῷδ' ἐγὼ κακότατι δίδωμι.

6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers an old saying (Athen. Deipn. 337 e),

ανδρί μεν αὐλητῆρι θεοί νόον οὐκ ένέφυσαν, αλλ' αμα τῷ φυσῆν χῶ νόος ἐκπέταται.

Cp. Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109, ἀπορρίψαι τὴν θεόν φασι τοὺς αὐλοὺς ὡς οὐ πρόσφορον ήδονὴν ἐπιφέροντας τοῖς σοφίας ἐφιεμένοις: also

Plato, Laws 644 A, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχὺν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης βάναυσόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι, and Eth. Nic. 7.
12. 1152 b 16, ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσφ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. For πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως, 'training in flute-playing contributes in no way to the intelligence,' cp. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, c. 14, πρῶτον γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ψιλῶς οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἡμᾶς, οῦτω δ' οὐδ' ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι, and Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ θαρρεῖν.

7. τη δὲ ᾿Αθηνῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. 'Science' and 'skill in art' are mentioned together, just as we have in Plato, Ion 536 C, οὐ γὰρ τέχνη οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη περὶ 'Ομήρου λέγεις ἀ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ καὶ κατοκωχῆ, and in Theaet. 207 C, ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι. In the passage before us καὶ τὴν τέχνην is probably added in explanation and limitation of τὴν ἐπιστήμην, for it is the less wide term of the two: cp. De Soph. Elench. 6. 168 b 6, οἱ τεχνῖται καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἐπιστήμονες. As to Athena cp. Hom. Odyss. 13. 297,

έπεὶ σὺ μέν ἐσσι βροτῶν ὅχ' ἄριστος ἁπάντων βουλῆ καὶ μύθοισιν, ἐγὰ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσιν μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν,

where she is the speaker: Il. 5. 60 sq., 9. 390, and 15. 411 sq.: Plato, Polit. 274 C (cp. Plut. De Fortuna, c. 4): and Paus. 8. 36. 5, ἔστι δὲ ᾿Αθηνᾶς ἱερὸν ἐπίκλησιν Μαχανίτιδος, ὅτι βουλευμάτων ἐστὶν ἡ θεὸς παντοίων καὶ ἐπιτεχνημάτων εὐρέτις. So we read of the Anaxagoreans in Syncell. Chron. p. 149 C (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 913. 4), ἐρμηνεύουσι δὲ οἱ ᾿Αναξαγόριοι τοὺς μυθώδεις θεούς, νοῦν μὲν τὸν Δία, τὴν δὲ ᾿Αθηνᾶν τέχνην.

- 8. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis to this protasis virtually comes in c. 7. 1341 b 19, σκεπτέον δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ., though by the time Aristotle reaches these words he has forgotten the existence of his protasis, owing to the interposition of the long parenthesis (10–18) in which he states his reasons for excluding a professional study of music. Compare 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., where the same thing occurs.
- 10. τεχνικήν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας. This is added because the word τεχνικός was commonly used in a different sense. Plato had already said of ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι that its only aim is pleasure (Gorg. 501 E), and Aristotle here has before him the whole passage, Gorg. 501 B-502 A.

ἐν ταύτη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἐν ταύτη=ἐν τῆ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παιδεία. Γάρ introduces the reason why Aristotle rejects study with a view to festival-competitions, not the reason why he calls this study τεχνική: hence the parenthesis which Sus. begins before τεχνικήν should rather begin before ἐν ταύτη. The object with which an ἐλεύθερος should study is his own improvement in virtue (c. 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.). The ἐλεύθερος is defined in Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25 sqq. as ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ἄν: it is characteristic of him not to live for the convenience of another (Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31 sq.). To do things with a view to the virtue of others would be more befitting to him than to contribute merely to their pleasure (cp. Plato, Gorg. 500 A sq.). Thus αὐτοῦ and ἀρετῆς are both of them emphatic, and also τῶν ἀκουόντων and τῆς ἡδονῆς.

14. For καὶ . . . δή see note on 1253 a 18. We expect βάναυσον rather than βαναύσους, but see note on 1338 b 1.

πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, ' for the object is evil with a view to which they select their end ' (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31, συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος, and Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 16, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς' ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν). Competitors at a festival play, or sing and play, in the way which is most likely to please the less refined among their audience.

17. αὐτούς τε ποιούς τινας ποιεί καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις. Ποιούς τινας, i.e. βαναύσους. As to the κινήσεις of performers on the αὐλός, cp. Poet. 26. 1461 b 29, ώς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, αν μή αὐτὸς προσθή, πολλήν κίνησιν κινούνται, οίον οί φαύλοι αύληταὶ κυλιόμενοι, αν δίσκον δέη μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ έλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον, αν Σκύλλαν αὐλῶσιν: Athen. Deipn. 21 f, Φίλλις δ Δήλιος μουσικός τούς άρχαίους φησί κιθαρφδούς κινήσεις ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ προσώπου μικρὰς φέρειν, ἀπὸ ποδῶν δὲ πλείους, έμβατηρίους καὶ χορευτικάς, and 22 C, Θεόφραστος δὲ πρῶτόν φησιν Ανδρωνα τὸν Καταναῖον αὐλητὴν κινήσεις καὶ ρυθμοὺς ποιῆσαι τῷ σώματι αὐλοῦντα ὅθεν σικελίζειν τὸ ὀρχεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς μεθ ὁν Κλεόλαν τον Θηβαΐον (cp. Scholiast. Aeschin. quoted by Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 336): and Paus. 9. 12. 6, λέγεται δὲ ώς καὶ τοῦ προσώπου τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῆ τοῦ παντὸς κινήσει σώματος περισσῶς δή τι ἔτερπε (Πρόνομος) τὰ θέατρα. Pronomus was a famous player on the αὐλός. In a bas-relief found at Mantineia (see Bull. de Corr. Hell. 12. 105 sqq., esp. p. 110 sq.) the contorted attitude of Marsyas, as he plays on the αὐλός in competition with the cithara of Apollo, is in strong contrast with the calm bearing of the god.

- 19. Σκεπτέον δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has finished what he had to C. 7. say about opyava and epyavia, and now only one of the subjects mentioned in c. 6. 1340 b 41 sqq. remains to be dealt with, and this is ποίων μελών καὶ ποίων ρυθμών κοινωνητέον (i.e. τοις πρός άρετήν παιδενομένοις πολιτικήν). But in taking up this subject for consideration Aristotle gives a wider extension to it than he had led us to expect that he would, and announces that he will inquire generally περί τε τὰς άρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ρυθμούς, as well as with regard to their use in education. And in fact we find in the sequel that he inquires in this chapter not only what harmonies are to be used in education, but also what are to be used for the other purposes served by music. This is quite in accordance with c. 5. 1339 a II sqq., where the question proposed for discussion is the broad question, for how many purposes music is useful. We see, therefore, that the Fifth Book of the Politics is not exclusively concerned with questions relating to the education of youth, but occupies itself also with the question for what purposes music is to be used in adult life. As to the state of the text in 19-26 see critical note.
- 21. τοις πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοῦσι, 'those who are practising music with a view to education': cp. τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν, c. 5. 1339 a 39. Cp. also Plut. Pericl. c. 4, 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ παρὰ Πυθοκλείδη μουσικὴν διαπονηθῆναι τὸν ἄνδρα φησίν, and Plato, Laws 818 A.
- 23. τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ἡυθμῶν οὖσαν. Sepulv. 'musicam in cantus modulatione et rythmis consistere,' and so most interpreters, but Vict. explains, 'musicam exerceri colique et per cantus et per numeros,' and perhaps he is right. Cp. 4(7). 2. 1324 a 15, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος).
- 24. τούτων δ' ἐκάτερον κ.τ.λ. What the difference is between the educational effect of rhythm and melody, Aristotle does not tell us, for the promise here given of a discussion of the subject is not fulfilled in what we possess of the Politics. We see from Plato, Laws 655 A, that ρυθμός makes men εὔρυθμοι and ἀρμονία makes them εὐάρμοστοι, but Aristotle probably has in view some more tangible difference than this. The εὔρυθμος μουσική would be the better preparation for war (cp. Polyb. 4. 20. 6). But the key to the question which of the two kinds is the better for education will be found in the question which benefits the character most.
- **27.** νομίσαντες οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1342 a 31 sq. Specialists in music (μουσικοί, cp. 1342 b 23, τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τινες) are distinguished here from philosophers who have received a musical training

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(cp. 1341 b 33, τινès τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφία, and c. 5. 1340 b 5 sq., and see below on 1342 a 31, and cp. for ἐκ Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232). Works seem to have been in existence written by men belonging to each of these classes, which went into full detail both on the subject of harmonies and rhythms and on that of musical education. As to the persons referred to see note on 1340 b 5.

31. As to the meaning of νομικῶς see Sus.4, who renders the word 'formally,' and compares Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 27, ἀπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμου χάριν. But does not the word mean 'after the fashion of a law,' i.e. in a broad and general way, as a law does? Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 9 sqq., and Plato, Laws 876 D, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴπομέν τε καὶ ἐδράσαμεν ἐν τῆ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν νομοθετήσει νόμων, τὸ περιγραφήν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωριῶν εἰπόντας δοῦναι τὰ παραδείγματα τοῖσι δικασταῖς τοῦ μή ποτε βαίνειν ἔξω τῆς δίκης κ.τ.λ.

32. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The classification of melodies here given rests on the familiar distinction of ήθη πράξεις and πάθη (cp. Poet. 1. 1447 a 28), for ένθουσιασμός is a πάθος (Pol. 5(8). 5. 1340 a 11). Of the four kinds of tragedy mentioned in Poet. 18. 1455 b 32 sqq. one is ή ήθική and another ή παθητική. Compare also Strabo, p. 15, τουναντίον δ' οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινὰ λέγουσι πρώτην την ποιητικήν, εἰσάγουσαν εἰς τὸν βίον ἡμᾶς ἐκ νέων καὶ διδάσκουσαν ήθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις  $\mu$ εθ' ήδονης. 'Ηθικὰ  $\mu$ έλη are those which imitate and mould to virtue (see above on 1340 a 36); as to πρακτικά μέλη, 'melodies which imitate and stir to action, cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 12, ηθος δε έχει ή μεν ύποφρυγιστί πρακτικόν, διό καὶ έν τε τῷ Γηρυόνη ἡ ἔξοδος καὶ ἡ ἐξόπλισις έν ταύτη πεποίηται, and Poet. 24. 1450 b 37, τὸ δὲ ἰαμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικά, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. So in Aelian, Var. Hist. 2. 44 a trumpeter is described as playing τὸ παρορμητικὸν μέλος, διάτορόν τε καὶ γεγωνὸς ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ οἶον εἰς τὴν μάχην ἐγερτήριον. Πρακτικά μέλη seem to have been the favourites at Sparta: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, and Inst. Lac. § 14, ἐσπούδαζον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τὰς ὦδὰς οὐδὲν ἦττον' κέντρον δ' εἶχε ταῦτα ἐγερτικὸν θυμοῦ καὶ Φρονήματος καὶ παραστατικὸν όρμης ἐνθουσιώδους καὶ πρακτικής. Plutarch, however, gives a somewhat different account of Spartan songs in Lycurg. c. 4, λόγοι γὰρ ἦσαν αἱ ຜόδαὶ πρὸς εὐπείθειαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀνακλητικοὶ διὰ μελών αμα καὶ ρυθμών πολύ τὸ κόσμιον έχόντων καὶ καταστατικόν, ων ἀκροώμενοι κατεπραΰνοντο λεληθότως τὰ ήθη καὶ συνφκειοῦντο τῷ ζήλφ τῶν καλῶν. As to πρακτικά μέλη, which were of course not exclusively warlike, see vol. i. p. 367, note 1. Dr. Johnson describes in his Journey to the Western Islands (Works, 8. 279) how the strokes of

the reapers' sickles 'were timed by the modulation of the harvestsong, in which all their voices were united,' and adds that 'they accompany in the Highlands every action which can be done in equal time with an appropriated strain, which has, they say, not much meaning, but its effects are regularity and cheerfulness. The ancient proceleusmatic song, by which the rowers of galleys were animated, may be supposed to have been of this kind.'

33. &s is followed in 35 by kal. For instances of a similar structure see note on 1313 b 13.

35. καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and they lay down that musical modes are appropriate in nature to each of these, one mode answering to one kind of melody and another to another.' The Dorian mode was the appropriate harmony for ἢθικὰ μέλη, the Phrygian for ἐνθονσιαστικά, and perhaps the hypo-Phrygian (see above on 32) for πρακτικά. Μέρος seems here to be used in the sense of εἶδος (cp. διαίρεσιν, 32): for this use of the word see Bon. Ind. 455 b 46 sqq.

36. φαμέν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1339 b 14. Plato, on the other hand, had spoken in Laws 659 D-660 A as if the ethical use of music was its only use. For καὶ πλειόνων see note on 1287 a 34.

38. καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν κ.τ.λ. See below on 1342 a 8. The promise here given of a full explanation of the word κάθαρσις is not fulfilled in the Poetics as it has come down to us: see note in Sus.4. For other matters known to have found a place in Aristotle's treatise which are wanting in our Poetics, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 107. I (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 102. 2). 'We possess Aristotle's treatise,' he remarks, 'only in a text mutilated and in many ways corrupted.' For ἀπλῶς, 'in a general way,' cp. Magn. Mor. I. 4. 1185 a 38, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ἰκανὸν οῦτως ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον διορίσαι δεῖ.

40. τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν κ.τ.λ. Bernays translates in his Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, p. 7 (ed. 1880), 'drittens zur Ergötzung, um sich zu erholen und abzuspannen,' but if, as he seems to think, the words πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν are added in explanation of πρὸς διαγωγήν, the word διαγωγή must here be used in a different sense from that in which it is used elsewhere in the Fifth Book, e.g. in c. 5. 1339 b 14, where it is distinguished from παιδιά. This is not perhaps impossible, but it is more likely that

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διαγωγή is used here in the same sense as in 1339 b 14, and that it is linked with ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπανσις because it has already been so linked in c. 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. Zeller, indeed, thinks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 771. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 308. 1) that Aristotle intends ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπανσις to come in as a fourth end and not as a part of the third, though the word τέταρτον is not used. Sus. would read ταύτης δ' ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπανσιν partly for other reasons and partly because he regards it as inconceivable 'that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction' (see Sus.4, 1. p. 638 sqq.), but if any change in the text is necessary, I should be content with the insertion of ή before πρὸς ἄνεσιν.

- 1342 a. 1. φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἄρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον. Aristotle probably refers only to the modes which are not παρεκβάσεις, yet he finds a use in 22 sqq. even for those which are. For the repetition of πάσαις see note on 1283 a 30.
  - 2. πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις. As to the meaning of ηθικωτάταις here and ηθικοῖς in 28 see note on 1340 a 36. Aristotle may use the plural because he is prepared to approve, in addition to the Dorian mode, of the ὑποδωριστί, of which we read in Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 14 that it is μεγαλοπρεπές καὶ στάσιμον, but perhaps it is more likely that he does not wish to exclude any modes which may be recommended as ηθικώταται by οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφία διατριβής και της περί την μουσικήν παιδείας (cp. 30 sqq.). He rejects without consideration the possible claims of πρακτικά and ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη to a place, however subordinate, in the education of the young, but he might well have considered whether they do not deserve to be occasionally used. Are not boys, or some of them at any rate, παθητικοί, and might not κάθαρσις by music be sometimes useful to such boys even educationally? Might not airs which stir to action also be a useful element in the education of some boys? It is not clear that Aristotle objects to the presence of boys at the performance of πρακτικά καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικά  $\mu \epsilon \lambda \eta$ , any more than he objects to their presence at the performance of tragedies (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20 sqq.), but he certainly allows no place in education to music of these two kinds.

- 4. καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. Sus. is probably right in translating these words 'also the practical and the enthusiastic': cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 14, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ ('also') τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.
- δ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See note in Sus.4. Aristotle seems to anticipate that his recommendation of the use of the 'enthusiastic' modes, when we listen to music played by others, will excite surprise, and hence in 4–16 he justifies it at some length, though he adds no similar justification of his recommendation of the use of the 'practical' modes under similar circumstances, probably because he does not anticipate that any objection will be made to this.
- 7. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν. Ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως = τούτου τοῦ πάθους: cp. 5, πάθος, and Plut. De Sanitate Tuenda c. 13, ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα τὸ σῶμα μηνύει πρὸς νόσον ἐπισφαλῶς ἔχειν, ἄλογοι γὰρ ἴσχουσιν ἀθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι. For κατακώχιμοι see critical note on 1269 b 30. Κατέχεσθαι is the appropriate technical term, cp. Plato, Symp. 215 C, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 65, τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ὁρμῆς καὶ ἐπιπνοίας κατεχομένους ὑπὸ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ. As to the nature of ἐνθουσιασμός see note on 1340 a 11. Of this susceptibility to ἐνθουσιασμός we have a striking example in Olympias, the mother of Alexander (Plut. Alex. c. 2, ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς μᾶλλον ἐτέρων ζηλώσασα τὰς κατοχὰς καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς κ.τ.λ.). Had Aristotle observed in her case the calming effect of sacred melodies?
- 8. ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν κ.τ.λ., ' and as an effect of the sacred melodies we see these men, when they have used the melodies which fill the soul with mystic excitement, brought back to a normal state as if having received medical treatment and purgation.' Sus.4 points out that χρησθαι, like κίνησις, καθίστασθαι, and κουφίζεσθαι, is a medical term. It seems likely that the patient both listened to and sang the maddening melodies (see note in Sus.4). Τοις έξοργιάζουσι την ψυχήν μέλεσι has been interpreted in many ways. Vict. explains these words 'cantibus expiando animo frangendisque vehementioribus illis motibus aptis,' Lamb. 'cantibus animum furore levantibus ac purgantibus,' and Liddell and Scott 'melodies which purge by mystic rites,' but Sepulveda is probably right in translating 'cantibus animum concitantibus' (cp. 1342 b 3, ἄμφω γὰρ δργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά). Bernays (followed by Sus.) renders the words in a not very dissimilar way, 'Lieder die eben das Gemüth berauschen' ('songs which intoxicate the soul'). Τοταν—μελεσι is bracketed by

Sus. as a gloss on ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν (see Sus.4, I. p. 640), but perhaps not all the iερὰ μελη were 'intoxicating to the soul': cp. Plato, Ion 536 C, ωσπερ οί κορυβαντιωντες έκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μελους ὀξέως, ὁ αν ή τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου αν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ρημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν. There may have been iepà μέλη introductory to the melody which produced the decisive effect.  $T\dot{\eta}\nu \psi \nu \chi \dot{\eta}\nu$  is emphatic: if the music does not go to the soul, it does nothing. For καθισταμένους see above on 1340 b 3. In larpeias καὶ καθάρσεως the καί is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, την χρηματιστικήν και την καπηλικήν (see note on 1257 b 7). The action of the sacred melodies on the souls of persons naturally disposed to ἐνθουσιασμός is compared to the action of some cathartic medicine like hellebore, which removes the worst elements and leaves the best (Plato, Rep. 567 C, καλόν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώματα οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον). The following passages may be selected from many others as throwing light on Aristotle's meaning—Plut. Sympos. 6. 7. 2, καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, & φίλε, φρενετίζων καὶ μαινόμενος (πλέον ἰσχύει) άλλ' όταν ελλεβόρω χρησάμενος ή διαίτη καταστή, το μεν σφοδρον έκεινο και σύντονον οίχεται καὶ γέγονεν έξίτηλον, ή δ' άληθινή δύναμις καὶ σωφροσύνη παραγίνεται τώ σώματι ούτω δή καὶ ή κάθαρσις τοῦ οίνου, τὸ πληκτικὸν ἀφαιροῦσα καὶ μανικόν, είς πραείαν έξιν καὶ ὑγιαίνουσαν καθίστησι: Strabo, p. 418, καὶ δή φασιν έκει (at the Malian Anticyra) τὸν ελλέβορον φύεσθαι τὸν ἀστεῖον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ (at the Phocian Anticyra) σκευάζεσθαι βέλτιον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδημεῖν δεῦρο (to the latter) πολλούς καθάρσεως καὶ θεραπείας χάριν: and Plut. Coriol. c. 12, έδοξεν οὖν τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν εἰς δέον γεγονέναι καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν ή χρεία τῶν Οὐελιτρανῶν διά τε τὴν ἀπορίαν κουφισμού δεομένοις, καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἄμα σκεδάσειν ἤλπιζον, εἰ τὸ θορυβοῦν μάλιστα καὶ συνεπηρμένον τοις δημαγωγοίς ώσπερ περίττωμα της πόλεως νοσερον και ταραχώδες ἀποκαθαρθείη. That certain sacred rites produced a similar effect on the soul to that produced by cathartic medicines on the body, we see from Plato, Rep. 560 D, τούτων δέ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες την τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχήν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 158, διὸ καὶ τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς έχεσθαί φασιν, όπως αν ή των αμαθεστέρων πτοίησις δια βίον ή τύχην ύπο των έν ταύταις μελωδιών τε καὶ ορχήσεων αμα παιδιαίς έκκαθαίρηται, where the purging influence of the rites is traced in part to the music by which they were accompanied. On the whole subject of the

κάθαρσις effected by music and also by tragedy, see Sus.4, 1.p. 641 sqq., and Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, c. 6. We are not distinctly told in the passage before us that a κάθαρσις παθημάτων occurs under the influence of the sacred melodies, as we are in the famous passage of the Poetics about tragedy (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27 sq.), but we can hardly be wrong in taking the musical κάθαρσις to be a κάθαρσις of παθήματα like the other. It should be noticed that music appears to purge all emotions, not merely, like tragedy, those of pity and fear, and also that the kind of music which produces a cathartic effect is by no means the wailful kind characteristic of such modes as the mixo-Lydian; music of this sort is charged with human feeling and essentially human, whereas cathartic music is full of a divine afflatus (Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 19, διὸ καὶ άρμόζει τῷ χορῷ τὸ γοερὸν καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος καὶ μέλος ἀνθρωπικὰ γάρ, ταῦτα δ' ἔχουσιν αἱ ἄλλαι άρμονίαι, ῆκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρυγιστί\* ένθουσιαστική γάρ καὶ βακχική). In Milton's Paradise Lost, 1. 549 sqq., the 'Dorian mood' is said to inspire 'deliberate valour' 'firm and unmoved With dread of death to flight or foul retreat' (cp. 1342 b 12 sqg.), and is also credited with a cathartic influence which Aristotle does not ascribe to it-

'Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage
With solemn touches troubled thoughts, and chase
Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain
From mortal or immortal minds.'

Here the passage before us may be present to Milton's mind. Julian perhaps refers to it in Epist. 56. 442 B, ὅτι γὰρ πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐτοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὸ τῆς θείας μουσικῆς καθαρθέντες ὀνήσονται, πιστευτέον τοῖς προαποφαινομένοις ὀρθῶς ὑπὲρ τούτων.

11. ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Aristotle seems still to be speaking of the effect of the sacred melodies. They cannot fail, he thinks, to purge others besides those who are specially given to ἐνθονσιασμός—those who are specially subject to the emotions of fear and pity (two allied emotions, as we learn from Rhet. 2. 8), and indeed those who are subject to emotion of any kind, and also those who are not specially emotional, so far as they are accessible to emotion. Philoxenus had represented the Cyclops as 'curing his love with music' (Philox. Fragm. 7: Plut. Amat. c. 18), and anger also was thought to be soothed by music (Athen. Deipn. 623 f sq.). As to the specially emotional persons referred to, cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1228 b 35, οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ

καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλὴν θᾶττόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ οἱ πολλοί, and Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 21, ἥκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρυγιστί ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχική. κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομέν τι παθητικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς μᾶλλον τῶν δυνατῶν εἰσί.

13. καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστῳ, 'so far as a share in the things mentioned' (i.e. emotions) 'falls to each': cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 22, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, ἐατέον ὅπως ἐκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.

14. τινα κάθαρσιν. Bern. 'irgend eine Katharsis,' and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 246, note 1) observes, 'τινὰ κάθαρσιν implies that the katharsis in all cases is not precisely of the same kind,' and (p. 247) 'it is pretty plainly implied that the katharsis of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, the katharsis of "enthusiasm." This may be so, but I am not sure that Aristotle means anything more than that all experience some purgation, though the amount of it varies with the amount of emotion by which they are severally possessed: cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 9, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ ('things which are shared by men in general') μὴ παρορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἔν τινι λόγφ τίθεσθαι. Τις, indeed, is sometimes added to a substantive merely to soften it, as in Xen. Oecon. 8. 3, καὶ γὰρ χορὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων συγκείμενός ἐστιν' ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ποιῶσιν ὅ τι ἄν τύχη ἕκαστος, ταραχή τις φαίνεται καὶ θεᾶσθαι ἀτερπές, but I do not think that this is the case here.

κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ήδονης. For κουφίζεσθαι cp. Plut. Coriol. c. 12 (quoted above on 8): De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8, δλίγοις δέ τισιν έν μικρῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας κουφίζει τοῦτ' ἀπιόν, ὅταν πλεονάση, καθάπερ ἡ πρώτη τροφή, ἂν ὑπερβάλλη τῷ πλήθει καὶ γὰρ ταύτης ἀπιούσης τὰ σώματ' εὐημερεῖ μᾶλλον: and Hist. An. 10. 5. 636 b 29 sqq.

15. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and similarly the cathartic melodies also' (as well as the sacred melodies) 'are a source to men of harmless pleasure.' So Vict. 'ut cantilenas illas sacras, quas docuit adhiberi solitas sua aetate ad expiandos lymphaticos, praeter furorem quem levant affirmavit gignere voluptatem, ita nunc testatur cantus purgandis animis factos, qui tamen non opitulantur ope divina valde commotis animo, sed concentu vocum sonorumque, apto illis motibus, prosunt, continere in se suavitatis plurimum.' The fact that they are a source of harmless pleasure shows that they are well suited both for diagogê and for relaxation (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.). The cathartic melodies here referred to seem to be the

same as those which are called enthusiastic in 1341 b 34. I understood this passage otherwise when I wrote (in vol. i. p. 366), 'the melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.' I should have written, 'just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.' [Since the foregoing note was written, Sus.<sup>4</sup> (1. p. 611) has rightly disagreed with the view which I took of the sentence in vol. i. p. 366. I then thought that it referred to cathartic melodies as distinguished from cathartic harmonies, whereas I think now that it refers to cathartic melodies as distinguished from the sacred melodies, whose effects I take to be described in ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν, 8—ἡδονῆs, 15. I am still of opinion that καθαρτικά should be retained in 15, and not, as Sus. suggests, discarded in favour of πρακτικά.]

- 16. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Μέν is taken up, not by δ' in 19, but by δέ in 28. With Spengel and Sus. I insert (χρῆσθαι) before θετέον: cp. χρηστέον, 1342 a 1, 2, χρῆσθαι, 27, and χρηστέον, 29. For θετέον χρῆσθαι, cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, ἔθηκε γὰρ θύειν μὲν βασιλέα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἄπαντα. Διὸ—ἀγωνιστάς is virtually repeated in 26–28.
- 18. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατὴς διττός κ.τ.λ. Cp. Poet. 26. 1461 b 28 sqq. For ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, see above on 1338 b 3.
- 19. ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος. Sus. aptly compares Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, quod e duplici genere voluptatis conjunctus est.
- 21. ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας, 'contests and spectacles.' Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a I, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσιακούς, κᾶν εἴ τινας ἐτέρας συμβαίνει τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας, whence it appears that a 'contest' was a kind of 'spectacle.' A dramatic or musical performance would also be a 'spectacle.' Θεωρία is explained by Stallbaum to be used in the wider sense of 'festival' (ἐορτή) in Plato, Laws 650 A, τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου θεωρίας. Cp. also Isocr. Aeginet. § 10, οὕτε θυσίαν οὕτε θεωρίαν οὕτ ἄλλην ἐορτὴν οὐδεμίαν. We infer from the use of καί in καὶ τοῦς τοιούτοις that Aristotle is prepared to provide ἀγῶνες and θεωρίαι at which music of a higher type is performed for the citizens of his 'best State.' It is remarkable that he should expect day-labourers to care for music of any kind.
- 22. εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ. As to the souls of βάναυσοι and θῆτες cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D, quoted above on 1337 b 8. The position of εἰσὶ is strange; it seems hardly to belong to

ωσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ., and yet it can hardly belong to οὖτω καὶ κ.τ.λ., for that clause is already provided with an εἰσἱ. Did Aristotle originally intend the sentence to run εἰσἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις and insert ωσπερ κ.τ.λ. by an afterthought? Perhaps the repetition of εἰσἱ in 24 is to be compared with the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13. 1283 b 17 and of ἔργον in 8(6). 5. 1319 b 35.

- 23. οὖτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσί. Here the relation between the soul and an ἀρμονία dwelt on in c. 5. 1340 b 17 sqq. is again present to Aristotle's mind. The μιξολυδιστί and συντονολυδιστί (Plato, Rep. 398 E) are probably among the modes referred to, and perhaps also the low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian (see note in Sus.4); at any rate both high-pitched and low-pitched modes are treated as παρεκβάσεις τῶν ἀρμονιῶν in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq. The abandonment of the mixo-Lydian mode to βάνανσοι and θῆτες is uncomplimentary to Sappho, its reputed inventress (see above on 1340 a 42).
- 24. καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, 'and of melodies those which are highly-strung and unnaturally coloured.' Σύντονα is perhaps used here in opposition both to ἀνειμένα οτ μαλακά, as in 1342 b 21 and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27, and to βαρέα, as in De Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 35, καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι τὸ βαρὰ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον. The Cretans are said by Ephorus to have used in their songs the rhythms which are most σύντονοι (Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250). For the meaning of χρῶμα in music see Liddell and Scott, s.v., and Sus.⁴, 1. p. 636 sqq. Aristotle probably objected to the musical innovations of Timotheus, of whom we read in Pherecr. Χείρων, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 333),

ούτος απαντας ούς λέγω

παρελήλυθ' ἄδων ἐκτραπέλους μυρμηκιάς, ἐξαρμονίους ὑπερβολαίους τ' ἀνοσίους,

and also to the music of Agathon: cp. Plut. Sympos. 3. 1. 1, θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ Ἐράτωνα τοῦτον, εἰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι παραχρώσεις βδελυττόμενος καὶ κατηγορῶν τοῦ καλοῦ ᾿Αγάθωνος, δν πρῶτον εἰς τραγωδίαν φασὶν ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ ὑπομίξαι τὸ χρωματικόν, ὅτε τοὺς Μυσοὺς ἐδίδασκεν, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν, ὡς ὁρᾶτε, ποικίλων χρωμάτων καὶ ἀνθηρῶν τὸ συμπόσιον ἐμπέπληκε καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν ὅτων ἀποκλείει τρυφὴν καὶ ἡδυπάθειαν κ.τ.λ. Compare also Philoch. Fragm. 66 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 395), where we read of Lysander of Sicyon, καὶ περιελῶν τὴν συντονίαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς κιθαρισταῖς, χρώματά τε εὕχροα πρῶτος ἐκιθάρισε κ.τ.λ., and Pratinas, Fragm. 5, quoted above on 1340 a 42.

- 26. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. So Plato makes over θρηνοι for famous men to women and worthless persons (Rep. 387 E).
  - 28. ωσπερ είρηται, in 1342 a 2.
  - 30. καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον, in c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.
- 31. οἱ κοινωνοὶ κ.τ.λ., 'those who have shared in philosophical study and in musical education,' as distinguished from mere musicians on the one hand and philosophers who have not studied music on the other (see above on 1341 b 27). For the phrase cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας: Laws 968 A, παιδείας ὁπόσης διεληλύθαμεν κοινωνὸν γενόμενον: Hipp. Minor 363 A, οἱ μάλιστ' ἃν ἀντιποιησαίμεθα μετεῖναι ἡμῖν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφία διατριβῆς: Theaet. 172 C, οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες.
- 32. ὁ δ' ἐν τῆ πολιτεία Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. Here begins a similar review of the opinions put in Socrates' mouth by Plato in the Republic to that which we find at the end of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.). As to these passages see vol. i. p. 519, note 1. The passage in the Republic referred to is Rep. 399 A sqq., where Plato seems to imply that the Dorian and Phrygian modes inspire courage in war and temperance in peace. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that the Phrygian mode does neither the one thing nor the other. Φρύγιον should probably be 'Ionian' in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, ωσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων άφειλε των παιδευομένων νέων την άρμονίαν την Λύδιον και την Φρύγιον, την μέν τὸ θρηνῶδες καὶ Φιλοπενθές ἡμῶν ἐγείρουσαν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν δὲ τὸ πρὸς ήδουας όλισθηρου και ακόλαστου αυξουσαν: cp. Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 22. For ἐν τῆ πολιτεία cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 28, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1, in all which passages the phrase is used in close proximity to a mention of δ Σωκράτης, and 2. 5. 1264 b 24, ή πολιτεία περὶ ής ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν. In 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1, on the other hand, we have ωσπερ Πλάτων έν ταις πολιτείαις (perhaps referring to the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Republic), and in 2. 1. 1261 a 6, έν τη πολιτεία τη Πλάτωνος.
  - **34**. ἀποδοκιμάσας, in Rep. 399 D.
  - 2. adds. For the absence of the article see note on 1255 b 36. 1342 b.
- 3. For the difference between ὀργιαστικά and παθητικά see above on 1341 a 21.
- δηλοί δ' ή ποίησις πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία κ.τ.λ., 'and poetry makes this clear' (i.e. that the αὐλός and the Phrygian mode are similar in effect), 'for every sort of Bacchic frenzy and all Bacchic agitation of mind [when represented in poetry] find their fit expression in

the pipes more than in any other instrument.' In translating κίνησις 'agitation of mind' and not 'bodily movement' I have followed Sus., who may probably be right (cp. 3, παθητικά, and c. 3. 1337 b 42), but I have done so with some hesitation, for βακχεία is used of physical movement in Plato, Laws 672 B, τάς τε βακχείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν χορείαν, 790 E, καθάπερ αὶ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσεις ταύτη τῆ τῆς κινήσεως ἄμα χορεία καὶ μούση χρώμεναι, and 815 B-C. For ἐστὶν ἐν (='sitae sunt in'), see above on 1330 b 8, and cp. c. 6. 1341 a 3, and Plato, Protag. 354 E, 356 D (where see Stallbaum). It should be noted that in a letter (genuine or not) from Olympias to Alexander quoted in Athen. Deipn. 659 f she distinguishes between τὰ ὀργιαστικὰ ἱερά and τὰ βακχικά, though in the passage before us βακχεία is evidently connected with τὸ ὀργιαστικόν.

7. οἷον ὁ διθύραμβος κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance the dithyramb, [which is an expression of Bacchic frenzy,] is generally agreed to be a Phrygian melody' (and to require the Phrygian mode).

8. σύνεσιν, not far in meaning from τέχνην: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11, της αὐτης φρονήσεως ταύτης.

9. διότι Φιλόξενος κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'est autem molestum hac in parte quod legitur in media sententia accusandi casu μύθους.' Schn. 'Reizius latere nomen dithyrambi Philoxenei suspicatus est; et recte quidem. Equidem non dubito Muoous id fuisse, quo nomine fabulas tragicas ab Aeschylo et Agathone publico in certamine Athenis commissas fuisse novimus.' Sophocles also wrote a tragedy thus entitled (see Nauck, Trag. Gr. Fragm., p. 175). Schneider's conjecture has been adopted by Coray, Stahr, Bekk.2, and Sus., and is probably right, if indeed τους Μυσούς is not an explanatory gloss which has crept from the margin into the text. Bergk accepts the change (Poet. Lyr. Gr., Philoxenus Fragm. 20), and adds, 'huc refero Plut. De Mus. c. 33, ωστε οὐδὲ ζητεῖν παρὰ ταύτης τὸ διαγνωναι δύνασθαι, πότερον οἰκείως εἴληφεν ὁ ποιητής ως οἶον [ομοιον MSS. in place of ως οἷον εἰπεῖν εν μούσοις (corrige Μυσοῖς) τὸν ὑποδώριον τόνον επὶ τὴν αρχήν, ή τὸν μιξολύδιόν τε καὶ δώριον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν, ή τὸν ὑποφρύγιόν τε καὶ φρύγιον ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην (τὸ μέσον?).' If τοὺς Μυσούς is correct, the dithyramb probably turned, like the tragedies of the same name by Aeschylus and Sophocles, on the story of Telephus. The mention of the title of the dithyramb is made somewhat abruptly, and also without necessity; still the title of a poem by Tyrtaeus is given, though less abruptly, in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39. As to the subjects in connexion with which the Dorian mode was employed, it should

be noticed that, as Plutarch points out (De Musica c. 17), it was sometimes used for τραγικοὶ οἶκτοι and even for ἐρωτικά, subjects as alien to it, one would have thought, as a dithyramb. We see from Plato, Laws 669 C, that composers were not always successful in mating melody and words.


- 11. ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς. Cp. Poet. 24. 1460 a 3 sqq.
- 12. περί δὲ τῆς δωριστί κ.τ.λ. See above on 1340 b 3.
- 14. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. Is this a reference to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 26 sqq., b 26 sq.? Cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 24. 1192 a 6, ὁ ἄρα ἐλευθέριος, ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἐπαινετός, μέσος τις ἂν εἴη τούτων.
  - 15. ή δὲ δωριστὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.
- 16. φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ Δώρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. Coray and Sus. read τοὺς νεωτέρους. Vet. Int. translates, 'manifestum quod Dorias melodias oportet erudiri magis iuniores,' but whether he found τοὺς νεωτέρους in his Greek text is doubtful. I incline on the whole to retain τοῖς νεωτέροις: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 19, ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, and Plato, Laws 811 D, προσήκοντες τὰ μάλιστα ἀκούειν νέοις, and 821 E, τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὁ θαυμαστὸν μὲν λέγεις, προσῆκον δ' αὖ μαθεῖν τοῖς νέοις.
- 17. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποί-34. τὸ πρέπον. Susemihl brackets this passage as an interpolation, and I incline now to think that he is right: I thought otherwise when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, note 1. It would seem that the writer of it seeks to qualify the decision just arrived at in favour of the use of the midway mode in education by pointing out that for certain ages the relaxed modes are the only possible and becoming ones, and also that there is something to be said for the use in education of such modes as the Lydian. It is hardly likely that Aristotle would do this, unless we suppose a change of mind on his part, for he would scarcely be willing to unsay what he has said against the relaxed modes in c. 5. 1340 b 2, or to allow the boys for whose training he recommends the Dorian mode to be also trained in modes which he regards as soft and effeminate. Besides, as Sus.4 remarks (1. p. 616, note), after what has been said in c. 6. 1340 b 35 sqq. we do not expect to hear of old men singing, except perhaps on the occasion of some special festivity (c. 5. 1339 b 9 sq.). The language of the passage recalls that of Plato in Laws 785 B, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ πρέπον έκάσταις προστάττειν μέχρι των πεντήκοντα έτων, and 670 D, ίνα καθορώντες τάς τε άρμονίας καί τοὺς ρυθμοὺς ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἶοί τ' ὧσιν, ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις τε καὶ

τοιούτοις ἄδειν πρέπον. We also hear a good deal about τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ πρέπον, or rather τὸ άρμόττον, in the opening chapter of the Book which stands next to the Fifth, if we adopt the order of the Books which has been adopted in the present edition and place the old Fourth Book immediately after the old Eighth. It should further be noticed that Plutarch seems to have had 17-29 before him in An seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 18, ωσπερ γάρ, εὶ καθηκον ην ἄδοντας διατελείν, έδει, πολλών τόνων καὶ τρόπων ὑποκειμένων φωνής, οὐς ἀρμονίας οἱ μουσικοί καλουσι, μή τὸν ὀξύν αμα καὶ σύντονον διώκειν γέροντας γενομένους, αλλ' έν φ τὸ ράδιον έπεστι μετά τοῦ πρέποντος ήθους. It is, however, possible that Plutarch had before him the criticism of the Republic by των περί την μουσικήν τινες which is reproduced here, and not its reproduction in the passage before us. In addition to the objections to the passage 17-34 to which reference has already been made, it may be noted that, as Sus. has pointed out, looking to the reference to τὸ δυνατόν in 18 sqq., we expect to be told that the young should learn those melodies which are suitable to them and not beyond their powers, and not to be told, as we in fact are, that they should learn those melodies which will be the only ones suitable and practicable for them when they are past a certain age. Perhaps, however, the writer does mean that the relaxed modes are suitable both to the young and to the old; this seems to be indicated by his use of καί in ωστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, 'for the coming age also as well as for that of youth.' If this is his meaning, however, and there is nothing defective in the text, he must be allowed to have expressed it in a very imperfect way.

20. καὶ ταῦτα, i.e. τὰ δυνατὰ καὶ τὰ πρέποντα, as well as τὰ μέσα: cp. 6 (4). II. I295 a 37, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς έκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος. Τὸ μέσον would not be exactly the same for boys and for men of full age and for old men.

οἷον τοἷς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Gen. An. 5. 7. 787 b 10, ἔστι μὲν οὖν πᾶσιν ἡ ἰσχὺς ἐν τοῖς νεύροις, διὸ καὶ τὰ ἀκμάζοντα ἰσχύει μᾶλλον ἄναρθρα γὰρ τὰ νέα μᾶλλον καὶ ἄνευρα. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν νέοις οὖπω ἐπιτέταται, τοῖς δὲ γηράσκουσιν ήδη ἀνίεται ἡ συντονία διὸ ἄμφω ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀδύνατα πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν, and Plut. An seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 18, quoted above on 17–34. Οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 33) are distinguished from those who are in the same state from other causes: see Bonitz (Ind. 71 b 45), who groups with the passage before us Hist. An. 6. 18. 572 a 18, ἀπείπωσι διὰ τὸν πόνον.

- 24. ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἄρμονίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 398 E, ἀλλὰ μὴν μέθη γε φύλαξιν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία. Πῶς γὰρ οὕ; Τίνες οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν άρμονιῶν; Ἰαστί, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ λυδιστί, αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται. See note on 1340 b 2.
- 25. ώς μεθυστικάς κ.τ.λ., 'taking them as connected with intoxication, not conformably to the influence of intoxication (for intoxication makes men rather frenzied revellers), but as enfeebled and exhausted.'
- 27. ὧστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν κ.τ.λ. This sentence seems to be modelled on 1342 a 28 sq. and to be intended to contradict it. Καί, 27, implies that the study of relaxed modes by the young (for with δεῖ we must supply τοὺς νέους οτ τοὺς νεωτέρους) will be useful to them at their actual time of life as well as with a view to the coming time of life (see above on 17–34). We expect not τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, but τὴν τῶν ἀπειρηκότων διὰ χρόνον, and we must not identify οἱ πρεσβύτεροι with οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 29 sqq.), but for some reason the wider term is preferred.
- 29. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here we pass from τὸ δυνατόν to τὸ πρέπον (cp. 17 sq.). The apodosis of this sentence is missing in a lacuna after ἀρμονιῶν, 33. It seems better to adopt this view (with Sus.) than (with Schn. Cor. and Göttling) to place a colon instead of a full stop after τοιούτων, 29, and to connect ἔτι δ' εἴ τις, 29- ἀρμονιῶν, 33, with what precedes. As to the lacuna after ἀρμονιῶν see critical note.
  - 30. For τοιαύτη followed by  $\tilde{\eta}$ , see above on 1266 b 36.
- 31. κόσμον, probably 'orderliness': cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 7, πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, quoted above on 1341 b 32.
- 33. τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς. For the absence of the article see above on 1253 b 11.



## APPENDIX A.

Collation of Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874 with the text of the Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle (ed. Bekker, 1831).

I AM indebted to the kindness of Mr. F. G. Kenyon for the following collation of Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874.

The MS. contains the First Book of the Politics with the exception of the latter part of its last chapter, from 1260 a 26,  $\tau \delta$   $\delta \rho \theta o - \pi \rho \alpha \gamma \epsilon \hat{\iota} \nu$ , to the end. It also contains 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 24–1301 a 12, beginning with the words  $\kappa \lambda \eta \rho \omega$   $\kappa \alpha \lambda \eta$   $\epsilon \xi$   $\delta \pi \delta \nu \tau \omega \nu$  and ending with the word  $\delta \eta \mu \nu \tau \iota \kappa \delta$ , and 7 (5). I. 1302 a 3–1302 b 31, beginning with the words  $\phi \alpha \hat{\iota} \lambda \delta \nu$ .  $\phi \alpha \nu \epsilon \rho \delta \nu$   $\delta$  and ending with the word Meyapé $\omega \nu$ . It is of octavo size, measuring  $\delta \eta$  in. X 5 in. It is on vellum, written in a very neat hand, apparently of the first half of the fifteenth century. There is nothing to show how it came into its present fragmentary condition, as it was rebound when acquired by Lord Oxford' (Letter from Mr. Kenyon).

The MS. does not, as far as I see, contain anything new except in one passage, 1253 b 8, where a 'lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter ποῖον et δεῖ' is noted. None of the seventeen MSS. examined by or for Susemihl in 1252–1254 a 17 (see his edition of the Politics of 1872, p. xxviii) have any lacuna there. It is possible that τι has dropped out. But the MS. belongs to the better type of the second family and is nearly allied to P²·³ (especially to P³), two MSS. which, with M<sup>8</sup> P¹, the Vatican Palimpsest Fragments, and the Latin Translation of the Vetus Interpres, stand at the head of the authorities for the text of the Politics. Of course it has many errors of its own, and when it agrees with P²·³, some of the inferior MSS. often do so too, but sometimes it agrees with P²·³ where none of the inferior MSS. do so (this is the case in 1252 a 15, 1253 a 16, 1254 b 2, 1257 a 13, 16, 1300 b 24, 26). I have

noticed only two or three passages in which it sides with inferior MSS. against  $P^{2.3}$ —in 1252 a 26 it has συνδιάζεσθαι with  $M^s$  Sb Ub  $L^s$  pr.  $P^6$ , and in 1257 b 21 it has  $\hat{\eta}$  with  $P^{4.6}$  Q  $L^s$  Ald., not  $\hat{\eta}$  as  $M^s$   $P^{1.2.3}$  Tb.

It often stands alone or almost alone in agreement with P3: thus in

1255 a 31 P³ has εἴπᾶμεν, and Harl. εἴπαμεν corrected into εἴπομεν prima manu,

b 2 ex is omitted by pr. P3 pr. Harl.,

1256 a 17 πότερος Harl. pr. P3,

b 35 οὐδὲ μιᾶς M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>3</sup> Harl.,

1258 b 33 ἔστι Ms P3 Harl.: ἐστὶ P2,

1259 b 8 αΐμασις Harl.: αΐμασις ('ut videtur,' Sus.¹) pr. P³, 10 ἔχοι P³ Harl.

But P³ has many false readings which Harl. has not, and in two passages Harl. shows a striking resemblance to P²: thus in 1255 a 37 we find ἐκ γόνοιν in P² Q Mʰ Harl., and in 1302 b 19 Ald. pr. P² have ἐν ἔσονται (αἰνέσονται γρ. marg. P²), while Harl. has ἐν ἔσονται (marg. μὴ αἰνέσονται prima manu). It is obvious, therefore, that Harl. is not copied from P³.

The glosses found in Harl. in 1302 a 28 and b 4 are found also in red ink in the margin of P<sup>2</sup> and in a later hand than the MS. in the margin of P<sup>3</sup> (see Susemihl's edition of 1872 in these passages). Harl. does not seem to have the glosses which are found in P<sup>2</sup> but not in P<sup>3</sup>.

- 1252 a 9. λέγουσιν] λέγουσι.
  14. ἐφεστήκη] ἐφεστήκη. Ita semper, iota subscripto nunquam adhibito.
  15. κατὰ λόγους] κατὰ τοὺς λόγους.
  16. ἀληθῆ om. MS., ins. in marg. alia manu.
  19. μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων om. MS.
  20. μόρια] μέρῖα.
  26. συνδυάζεσθαι] συνδῖάζεσθαι.
  28. ἐκ om. MS.
  32. ἄρχον om. MS.
  - b 8. φασιν ] φασίν.
    10. κοινωνιῶν ] κοινωνϊμων.
    12. πένησίν ἐστίν ; et similiter l. 14 οἶκος ἐστίν.
    18. παῖδάς τε ] παῖδας δὲ.
    23. ἀλόχων ] ἀλλόχων.
    28. δὴ ] δὲ.
    32. τῆς om. MS.
- 1253 a 1. τέλος] καὶ τέλος.
  4. φαῦλός ἐστιν] φαῦλος ἐστἴν, et ita fere semper.
  7. ἄζυξ ῶν] lacuna in MS.
  9. ἡ om. MS.
  12. ἐλήλυθεν] ἐλήλυθε.
  12, 13. ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ] τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν.
  19. ἐστίν] ἐστῖ.
  34.

φρονήσει] φρονύσει. 35. έστι] έστὶ. 36. ἀφροδίσια] ἀφροδισία.

b 2-4. περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πρότερον κ.τ.λ.] πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν.
8. ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι] lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter ποῖον et δεῖ.
11. ἔστωσαν] ἔστωσαν.
25. ἐν οπ. MS.
28. τὰ δὶ τὰ δὲ.
35. αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ.
36. οὕς φησιν] οῦς φησῖν.
37. αὐταὶ] αὖται, corr., ut videtur, αὖται.

1254 a 6. δέονται δ' καὶ δέονται. 15, 16. ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν om. MS.
16. ἄνθρωπος ὤν ] δοῦλος ὧν, corr, ἄνθρωπος ὧν in marg.
prima manu. 19. παρὰ] περὶ. 22. ἐστί] ἔστι.
25. ἐστίν] ἐστϊ. βελτίων] βελτίον. 28. ἐστί] ἔστι.
32. ἐστί τις] ἔστι τίς. 33. ἐξωτερικωτέρας] ἐξωτερικοτέρας.

b 2. παρὰ] περἴ. 9. πᾶσιν] πᾶσϊ. 12. βέλτιον] βέλτιστον. 17. διάκεινται] διακείνωνται. δὲ om. MS. 20. ἔστὶ] ἐστὶ. 22. ἐστίν] ἐστὶ. 23. λόγον] λόγον. 28. ποιεῖν] ποιεῖ. 31. εἴs] εἴ. 37. τοῦτ ἀληθές] τὰληθές.

1255 a 2-4. καὶ δίκαιόν . . . τὸ δουλεύειν om. MS. 5. καὶ post τις om. MS. 7. φασιν] φασί. 10. κρείττονος] κρείττον. 15. ἀεὶ] αἰεὶ. 20. οὕτὶ] οὕτε. 24. φασιν] φασί. 26. τις] τίς. 29. δούλους] δοῦλος. 31. εἴπομεν] εἴπαμεν (corr. εἴπομεν, prima manu). 32. δούλους] λούλους. 33. αὐτοὺς] αὐτοῖς. 34. νομίζουσιν] νομίζουσι. 35. καὶ ἐλεύθερον] ἐλεύτερον. 36. ὥσπερ] ὥσπερ καὶ. φησὶ] φασὶ (ut videtur: corr. sec. manu). 37. ἔκγονον] ἐκ γόνοιν.

δεσπόζειν om. MS.
 13. ἐστί τι] ἔστι τί.
 18. ἐστίν]
 ἔστι.
 24. τις] τίς.
 27. ἔτερα] ἔργα.
 29. δεσπότης]
 δεσπότις.
 32. τῷ κτᾶσθαι] τῶν τᾶσθαι.
 38. τις] τίς,
 et ita saepe.

1256 a 4. αὐτὴ τῆ] αὐτῆ. 10. ἡ οἰκονομικὴ] οἰκονομικῆ. 13. παρὰ] περτ. 16. κτῆσις] κτήσις. 17. πότερον] πότερος. 28. ἀλλὶ] ἀλλὰ. 36. άλιείας] άλείας. 41. ἀλλαγῆς] ἀλαγῆς.

b 5. ληστρικόν] δηστρικόν.
6. τοὺς] τὰς.
9. τελειωθεῖσιν] τελειωθεῖσιν]
11. μέχρις] μέκρῖς.
14. αὐτοῖς] αὐτοῖς.
16. τἆλλα] τὰ ἄλλα.
28. ἐστὶ] ἐστῖ.
32. ἀγαθὴν] ἀγαθῶν.
35. οὐδεμιᾶς] οὐδὲ μιᾶς.
37. ἔστι] ἐστῖ.
41. χρηματιστικήν] χρηματικὴν.

1257 a 13. γέγονεν] γέγονε. 26. ἐπὶ πλέον] ἐπὶ λέον. 27. σῖτον] σίτον. 29. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 35. ἀναγκαίων] ἀναγκαίω pr. manu, ν additum est postea.

b 10. λῆρος] in marg., alia manu, λοιδος. 12. οὐδε οὔτε.
17. γιγνομένων] γινομένων. 21. ἡ] ἡ. 23. ἀλλαγῆς]
ἀναγκῆς. ἐστίν] ἐστῖ. 33. ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον] ὁρῶ συμβαῖον. 36. χρηματιστικῆς] χρηματικῆς. 37. ἐστὶ ἔστι.

1258 a 8. ζητοῦσιν] ζητοῦσι. 15. τίνα om. MS. 18. ἀλλ'] ἀλλὰ. 20. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 21. ὥσπερ] ὥπερ. 30. κατὰ τὴν] κατὰ τὰ τὴν. 32. ὑγιείας] ὑγείας. 37. ἐστιν] ἐστί. χρηματιστικὴ] χρηματικὴ. 39. οἰκονομικῆς] οἰκονομηκῆς.

b 13. ποῦ] τοῦ.
14. κτῆσις] κτήσις.
15. λοιπῶν om. MS.
16. τόποις] τούτοις.
20. ἔστὶ] ἐστὶ. χρηματιστικῆς]
χρηματηστικῆς.
30. γινομένων] γιννομένων.
33. ἐστίν]
ἔστῖ.
36. τῆς om. MS.
38. σώματος] σόματος.

1259 a 3. ἐπιμελές] ἐπιμενὲς. 18. σπουδάζουσιν] σπουδάζουσι.
25. ἐμπορίων] ἐμποριῶν. 28. τοῦτο] τοῦτον. 29. γ΄]
γε. 35. πόρων om. MS. 37. μέρη om. MS.

b 8. "Αμασις] αἴμασις.
10. ἔχει] ἔχοι.
12. ὅπερ ἐστὶ om.
MS.
14. τε post ἀνδρῶν om. MS.
25. ἔξεων] ἔξεων.
26. εἴτε] εἴ τὶ.
27. ἔστι] ἐστῖ. ἐστῖν] ἔστῖν.
28. δὲ] δὴ.
36. καθάπαξ] κατάπαξ.
40. εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος . . .
καλῶς om. MS.

1260 a 5. δὲ] δ'. 9. ἐλεύθερον] ἐλεύτερον. 11. διαφερόντως] διαφερόντος. 16. αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ. 19. ἀρχιτέκτων] ἀρχιτέκτον. 20. ἐστὶν] ἔστϊν. 25. ἐπισκοποῦσιν] ἐπισκοποῦσι. 26. Post verbum ἀρετή deficit MS.

# BOOK IV. c. 15.

1300 a 24. Incipit κλήρω καὶ ἢ ἐξ ἀπάντων. 25. φυλὰs] φϊλὰs. φρατρίαs] φατρίαs. 26. πολιτῶν] πολιτικῶν. 28. ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τϊνων. 29. ἐκ τινῶν] ἐκ τἴνων. δ'] δὲ. 35. ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τἴνων, et ita 1300 b 2-4, 17, 1301 a 2, 3, 8, 9.

b 4. τὸ δὲ ἐκ τινῶν] τότε δὲ ἔκ τίνων.
7. οὕτως] οὕτω.
10. τῶν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν οπ. MS.
22. ἀμφισβητοῦσι.
30. πόλεσιν] πόλεσι.

1301 a 4. δικαστήρια] δηκαστηρία. 7. συνδυαζόμενα] συνδιαζόμενα. 9. δικαστηρίου] δϊκαστϊρίου. 12. Post verbum δημοτικά deficit MS.

BOOK V. c. I.

- 1302 a 3. Incipit φαῦλον. φανερὸν δ'. 10. ἐγγίνονται] ἐγγίγνονται.
  14. ἡ ἐκ τῶν . . . ἡ om. MS. 16. γίγνονται] γίνονται.
  28. Scholium in marg., τῆς ἰσότητος δηλονότι καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς. 33. αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν.
  - b 2. Post εβριν iterantur verba δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων, sed ab ipso scriba error notatur.

    4. Post τρόπου inseruntur verba ἐρίθεια ἡ φιλονεικία. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ μισθαρνία.

    6. πῶς] πός.

    10. Post ὁτὲ δὲ inseritur μὲν.

    12. στασιάζουσιν] στασιάζουσι.

    19. ᾿Αθήνησιν] ᾿Αθήνησιν ἐνέσονται] ἐν ἔσονται (marg. μὴ αἰνέσονται, prima manu).

    31. Post verbum Μεγαρέων deficit MS.

# APPENDIX B.

On the use of Hyperbaton in the Politics.

HYPERBATON is much used in the Politics—more, I think, than in the Nicomachean Ethics—for the purpose of emphasizing a particular word or words.

Kühner's account of Hyperbaton (Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 607. 1) is as follows—' In Hyperbaton two words forming together a unity are severed by the interposition of one or more less important words. By means of this severance prominence is given, as a rule, to one only of the severed words, that which stands first, but often also to both of them, especially when both are placed in emphatic positions in the sentence, for instance at the beginning or end of it.' In one particular this account is open to amendment. The severed words are not always only two in number; they are more than two, for instance, in Pol. 4 (7). I. 1323 b 38, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους.

In the following passages the emphasis appears to fall on the first only of the severed words:—

- 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 39, έτέρας γάρ έστιν έργον σχολής ταῦτα,
- 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 21, ήμεις δε ταύτην προηρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν,
- 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 22, ωστε πρὸς τους τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιρούς χρηστέον έν οις κ.τ.λ.
- 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 4, ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει.

In the following passages, on the other hand, the emphasis appears to fall on both, or all, the severed words:—

- 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 16, ἀδήλου γὰρ ὅντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν,
- 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτη γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς,
- 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 7, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις, 37, καὶ ἄρξουσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν εἶναι κυρίους έτέρους,
- 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 23, φυλαί τε γὰρ ἔτεραι ποιητέαι πλείους καὶ φρατρίαι,
- 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14, δεί δὲ καὶ τῆ πολιτεία πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εῦνους εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας,

35, τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἀν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος.

The following words are among those most often emphasized in this way—oùdeis and  $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon$ is,  $\pi$ as,  $\pi$ oùvs, oùvos,  $\epsilon$ kaa $\tau$ os,  $\epsilon$ is, a $\nu$ ros and  $\delta$  a $\nu$ ros,  $\delta$ ahdos and  $\delta$  a $\nu$ hdos,  $\tau$ olo $\nu$ ros and  $\delta$   $\tau$ olo $\nu$ ros,  $\tau$ is and  $\tau$ is,  $\tau$ o $\sigma$ os, and  $\tau$ o $\delta$ os.

Occasionally two sets of words are thus emphasized in the same sentence—e.g. in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 3, ή γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας, where both διέστηκεν πολύ and ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας are emphasized by severance, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 10, ἄπαν γὰρ οἰκείον τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον, where both ἄπαν τοῦτο and οἰκείον μᾶλλον are similarly emphasized.

Groups of words linked by  $\kappa a i$  or  $\eta$  are often emphasized in this way: e.g. in

- 3. 5. 1278 a 6, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ξενικόν,
  - 17, ὥστ' ἐν μέν τινι πολιτεία τὸν βάναυσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας,
- 19, ἐν ή κατ' ἀρετὴν αί τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν, 3. 10. 1281 a 24, ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἄρχειν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους;
- 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων.

It should be added that, though in nearly all the cases of the severance of connected words which have been examined by me in the Politics the aim evidently is to throw emphasis on particular words, I have noticed two or three passages in which this cannot

be said to be clearly the case. They are passages in which the relative is severed from its substantive. We have in

- 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 15, ήνπερ είληφε διάστασιν ων φαμέν αὐτὰς είναι διαθέσεις ταύτας,
- 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἶς κινεῖται μορίοις ἔκαστον αὐτῶν, 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31, ὅνπερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικεῖται τρόπον (contrast 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24, ὅν τρόπον νῦν ἕκαστος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων κ.τ.λ.).

Is any emphasis intended to be thrown on the severed words in these three passages?

## APPENDIX C.

On the variations in the order of words in  $\Pi^1$  and  $\Pi^2$ .

A considerable proportion of the variations in the order of words which we observe in  $\Pi^1$  and  $\Pi^2$  may be arranged in classes.

- 1. There are those in which  $\Pi^2$  sever the adjective or pronoun from the substantive with which it agrees, while  $\Pi^1$  place them together:—
  - 1253 a 7, διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον  $\Pi^2$  (ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος  $\Pi^1$ ),
    - b 7, περὶ τριῶν αν τούτων σκεπτέον εἴη  $\Pi^2$  (περὶ τριῶν τούτων σκεπτέον αν εἴη  $\Pi^1$ ),
  - 1256 b 26, τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον  $\Pi^2$  (ὄντα τοῦτον  $\Pi^1$ ),
  - 1270 b 28, κρίσεών είσι μεγάλων  $\Pi^2$  (κρίσεων μεγάλων είσὶ  $\Pi^1$ ),
  - 1273 b 36, νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαΐον  $\Pi^2$  (γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαΐον  $\Pi^1$ ),
  - 1274 a 17, κύριος ὧν ὁ δημος Π² (ὧν ὁ δημος κύριος Mª P¹ and perhaps Γ),
  - 1276 b 14, εἰς έτέραν μεταβάλη πολιτείαν  $\Pi^2$  (πολιτείαν μεταβάλη  $\Pi^1$ ),
  - 1323 b 15, ων φαμέν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας  $\Pi^2$  (εἶναι αὐτὰς ταύτας διαθέσεις  $\Pi^1$ ),
  - 1330 b 29, τὴν μὲν ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὕτομον  $\Pi^2$  (πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν  $\Gamma$   $M^s$ , πόλιν om.  $P^i$ ),
  - 1335 a 38, τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην  $\Pi^2$  (ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συναυλίαν  $\Pi^1$ ),

[ 1339 a 14, τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν  $\Pi^2$  (τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει  $\Pi^1$ ),
[ 1341 b 25, τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν  $P^3$   $\Pi^3$  (τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει the rest) 1,
[ 1340 b 8, ἢθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον  $\Pi^2$  (ἔχουσιν ἢθος  $\Pi^1$ ),
[ 1289 b 29, πάσας ὁρῶμεν τὰς πόλεις  $\Pi^2$  (ὁρῶμεν πάσας  $\Pi^1$ ),
[ 1290 b 24, πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν  $\Pi^2$  (ἔχειν πᾶσαν πόλιν  $\Pi^1$ ),
[ 1312 a 40, τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη πολιτειῶν  $\Pi^2$  (πολιτειῶν ἐκάστη  $\Pi^1$ ),
[ 1315 b 12, πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον  $\Pi^2$  (χρόνον ἐγένετο  $\Pi^1$ ),
[ 1320 a 31, ὁ τετρημένος γάρ ἐστι πίθος  $\Pi^2$  (πίθος ἐστὶν  $\Pi^1$ ) 2.

2. There are those in which  $\Pi^2$  sever words from the words they govern, while  $\Pi^1$  group the words together. A substantive, for instance, is often severed from the genitive it governs by  $\Pi^2$ , where it is not so severed by  $\Pi^1$ . Thus  $\Pi^2$  have in

1328 b 17, έὰν δέ τι τυγχάνη τούτων ἐκλεῖπον (τι τούτων τυγχάνη Π1),

1331 b 4, τὸ πληθος διαιρείται της πόλεως (της πόλεως διαιρείται Π1),

1337 a 2, τὸ προσλείπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν (τῆς φύσεως βούλεται Π¹),

1340 b 29, τοις νηπίοις άρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων (άρμόττουσα τοις νηπίοις Π¹),

1309 b 38, οὐδετέραν μεν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν (οὐδετέραν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται Π¹),

1321 b 30, αδται μέν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς (τούτων εἰσὶ τρεῖς  $\Pi^1$ ).

A similar tendency appears in the following passages, though in a less marked degree:—

1341 a 23, κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται  $\hat{\eta}$  μάθησιν  $\Pi^2$  (δύναται μᾶλλον  $M^8$   $P^1$  and possibly  $\Gamma$ ).

24, συμβέβηκεν έναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς παιδείαν  $\Pi^2$  (αὐτῷ έναντίον  $\Pi^1$ ),

1295 b 31, καθάπερ της των πλουσίων οι πένητες επιθυμούσιν  $\Pi^2$  (καθάπερ οι πένητες της των πλουσίων επιθυμούσιν  $\Pi^1$ ),

1302 b 17, γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων Π² (γίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων εἴωθε MªP¹ and possibly Γ),

1322 a 7, κοινωνείν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις  $\Pi^2$  (κοινωνείν ἀλλήλοις ἀδύνατον  $\Pi^1$ ).

3. In all the above passages the order of words adopted in  $\Pi^2$  is more broken and more emphatic than that adopted in  $\Pi^1$ , and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In 1302 b 5 all MSS. have τίνα  $\Pi^1$  have ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν θαλείην and  $\Pi^2$  καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην, where  $\Pi^1$  are evidently wrong.

the following passages also show a leaning on the part of  $\Pi^2$  to a more emphatic order (in the first five the adjective is placed before the substantive by  $\Pi^2$ ):—

1276 b 40, οὐκ ἃν εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ  $\Pi^2$  (ἀρετὴ μία  $\Pi^1$ ),

1280 a 15, φαῦλοι κριταὶ Π² (κριταὶ φαῦλοι Π¹),

1290 b 8, πλείονα μόρια Π² (μόρια πλείονα Π¹),

Ι 294 α 22, ἀρχαίος πλούτος καὶ ἀρετή  $\Pi^2$  (ἀρετή καὶ πλούτος ἀρχαίος  $\Pi^1$ ),

1320 a 22, δεί ποιείν όλίγας έκκλησίας  $\Pi^2$  (έκκλησίας όλίγας  $\Pi^1$ ),

1277  $\alpha$  14, φαμέν δή τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαίον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον  $\Pi^2$  (εἶναι ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον  $\Pi^1$ ),

[ 1329 b 2, τον τρόπον τοῦτον  $\Pi^2$  (τοῦτον τον τρόπον  $\Pi^1$ ),

 $\{$  1301 b 26, ἐν τ $\hat{y}$  πολιτεία ταύτη  $\Pi^2$  (ἐν ταύτη τ $\hat{y}$  πολιτεία  $\Pi^1$ ),

1330 b 27, τούτων ἀμφοτέρων Π² (ἀμφοτέρων τούτων Π¹),

1334 b 29, ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται  $\Pi^2$  (ὅπως τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνηται  $\Pi^1$ ),

1337 b 12, τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι Π² (παρασκευάζουσι τὸ σῶμα χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι Π¹).

Yet sometimes  $\Pi^1$  place words in the more emphatic order. Thus they have in

1259 b 30, δεί τὴν γυναίκα σώφρονα εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν  $(εἶναι σώφρονα Π^2),$ 

1265 b 15, ἀνίσους τοὺς κλήρους εἶχον  $M^s$   $P^1$ , ἀνίσους εἶχον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον  $\Pi^2$ ),

1280 b 30, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου (ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι  $\Pi^2$ ): cp. 1341 a 21 (οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλός  $\Gamma\Pi$ ) and 1286 a 15,

1281 a 27, φαῦλα πάντα (πάντα φαῦλα Π²),

Ι 282 a 40, τούτων πάντων (πάντων τούτων  $\Pi^2$ ),

1331 a 16, τὰ δὲ ζητεῖν δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν (τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν Π²),

1339 a 39, εὶ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖ διαπονεῖν αὐτούς (δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα  $\Pi^2$ ),

1300 b 27, ὅσα τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐπὶ καθόδωρ ἐπιφέρεται φόνου (τοῖς φεύγουσι φόνου  $\Pi^2$ ),

1307 b 11, ωστ' έξείναι συνεχως τοὺς αὐτοὺς στρατηγείν (τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχως  $\Pi^2$ ),

1322 a 31, εν μείζονι δε σχήματι (εν σχήματι δε μείζονι  $\Pi^2$ ).

4. In some passages the genitive is differently placed in  $\Pi^1$  and  $\Pi^2$ :—

1326 a 20, πόλεώς είσι μέρος  $\Pi^2$ , μέρος είσὶ πόλεως  $M^8$   $P^1$  and perhaps  $\Gamma$ ,

1340 a 1, τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις έστὶν Π<sup>2</sup> (ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς έστιν P<sup>1</sup>, έστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς Γ M<sup>8</sup>),

1311 b 18, χρώμενος αὐτοῦ τῆ ἡλικίᾳ  $\Pi^2$  (τῆ ἡλικίᾳ αὐτοῦ  $\Pi^1$ ), 1319 b 17, ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἴτιον γενέσθαι  $\Pi^2$  (αἴτιον τῆς στάσεως  $\Pi^1$ ).

In 1311 a 22, on the other hand,  $\Pi^2$  have τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν and  $M^8\,P^1$  and perhaps  $\Gamma$  τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας, and in 1291 a 33  $\Pi^2$  have ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μόριον τῆς πόλεως and  $M^8\,P^1$  and perhaps  $\Gamma$  ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τῆς πόλεως μόριον.

The variations classified in the foregoing pages amount to nearly half the entire number of variations in the order of words in  $\Pi^1$  and  $\Pi^2$ .

## APPENDIX D.

Reminiscences in the Politics of passages in the writings of Plato and other Greek authors and of dicta of notable men.

We are concerned in this Appendix not with explicit references, but with reminiscences, or apparent reminiscences, of a tacit kind. I have endeavoured to gather together in it those noticed in the commentary, or most of them, and a few which I have observed since I wrote it, beginning with reminiscences of Plato's writings or dicta. Many reminiscences have no doubt escaped me, but those which are here pointed out may serve in some degree to throw light on the direction and extent of Aristotle's reading in connexion with the Politics.

#### i. PLATO.

2.	108	1252 b	5 sqq.	Laws 805 D-E
	114, 117		16 sqq.	— 776 A, 680 A sqq.
	122	1253 a	8	Polit. 267 B sq., 276 A?
	162	1255 b	20 sq.	— 259 B
	177 sq.	1256 b	23 sqq.	Sophist 222 B-C, Laws 823 B
		1258 a	10 sqq.	Laws 962 A, Rep. 397 E
	224	1260 b	5 sq.	— 777 E (cp. 720 B sqq.).
	260	1264 a	25	Rep. 422 E
	268	1265 a	23	Laws 625 C sq.
	270	b	ı sqq.	— 928 E sq.
	271		7-10	Rep. 460 A

2.	315	1269 a 34 sqq.	Laws 776 C sqq.
	317	b 14 sqq.	— 781 A sq., 806 C
	322	1270 a 4 sqq.	— 780-1, esp. 780 B and 781 A
	337	b 34 sq.	Rep. 548 B
	358	1272 b 9 sqq.	Laws 712 E
3.	163	1277 a 26 sq.	Laws 643 E
	169	b 11 sqq.	— 762 E?
	172	24 sq.	Meno 71 E
		25 sqq.	Rep. 433 C
	189	1279 a 3 sq.	341 C-D
	196	b 17 sq.	— 550 С
	207	1280 b 20 sqq.	— 369 A sqq.
	212	1281 a 34 sqq.	Laws 713 E sqq.
	222	1282 a 15 sq.	— 701 A
	223	20 sqq.	Rep. 601 D, Cratyl. 390
		25 sqq.	Laws 945 B sqq.
	225 sq.	b 14 sqq.	— 756 E-758 A, esp. 757 C,
			Rep. 540 D sq.
	227	23 sqq.	Gorg. 490 B sqq.
	236	1283 a 40 sqq.	— 488 D
	238	b 23 sqq.	— 489 E sqq.
	240	1284 a 3 sqq.	Rep. 540 D
	285	1286 b 3 sqq.	— 445 D
	296 sq.	1287 a 38 sqq.	Polit. 298 A sq., 300 A
	303	1288 a 4 sq.	Plato ap. Diog. Laert. 3. 18?
	306	41 sqq.	Polit. 292 B, E, 259 B
	311	1323 a 36 sqq.	Apol. Socr. 29 D, E
	312	40 sqq.	— 30 A sq.
	318	b 29 sqq.	Rep. 435 B sq., 441 C sq.
	322	1324 a 27 sq.	Theaet. 175 D sq., Rep. 476 A sq.
	323	32 sqq.	Gorg. 500 C
	326	b 9 sqq.	Laws 637 D
	331	41 sqq.	— 704 C
	338	1325 b 21-23	Polit. 259 C, E
	341	40 sqq.	Laws 709 C sqq.
	346	1326 b 2 sq.	Rep. 369 D
	347	7 sqq.	Same passage
	348	14 sqq.	Laws 738 D sq., 751 D, 766 E
	350	26 sqq.	— 704 C, Critias 110 E
	351	30 sqq.	— 737 D, Critias 112 C
	358	1327 a 19 sqq.	— 705 A

3.	361	1327 a	37 sqq.	Laws 952 D sqq.
	368	1328 a	6 sq.	Rep. 375 B
			8 sqq.	— 375 D sqq.
	375	b	6 sqq.	— 369 C sq., Critias 110 C
	391	1330 a	14 sqq.	Laws 745 C
	394		26	— 777 C sq.
	395		31 sqq.	— 777 C sqq.
	406	b	32 sqq.	— 778 D
	419	1331 b	13 sqq.	— 848 C sqq., 760 B sqq.,
				762 B sq.
	420		20 sqq.	— 745 B
	422		26 sqq.	— 962 A sq.
			39 sq.	Meno 78 A
	425	1332 a	11 sqq.	Laws 728 C, 859 D-860 B
	431		40 sqq.	Plato ap. Plut. Marius, c. 46
	434	b	16 sqq.	Polit. 301 D sq.
	436		37 sq.	Laws 690 A, Rep. 412 C
	442	1333 a	35	— 628 D sq., 803 D
	454	1334 b	9 sq.	— 653 B, 659 D
	455		12 sqq.	Phaedr. 245 D
	456		22 sqq.	Rep. 441 A sq.
	457		27 sq.	— 591 C sq.
			29 sqq.	Laws 721 A
	477	1335 b	38 sqq.	— 784 E, 841 C sqq.
	480	1336 a	8 sqq.	Theaet. 153 A, B, Laws 789 E
	485		30 sqq.	Rep. 376 E sq.
	486		33 sq.	Laws 643 B sq.
	487		34 sqq.	— 791 E sqq.
	489		41 sqq.	<del>- 794</del>
	490	b	6 sqq.	— 729 B
•	495		33	Rep. 378 D sq.
	496		35 sqq.	— 466 E sq.
	499	1337 a	14 sqq.	— 544 D sq.
	501		23 sqq.	Laws 804 C-D, 810 A
	502		27 sqq.	— 923 A sq.
			29 sqq.	— 903 B, Charm. 156 E
	506	b	2 sq.	Laches 190 B sq.
	507		8 sqq. \	Ren and Dec
			22 sq. 5	Rep. 495 D sq.
	512		35 sq.	Laws 803 D sq.
	519	1338 b	6 sqq.	— 794 C

0		Oh		Dan D
5.	520	1338 p	-	Rep. 410 D
	529	1339 a		Laws 819 B, 820 D?
	534	b		— 658 E sq.
	536	1340 a		Rep. 401 D, Tim. 47 D
	538		18 sqq.	— 399 A sqq.
	542		42 sqq.	398 D sqq.
	550		10 sq.	Laws 812 D sq.?
	557	,	10 sqq.	Gorg. 501 B-502 A
	571	1342 b	17 sqq.	Laws 785 B, 670 D
4	139	1288 b	4.1	Rep. 501 A, 540 E sq.
	158		30 sqq.	Polit. 291 D
	181	1292 a	-	Rep. 557 C sqq., Laws 712 E
			18 sq.	Laws 712 D sqq.
	204		•	
	211	1295 0	4 sqq.	— 679 B sq., 728 D-729 A
	212		13 sqq.	— 728 D-729 A, 791 D
	213		21 sqq.	Menex. 238 E sq., Laws 756 E sq.,
		(-	0	712 E, Rep. 417 A-B
	217	1296 a	-	Laws 744 D
	258	1299 a	25 sqq.	Polit. 260 C sqq.
	260		38 sqq.	Rep. 370 C, 374 A sqq., Laws
	0.6			846 D sqq.
	286	1301 p		Laws 690 D
	290		26 sq.	— 757 A
			29	— 757 A sqq.
	291	1302 a		— 757 E
	309	1303 a	_	— 708 D
	322	b	28 sq.	— 792 C
	336	1304 b	22 sqq.	Rep. 565 A sqq.
	358	1306 a	19-31	— 551 D sq.
٠	371	1307 a	17 sq.	Gorg. 483 C
	376		40 sqq.	Phaedr. 262 A, Rep. 424 B-E
	379	b	30 sqq.	Rep. 424 B-E
	406	1309 b	18 sqq.	Laws 701 E, Rep. 562
			20 sqq.	Rep. 562 B
	409	1310 a	12 sqq.	— 552 E, Laws 793, 870 A
			34 sqq.	Laws 715 D
	415	b	12 sqq.	Rep. 568 E sq.
	438		26 sqq.	Symp. 208 C sq.
	442	-	19 sq.	Rep. 567 C sq.
	446		19 sqq.	Laws 690 D-E, 691 D sqq.
	447		25 sqq.	— 691 D sqq.
			0 11	

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4. 456
        1313 b 18 sqq.
                        Rep. 567 A
                        - 566 E
                28 sq.
  459
                         — 580 A
          1315 b 8 sqq.
  477
                         - 562 B sq.
          1317 a 41 sqq.
  494
                        Laws 663 E
          1318 b 1 sqq.
  507
                         — 695 A
  518
          1319 a 22 sqq.
                        Rep. 556 E
          1320 b 33 sqq.
  539
                        — 371 В
          1321 b 14 sqq.
  549
                        Crito 50 B
          1322 a 5 sqq.
  557
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# ii. ISOCRATES.

2.	122 sq.	1253 a 9 sqq.	Nicocl. § 5 sqq., De Antid. §§ 253-
	155	1255 a 14	Philip. § 15
		1256 b 23 sqq.	Panath. § 163
		1260 b 33 sqq.	De Antid. § 83
		1274 a 14 sq.	— § 316 sqq.
3.	190	1279 a 10 sqq.	Areop. § 24 sq.
	447	1333 b 38 sqq.	Panath. § 219 sq.
	448	1334 a 8 sqq.	De Pace § 96
4.	204	1294 b 18 sqq.	Areop. § 61, Nicocl. § 24
	334	1304 b 20 sqq.	De Pace §§ 108, 122 sq.
	340	1305 a 7 sqq.	- § 54 sq., Philip. § 140
	409	1310 a 12 sqq.	Areop. § 40 sqq.
	420	b 40 sqq.	Ad Nicocl. § 16
	454	1313 b 6 sqq.	Paneg. § 151
	460	29 sqq.	Hel. § 33, De Pace § 112
	468	1314 b 21 sq.	Ad Nicocl. §§ 11, 24
	477	1315 b 8 sqq.	Hel. § 34
	512	1319 a 2 sqq.	Ad Nicocl. § 16
	535	1320 a 39 sq.	Areop. § 32

## iii. XENOPHON.

2. 162, 164 1255 b 20 sqq., 33 Oecon. 13. 5, 21. 10

3. 172	1277 b 24 sq.	<b>—</b> 7. 25
210	1281 a 11 sqq.	Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq.
300	1287 b 26 sqq.	Cyrop. 8. 2. 10-12
344	1326 a 32 sqq.	<b>—</b> 8. 7. 22
365	1327 b 25 sqq.	— I. I. 4
414	1331 a 31 sqq.	— I. 2. 3 sq.

4.	198	1294 a 3 sq.	Oecon. 9. 14
	258	1299 a 25 sqq.	Mem. 3. 9. 11
	260	38 sqq.	Cyrop. 2. 1. 21
	446	1313 a 21 sqq.	Rep. Lac. 15. 8
	460	b 29 sqq.	Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, Hiero 3. 7 sqq.,
			1. 38
	472	1315 a 6 sqq.	Hiero 9. 3
	475	37 sq.	<b>—</b> 6. 5
	542	1321 a 19 sq.	Cyrop. 2. 1. 8?

### iv. HOMER.

The reminiscences of Homer noticed by me are more doubtful, but possible reminiscences of the Iliad are pointed out in 2. 257, 3. 214, 273, 295, 301, 343, 379, 436 (compare also 2. 5. 1263 a 11 sqq. with Il. 1. 165–168), and of the Odyssey in 2. 239, 3. 177.

v. Reminiscences of the writings of the following authors also seem to occur in the Politics:—

Aeschines 4. 198, 255? (see also 4. 214) Aeschylus 4. 460 Aristophanes 4. 179, 510? (see also 3. 214 sq.) Democritus 3. 489 Ephorus 2. 347-350, 4. 219 Eubulus, the comic poet, 4. 462 Euripides 2. 358?, 3. 459, 4. 211, 391, 460?, 461 Herodotus 3. 326, 4. 461 (see also 3. 150 sq., 4. 208) Hippias of Elis 4. 297 sq. Hippocrates 3. 401, 473, 483, 532 (compare also 1. 8. 1256 a 32 sqq. with Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. 1. p. 556 Kühn, foot) Melanippides 3. 556 Pratinas 3. 542 Solon 3. 169, 228, 350, 4. 139?, 290, 391, 408 Telestes 3. 556:

and reminiscences of sayings ascribed to

Alcibiades 2. 337
Anacharsis 3. 522
Epaminondas 3. 523
the Lacedaemonians 3. 525
Pelopidas 3. 423
the Pythagoreans 2. 142 sq.:

of other sayings 3. 556, 4. 321, 507: of proverbs 3. 238, 417, 461?, 598, 4. 226?, 290?

Reminiscences may also occur, though this is more doubtful, of the writings of

Anaxandrides 3. 201, 397
Antiphanes 2. 252
Archilochus 4. 465 (quoted 3. 368)
Eupolis 3. 429 sq.
Heraclitus 2. 153 (quoted 4. 474)
Lysias 3. 150, 4. 334
Phrynichus, the comic poet, 2. 120
Pindar 2. 131, 153, 157, 3. 399, 4. 182
Theognis 4. 226, 297, 321, 391
Thucydides 2. 308, 3. 525, 4. 294, 402, 416,

and of sayings ascribed to Aristides 4. 403, Aristippus, 2. 287, Socrates, 3. 217, 431, and Themistocles, 4. 403.

# ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOLS. I, II, AND III.

#### VOL. I.

- P. 15, line 14, for παμπολλοί read πάμπολλοι.
- P. 20, eleven lines from foot of page, for compounds formed read things constituted.
- P. 34, line 14. A. Schmekel (Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, p. 375) takes the reference in the words 'docti homines' (Cic. De Rep. 1. 24. 38) to be to Aristotle, while C. Hinze (Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, p. 50 sq.) takes it to be to Panaetius.
  - P. 148, line 9, for Hecuba read Helen.
- P. 236, lines 15-27. See as to the two arguments here summarized the explanatory notes on 3. 4. 1276 b 37 and 1277 a 5 (vol. iii. pp. 157-159).
  - P. 237, five lines from foot of page, for from read after, and dele first.
- P. 242, line I sq. As to this recapitulation, however, see note on 3.5. 1278 a 34 (vol. iii. p. 182).
- P. 243, line 8 sq. I have given a slightly different translation of this sentence in the explanatory note on 3. 6. 1278 b 8 (vol. iii. p. 184 sq.).
- P. 264, six lines from foot of page, 'his disciple Dicaearchus'. See however below on vol. ii. pp. xiii and xiv.
- P. 270, note 1. In the quotation from 3. 16. 1287 b 6 for ωστε read ωστ' εί (see critical note on 1287 b 6).
  - P. 272, line I, for compensation read return (see vol. iii. p. 282 sq.).
- P. 278, lines 17-20, add a reference to Diod. 16. 92. 5 and 95. 1, and Stob. Floril. 98. 70.
- P. 286, note. The term 'mortal god' is borrowed by Hobbes from Aristotle: see Cic. De Fin. 2. 13. 40, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et ad agendum esse natum quasi mortalem deum (Aristot. Fragm. 48. 1483 b 15: Rose<sup>2</sup>, Fragm. 61).
  - P. 290, line 14, for leadership read rule.
- P. 297, note 2. Mr. Shute's essay 'On the history of the process by which the Aristotelian writings arrived at their present form' (Clarendon Press, 1888) has been published since my first and second volumes appeared. See p. 164 sqq. of the essay.
  - P. 299, note I, first column, last line but two, for So read 81.
  - P. 324, note 1. See critical note on 1331 b 4 (vol. iii. p. 112).

- P. 325, in the quotation from Ion of Chios (Fragm. 63 Nauck), after εὖτ' add aν.
- P. 348, note I, lines I-2, read We find this many-sidedness and versatility more often realized, etc.
  - P. 363, lines 21-24. See however vol. iii. p. 540.
- P. 366, line I sqq. See as to the passage here summarized the critical note on 1341 b 19-26 (vol. iii. p. 126 sq.).
- P. 366, last line, for The melodies also read Just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies. (See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 15 in vol. iii. p. 566 sq.)
- P. 366, note 1, and p. 369, note. See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 17-34 (vol. iii. p. 571 sq.)
- P. 375, line 24, for thus composed read composed of owners of complete lots.
- P. 443, seven lines from foot of page, 'he abandons'. This is true, subject to what is said in p. 435, line 14 sqq.
- P. 445, last line but one. See the explanatory note on 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 (vol. iv. p. 249).
  - P. 456, note. Add Plato, Polit. 299 B sqq. to the passages referred to.
  - P. 470, lines 20-22. See the explanatory note on 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 38 sqq.
- P. 502, four lines from foot of page, 'the rich encroach', etc. See explanatory note on 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 11 for a closer rendering of this passage.
- P. 508, note 2. Perhaps it is better to read  $\hat{\eta}$   $\pi o \lambda \iota \tau \epsilon i \alpha$  in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 than  $\hat{\eta}$   $\pi o \lambda \iota \tau \epsilon i \alpha$ . See the critical note on 1298 b 8 and the explanatory note on 1298 b 5.
- P. 509, lines 14, 15. This will not be so if I am right in bracketing  $\hat{\eta}$   $\hat{\epsilon}\kappa$   $\tau\iota\nu\hat{\omega}\nu$  with Spengel in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 35.
- P. 513, fourteen lines from foot of page, 'from each tribe or section of the State'. Probably rather 'from the  $\gamma\nu\omega\rho\mu\rho$  and  $\delta\hat{\eta}\mu$ os': see the explanatory note on 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 21.
- P. 519, note, second column, line 4, add For other statements in this chapter inconsistent with statements made elsewhere in the Politics, see vol. iv. pp. 441, 485 sq.
- P. 541, last line but one, 'worth or' should perhaps be omitted: see the explanatory note on 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 34.
- P. 566, seven lines from foot of page, for nor again where a wealthy majority rules over a minority of poor read nor again an oligarchy where the rich rule, because they are in a majority, over a minority of poor. (See critical note on 1290 b 15 and explanatory note on 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 14.)
- P. 573, line 18. 'This agrees sufficiently well with the account of aristocracy in the passage before us'. I have changed my opinion as to this, and now distinguish the aristocracy of the Third Book from that of the Fourth (old Seventh): see above, p. xxxvi, and vol. iv. p. ix.
- P. 575, end of Appendix E, after Aristotle's? add It should not, however, escape notice that if this part of c. 10 (1329 a 40-b 35) is an interpolation, it is an interpolation of old date, for the author of the epitome of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics which is preserved in the Eclogae of Stobacus

(2. 6. 17) seems to have had it before him when he says of the distribution of functions in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book of the Politics between the young, the elders, and the old, ταύτην δ' ἀρχαίαν εἶναι πάνυ τὴν διάταξιν, Αἰγυπτίων πρώτων καταστησαμένων, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἦττον, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c: 10.

P. 577, line 2 sq. Should τοῦτο οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου be read?

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Pp. xii-xvi. So far as the question has been investigated at present, it seems likely that neither Polybius nor Cicero had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics, and that any resemblances traceable in their teaching to that of the Politics are due to their use of a work by an authority—probably Panaetius—who had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics. See A. Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, pp. 47-85 and 374-379, C. Hinze, Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, pp. 11-21 and 29-55, and Sus.<sup>4</sup>, vol. i, p. 660 sq.

P. xiii, last line but two, and p. xiv, note 3. See however as to Dicaearchus C. Hinze, op. cit. p. 23 sqq., where a different view is taken as to the probable subject of the Τριπολιτικόs of Dicaearchus.

P. xiv, note 1. See Mr. Shute's essay, p. 40 sq.

P. xvii, line 19, after the Politics add See also the explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 19 as to Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12.

P. xviii sq. For a fuller list of apparent reminiscences of passages in the Politics see the heading Politics of Aristotle in the General Index (vol. iv. p. 642).

P. xix, line 10, after this passage add See, however, the explanatory note on 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 38.

P. xix, line 20, after 1333 a 30 add (see also explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 38).

P. xx, four lines from foot of page. For the term πρῶτοι λόγοι cp. De Part. An. 4. 5. 682 a 2 sq. and Isocr. De Antid. § 71.

P. xxviii, line 8, after περί add τη̂s.

P. xxix, line 1, after 1338 a 32 sqq.: add 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 10 sq.:.

P. xxix, line 2, after 8 (6). 1. add 1316 b 36 sqq. and after 1316 b 39 sqq. add 1317 a 13 sqq.

P. xxxix, twelve lines from foot of page, for 'disjecta membra' read pieces.

P. xl, line 5, after the Seventh add In one MS. of Pliny's Natural History (the Pollingensis) 'the first eighteen Books are wrongly numbered' (Class. Rev. 7. 452).

P. xlviii, six lines from end of note 2, dele in 4 (7). 17—inducere).

P. li, note 4, line 3, dele 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15 and, and after 1260 a 24 (line 4) add 3. 5. 1278 a 40 and 3. 13. 1283 a 40.

P. lvi, line 21, after 1269 a 18 read M<sup>3</sup> P<sup>1</sup> add  $\tau$ is before  $\kappa i \nu \dot{\eta} \sigma as$ :  $\Pi^2$  are probably right in reading simply  $\kappa i \nu \dot{\eta} \sigma as$ , which was the reading of  $\Gamma$  also (see vol. iii. p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

P. lvii, dele lines 1-5 (see critical note on 1339 a 29).

P. 15, last line, for yap read yap.

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- P. 26, nine lines from foot of page. Should τοὺs be added before ἀμφοτέρους? See vol. iii. p. 315.
  - P. 28, line 9, for ήθεσι read έθεσι (see Class. Rev. 7. 307).
- P. 54, fourteen lines from foot of page, for γενέσθαι νομοθέτην read νομοθέτην γενέσθαι.
- P. 61, line 17, after Latin Translation add unless indeed, which is more probable, he copied the annotations from the MS. before him.
  - P. 76, eighteen lines from foot of page, read δρθοπραγείν.
- P. 76, last line but one, after τοὺς ἀπόρους) add In Demosth. Phil. 3. 54 Σ has λοιδορίας φόνου (l. φθόνου) σκώμματος where other MSS. have λοιδορίας  $\mathring{\eta}$  φθόνου  $\mathring{\eta}$  σκώμματος.
  - P. 78, eleven lines from foot of page, after 23. add 22.  $\epsilon \kappa$  om.  $\Pi^1$ .
  - P. 80, line 19, for  $\alpha\pi o\theta \epsilon \nu$  read  $\alpha\pi\omega\theta \epsilon \nu$ .
  - P. 80, three lines from foot of page, before Almost add See vol. iii. p. xvii.
- P. 81, twenty-one lines from foot of page, dele rightly—note). See above on p. 28.
- P. 82, line 19, end of note on 1264 a 8, add Sus. 3 a reads φρατρίαs, not φατρίαs.
- P. 84, twenty lines from foot of page, after rightly add but see explanatory note on 1283 b 4.
- P. 85, last line but two, after 35. add  $\hat{\epsilon}\kappa\lambda\iota\pi\hat{\epsilon}\hat{\iota}\nu$   $\Pi^2$ :  $\hat{\epsilon}\kappa\lambda\epsilon\hat{\iota}\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$   $M^s$   $P^t$ : we cannot tell from Vet. Int. derelinquere which reading he found in his text. See critical note on 1270 a 21.
  - P. 86, five lines from foot of page, after § 77 add (ed. 2, § 694 sqq.).
- P. 86, last line but one, before 12. add 6.  $\mathring{\eta}$  after  $\mathring{\epsilon}\pi\iota o\rho\kappa \epsilon \hat{\iota}\nu$  om.  $\Gamma M^s$ ,  $\mathring{\eta}$  τα $\hat{\iota}\tau a$  om. L<sup>s</sup> pr. P<sup>1</sup> (corrected in P<sup>1</sup> in paler ink than the MS.).  $\mathring{\epsilon}\tau \ell \theta \epsilon \iota$  δ $\mathring{\epsilon}$  νόμον  $\Pi^2$  Bekk.:  $\mathring{\epsilon}\tau\iota$  δ $\mathring{\epsilon}$  νόμον  $\mathring{\epsilon}\tau \ell \theta \epsilon \iota$   $\Pi^1$  Sus.
- P. 87, fourteen lines from foot of page, after render it add 23. γίνεσθαί Π<sup>2</sup> Bekk. Sus.: γενέσθαι M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. fieri).
- P. 87, four lines from foot of page, for (perhaps ... 1340 b 24) read (=  $\kappa i \nu \dot{\eta}$ - $\sigma as$ : see above, p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).
  - P. 87, last line, read in.
- P. 88, line 10, after Vet. Int. add 6.  $\pi\epsilon\rho\rho\alpha\iota\betao\hat{\imath}s$   $\Pi^2$  Bekk.:  $\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota\betao\hat{\imath}s$   $\Pi^1$  Sus.: see Class. Rev. 7. 307 sq.
- P. 92, line 22, after here add It is, however, so used in Eurip. Fragm. 795 Nauck (ed. 2).
- P. 101, line 5. Της τοιαύτης may possibly refer forward and mean της πολιτικής: see the explanatory note on 1337 b 6.
- P. 104, line 16. At the end of the note add For τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα cp. Plato, Laws 757 D, τὴν νῦν φυομένην κατοικίζειν πόλιν, and Aristot. Poet. 14. 1453 b 5, τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα.
- P. 106, last line, after here add As to διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν cp. c. 5. 1254 b 12 and Plut. Pelop. c. 24, ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ κυριώτατος νόμος τῷ σώζεσθαι δεομένῳ τὸν σώζειν δυνάμενον ἄρχοντα κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδίδωσι.
- P. 114, thirteen lines from foot of page, before Plato add Παιδάς τε καὶ παίδων παίδας may possibly be added because ὁμογάλακτες standing by itself might be taken to refer only to children, and not to grandchildren also.

P. 114, ten lines from foot of page. It is probably from Panaetius that Cicero derives the views expressed in De Offic. 1. 17. 54: see C. Hinze, Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, p. 50.

P. 115, thirteen lines from foot of page. The passage referred to as 7. 13. 11 is probably 6 (4). 13. 11. 1297 b 24 sqq.

P. 118, line 14, end of note, add Cp. also Xenophanes, Fragm. 5, 6 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 101 sq.).

P. 118, seventeen lines from foot of page, add In illustration of ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν cp. Strabo, p. 336 sub fin.—337.

P. 123, five lines from foot of page, add 12. μέχρι γὰρ τούτου κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. Περὶ μακροβιότητος 6. 467 a 20 and [Plato,] Epinomis 978 C.

P. 128, twenty-one lines from foot of page, after 29. add For  $\mathring{\eta}$  θηρίον  $\mathring{\eta}$  θεός cp. Plut. Publicola, c. 6, οὐδέτερον δὲ μικρὸν οὐδ' ἀνθρώπινον, ἀλλ'  $\mathring{\eta}$  θείον  $\mathring{\eta}$  θηριῶδες. See also Plut. Aristid. c. 6 sub fin. and De Profect. in Virt. c. 1 sub fin.

P. 131, ten lines from foot of page, for The ellipse—πᾶσα μεταλλευτική read Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ἕτερον (sc. δικαστήριον) ὅσα εἶs τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, where περὶ ταῦτα must apparently be supplied before ὅσα.

P. 133, seventeen lines from foot of page, after χρησιν add and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 16.

P. 138, twelve lines from foot of page. Prof. Bywater points out (Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Band ii. p. 504), no doubt rightly, that the article is used before 'H $\phi a (\sigma \tau o v)$  because the Hephaestus of Homer's Iliad (18. 376) is referred to. It should be noticed, however, that in the Politics the article is almost always prefixed to the names of gods and goddesses. The phrase  $v \dot{\eta} \Delta i a$  is the only exception I remember.

P. 147, line 17, after cp. add Plato, Polit. 289 B, τὰ δὲ περὶ ζώων κτῆσιν τῶν ἡμέρων, πλὴν δούλων κ.τ.λ.

P. 159, twelve lines from foot of page, add 37 sq. See explanatory note on 1275 b 21, and cp. Diod. 17. 77. 3 and Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6 (vol. iii. p. 605 Kühn), δύο δὲ μεγάλων μεγάλα καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα γίνεται.

P. 164, line 15, end of note, add Cp. Soph. Philoct. 138 sqq. and Manil. Astron. 5. 739 sqq. (where atque omnia iusta priorum should perhaps be read).

P. 169, three lines from foot of page, before Their add and Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, c. 18 Kuehlewein (vol. i. p. 556 Kühn), μένουσι δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον χρόνον, ὅσον αν ἀποχρῆ αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κτήνεσιν ὁ χόρτος ὁκόταν δὲ μηκέτι, ἐς ἑτέρην χώρην ἔρχονται.

P. 171, line 5, before Giph. add Vet. Int. 'quicunque quidem sponte natam habent elaborationem':

P. 171, line 9, after betreiben' add J. C. Wilson, 'the industries of which spring up of themselves', a rendering which resembles that of Vet. Int.

P. 171, line 11, for vita read ἐργασία.

P. 171, line 22, end of note, after c. 12 add I am not disposed to be dogmatic in support of Victorius' interpretation of the rare word αὐτόφυτος in the passage before us, but I still incline to think that it is right. See for J. C. Wilson's view Class. Rev. 10 (1896), p. 187 and Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 11. 260 sq. The meaning of αὐτόφυτος may be studied in Pindar, Pyth. 3. 47, where

it seems to mean 'self-engendered' ('self-caused', as Liddell and Scott, not 'sponte natus', as Boeckh): cp. Polyb. 11. 25. 2 Hultsch, τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων γινόμενα φύματα καὶ νόσους. Its meaning is still clearer in Dio Cass. 44. 37. 2. Here αὐτόφυτος is contrasted with ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου and explained by ἐκ παρασκευῆς συγγενοῦς, and it seems to mean 'self-bred', 'self-engendered', i.e. engendered by the stock of which the person comes ('bon chien chasse de race'). 'Ετερόφυτον δένδρον is 'a grafted tree', i.e. a tree not self-engendered (Theophrast. ap. Julian, Epist. 24, referred to by Liddell and Scott). Cp. also the use of αὐτοφυής in Plato, Laws 794 A, where it is explained by ἃς ἐπειδὰν ξυνέλθωσιν αὐτοὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρίσκουσι. If αὐτόφυτος in the passage before us meant 'springing up of itself', we should expect that exchange (ἀλλαγή), if not carried too far, would be described by Aristotle as αὐτόφυτος, for he says in 1. 9. 1257 a 18 sq. that exchange not carried beyond a certain point is necessary. Yet he nowhere describes the necessary kind of exchange as αὐτόφυτος.

- P. 172, after line 13, add of μεν νομαδικόν αμα και ληστρικόν. That these lives were often conjoined we see from Strabo, p. 511.
- P. 172, nine lines from foot of page, after 1216 a 7 add Cp. also [Plato,] Axiochus 366 D, οὐ κατὰ μὲν τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν τὸ νήπιον κλαίει;
- P. 172, next line, add 10. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 237 E, and [Demosth.] Or. Fun. c. 5, πάντα γὰρ τὰ τίκτοντα ἄμα καὶ τροφὴν τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως φέρει.
- P. 179, sixteen lines from foot of page, after συνέστηκεν dele and in . . . 1253 b 3).
- P. 181, line 10, after 3. add έστι δ' ούτε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hist. An. 1. 13. 493 a 33, οἱ δ' ὄρχεις ούτε ταὐτὸ σαρκὶ οὕτε πόρρω σαρκός, and 2. 12. 504 b 11 sq.
- P. 187, end of note on τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων, add For the account of χρηματιστική here given cp. Plato, Gorg. 452 C, where the χρηματιστής claims to be πλούτου δημιουργός.
- P. 188, line 12, before Eryxias add the saying of Solon to Croesus reported in Diod. 9. 27. 2, of Plato, Rep. 521 A and Laws 742 E, and of.
- P. 193, line 8, add 12. ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Laws 962 A.
- P. 203, lines 3-5. I prefer to the interpretation of this passage given here that given by Sus., and independently with greater fullness and clearness by J. C. Wilson in Class. Rev. 10 (1896), p. 184 sqq. and Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 11. 246 sqq. and 12. 50 sqq. The latter explains ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς by ὅσα μέρη χρηματιστικῆς χρηματίζεται ἀπὸ γῆς, comparing Oecon. 1. 1343 a 26, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργικὴ προτέρα καὶ δεύτεραι ὅσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἶον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη τοιαύτη, and translates the whole passage 'all the forms of acquisition (or all the industries) which make their profit from minerals and from things growing from the earth which, though not edible (or fruits), are still useful.' One difficulty in connexion with this rendering should be noticed. In the short phrase ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων the words ἀπὸ γῆς οccur twice, and one would expect them to be used in the same sense in both places, but in the first place we have to translate them 'from minerals' (i.e. from rock, metal, soil, sand, etc.) and in the second 'from the earth' (i.e. from soil, but not from rock, metal, or sand). We need not make too much of this difficulty,

but it seems to me to exist. It appears also to be implied, which we hardly expect, that agriculture où  $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau i(\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \dot{\alpha}\pi\dot{\alpha}\ \gamma\hat{\eta}s$ , though it obviously derives food from that source (Oecon. 1. 1343 a 30 sqq.: cp. Plut. Numa, c. 16, where  $\gamma\epsilon\omega\rho\gamma\dot{\alpha}$  is described as  $\dot{\alpha}\dot{\alpha}\dot{\alpha}\dot{\gamma}\dot{\eta}s$   $\dot{\beta}ios$ ), but this is implied in Oecon. 1. 1343 a 26 sqq. also, so that this passage is open to the same objection.

P. 203, line 5, after 1256 b 26 add and cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, έτερον (sc. δικαστήριον) ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, where we have to supply περὶ ταῦτα or something equivalent before ὅσα.

P. 203, last line but one. I have here taken  $\lambda\omega\beta\hat{\omega}\nu\tau\alpha i$  in  $\tau\hat{\alpha}$   $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\omega\beta\hat{\omega}\nu\tau\alpha i$  as passive and  $\tau\hat{\alpha}$   $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$  as the nom. to it, but it is more likely that  $\lambda\omega\beta\hat{\omega}\nu\tau\alpha i$  is middle, and that the words should be construed, 'men injure their bodies'.

P. 206, lines 10-12, dele ἀλλὰ μὴν-1339 a 29.

P. 209, twenty-two lines from foot of page, after τον ολκονόμον add Cp. (with J. C. Wilson) Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 593, Anm. 1.

P. 210, lines 16-20. Perhaps it is better (with Sepulveda) to supply τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ with συνέστηκε than to take συνέστηκε as impersonal, as I have here done.

P. 213, line 17, after quoted add Cp. also 6 (4). I. 1289 a 3, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1169 b 10, εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, and see explanatory note on Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 11.

P. 217, line 11, after Cp. add Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 4. 3. p. 722. 12 Bekker,  $\tau \partial \nu$  λόγον  $\tau \hat{\eta}$ s ἀπάντων συστάσεως, οἶον εὐθέως τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ τ $\hat{\eta}$ s ψυχ $\hat{\eta}$ s, and.

P. 219, fourteen lines from foot of page, after ἀρχιτέκτονας add and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 12, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὖ καὶ τὸ ὅργανον ῷ χρῆται πρὸς τὸ ἔργον.

P. 223, line 13, after with him add Cp. Athen. Deipn. 262 b, ταύτας γὰρ (sc. τὰς λιχνείας) ὑπερορῶσιν (οἱ δοῦλοι) οὐ μόνον διὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ διδασκαλίαν, οὐ τὴν ἐν Δουλοδιδασκάλφ Φερεκράτους, ἀλλὰ ἐθισθέντες.

P. 223, fourteen lines from foot of page, after  $\pi\epsilon i\theta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  add and Xen. De Re Equestri 8. 13. I incline now to follow Stahr, not Bonitz, in his interpretation of  $\lambda\delta\gamma\sigma$  in this passage.

P. 238, lines 3-5. Prof. Robinson Ellis adds other Greek examples to those given by me—Xen. Oecon. 6. 14, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὸ σεμνὸν ὅνομα τοῦτο τὸ καλός

τε κάγαθός, and 6. 15, προσέκειτο τὸ καλὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ—and supplies me with closer Latin parallels—Ovid, Met. 15. 96,

At vetus illa aetas cui fecimus Aurea nomen,

and Plin. Epist. 3. 2, cum dico princeps ('where J. E. B. Mayor has a learned note'). See Prof. Ellis' commentary on Catull. lxxxvi. 3 (ed. 2).

P. 239, ten lines from foot of page, for is probably read may be.

P. 239, seven lines from foot of page, after p. 79) add But Hecataeus and others had written γη̂ς περίοδοι (Bywater).

P. 242, eighteen lines from foot of page, after είs dele 3. 4 . . . ταὐτά, and.

P. 243, eight lines from foot of page, add 26. eis τους φύλακας and 27. eis εκείνους. 'We often find eis used of movement to persons, for instance in De Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 20 and Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 26, 27' (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 33).

P. 248, lines 16-20, for but ἤθεσι... χρωμένων read probably rightly: see my remarks on the passage in Class. Rev. 7. 307.

P. 254, line 16. I do not feel sure that Sus. intended to render καί by 'gerade', and I doubt whether it can bear this meaning here. Perhaps καί means simply 'also', and the sense is 'since we see that those also quarrel who own property in common, as well as owners of several property, and indeed that the former quarrel more than the latter', etc.

P. 254, line 25, after p. 54. 2 add See as to these cases of undivided property Dio Chrys. Or. 38, 2. 151 R. Cp. Lucan, De Bell. Civ. 1. 84,

Tu causa malorum

Facta tribus dominis communis, Roma.

P. 255, line 18, after 36. add  $\pi\lambda\hat{\eta}\theta$ os  $\delta\nu$ , not  $o\vartheta\sigma\alpha\nu$ , though  $\tau\hat{\eta}\nu$   $\pi\delta\lambda\nu$  is to be supplied: cp. Plato, Cratyl. 418 E and Stallbaum's note, and see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Gerth, § 369. 3.

P. 256, nine lines from foot of page, add τοῖς δ' οὐ χρῶνται γινώσκοντες. Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 145, πολλὰ γιγνώσκοντες ὀρθῶς ὑμεῖς οὐ διὰ τέλους αὐτοῖς χρῆσθε.

P. 267, twenty lines from foot of page, end of note on 1265 a 12, add This was proverbial: cp. Demosth. Prooem. 42, p. 1450, ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἰδία ράδιόν ἐστιν ἄπαντ' ὀρθῶς πράττειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ κοινῆ.

P. 267, line 26. I have here taken  $\tau \delta \nu \hat{\nu} \nu \epsilon i \rho \eta \mu \dot{\epsilon} \nu \sigma \nu \pi \lambda \hat{\eta} \theta \sigma s$  as an 'anticipatory accusative', but it may be, as Prof. R. Ellis points out, the direct subject of  $\lambda \alpha \nu \theta \dot{\alpha} \nu \epsilon \nu$ .

P. 269, twenty-three lines from foot of page, after using property add Cp. also Cic. De Offic. 1. 27. 96, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.

P. 269, fourteen lines from foot of page, after μετριότης add See Class. Rev. 7. 309.

P. 270, line 20, after § 41. 4 add (ed. 2. § 216).

P. 271, line 4, after 1335 b 22 sq. add Τέκνα must be supplied with πλείονα from τεκνοποίαν (see Bon. Ind. 239 a 39 sqq.).

P. 275, last line but four, and p. 277, line 9, 'checked by an approach to the principle of the lot'. See below on p. 335, last line.

P. 283, twenty lines from foot of page, after given add (see explanatory note on 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 31).

P. 293, line 5, after name add See Sandys' note on 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 28, l. 20,  $\tau \dot{\eta} \nu$  διωβελίαν.

P. 293, line 13, after κ.τ.λ. add and Demosth. Prooem. 5. p. 1422, ή μεν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δοκιμάζειν ὀρθῶς ἄπαντ' ἐστὶ μηδεν οἴεσθαι πρότερον γιγνώσκειν πρὶν μαθεῖν, and Prooem. 18. p. 1430.

P. 298, line 10, after 1326 a 32) add Hippodamus' wish to be learned about Nature as a whole reminds us of the similar teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Plato, Phaedrus 270 C. See also Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 7. 1102 a 19.

P. 304, line 7, after κοινωνείν add See, however, vol. iii. p. xvii.

P. 307, last line, after είη add Or perhaps admirers of Lacedaemonian customs: cp. [Plato,] Hippias Maior 284 B, οὐ γὰρ πάτριον, ὧ Σώκρατες, Λακεδαιμονίοις κινεῖν τοὺς νόμους. See R. Hirzel, Ἄγραφος νόμος, p. 72. 2.

P. 308, line 20, after e.g. dele in 3.9... σχεδον γάρ, and.

P. 309, line 26. Μαρτύρων τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν is probably intended to be emphasized by hyperbaton, the words ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον being interposed after μαρτύρων: see vol. iii. Appendix B.

P. 314, line 5 sqq. It is likely that the Polities were written, not before, as I have implied here, but after, the Politics.

P. 316, nineteen lines from foot of page, after την γην add 40. For the change of construction in τὰs γειτνιώσας πόλεις... μηδεμίαν cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15 sqq., where see note.

P. 318, line 8. Prof. R. Ellis much prefers Victorius' way of taking the passage, 'We ought to think that a city approximates to a division into equal halves as divided into men and women'.

P. 319, line 2, after Σαυρομάται add Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 460), ταις δε γυναιξί (Σαυρομάται) πάντα πείθονται ώς δεσποίναις, Strabo, p. 165, as to the Cantabri, and Plut. Cato Censor, c. 8, as to the Romans.

P. 323, line 5 sq. See above on p. 314, line 5 sqq.

P. 334, line 10, for According to Plutarch read We read of Agesilaus in Plut. Ages. c. 4, δσάκις δὲ τύχοι καθήμενος ἐν τῷ βασιλικῷ θώκῳ καὶ χρηματίζων, ἐπιοῦσι τοῖς ἐφόροις ὑπεξανίστατο.

P. 334, line 25, after 1266 b 23 add Contrast the view of Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 29, ή γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων κατάστασις οὐκ ἄνεσις ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐπίτασις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ δοκοῦσα πρὸς τοῦ δήμου γεγονέναι σφοδροτέραν ἐποίησε τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν.

P. 335, last line. It has been pointed out by Mr. J. Solomon (*Class. Rev.* 3. 295: see Susemihl, Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, 1891, Bericht über Aristoteles, etc., für 1887–1890, p. 124) that this expression of Plato refers not to the ephorate, as Stallbaum and others have thought, but to the kingship.

P. 338, line 3, before For add Mimnermus had said of old age (Fragm. 5 Bergk),

βλάπτει δ' ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ νόον ἀμφιχυθέν.

Cp. Herondas 1. 67 sq. and Hdt. 3. 134.

P. 339, note on 1271 a 14. I am inclined still to read τούτφ, but to interpret it in a slightly different way from that in which I have interpreted it in

this note. Is not τούτω = τω φιλοτίμους κατασκευάζειν τοὺς πολίτας? Cp. Demosth. Prooem. 4. p. 1421, οὕτ' εἴωθα μακρολογεῖν οὕτ' αν . . . νῦν ἐχρησάμην τούτω, and Plut. De Virtute Morali, c. 12, ταῦτα δ' ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συνιδόντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ζῆλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

P. 350, fourteen lines from foot of page, add 38. τὰs δ' ικίσεν. 'Ceos is called by Bacchylides (2. 8) Εὐξαντὶς νᾶσος, a title hitherto unknown, but evidently implying a claim to have been colonized by the son of Minos' (Kenyon, Poems of Bacchylides, p. xxvii).

P. 355, twelve lines from foot of page, after ἔνδεια add Hippocr. De Morbis 4 (vol. ii. p. 335 Kühn), εἰ ἄνθρωπος ὀλίγα ἐσθίει καὶ ὀλίγα πίνει, οὐδεμίαν τούτω νοῦσον ἐπάγει.

P. 358, line 4, for of read ascribed to.

P. 359, line 19, after στάσιν) add Cp. also Plut. Cato Minor, c. 45, where Cato says of Pompey, αὐτὸς δὲ τῆ πόλει παρακάθηται στάσεις ἀγωνοθετῶν ἐν ταῖς παραγγελίαις καὶ θορύβους μηχανώμενος, ἐξ ὧν οὐ λέληθε δι' ἀναρχίας μοναρχίαν ἑαντῷ μνηστενόμενος, and Justin 16. 4. 6.

P. 361, four lines from foot of page, dele c. 12. 1274 a 2.

P. 362, five lines from foot of page, dele the parenthesis, 'cp. . . . changes', and see critical note on 1299 b 27.

P. 366, nineteen lines from foot of page, for all magistracies read all magistracies empowered to try cases.

P. 371, note on 1273 b 19. I incline now to adopt the reading τŵ πλουτίζειν.

P. 373, fifteen lines from foot of page, for as he found them read in existence.

P. 374, nineteen lines from foot of page, note on 1274 a 2. Τὸν δῆμον καταστῆσαι probably means not 'set up the demos', as I have interpreted it in this note, but 'set up the democracy' (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22, οἱ τὸν δῆμον καθιστάντες).

P. 375, line 10. As to the meaning of the expression τὰ Μηδικά, see vol. iii. P. 554.

P. 376, line 18, for The fact . . . 1537 a 20 sqq.) read See 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 7, l. 9 sqq.

P. 379, line 4, after latter add and which represented the Chalcidian Charondas as a disciple of Zaleucus, the lawgiver of the Italian Locri, a not too friendly rival of the Chalcidic colonies of Italy and Sicily.

P. 384, line 3, after 155 E add 'In inscriptions of the Attic period there is no trace of an exception to this rule' (Prof. Bywater, Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 2. 504). See on this subject Sus. 4, vol. i, p. 682.

P. 384, thirteen lines from foot of page, add 23. ἐγένετο δὲ κ.τ.λ. We notice that one and the same lawgiver gave laws to all the Thraceward Chalcidians—an early indication of the tendency to unity which they afterwards displayed in grouping themselves round Olynthus—and that this lawgiver was a citizen of Rhegium, itself a colony of Chalcis.

## VOL. III.

P. xix, end of note, add and in 1312 a 11, 18 all the MSS. have  $\tau o is$   $\mu o \nu \dot{a} \rho \chi o is$ . In 1295 a 13 also M<sup>8</sup> P<sup>1</sup> have  $\mu \dot{b} \nu a \rho \chi o i$  with  $\Pi^2$ .

P. 11, line 1, colon in place of full stop.

- P. 11, line 17, colon in place of full stop.
- P. 21, line 9, for τοῦτ read τοῦτ'.
- P. 37, line 13, dele comma.
- P. 89, line I, for ac si read ac si utique.
- P. 91, line 4, after ὑπερέχοντας add See on the subject of this note vol. iii. Appendix C.
  - P. 93, last line, for have read sometimes show. See vol. iii. Appendix C.
  - P. 100, last line, for έχθοοιs read έχθροιs.
- P. 101, fourteen lines from foot of page, after Musurus add See critical note on 1311 a 36-39.
- P. 104, line 17, after δύο? add Yet compare 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 37, where we have  $\lambda \dot{\epsilon} \gamma o \nu \sigma \iota \delta \dot{\epsilon} \tau \dot{\epsilon} \tau \tau a \rho a s$ , not  $\tau \dot{a} s \tau \dot{\epsilon} \tau \tau \tau a \rho a s$ .
- P. 105, eleven lines from foot of page, after in place of it add (with Madvig, Adversaria Critica, 1. 468 sq.).
- P. 117, line 5, after ἐπιχωριάζεται add In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 34, however, Vet. Int. renders ἐπεχωρίασεν by devenit, if the text is correct.
  - P. 126, line 20, for έλλανοκράτας read έλλανοκράτεις (see vol. iv. p. 431).
  - P. 126, line 21, after -as add and -eis.
  - P. 144, seven lines from foot of page, read κτίσαντες.
- P. 156, three lines from foot of page. This is one of several passages in which it is doubtful which word in the sentence is the subject and which the predicate. Among these passages are the following—3. 6. 1278 b 11, 3. 7. 1279 a 26 sq., 3. 13. 1283 b 42 sqq. I have followed most of the translators and commentators in the view I have taken on this question in my notes on these passages, but there is much to be said for the opposite view, and I do not feel sure that I am right. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρ-χειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολίται δὲ οὖτοι, the word πολίται seems to be the predicate (see also 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 5 sq.); yet in 3. I. 1275 a 22 sq., where τὸν ἁπλῶς πολίτην is taken up in πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ., πολίτης is clearly the subject of the sentence (see also 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sq.).
- P. 186, line 4, Sus. supplies πολιτείαις, not πόλεσι, with ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς, perhaps rightly (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sq.).
  - P. 189, fifteen lines from foot of page, dele comma.
  - P. 191, line 4, after Hdt. 1. 97. 2 add and Plato, Rep. 347 A-D.
- P. 191, three lines from foot of page, after conduct add (This remark is borrowed from Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 19, 'Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects', etc.).
- P. 196, seven lines from foot of page, after preferred add The next  $\hat{a}\pi\rho\rho\hat{a}$  is whether the version of justice put forward by the partisans of oligarchy and democracy is satisfactory. This  $\hat{a}\pi\rho\rho\hat{a}$  is discussed in c. 9.
- P. 199, line 12, after προστιθέναι add For άφαιροῦσι cp. Περί άναπνοῆς 2. 471 a 6, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφαιροῦσι.
  - P. 204, line 18, for Cf. read Cp.
  - P. 206, seventeen lines from foot of page, dele Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36.
  - P. 210, line 6, after force add comma.

P. 212, twelve lines from foot of page, before 40. add 39. περί μèν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἔτερος λόγος. Cp. Περί μακροβιότητος 2. 465 a 19, περί μèν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερος λόγος.

P. 220, line 10, after the true one add A distinction is, in fact, drawn in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 sqq. between αἰρετοί and κληρωτοί ἐκ προκρίτων.

P. 238, line 15, after πέτεσθαι add Cp. Aristoph. Eq. 384 sq.

P. 258, eight lines from foot of page, add In Nymphis, Fragm. 15 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 15) we read Παυσανίας . . . τὰ τῆς Σπάρτης ἐξελθὼν νόμιμα.

P. 260, eleven lines from foot of page, after Kingship? add It would seem from Diod. 15. 60. 5 that the office of the ταγόs might be so classed.

P. 264, eight lines from foot of page, see above on p. 260.

P. 267, seventeen lines from foot of page, for Ἐπιμένης read Ἐπιμένης.

P. 272, line 19, after 31 sqq. add In this passage Aristotle is speaking of Kingship in both  $\pi\delta\lambda\epsilon\iota s$  and  $\epsilon\theta\nu\eta$  (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 35), whereas in the passage before us he seems to refer only to Kingships in  $\pi\delta\lambda\epsilon\iota s$  (cp. 1285 b 13,  $\tau\lambda$   $\kappa\alpha\tau\lambda$   $\pi\delta\lambda\iota\nu$ , and 16,  $\epsilon\nu$   $\tau\alpha\hat{\imath}s$   $\delta\lambda\lambda\alpha\iota s$   $\pi\delta\lambda\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu$ , and also c. 15. 1286 b 7–10).

P. 272, six lines from foot of page, for τόν read τὸν.

P. 288 (and p. 418), page-heading, after NOTES add full stop.

P. 301, eleven lines from foot of page, after rule) add and Polyb. 6. 2. 14 Hultsch.

P. 308, line 2, for υπαρχόντων read ὑπαρχόντων.

P. 312, line 1, for  $\pi \epsilon \rho \iota$  read  $\pi \epsilon \rho \iota$ .

P. 317, twelve lines from foot of page, after Protag. 323 D sq. add and Seneca, Epist. 123, nemo est casu bonus.

P. 318, line 11, before latter add the.

P. 342, line 6. Perhaps it is more likely that Megalopolis was founded in B.C. 370 than in B.C. 369. See Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 319, note 5 (Part 2, c. 78), and Frazer, Pausanias 4. 307.

P. 345, line 8, end of note, add Cp. also Plin. Epist. 1. 20. 5.

P. 362, eighteen lines from foot of page, for θομοειδείς read θυμοειδείς.

P. 363, twenty-two lines from foot of page, after τούτων add and Περὶ αἰσθή-σεως 2. 439 a 5, ἔστω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διωρισμένα.

P. 370, five lines from foot of page, after military duties add and provides in the Laws (see vol. i. p. 446) that the Nomophylakes are not to remain in office after they have attained seventy years of age.

P. 385, line 5, for διεξελθών read διεξελθών.

P. 386, seven lines from foot of page, after other laws also add For των ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινές cp. Plut. Solon, c. 12, τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Μεγακλέους.

P. 387, three lines from foot of page, 'all other'. It is possible that  $\tau \lambda \tilde{a} \lambda \lambda a$  means here 'other things than  $\tau \hat{a} \pi \epsilon \rho \hat{\iota} \tau \hat{d} s \pi o \lambda \iota \tau \epsilon \hat{\iota} a s$  (30)', and not, as I have taken these words to mean, 'other things than syssitia and the division into classes'.

P. 414, line 17, after Greece add But Aristotle's main object is to place the gymnasium of the elders in the immediate neighbourhood, and under the eye, of the chief magistrates. It must, therefore, be situated, like the agora, under the hill on which the chief magistrates dwell.

P. 418, eighteen lines from foot of page, after contracts add at any rate those which were made in the agora.

P. 428, line 3, after θάνατον add For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 b 35 sqq.

P. 428, line 18, after 116 b 8 sqq. add and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 3 sq.

P. 433, thirteen lines from foot of page, for ἀκούοντεν read ἀκούοντες.

P. 434, line 4, for βελτιστε read βέλτιστε.

P. 475, line II, after I. 254) add In Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως I. 467 b II, ἄμα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀναπνοῆς ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν ζώων (cp. Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς I. 470 b 9 sqq.) διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ μὴ ζῆν, and 21. 480 b I2, 19 sq., Aristotle seems to make some concessions to this view.

P. 483, ten lines from foot of page, after life add Cp. also Περὶ ὕπνου 3. 457 a 3 sqq.

P. 487, nineteen lines from foot of page. My rendering of γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is that of the translators generally, but it would be possible to translate the words, 'for in a way exercise results to the bodies [of the children]'. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 3, γίγνεται κατάλυσις, and 7 (5). II. 1314 a 30, γίγνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι.

P. 491, nine lines from foot of page, before Compare add and Frazer, Pausanias 2. 492.

P. 497, twenty lines from foot of page. We need not perhaps interpret  $\delta i \eta \rho \hat{\eta} \sigma \theta a i$  so strictly as to infer from it, as I have done here, that Aristotle intended the education of his future citizens to be carried on beyond twenty-one, though it is on other grounds not improbable that he did so.

P. 500, line 12, for čiký read čiký.

P. 500, line 20, after 1366 a 36 sqq. add and see explanatory note on 1258 a 10.

P. 505, line I, for εμάνθανον read εμάνθανον.

P. 507, line 2, after 1319 b 19 sqq. add Cp. also Thuc. 8. 89. 3 (τῷ τοιούτῳ . . . ἐν ϣπερ).

P. 507, twelve lines from foot of page, after μάθησιν add comma.

P. 509, fourteen lines from foot of page, after himself add (cp. Athen. Deipn. 18 a sq.).

P. 509, last line but one, for av read av.

P. 524, line 2, after c. 34. l. 4 add and c. 48. l. 16, ται̂s ἀ[γορ]αι̂s.

P. 524, line 7, for μη read μη.

P. 525, nine lines from foot of page, after fifteen add As to light and heavy gymnastic exercises see Frazer, Pausanias 4. 103.

P. 535, line 4, after 503 a 23 sqq. add Περὶ ὕπνου 1. 454 a 26, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλη τὸν χρόνον ῷ δύναται χρόνω τι ποιεῖν.

P. 545, seventeen lines from foot of page, for Muller read Müller.


P. 548, three lines from foot of page, dele the first comma.


P. 557, line II, for  $\tau\eta$  read  $\tau\hat{\eta}$ .

P. 559, four lines from foot of page, add As to rhythm and melody see Abert, Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik, pp. 53-56.

P. 575, nineteen lines from foot of page, read 5%.

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